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The	  thesis	  analyses	  the	  emergence	  of	  biocultural	  rights	  as	  a	  sub-­‐set	  of	  third	  generation,	  
group	   rights	   in	   environmental	   law.	   It	   submits	   that	   these	   rights,	   which	   advocate	   a	  
people’s	   duty	   of	   stewardship	   over	   Nature,	   have	   arisen	   as	   a	   response	   to	   the	   world’s	  
ecological	   crisis.	   Indeed,	   the	   growing	   discourse	   about	   biocultural	   rights	   has	   begun	   a	  
radical	  reconfiguration	  of	  the	  dominant	  notions	  property	  and	  the	  juridical	  subject.	  
	  
The	   thesis	   uses	   a	   multipronged	   approach,	   relying	   upon	   economic,	  
anthropological,	   political	   and	   legal	   theories,	   to	   deconstruct	   the	   current	   concepts	   of	  
private	   property	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	   traditional	  
communities.	  It	  further	  presents	  evidence	  that	  this	  discursive	  shift	  is	  gaining	  formal	  legal	  
recognition	   by	   referring	   to	   negotiations	   of	   multilateral	   environmental	   agreements,	  
judicial	  decisions	  of	  regional	  and	  domestic	  courts	  and	  community	  initiatives.	  The	  thesis	  
concludes	   with	   a	   description	   of	   the	   new	   biocultural	   jurisprudence	   including	   its	  
application	   through	   innovative,	   community-­‐developed	   instruments	   such	   as	   biocultural	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CHAPTER	  I	  –	  SELF-­‐DETERMINATION	  AS	  POLITICAL	  ECOLOGY:	  THE	  ROOTS	  
OF	  BIOCULTURAL	  RIGHTS	  	  
Environmental	  law	  is	  at	  a	  political	  crossroads.	  It	  presents	  an	  optical	  illusion	  that	  on	  the	  
face	  of	  it	  seems	  like	  a	  clear-­‐eyed	  response	  by	  governments	  to	  stem	  the	  ecological	  crisis	  
that	  confronts	  the	  planet.	  But	  beneath	  the	  surface	  a	  furious	  battle	  is	  being	  fought.	  The	  
terrain	  of	  this	  battle	  is	  law	  itself	  and	  the	  battle	  is	  around	  the	  nature	  of	  solutions	  to	  solve	  
environmental	  problems.	  The	  kind	  of	  solutions	  that	  could	  be	  implemented	  through	  law	  
are	  either	  technocratic	  in	  nature	  or	  those	  that	  engender	  local	  self-­‐determination.	  Herein	  
lies	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  conflict	  that	  is	  also	  a	  fault	  line	  within	  the	  environmental	  movement	  
itself.	  
	   	  
This	  work	  will	  examine	   the	  emergence	  of	  biocultural	   rights	  as	  an	  aspect	  of	   the	  
third	   generation	   group	   rights	   -­‐	   an	   aspect	   that	   seeks	   to	   resolve	   our	   current	  
environmental	   predicament	   through	   affirming	   the	   stewardship	   role	   of	   indigenous	  
peoples,	  tribal	  and	  other	  traditional	  communities1	   over	  their	  lands	  and	  waters.	  In	  doing	  
so	  the	  current	  chapter	  will	  trace	  the	  origins	  of	  biocultural	  rights	  to	  the	  convergence	  of	  
three	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  social	  movements	  of	  our	  times,	  all	  of	  which	  have	  a	  direct	  
bearing	   on	   the	   fate	   of	   our	   planet	   -­‐	   the	   post-­‐development	  movement,2	   the	   commons	  
movement3	   and	   the	   movement	   for	   the	   rights	   of	   indigenous,	   tribal	   and	   traditional	  
communities.4	   	  
	  
It	   is	   important	   to	   bear	   in	   mind	   that	   aim	   here	   is	   to	   map	   the	   trajectory	   of	  
biocultural	   rights	   as	   they	   emerge	   through	   multilateral	   environmental	   agreements,	  
domestic	   legislation,	   case	   law,	   shifts	   in	   development	   discourse	   and	   the	   struggles	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   When	  the	  term	  ‘community’	  is	  used	  in	  this	  work,	  it	  should	  be	  taken	  to	  include	  indigenous,	  tribal	  and	  
traditional	  communities	  whose	  ways	  of	  life	  are	  predominantly	  land	  based	  and	  who	  have	  strong	  cultural	  
and	  spiritual	  bonds	  with	  their	  traditional	  lands	  and	  waters.	  
2	   See	  generally,	  infra	  n.13.	  
3	   See	  generally,	  infra	  n.26.	  












communities.	  Because	  biocultural	  rights	  are	  at	  an	  incipient	  stage,	  the	  examples	  that	  are	  
provided	   here	   in	   support	   of	   biocultural	   rights	   should	   not	   be	   viewed	   as	   unequivocal	  
evidence	  that	  there	  are	  no	  cases	  to	  the	  contrary.	  Rather	  they	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  efforts	  
to	   trace	   a	   preponderant	   tendency	   in	   environmental	   jurisprudence	   towards	   the	  
affirmation	  of	  biocultural	   rights.	   It	   is	  only	  a	  matter	  of	   time	  before	   the	   long	  arc	  of	   this	  
preponderant	   tendency	   bends	   undeniably	   towards	   biocultural	   rights.	   The	   rich	   and	  
varied	  evidence	  presented	  in	  following	  chapters	  is	  testimony	  to	  this	  assertion.	   	  
	  
The	   chapters	   following	   the	   current	   one	   will	   make	   a	   clear	   case	   for	   biocultural	  
rights	   by	   critically	   analysing	   the	   contemporary	   dominance	   of	   private	   property	   over	  
common	  property	  discourses	  and	  the	  hegemony	  of	  market	  values	  over	  all	  other	  social	  
values.	  The	  case	  for	  biocultural	  rights	  will	  be	  supported	  by	  theories	  of	  political	  economy	  
from	  Karl	  Marx	  to	  Karl	  Polanyi	  to	  theories	  of	  property	  from	  C	  B	  Macpherson	  to	  Margaret	  
Jane	  Radin.	  Emerging	  biocultural	  rights	  jurisprudence	  in	  international	  and	  domestic	  law	  
will	  also	  be	  mapped	  by:	   	  
	  
a) Tracing	   the	   rights	   gains	   of	   communities	   in	   recent	   multilateral	  
environmental	   agreements	   like	   the	   Nagoya	   Protocol	   on	   Access	   and	  
Benefit	  Sharing;	   	  
b) Examining	  the	  decisions	  of	  regional	  tribunals	  such	  as	  the	   Inter-­‐American	  
Court	   of	   Human	   Rights	   and	   the	   African	   Commission	   for	   Human	   and	  
Peoples	   rights,	   and	   domestic	   courts	   like	   the	   High	   Court	   of	   Australia,	  
Supreme	  Court	   of	   Canada	   and	   the	  Constitutional	   Court	   of	   South	  Africa;	  
and	   	  
c) Exploring	  the	  widespread	  development	  and	  use	  of	  biocultural	  community	  
protocols	   by	   communities	   across	   the	   world	   to	   assert	   their	   biocultural	  













It	   is	   useful	   to	   note	   that	   the	   evidence	   presented	   here	   of	   a	   jurisprudential	  
tendency	   in	   favour	  of	  biocultural	   rights	   is	  not	   restricted	   to	  any	  one	  particular	   country	  
but	  is	  of	  a	  widespread	  nature.	   	  
	  
(a)	  Political	  Ecology:	  Local	  Affirmation	  versus	  Techno-­‐Bureaucracy	  
	  
Technocratic	   solutions	  are	  generally	  based	  on	  scientific	   reports	  about	   the	  ecosystem’s	  
carrying	  capacity	  and	  pollution	  thresholds.	  They	  are	  also	  supported	  by	  economic	  studies	  
around	  ensuring	  that	  industrialization	  keeps	  step	  with	  the	  regenerative	  capacity	  of	  the	  
ecosystem.	  They	  recognize	  the	  need	  to	  prevent	  the	  abuse	  of	  natural	  resources	  and	  seek	  
to	   put	   forward	   expert	   solutions	   for	   the	   rational	  management	   of	   air,	   water	   and	   land.	  
They	   also	   propose	   policies	   for	   reducing	   waste	   and	   for	   recycling,	   along	   with	   the	  
development	  of	  environment	  friendly	  technologies.5	   	  
	  
States	  implement	  technocratic	  solutions	  developed	  by	  experts	  through	  a	  variety	  
of	  carrots	  and	  sticks	  such	  as	  taxes,	  subsidies	  and	  penalties.	  The	  enforceability	  of	  these	  
technocratic	  solutions	  ultimately	  depends	  on	  a	  class	  of	  experts	  and	  bureaucrats	  who	  are	  
tasked	   with	   the	   role	   of	   rationally	   managing	   the	   environment	   in	   the	   interests	   of	  
humanity.6	   The	  demarcation	  and	  management	  of	  protected	  areas	  to	  conserve	  forests	  is	  
an	  example	  of	   the	  exercise	  of	   techno-­‐bureaucratic	  power	   through	  environmental	   law.	  
Often	  however	  this	  power	  involves	  a	  usurping	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  authority	  of	  local	  
communities	   by	   a	   professional	   class	   of	   experts.	   The	   case	   of	   the	   Raika	   pastoralists	   of	  
Rajasthan	  and	   the	  denial	  of	   their	  historical	  monsoon	  grazing	   rights	   in	   the	  Kumbalgarh	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	   	   See	  generally,	  Segal,	  Howard	  P.,	  Technological	  Utopianism	  in	  American	  Culture,	  New	  York:	  Syracuse	  
University	  Press,	  2005.	  
6	   	   Gorz,	  Andre,	  “Political	  Ecology:	  Between	  Expertocracy	  and	  Self-­‐Limitation”,	  Ecologica,	  Calcutta:	  Seagull	  












sanctuary	  by	  a	  2003	  decision	  by	   the	   Indian	  Central	   Empowered	  Committee	   is	   such	  an	  
example.7	  
	  
Indigenous	  peoples	  and	  community	  organizations	  fighting	  for	  the	  recognition	  of	  
customary	   land	   rights,	   however,	   insist	   that	   communities	   who	   have	   historically	  
conserved	  ecosystems	  (and	  are	  most	  affected	  by	  any	  adverse	  environmental	  impact)	  are	  
best	   suited	   to	   make	   decisions	   about	   these	   ecosystems.	   These	   groups	   argue	   that	   the	  
current	   ecological	   crisis	   is	   an	   outcome	   of	   an	   expertocracy	   imposing	   non-­‐consultative	  
top-­‐down	   solutions	   resulting	   in	   the	   delegitimization	   of	   local	   knowledge	   and	   decision-­‐
making.	  Many	  of	   them	  rely	  on	  growing	  evidence	  of	  community	  conservation	  practices	  
that	  have	  sustained	  ecosystems	  for	  generations.	  Much	  of	  this	  evidence	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  
later	   has	   come	   to	   fore	   over	   the	   last	   two	   decades,	   and	   in	   some	   cases	   contradicts	   the	  
established	   ‘truths’	   of	   communities	   being	   in	   direct	   conflict	   with	   conservation	  
objectives.8	  
	  
The	   top-­‐down	   solutions	   posed	   by	   experts	   for	   environmental	   conservation	   are	  
what	  Andre	  Gorz	   terms	   ‘locking	   technologies’.	  He	  distinguishes	  between	   ‘locking’	   and	  
‘open’	  technologies’.9	   Open	  technologies	  facilitate	  communication,	  local	  autonomy	  and	  
sharing,	  and	  rely	  on	  the	  personal	  and	  creative	  energies	  of	  its	  recipients	  thereby	  making	  
them	  both	  users	  and	  creators.	   Locking	   technologies	  on	   the	  other	  hand	  are	   those	   that	  
come	  pre-­‐set	  and	  work	  on	  a	  principle	  of	  command	  and	  control.	  Their	  development	  and	  
deployment	  is	  centralized,	  and	  it	  provides	  its	  recipients	  little	  or	  no	  freedom	  to	  adapt	  it	  
to	  their	  local	  needs	  and	  context.	   	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	   	   Kohler-­‐Rollefson,	  Ilse	  “Biocultural	  Community	  Protocols:	  A	  Tool	  for	  Pastoralists	  to	  Secure	  Customary	  
Rights	  to	  the	  Commons”,	  FES,	  Common	  Voices,	  Issue	  2,	  2010,	  pp.	  16-­‐18.	  
8	   	   See	  generally,	  Bio-­‐cultural	  diversity	  conserved	  by	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  local	  communities-­‐	  examples	  
and	  analysis,	  Companion	  document	  to	  the	  IUCN/CEESP	  Briefing	  Note	  No.10,	  Tehran:	  CENESTA,	  2010.	  












Community	   activism	   around	   environmental	   issues	   represents	   a	   break	   in	   the	  
environmental	  movement	  from	  a	  techno-­‐bureaucratic	  approach	  to	  ecology	  to	  a	  political	  
ecology.	  The	  proponents	  of	  the	  latter	  trace	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  environmental	  movement	  
to	   a	   time	   before	   the	   current	   crisis	   when	   it	   manifested	   as	   a	   protest	   against	   the	  
usurpation	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  communities	  to	  their	  lands	  and	  waters	  by	  the	  administrative	  
and	  economic	  apparatus	  of	  colonial	  and	  settler	  states.10	  
	  
The	  Nature	   that	   these	   communities	   sought	   to	  protect	   is	  not	   the	  Nature	  of	   the	  
technocrats	  and	  bureaucrats,	  nor	  is	  it	  the	  ‘unspoilt	  wilderness’	  of	  the	  naturalists.	  Rather	  
it	   was	   a	   Nature	   that	   was	   so	   integrally	   intertwined	   with	   commu ity	   life	   that	   it	  
represented	   an	   entire	  way	   of	   being	   and	   knowing.11	   The	   defence	   of	   Nature	   for	   these	  
communities	   represented	   a	   defence	   of	   a	   ‘cosmovision.’12	   Nature	   for	   them	   was	   not	  
something	   ‘out	   there’	   that	   needed	   to	   be	   protected	   by	   scientists	   and	   administrators	  
through	  ‘command	  and	  cope’	  mechanisms	  but	  the	  very	  notions	  of	  self	  and	  community	  
were	  constructed	  through	  an	  intimate	  and	  historical	  interaction	  with	  the	  ecosystem.	   	  
	  
It	  is	  against	  this	  backdrop	  of	  political	  ecology	  that	  we	  shall	  highlight	  three	  social	  
movements	   that	   have	   contributed	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   biocultural	   rights:	   the	   post-­‐
development	  movement;	  the	  commons	  movement	  and;	  the	  movement	  for	  the	  rights	  of	  
indigenous	  people.	  
	   	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	   Supra	  n.	  6,	  at	  50.	  
11	   Supra	  n.	  8.	   	  
12	   ‘[T]he	  term	  cosmovision	  has	  to	  do	  with	  basic	  forms	  of	  seeing,	  feeling	  and	  perceiving	  the	  world.	  It	  is	  
made	  manifest	  by	  the	  forms	  in	  which	  a	  people	  acts	  and	  expresses	  itself.	  This	  means	  that	  a	  cosmovision	  
does	  not	  necessarily	  correspond	  to	  an	  ordered	  and	  unique	  discourse	  (cosmology)	  through	  which	  it	  can	  
be	  described/explained	  and	  understood.	  In	  some	  cases	  the	  only	  way	  to	  understand	  a	  cosmovision	  is	  
through	  living	  it-­‐	  by	  sharing	  experiences	  with	  people	  who	  sustain	  that	  mode	  of	  living	  and	  that	  life-­‐
world.’	  See	  Ishizawa,	  Jorge,	  “Affirmation	  of	  Cultural	  Diversity-­‐	  Learning	  with	  Communities	  in	  the	  












(b)	  Post-­‐development:	  Developing	  a	  People	  Centred	  Ecology	  
	  
The	  post	   -­‐development13	   movement	  traces	   its	  origins	  to	  thinkers	  and	  activists	  ranging	  
from	  E.F	  Schumacher14	   and	  Ivan	  Illich15	   to	  Arturo	  Escobar	  and	  Gustavo	  Esteva.16	   In	  his	  
seminal	  work	  Encountering	  Development:	   The	  Making	   and	   the	  Unmaking	   of	   the	   Third	  
World,	  Escobar	  best	  sums	  the	  post-­‐development	  turn	  when	  he	  says:	  
	  
Development	   was	   -­‐	   and	   continues	   to	   be	   for	   the	   most	   part	   -­‐	   a	   top	   down,	  
ethnocentric	   and	   technocratic	   approach,	  which	   treated	  people	   and	   cultures	   as	  
abstract	  concepts,	  statistical	   figures	  to	  be	  moved	  up	  and	  down	   in	  the	  charts	  of	  
‘progress’.	  Development	  was	  conceived	  not	  as	  a	  cultural	  process	  (culture	  was	  a	  
residual	  variable,	  to	  disappear	  with	  the	  advance	  of	  modernization)	  but	  instead	  as	  
a	  system	  of	  more	  or	  less	  universally	  applicable	  technical	  interventions	  intended	  
to	   deliver	   some	   ‘badly	   needed’	   goods	   to	   a	   ‘target’	   population.	   It	   comes	   as	   no	  
surprise	   that	   development	   became	   a	   force	   so	   destructive	   to	   the	   Third	   World	  
cultures,	  ironically	  in	  the	  name	  of	  people’s	  interests.17	  
	  
The	   post-­‐development	   scholars	   presented	   a	   foundational	   critique	   of	   the	   large	  
development	   projects	   of	   the	   seventies	   and	   eighties	   as	   contributing	   to	   destabilizing	  
communities,	   creating	   poverty	   and	   destroying	   the	   environment.18	   In	   the	   eighties	   and	  
nineties,	   with	   the	   looming	   ecological	   crisis,	   post-­‐development	   activists	   began	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	   	   Post-­‐development	  theories	  gained	  momentum	  in	  the	  1990s	  as	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  ecological	  and	  social	  
fallouts	  of	  dominant	  development	  paradigms	  that	  ranged	  from	  neo-­‐liberalism	  to	  the	  Green	  
Revolution.	  Post-­‐development	  theorists	  critiqued	  these	  development	  paradigms	  as	  top	  down,	  techno-­‐
bureaucratic	  solutions	  bound	  to	  fail	  due	  to	  their	  inability	  to	  genuinely	  engage	  with	  community	  needs	  
and	  experiences.	  
14	   	   Schumacher,	  E.F.,	  Small	  is	  Beautiful:	  Economics	  as	  if	  People	  Mattered,	  London:	  Blond	  and	  Briggs,	  
1973.	  
15	   	   Illich,	  Ivan,	  Tools	  of	  Conviviality,	  London	  Boyars,	  1973;	  Illich	  argued	  that	  politics	  is	  no	  longer	  about	  
choosing	  between	  Left	  and	  Right.	  The	  real	  choice	  is	  between	  ‘vernacular	  values’	  and	  ‘industrial	  values’	  
or	  between	  ‘conviviality’	  and	  ‘technofascism’.	   	   	  
16	   Esteva,	  Gustavo	  and	  Madhu	  Suri,	  Grassroots	  Postmodernism:	  Remaking	  the	  Soil	  of	  Cultures,	  London:	  
Zed	  Books,	  1998.	   	  
17	   Escobar,	  Arturo,	  Encountering	  Development:	  The	  Making	  and	  Unmaking	  of	  the	  Third	  World,	  Princeton:	  
Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1997.	  
18	   See	  generally,	  Sachs,	  Wolfgang,	  Ed.,	  The	  Development	  Dictionary,	  New	  York:	  Zed	  Books,	  2010	  and	  












highlight	   local	   community	   conservation	   systems	  and	   the	   importance	  of	   affirming	   such	  
systems.19	   The	  work	  of	  organisations	  such	  as	  the	  PRATEC	  (Andean	  Project	   for	  Peasant	  
Technologies) 20 	   and	   COMPAS-­‐ED	   (Comparing	   and	   Supporting	   Endogenous	  
Development)21	   epitomized	  the	  best	  of	  post-­‐development	  thinking	  in	  practice.	   	  
	  
PRATEC	  based	  in	  the	  central	  Andes	  (covering	  parts	  of	  Peru,	  Bolivia	  and	  Ecuador)	  
has	   worked	   extensively	   on	   cultural	   affirmation	   through	   the	   valorisation	   of	   traditional	  
agricultural	  practices.	  As	  Jorge	  Ishizawa	  from	  PRATEC	  points	  out:	  
	  
In	   our	   understanding,	   cultural	   affirmation	   is	   the	   process	   by	  which	   people	  who	  
live	   in	   a	   place	   remember	   and	   regenerate	   their	   traditional	   practices,	   nurturing	  
their	  pacha	   (local	  world)	  and	   letting	   themselves	  be	  nurtured	  by	   it.	  Since	   in	   the	  
case	  of	  the	  central	  Andes,	  this	  local	  world	  is	  agrocentric,	  nurturance	  is	  the	  mode	  
of	   being	   in	   the	   Andean	   pacha.	   Andean	   cultural	   affirmation	   is	   the	   continuous	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	   One	  of	  the	  most	  famous	  examples	  of	  this	  is	  the	  work	  of	  Vandana	  Shiva	  that	  critiqued	  the	  cultural	  and	  
ecological	  devastation	  caused	  by	  the	  Green	  Revolution	  in	  India,	  stressing	  the	  importance	  of	  affirming	  
traditional	  agricultural	  practices,	  and	  recognizing	  their	  ability	  to	  adequately	  respond	  to	  increased	  
demand	  for	  food.	  Shiva,	  Vandana,	  Monocultures	  of	  the	  Mind,	  Penang:	  Third	  World	  Network,	  1993.	  
20	   ‘The	  “Andean	  Project	  for	  Peasant	  Technologies”	  (Proyecto	  Andino	  para	  las	  Tecnologías	  Campesinas,	  
PRATEC)	  is	  a	  Peruvian	  NGO	  founded	  in	  1988	  and	  devoted	  to	  the	  recovery	  and	  valorization	  of	  
traditional	  agricultural	  practices	  and	  associated	  knowledge.	  PRATEC	  participates	  in	  the	  efforts	  of	  
Andean	  Amazonian	  peasant	  communities	  to	  counter	  the	  socially	  and	  ecologically	  destructive	  effects	  of	  
industrial	  agriculture	  and	  governmental	  agrarian	  policies.	  By	  using	  local	  knowledge	  and	  the	  practice	  of	  
traditional	  “ritual	  agriculture”	  and	  through	  adopting	  a	  non-­‐dualistic,	  eco-­‐centric	  worldview,	  PRATEC	  
supports	  the	  resurgence	  of	  local	  approaches	  to	  agriculture,	  which	  it	  sees	  as	  radically	  opposed	  to	  
Western	  industrial	  agriculture.	  The	  Andean	  peasant	  practice	  of	  ritual	  agriculture	  embraces	  kinship-­‐
oriented	  visions	  of	  the	  land	  and	  encourages	  empathetic	  actions	  that	  illustrate	  respect	  for	  all	  living	  
entities	  of	  the	  biosphere.’	  Agricultural	  activities	  include	  ritual	  actions,	  utterances,	  and	  offerings	  that	  
express	  both	  a	  deep	  respect	  for	  Pachamama	  (Mother	  Earth)	  and	  communitarian	  aspects	  that	  
characterize	  the	  worldview	  of	  the	  Andean	  people.	  
http://www.terralingua.org/bcdconservation/?p=244.	  Retrieved	  14th	  March	  2012.	  
21	   The	  COMPAS	  network	  supports	  field	  programmes	  of	  Community	  Based	  Organisations	  (CBOs)	  and	  Non-­‐
Governmental	  Organisations	  (NGOs)	  to	  develop,	  test	  and	  improve	  the	  endogenous	  development	  
approach	  in	  dialogue	  with	  modern	  western-­‐based	  science.	  COMPAS	  systematises	  the	  experiences	  in	  
such	  a	  way	  that	  other	  NGOs	  and	  government	  agencies	  can	  make	  use	  of	  the	  endogenous	  development	  
approach.	  COMPAS	  facilitates	  intercultural	  dialogues	  amongst	  CBOs,	  NGOs,	  universities	  and	  research	  
centres	  across	  countries	  and	  continents	  to	  enable	  systematisation	  beyond	  the	  national	  level.	  
According	  to	  COMPAS,	  endogenous	  development	  revitalises	  ancestral	  and	  local	  knowledge	  and	  
integrates	  external	  knowledge	  and	  resources	  that	  fit	  the	  local	  context.	  It	  leads	  to	  increased	  bio-­‐
cultural	  diversity,	  reduced	  environmental	  degradation,	  and	  a	  self-­‐sustaining	  local	  and	  regional	  












affirmation	   of	   this	   mode	   of	   being….Cultural	   affirmation,	   then,	   is	   not	   an	  
intellectual	   matter.	   For	   the	   people	   of	   the	   central	   Andes,	   it	   is	   the	   sustained	  
regeneration	  of	  biocultural	  diversity	  through	  the	  activities	  of	  mutual	  nurturance	  
undertaken	  by	  the	  campesinos	  and	  the	  entities	  that	  make	  up	  their	  pacha.22	  
	  
A	  statement	  by	  Julia	  Pacoricona	  Aliaga	  from	  Conima	  in	  Peru	  best	  exemplifies	  the	  
kind	  of	  culture	  that	  PARTEC	  seeks	  to	  affirm:	   	  
	  
The	   potato	   is	   our	   mother	   because	   when	   it	   produces	   fruits	   it	   is	   feeding	   us,	  
clothing	  us	  and	  giving	  us	  happiness,	  but	  we	  also	  nurture	  her.	  When	   the	  plants	  
are	  small,	  we	  call	   them	  wawas	   (children)	  because	  we	  have	   to	   look	  after	   them,	  
delouse	  (weed)	  them,	  clothe	  (hill)	  them,	  dance	  and	  feast	  them.	  This	  has	  always	  
been	  done.	  My	  parents	  taught	  me	  to	  nurture	  them	  with	  affection	  and	  good	  will	  
as	  we	  do	  with	  our	  children.23	  
	  
Over	  the	  last	  16	  years	  COMPAS-­‐ED	  has	  worked	  on	  endogenous	  development	  in	  a	  
sustained	   manner	   with	   partner	   organizations	   in	   Asia,	   Latin	   America	   and	   Africa.	  
Endogenous	   development	   encapsulates	   the	   essence	   of	   post-­‐development	   thinking	   by	  
basing	   itself	   on	   local	   peoples'	   own	   criteria	   of	   development,	   taking	   into	   account	   the	  
material,	   social	   and	   spiritual	   wellbeing	   of	   people.	   In	   an	   effort	   to	   avoid	   techno-­‐
bureaucratic	  top	  down	  solutions,	  COMPAS-­‐ED	  seeks	  to	  make	  local	  peoples'	  worldviews	  
and	  livelihood	  strategies	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  development.	  The	  work	  of	  its	  partners	  in	  
Guatemala,	   India	   and	   Ghana 24 is	   evidence	   that	   these	   worldviews	   and	   livelihood	  
strategies	  promote	  sustainable	  development	  as	  a	  balance	  between	  material,	  social	  and	  
spiritual	  wellbeing.25	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	   Supra	  n.	  12,	  at	  111.	  
23	   Ibid,	  quote	  from	  Terre	  des	  homes-­‐Germany,	  Children	  and	  Biodiversity	  in	  the	  Andes,	  Lima,	  2001,	  p.23.	   	  
24	   Community	  well-­‐being	  and	  biocultural	  diversity	  through	  endogenous	  development,	  COMPAS	  network:	  
outcomes,	  impact	  and	  new	  initiatives,	  by	  request	  www.compasnet.org.	  Retrieved	  13th	  September	  
2011.	  












Post-­‐development	  as	  a	  discipline	   that	   valorised	   community	  ecological	  practices	  
arose	   as	   a	   result	   of	   political	   ecology’s	   critique	   of	   techno-­‐bureaucratic	   solutions	   to	  
development	  and	  conservation.	   In	   this	   sense	   it	  broke	   from	  sections	  of	   the	  established	  
environmental	   thinking	   by	   insisting	   on	   an	   integral	   link	   between	   environmental	  
conservation	  and	  community	  rights	  to	  manage	  their	  lands	  and	  waters.	   	  
	  
(c)	  (Un)	  Common	  Wisdom	  of	  the	  Commoners	  
	  
The	   post-­‐development	   movement	   found	   a	   natural	   ally	   in	   the	   movement	   for	   the	  
commons.	   The	   latter	   had,	   through	   empirical	   data,	   begun	   to	   turn	   the	   ‘tragedy	   of	   the	  
commons’	   argument	   on	   its	   head.26	   The	   theory	   of	   the	   ‘tragedy	   of	   the	   commons’	   was	  
based	  on	  an	  assumption	  that,	  where	  consequences	  regarding	  commonly	  held	  resources	  
are	   borne	   by	   the	   community	   as	   a	   whole,	   individuals	   would	   seek	   to	   maximize	   self-­‐
interest	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   the	   community	   and	   sustainability	   of	   the	   resource.	  
Therefore,	  the	  ‘tragedy	  of	  the	  commons’	  is	  an	  argument	  that	  long-­‐term	  sustainability	  of	  
common-­‐pool	   resources	   is	   best	   ensured	   when	   such	   resources	   are	   privatized	   or	   state	  
controlled.27	   	  
	  
Extensive	   research	   on	   governance	   of	   the	   commons	   by	   political	   scientists	   and	  
economists	  such	  as	  Elinor	  Ostrom28	   and	  Arun	  Agarwal29	   unequivocally	  established	  that	  
state	   control	   or	   privatization	   of	   common	   pool	   resources	   are	   not	   necessarily	   the	   best	  
solutions	  to	  ensure	  conservation,	  and	  in	  many	  cases	  are	  counter-­‐productive.	  Contrary	  to	  
the	   ‘tragedy	  of	   the	  commons’	  assertion	  of	   the	  destruction	  of	   common	  pool	   resources	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	   Tierny	  John,	  “The	  Non-­‐Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons,”	  The	  New	  York	  Times,	  October	  15,	  2009,	  
http://tierneylab.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/15/the-­‐non-­‐tragedy-­‐of-­‐the-­‐commons/.	  Retrieved	  14th	  
March	  2012.	  
27	   Hardin,	  Garrett,	  “The	  Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons,”	  Science,	  1968,	  pp.	  1243–1248.	  
28	   Ostrom,	  Elinor,	  Governing	  the	  Commons:	  The	  Evolution	  of	  Institutions	  for	  Collective	  Action,	  New	  York:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1990.	  
29	   Chhatre,	  Ashwini	  and	  Arun	  Agrawal,	  “Forest	  Commons	  and	  Local	  Enforcement,”	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  












due	   to	   mismanagement	   by	   communities	   and	   the	   free-­‐rider	   problem,30	   researchers	  
working	  on	  the	  commons	  established	  that	  under	  certain	  conditions31	   communities	  are	  
best	  able	  to	  conserve	  ecosystems.	   	  
	  
Recent	  research	  evaluating	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  protected	  areas	  under	  different	  
kinds	   of	   management	   regimes	   traced	   forest	   change	   in	   three	   diverse	   landscapes:	   the	  
Chitwan	  District	  of	  Nepal,	  the	  Mahananda	  Wildlife	  Sanctuary	  in	  West	  Bengal,	  India	  and	  
the	   Tadoba-­‐Andhari	   Tiger	   Reserve	   in	   Maharashtra,	   India.	   The	   research	   found	   that	   a	  
protectionist	  approach	  that	  excludes	  local	  communities	  is	  likely	  to	  fail	  without	  expensive	  
government	   inputs.	   Conservation	   is	   also	   likely	   to	   fail	   in	   cases	   where	   outsiders	   or	  
dominant	   insiders	   impose	   rules	   on	   the	   community	   for	   use	   of	   resources.	  However	   the	  
research	   also	   proved	   that	   effective	   management	   of	   forest	   resources	   occurs	   when	  
community	  members	  are	  genuinely	  involved	  in	  decision-­‐making	  and	  in	  developing	  rules	  
for	  the	  use	  of	  these	  resources.32	  
	  
The	   intersection	   of	   the	   post-­‐development	   with	   the	   commons	   movement,	   the	  
latter	   empirically	   validating	   the	   postulates	   of	   post-­‐development	   theorists,	   further	  
highlighted	  the	  role	  that	  communities	  played	  in	  conservation	  of	  ecosystems.	  This	  was	  a	  
politically	  significant	  marriage	  of	  strengths,	  and	  represented	  a	  new	  certainty	  that	  could	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	   The	  problem	  of	  the	  ‘free-­‐rider’	  in	  economic	  theory	  arises	  when	  individuals	  who	  do	  not	  contribute	  to	  its	  
maintenance	  consume	  public	  goods/resources	  thereby	  free	  riding	  on	  the	  contributions	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  
the	  community	  for	  the	  upkeep	  of	  the	  goods/resources.	  See	  also	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy,	  
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-­‐rider/.	  Retrieved	  13th	  September	  2011.	  
31	   These	  conditions	  are	  what	  Ostrom	  terms	  as	  the	  eight	  design	  principles	  for	  effective	  common	  pool	  
resource	  management.	  They	  are:	  1)	  Define	  clear	  group	  boundaries;	  2)	  Match	  rules	  governing	  use	  of	  
common	  goods	  to	  local	  needs	  and	  conditions;	  3)	  Ensure	  that	  those	  affected	  by	  the	  rules	  can	  
participate	  in	  modifying	  the	  rules;	  4)	  Make	  sure	  the	  rulemaking	  rights	  of	  community	  members	  are	  
respected	  by	  outside	  authorities;	  5)	  Develop	  a	  system,	  carried	  out	  by	  community	  members,	  for	  
monitoring	  members’	  behavior;	  6)	  Use	  graduated	  sanctions	  for	  rule	  violators;	  7)	  Provide	  accessible,	  
low-­‐cost	  means	  for	  dispute	  resolution;	  8)	  Build	  responsibility	  for	  governing	  the	  common	  resource	  in	  
nested	  tiers	  from	  the	  lowest	  level	  up	  to	  the	  entire	  interconnected	  system.	  Supra	  n.	  19,	  at	  90.	  
32	   Ostrom,	  Elinor	  and	  Harini	  Nagendra,	  “Insights	  on	  Linking	  Forests,	  Trees,	  and	  People	  from	  the	  Air,	  on	  
the	  Ground,	  and	  in	  the	  Laboratory,”	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  National	  Academy	  of	  Sciences,	  103(51),	  2006,	  
pp.	   	   19224–19231;	  see	  also	  “Elinor	  Ostrom:	  Taking	  Sustainability	  Research	  Mainstream”,	  FES,	  












no	   longer	   be	   ignored	   by	   policy	   makers	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	   ecological	   catastrophe	  
surrounding	   them.	   Ostrom	   best	   summed	   up	   this	   certainty	   when	   she	   responded	   to	   a	  
question	  that	  asked	  her	  advice	  to	  state	  actors	  who	  influence	  natural	  resource	  policy:	   	  
	  
No	  panaceas!	  We	   (policy	  makers)	   tend	   to	  want	   simple	   formulas.	  We	  have	   two	  
main	  prescriptions:	  privatize	  the	  resource	  or	  make	  it	  state	  property	  with	  uniform	  
rules.	  But	  sometimes	  the	  people	  who	  are	  living	  on	  the	  resource	  are	  in	  the	  best	  
position	  to	  figure	  out	  how	  to	  manage	  it	  as	  a	  commons.33	  
	  
(d)	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Ecological	  Stewardship	  
	  
International	  efforts	   for	   indigenous	  peoples’	   rights	  go	  back	   to	  1923.	   It	  began	  with	   the	  
efforts	  of	  Levi	  General	  Deskaheh,	  chief	  of	  the	  Younger	  Bear	  Clan	  of	  the	  Cayuga	  Nation,	  a	  
spokesperson	   of	   the	   Six	   nations	   of	   the	  Grand	   River	   Land	   near	   Brantford,	   Ontario.	   He	  
obtained	  a	  hearing	  at	  the	  League	  of	  Nations	  regarding	  a	  dispute	  with	  Canada	  over	  tribal	  
self-­‐government. 34 	   Since	   the	   1980s	   however	   a	   global	   movement	   for	   indigenous	  
peoples’	   rights	  and	  the	   increasing	  use	  of	  supra-­‐national	   forums	  by	   indigenous	  peoples	  
groups	  to	  claim	  their	  rights	  has	  grown.35	   	  
	  
This	   global	   movement,	   though	   a	   distinctly	   modern	   phenomenon,	   represents	  
itself	  as	  a	  primordial	  identity	  that	  unifies	  the	  estimated	  300	  million	  indigenous	  peoples	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	   Korten,	  Fran,	  “Elinor	  Ostrom	  wins	  Nobel	  for	  Common(s)	  Sense”,	  yes!	  Magazine,	  2010,	  
http://www.yesmagazine.org/issues/america-­‐the-­‐remix/elinor-­‐ostrom-­‐wins-­‐nobel-­‐for-­‐common-­‐s-­‐
sense.	  Retrieved	  13th	  September	  2011.	  
34	   Titley,	  Brian	  E.,	  A	  Narrow	  Vision:	  Duncan	  Campbell	  Scott	  and	  the	  Administration	  of	  Indian	  Affairs	  in	  
Canada,	  Vancouver:	  University	  of	  British	  Columbia	  Press,	  1986,	  p.122	  
35	   As	  a	  result	  of	  persistent	  lobbying	  at	  the	  UN	  by	  indigenous	  peoples,	  the	  Working	  Group	  on	  Indigenous	  
Populations	  (WGIP)	  was	  established	  pursuant	  to	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Council	  resolution	  1982/34	  as	  a	  
subsidiary	  body	  of	  the	  Sub-­‐Commission	  on	  the	  Promotion	  and	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights.	  The	  work	  
of	  the	  WGIP	  finally	  led	  to	  the	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  adopted	  by	  the	  UN	  
General	  Assembly	  in	  2007.	  Since	  then	  the	  WGIP	  has	  been	  discontinued	  and	  replaced	  with	  the	  Expert	  
Mechanism	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  (EMRIP)	  through	  Resolution	  6/36	  of	  the	  UN	  Human	  
Rights	  Council.	  See	  http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/groups/wgip.htm.	  Retrieved	  












from	   4000	   distinct	   societies.36	   Unlike	   the	   1960s	   movements	   for	   the	   recognition	   of	  
ethnicity,	  the	  indigenous	  peoples	  movement	  asserts	  itself	  not	  as	  a	  legal	  category	  or	  an	  
analytical	   concept	   but	   as	   a	   paradoxical	   expression	   of	   a	   global	   identity.	   This	   global	  
identity	   of	   ‘indigenous’	   harks	   to	   a	   unity	   amidst	   diversity	   and	   has,	   with	   remarkable	  
success,	   used	   the	   United	   Nations	   as	   the	   key	   site	   of	   struggle	   for	   indigenous	   peoples	  
rights.37	  
	  
While	   there	   is	   no	   universally	   agreed	   definition	   of	   who	   is	   indigenous,	   the	  
definition	  around	  which	  there	  is	  a	  broad	  consensus	  was	  given	  by	  Jose	  R.	  Martinez	  Cobo,	  
the	   Special	   Rapporteur	   of	   the	   Sub-­‐Commission	   on	   Prevention	   of	   Discrimination	   and	  
Protection	  of	  Minorities,	   in	  his	  seminal	  Study	  on	  the	  Problem	  of	  Discrimination	  against	  
Indigenous	  Populations:	  
	  
Indigenous	   communities,	   peoples	   and	   nations	   are	   those	   which,	   having	   a	  
historical	  continuity	  with	  pre-­‐invasion	  and	  pre-­‐colonial	  societies	  that	  developed	  
on	   their	   territories,	   consider	   themselves	   distinct	   from	   other	   sectors	   of	   the	  
societies	   now	   prevailing	   on	   those	   territories,	   or	   parts	   of	   them.	   They	   form	   at	  
present	   non-­‐dominant	   sectors	   of	   society	   and	   are	   determined	   to	   preserve,	  
develop	  and	  transmit	  to	  future	  generations	  their	  ancestral	  territories,	  and	  their	  
ethnic	   identity,	   as	   the	   basis	   of	   their	   continued	   existence	   as	   peoples,	   in	  
accordance	   with	   their	   own	   cultural	   patterns,	   social	   institutions	   and	   legal	  
system.38	  
	  
At	  the	  heart	  of	   the	  struggle	   for	  the	  rights	  of	   indigenous	  peoples	   is	   the	   ‘right	  to	  
self-­‐determination’.	   As	   James	   Anaya,	   the	   UN	   Special	   Rapporteur	   on	   the	   Situation	   of	  
Human	   Rights	   and	   Fundamental	   Freedoms	   of	   Indigenous	   Peoples	   notes,	   self-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	   Niezen,	  Ronald,	  The	  Origins	  of	  Indigenism:	  Human	  Rights	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  Identity,	  Berkeley:	  
University	  of	  California	  Press,	  2003,	  p.	  4.	  
37	   See	  generally,	  Introduction	  chapter,	  ibid.	  
38	   UN	  Doc.	  E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7	  and	  Add.	  1-­‐4.	  The	  report	  further	  states	  that	  ‘On	  an	  individual	  basis,	  an	  
indigenous	  person	  is	  one	  who	  belongs	  to	  these	  indigenous	  populations	  through	  self-­‐identification	  as	  
indigenous	  (group	  consciousness)	  and	  is	  recognized	  and	  accepted	  by	  these	  populations	  as	  one	  of	  its	  












determination	  here	  is	  not	  a	  claim	  for	  separate	  statehood	  but	  a	  self-­‐determination	  that	  is	  
grounded	   in	   international	   human	   rights.	   Such	   a	   self-­‐determination	   has	   certain	   core	  
values	  which	  are:	  non-­‐discrimination,	  protection	  of	  cultural	   integrity,	   rights	  over	   lands	  
and	  natural	  resources,	  social	  welfare	  for	  economic	  well-­‐being	  and	  self-­‐government.39	   	  
	  
Since	  the	  coming	  into	  force	  of	  the	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity	  (CBD)40	   in	  
1993	  the	  nature	  of	   the	   indigenous	   ‘self’	   that	  seeks	   the	  right	   to	  determine	  or	  actualize	  
itself	   has	   extended	   beyond	   Martinez	   Cobo’s	   1987	   definition.	   The	   definition	   of	  
indigenous	  that	  has	  now	  captured	  the	  public	  imagination	  includes	  the	  role	  of	  indigenous	  
peoples	   as	   the	   original	   trustees	   of	   the	   earth.	   Strategically	   and	   steadfastly,	   indigenous	  
peoples	  have	  begun	  to	  uphold	  their	  role	  as	  guardians	  of	  the	  ecosystem	  and	  demand	  the	  
rights	   to	   ecological	   stewardship	   in	   negotiations	   towards	   multilateral	   environmental	  
agreements,	  programs	  of	  work,	  decisions	  and	  guidelines	  under	  the	  CBD.41	   Riding	  on	  the	  
momentum	   of	   the	   commons	   and	   post-­‐development	   movements,	   indigenous	   peoples	  
present	  recognition	  of	  their	  rights	  to	  self-­‐determination	  as	  both	  a	  practical	  and	  a	  moral	  
solution	  to	  the	  ecological	  crisis.	  
	  
Discourses	   around	   the	   strong	   cultural	   and	   spiritual	   links	   between	   indigenous	  
peoples	   and	   their	   lands	   are	  not	   new.	   They	   stretch	  back	   to	   the	  beliefs	   of	   some	  of	   the	  
oldest	  aboriginal	  peoples	  of	  the	  world	  such	  as	  the	  San	  of	  Southern	  Africa.	  The	  common	  
theme	  among	  the	  different	  San	  groups	  was:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	   Anaya,	  James,	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  in	  International	  Law,	  2nd	  ed.,	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  
2004,	  p.	  6.	  
40	   The	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity	  (CBD)	  entered	  into	  force	  in	  1993.	  It	  has	  193	  state	  parties	  and	  
aims	  to	  ensure	  the	  conservation	  and	  sustainable	  use	  of	  biological	  diversity	  and	  the	  fair	  and	  equitable	  
sharing	  of	  benefits	  arising	  from	  its	  commercial	  and	  research	  utilization.	  Many	  developing	  countries	  
view	  the	  CBD	  as	  a	  way	  to	  redefine	  historical	  benefit	  flows	  from	  the	  use	  of	  genetic	  resources.	  See	  
generally,	  Glowka,	  Lyle	  et.al,	  A	  Guide	  to	  the	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity,	  Gland:	  IUCN,	  1994.	  See	  
also	  Glowka,	  Lyle,	  “Emerging	  Legislative	  Approaches	  to	  Implement	  Article	  15	  of	  the	  Convention	  on	  
Biological	  Diversity”,	  RECIEL,	  Vol.6,	  Issue	  3,	  1997,	  pp.	  249-­‐262.	   	   	  
41	   Infra	  n.	  69	  and	  70	  are	  some	  examples	  of	  the	  discourse	  of	  stewardship	  in	  international	  environmental	  












[T]he	  existence	  of	  a	  primal	  time,	  a	  mythic	  age	   in	  which	  beings	  and	  states	  were	  
ontologically	  fluid	  and	  a	  certain	  state	  of	  inchoate	  amorphousness	  prevailed….The	  
majority	  of	   the	  beings	  of	  primal	   time	  were	  beings,	   in	  which	  animal	  and	  human	  
traits	  co-­‐mingled….These	  therianthropic	  variants	  of	  the	  “Early	  Race”	  bore	  animal	  
names	  -­‐	  Anteater,	  Lion,	  Hyena,	  Jackal,	  Springbok,	  Blue	  Crane,	  Tortoise….Yet	  they	  
were	  also	  human,	  and	  were	  married,	   in	  a	  riotous	  mix	  of	  cross-­‐species	  alliances,	  
including	   with	   humans	   of	   the	   “Early	   Race”….They	   behaved	   in	   all	   ways	   like	  
humans;	  however	  now	  and	  again	  their	  actions	  took	  an	  animal	  twist,	  in	  line	  with	  
the	  protagonist’s	  specific	  faunal	  trait.42	  
	  
The	   origins	   of	   the	   CBD	   had	   much	   to	   do	   with	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   homo	  
economicus	  and	  the	  consequent	  desacralizing	  of	  Nature.43	   An	  alarming	  report	  issued	  by	  
the	  Secretariat	  of	  the	  CBD	  states	  that	  species	  are	  now	  disappearing	  at	  50-­‐100	  times	  the	  
natural	  rate,	  and	  this	  is	  predicted	  to	  continue	  to	  rise	  exponentially.	  An	  estimated	  34,000	  
plant	  and	  5,200	  animal	  species,	   including	  one	   in	  eight	  of	  the	  world's	  bird	  species,	   face	  
extinction.	  About	  45	  per	   cent	  of	   the	  Earth's	  original	   forests	   are	   gone	  and	   continue	   to	  
shrink.	  Up	  to	  10	  per	  cent	  of	  coral	  reefs,	  which	  are	  among	  the	  most	  biologically	  diverse	  
ecosystems,	  have	  been	  destroyed	  and	  one	  third	  of	   those	  remaining	  face	  collapse	  over	  
the	  next	  10	  to	  20	  years.	  Coastal	  mangroves,	  a	  vital	  nursery	  habitat	  for	  countless	  species,	  
are	  also	  vulnerable,	  with	  half	  already	  gone.44	  
	  
In	   a	   political	   climate	   where	   grand	   top-­‐down	   development	   theories	   have	   been	  
discredited	   and	   local	   systems	   of	   resource	   management	   affirmed,	   the	   indigenous	  
peoples	   movement	   has	   begun	   to	   make	   a	   critical	   link	   between	   their	   right	   to	   self-­‐
determination	  and	  environmental	  conservation.	  To	  do	  so,	  they	  have	  begun	  to	  highlight	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	   Guenther,	  Mathias,	  “On	  /Xam	  San	  Folklore”,	  The	  Moon	  as	  Shoe:	  Drawings	  of	  the	  San,	  Miklos	  Szalay,	  
Ed.,	  Zurich:	  Scheidegger	  and	  Spiess,	  2002,	  p.	  92.	  
43	   Bragdon,	  S.H,	  “The	  Evolution	  and	  the	  Future	  of	  Law	  of	  Sustainable	  Development:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  
Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity”,	  Georgetown	  International	  Environmental	  Law	  Review,	  Vol.	  VIII,	  
Issue	  3,	  1996,	  pp.	  389-­‐513.	   	   	   	  
44	   Sustaining	  Life	  on	  Earth:	  How	  the	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity	  Promotes	  Nature	  and	  Well-­‐Being,	  












their	  role	  as	  guardians	  of	  ecosystems	  and	  the	  significance	  of	  their	  cultural	  and	  spiritual	  
bonds	  with	  Nature.	   	  
	  
Indigenous	   peoples	   also	   point	   out	   that	   their	   territories	   are	   some	   of	   the	  most	  
biodiversity	  rich,	  and	  the	  collapse	  of	   local	  ecosystems	  began	  with	  the	  dispossession	  of	  
communities	   from	   the	   lands	   and	   waters	   they	   traditionally	   occupied.45	   The	   natural	  
corollary	  that	  follows	  from	  this	  view	  is	  that	  biodiversity	  conservation	  is	  integrally	  linked	  
to	  securing	   the	  rights	  of	   indigenous	  peoples	   to	   their	   territories,	   their	  way	  of	   life,	   their	  
culture	  and	  customary	  ways	  of	  decision-­‐making.	  
	  
(e)	  The	  Genesis	  of	  Biocultural	  Rights:	  At	  the	  Confluence	  of	  Three	  Streams	  
	  
Biocultural	  rights	  arise	  at	  the	  confluence	  of	  the	  movement	  for	  the	  rights	  of	   indigenous	  
peoples,	   the	   post-­‐development	   and	   commons	   movements.	   Despite	   their	   differences,	  
the	   overlap	   between	   these	   three	   movements	   is	   their	   common	   goal	   to	   protect	   local	  
ecosystems	  and	  an	  understanding	  that	  these	  ecosystems	  are	  best	  protected	  by	  securing	  
the	  rights	  of	  communities	  who	  live	   in	  them.	  Biocultural	  rights	  therefore	  denote	  all	   the	  
rights	   required	   to	   secure	   the	   stewardship	   role	   of	   communities	   over	   their	   lands	   and	  
waters.	  This	  role	  represents	  a	  way	  of	  life	  where	  the	  identity	  of	  a	  community,	  its	  culture,	  
spirituality,	  systems	  of	  governance	  and	  traditional	  occupations	  are	  inseparable	  from	  its	  
lands	  and	  waters.	  The	  relationship	  of	  the	  community	  to	  its	  territory	  is	  akin	  to	  a	  fiduciary	  
duty	  of	  care	  and	  protection,	  rather	  than	  an	  exercise	  of	  dominion.46	   	  
	  
	   The	   CBD	   was	   the	   first	   international	   treaty	   that	   explicitly	   recognized	   the	   link	  
between	   traditional	   ways	   of	   life	   of	   communities	   and	   biodiversity	   conservation.	  More	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	   See	  generally,	  supra	  n.	  8.	  













importantly,	   in	   Articles	   8(j)47and	   10(c)48	   the	   CBD	   obliged	   its	   193	   state	   parties	   to	  
safeguard	   these	   traditional	   ways	   of	   life	   by	   ensuring	   the	   integrity	   of	   their	   cultures,	  
encouraging	  customary	  use	  of	  biological	  resources	  and	  upholding	  local	  decision-­‐making	  
structures.	   These	   CBD	   rights	   have	   been	   underscored	   by	   various	   indigenous	   peoples’	  
declarations	   and	   statements	   that	   have	   called	   for	   the	   recognition	   of	   the	   right	   of	  
indigenous	   peoples	   to	   maintain	   and	   strengthen	   their	   distinctive	   spiritual	   relationship	  
with	   their	   traditionally	   owned	  or	  occupied	   territories	   in	   accordance	  with	  Article	   25	  of	  
the	  United	  Nations	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  (UNDRIP).49	  
	  
Examples	  of	  indigenous	  peoples’	  declarations	  include	  the	  May	  2007,	  Declaration	  
on	   Indigenous	   Peoples'	   Rights	   to	   Genetic	   Resources	   and	   Indigenous	   Knowledge	  which	  
was	   issued	  by	  44	   indigenous	  peoples’	  groups.	  The	  document	   reaffirmed	   their	   spiritual	  
and	   cultural	   relationship	  with	   all	   life	   forms	  existing	   in	   their	   traditional	   territories,	   and	  
their	  fundamental	  role	  and	  responsibility	  as	  the	  guardians	  of	  their	  territories,	  lands	  and	  
natural	  resources.	  Other	  examples	  are	  the	  August	  1997	  Heart	  of	  the	  People	  Declaration	  
and	   the	   February	   1995	  Declaration	   of	   Indigenous	   Peoples	   of	   the	  Western	  Hemisphere	  
Regarding	   the	   Human	   Genome	   Diversity	   Project.	   The	  Heart	   of	   the	   People	   Declaration	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	   Article	  8(j)	  of	  the	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity	  (CBD)	  reads	  ‘Each	  Contracting	  Party	  shall,	  as	  far	  as	  
possible	  and	  appropriate	  (chapeau)	  subject	  to	  national	  legislation,	  respect,	  preserve	  and	  maintain	  
knowledge,	  innovations	  and	  practices	  of	  indigenous	  and	  local	  communities	  embodying	  traditional	  
lifestyles	  relevant	  to	  the	  conservation	  and	  sustainable	  use	  of	  biological	  diversity	  and	  promote	  their	  
wider	  application	  with	  the	  approval	  and	  involvement	  of	  the	  holders	  of	  such	  knowledge,	  innovations	  
and	  practices	  and	  encourage	  the	  equitable	  sharing	  of	  the	  benefits	  arising	  from	  the	  utilization	  of	  such	  
knowledge,	  innovations	  and	  practices.’	  http://www.cbd.int/convention/text/.	  Retrieved	  13th	  
September	  2011.	  
48	   Article	  10(c)	  of	  the	  CBD	  reads	  ‘Each	  Contracting	  Party	  shall,	  as	  far	  as	  possible	  and	  appropriate	  protect	  
and	  encourage	  customary	  use	  of	  biological	  resources	  in	  accordance	  with	  traditional	  cultural	  practices	  
that	  are	  compatible	  with	  conservation	  or	  sustainable	  use	  requirements.’	  
http://www.cbd.int/convention/text/.	  Retrieved	  13th	  September	  2011.	  
49	   On	  14th	  September	  2007,	  the	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly	  adopted	  the	  ‘Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  
of	  Indigenous	  Peoples’.	  Article	  25	  of	  the	  Declaration	  states	  that:	  ‘Indigenous	  peoples	  have	  the	  right	  to	  
maintain	  and	  strengthen	  their	  distinctive	  spiritual	  relationship	  with	  their	  traditionally	  owned	  or	  
otherwise	  occupied	  and	  used	  lands,	  territories,	  waters	  and	  coastal	  seas	  and	  other	  resources	  and	  to	  
uphold	  their	  responsibilities	  to	  future	  generations	  in	  this	  regard.’	  













best	  captures	  the	  sentiment	  of	  the	  stewardship	  role	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  vis-­‐á-­‐vis	  their	  
territories	  by	  stating:	  
	  
Mother	   Earth	   and	   all	   human,	   plant	   and	   animal	   relatives	   are	   sacred,	   sovereign,	  
respected,	  unique	  living	  beings	  with	  their	  own	  right	  to	  survive,	  and	  each	  plays	  an	  
essential	  role	  in	  the	  survival	  and	  health	  of	  the	  natural	  world.	  Human	  beings	  are	  
not	   separate	   from	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   natural	   world,	   but	   are	   created	   to	   live	   in	  
relationship	   and	   harmony	  with	   it	   and	  with	   all	   life.	   The	   Creator	   has	   given	   us	   a	  
sacred	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  and	  care	  for	  the	  land	  and	  all	  of	  life,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  
safeguard	  its	  well	  being	  for	  future	  generations	  to	  come.50	  
	  
	   The	  CBD	  has	  therefore	  engendered	  a	  new	  legal	  landscape	  where	  biocultural	  rights	  
are	   being	   developed	   as	   a	   people-­‐led	   alternative	   to	   state-­‐led	   technocratic	   solutions	   to	  
the	   environmental	   crisis.51	   Nearly	   every	   CBD	   body,	   including	   the	   Working	   Group	   on	  
Article	  8(j),	  the	  Working	  Group	  on	  Access	  and	  Benefit	  Sharing	  (ABS),	  the	  Working	  Group	  
on	  Protected	  Areas	  and	   the	  Subsidiary	  Body	  on	  Scientific,	  Technical	  and	  Technological	  
Advice	   (SBSTTA)	   has	   become	   a	   fertile	   ground	   for	   the	   conceptualizing	   and	   realizing	   of	  
biocultural	   rights.	   In	  many	  ways	   these	   rights	  have	  begun	  crystallize	  as	  a	   subset	  of	   the	  
third	  generation	  group	  or	  solidarity	  rights.52	  
	  
	   The	  discourse	  on	  biocultural	  rights	   is	  spilling	  over	  from	  the	  CBD	  to	  other	  UN	  and	  
international	   fora	  and	  other	  environmental	  conventions	  such	  as	   the	  World	   Intellectual	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	   See	  http://www.ienearth.org/docs/declare.html	  for	  full	  texts	  of	  these	  declarations.	  Retrieved	  13th	  
September	  2011.	  
51	   See	  generally,	  Tobin,	  Brendan,	  “‘	  Law	  Giveth	  and	  the	  Law	  Taketh	  Away’:	  The	  Case	  for	  Recognition	  of	  
Customary	  Law	  in	  International	  ABS	  and	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  Governance”,	  Policy	  Matters,	  Issue	  17,	  
October	  2010,	  pp.16-­‐24.	  
52	   Under	  international	  law,	  the	  first	  generation	  of	  rights	  are	  commonly	  understood	  as	  civil	  and	  political	  
rights	  attributed	  to	  the	  Universal	  Declaration	  on	  Human	  Rights	  (UDHR)	  and	  the	  International	  Covenant	  
on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights	  (ICCPR).	  The	  second	  generation	  of	  rights	  are	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  cultural	  
rights	  covered	  to	  some	  extent	  by	  the	  UDHR	  but	  enshrined	  in	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  
Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (ICESR).	  Solidarity	  rights	  or	  group	  rights	  which	  are	  considered	  as	  third	  
generation	  rights	  have	  begun	  to	  gain	  increasing	  momentum	  through	  the	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  












Property	  Organization-­‐Intergovernmental	  Committee	  (WIPO-­‐IGC),53	   the	  Commission	  on	  
Genetic	   Resources	   for	   Food	   and	   Agriculture	   (FAO-­‐CGRFA),54	   the	   UN	   Convention	   on	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Combating	   Desertification	   (UNCCD)55	   and	   the	   UN	   Framework	   Convention	   on	   Climate	  
Change	  (UNFCCC).56	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	   Established	  by	  the	  World	  Intellectual	  Property	  Organization	  (WIPO)	  General	  Assembly	  in	  October	  2000	  
(document	  WO/GA/26/6),	  the	  WIPO	  Intergovernmental	  Committee	  on	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  
Genetic	  Resources,	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  and	  Folklore	  (IGC)	  is	  undertaking	  text-­‐based	  negotiations	  
with	  the	  objective	  of	  reaching	  agreement	  on	  a	  text	  of	  an	  international	  legal	  instrument	  (or	  
instruments)	  which	  will	  ensure	  the	  effective	  protection	  of	  traditional	  knowledge	  (TK),	  traditional	  
cultural	  expressions	  (TCEs)/folklore	  and	  genetic	  resources.	  See	  http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/igc/.	  
Retrieved	  13th	  September	  2011.	  For	  a	  spill	  over	  of	  biocultural	  rights	  into	  the	  WIPO-­‐IGC	  negotiations,	  
see	  generally,	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Traditional	  Knowledge,	  Booklet	  no.2,	  New	  York:	  WIPO	  
Publication.	   	  
54	   The	  Commission	  on	  Genetic	  Resources	  for	  Food	  and	  Agriculture	  (CGRFA)	  is	  a	  permanent	  forum	  where	  
governments	  discuss	  and	  negotiate	  matters	  relevant	  to	  biodiversity	  for	  food	  and	  agriculture.	  The	  main	  
objectives	  of	  the	  Commission	  are	  to	  ensure	  the	  conservation	  and	  sustainable	  utilization	  of	  genetic	  
resources	  for	  food	  and	  agriculture,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  fair	  and	  equitabl 	  sharing	  of	  benefits	  derived	  from	  
their	  use,	  for	  present	  and	  future	  generations.	  The	  Commission	  on	  Genetic	  Resources	  for	  Food	  and	  
Agriculture	  was	  established	  in	  1983	  to	  deal	  with	  issues	  related	  to	  plant	  genetic	  resources.	  In	  1995,	  the	  
FAO	  Conference	  broadened	  the	  Commission’s	  mandate	  to	  cover	  all	  components	  of	  biodiversity	  of	  
relevance	  to	  food	  and	  agriculture.	  Since	  its	  establishment,	  the	  Commission	  has	  overseen	  global	  
assessments	  of	  the	  state	  of	  the	  world’s	  plant	  and	  animal	  genetic	  resources	  for	  food	  and	  agriculture	  
and	  negotiated	  major	  international	  instruments,	  including	  the	  International	  Treaty	  on	  Plant	  Genetic	  
Resources	  for	  Food	  and	  Agriculture.	  See,	  Biodiversity	  for	  a	  World	  without	  Hunger:	  The	  Commission	  on	  
Genetic	  Resources	  for	  Food	  and	  Agriculture,	  Rome:	  FAO,	  www.fao.org/nr/cgrfa.	  Retrieved	  September	  
11th	  2011.	  See	  also	  Köhler-­‐Rollefson,	  Ilse	  et.al,	  “Livestock	  Keepers’	  Rights:	  A	  Rights-­‐	  Based	  Approach	  to	  
Invoking	  Justice	  for	  Pastoralists	  and	  Biodiversity	  Conserving	  Livestock	  Keepers”,	  Policy	  Matters,	  Issue	  
17,	  October	  2010,	  pp.113-­‐115.	  
55	   The	  UNCCD	  (United	  Nations	  Convention	  to	  Combat	  Desertification	  in	  Those	  Countries	  Experiencing	  
Serious	  Drought	  and/or	  Desertification,	  Particularly	  in	  Africa)	  was	  adopted	  in	  1994	  and	  has	  194	  parties	  
to	  it.	  The	  objective	  of	  the	  Convention	  is	  to	  combat	  desertification	  and	  mitigate	  the	  effects	  of	  drought	  
in	  countries	  experiencing	  serious	  drought	  and/or	  desertification,	  particularly	  in	  Africa,	  through	  
effective	  action	  at	  all	  levels,	  with	  a	  view	  to	  contributing	  to	  the	  achievement	  of	  sustainable	  
development	  in	  affected	  areas.	  See	  Article	  2	  of	  the	  Convention	  for	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  UNCCD.	  For	  a	  
spill	  over	  of	  biocultural	  rights	  into	  the	  UNCCD,	  see	  generally,	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Desertification:	  
Exploring	  the	  Complementarity	  of	  International	  Human	  Rights	  Law	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  
to	  Combat	  Desertification,	  Issue	  paper	  1,	  Desertification,	  Land	  Degradation	  and	  Drought,	  Bonn:	  
UNCCD,	  2008.	   	   	  
56	   In	  1992,	  the	  United	  Nations	  Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (UNFCCC)	  was	  adopted	  as	  the	  
basis	  for	  a	  global	  response	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  climate	  change.	  With	  194	  Parties,	  the	  ultimate	  objective	  
of	  the	  Convention	  is	  to	  stabilise	  greenhouse	  gas	  concentrations	  in	  the	  atmosphere	  at	  a	  level	  that	  will	  
prevent	  dangerous	  human	  interference	  with	  the	  climate	  system.	  The	  Convention	  is	  complemented	  by	  
the	  1997	  Kyoto	  Protocol,	  which	  has	  192	  Parties.	  Under	  this	  treaty,	  37	  industrialised	  countries	  and	  the	  
European	  Community	  have	  committed	  to	  reducing	  their	  emissions	  by	  an	  average	  of	  5	  percent	  by	  2012	  
against	  1990	  levels.	  Industrialized	  countries	  must	  first	  and	  foremost	  take	  domestic	  action	  against	  
climate	  change.	  But	  the	  Protocol	  also	  allows	  them	  to	  meet	  their	  emission	  reduction	  commitments	  















(f)	  Biocultural	  Rights:	  Future	  Trajectories	  
	  
Biocultural	   rights	   denoting	   the	   rights	   of	   communities	   to	   fulfil	   their	   role	   as	   trustees	   of	  
their	   cultures,	   lands,	   waters	   and	   resources	   are	   increasingly	   being	   recognized	   in	  
international	   environmental	   law.	   These	   rights	   include	   the	   rights	   of	   communities,	   in	  
accordance	  with	  their	  customary	  laws,	  to	  regulate	  access	  to	  their	  cultures	  and	  territories	  
by	   parties	   outside	   their	   traditional	   circle.	   It	   is	   critical	   to	   distinguish	   biocultural	   rights	  
from	  a	  pure	  property	  claim	  by	  a	  hitherto	  excluded	  group	  in	  the	  typical	  market	  sense	  of	  
property	   being	   universally	   commensurable,	   commodifiable	   and	   alienable.	   On	   the	  
contrary,	  biocultural	  rights	  are	  collective	  rights	  of	  communities	  to	  carry	  out	  traditional	  
stewardship	  roles	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  Nature.	  
	  
	   Mounting	  evidence	  of	  sophisticated	  systems	  of	  conservation	  and	  sustainable	  use	  
of	  ecosystems	  by	  communities	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  customary	  laws	  and	  values	  has	  
laid	  a	   firm	   foundation	   for	  biocultural	   rights.	  Examples	   include	  action-­‐research	  projects	  
by	  the	  International	  Institute	  for	  Environment	  and	  Development	  (IIED)	  since	  2005.	  These	  
projects	  compared	  conservation	  practices	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  local	  communities	  
in	  India,	  China,	  Peru,	  Panama	  and	  Kenya.57	   One	  of	  the	  most	  interesting	  findings	  of	  these	  
projects	   has	   been	   the	   discovery	   of	   a	   set	   of	   ecological	   ethics	   common	   to	   all	   these	  
communities	   despite	   their	   diverse	   cultures	   and	   vastly	   different	   terrains.	   These	   ethics	  
that	   resonated	   with	   communities	   internationally	   were	   initially	   identified	   as	   Quechua	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Framework	  Convention	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (UNFCCC)	  and	  its	  Kyoto	  Protocol,	  Fact	  Sheet,	  UNFCC,	  
February	  2011.	  For	  a	  spill	  over	  on	  biocultural	  rights	  into	  the	  UNFCCC,	  see	  generally,	  Wood,	  Peter	  et.al,	  
“REDD	  Community	  Protocols:	  A	  Community	  Approach	  to	  Ensuring	  the	  Local	  Integrity	  of	  REDD”,	  
Outreach,	  Special	  Post-­‐COP	  15	  Issue,	  2010,	  p.7.	  
57	   Swiderska,	  K	  et	  al.,	  Protecting	  Community	  Rights	  over	  Traditional	  Knowledge:	  Implications	  of	  
Customary	  Laws	  and	  Practices:	  Key	  Findings	  and	  Recommendations	  2005-­‐2009,	  London:	  IIED,	  2009,	  












customary	   norms	   through	   the	   pioneering	   work	   of	   Alejandro	   Argumedo	   of	   Asociación	  
ANDES	  with	  the	  Quechua	  communities	  of	  Peru	  who	  had	  set	  up	  a	  Potato	  Park	  as	  an	   in-­‐
situ	  gene	  bank	  and	  a	  biocultural	  territory	  to	  conserve	  their	  traditional	  potato	  varieties.	  
The	  IIED	  has	  summed	  up	  these	  ethics	  as:	  reciprocity	  (what	  is	  taken	  from	  Nature	  is	  given	  
back	   in	   equal	  measure),	   duality	   (everything	   in	  Nature	  has	   a	   complementary	  opposite,	  
and	   these	   opposites	  must	   be	   balanced)	   and	   equilibrium	   (everything	   in	   Nature	   is	   in	   a	  
state	  of	  dynamic	  equilibrium	  or	  harmony	  and	  this	  harmony	  must	  not	  be	  disrupted).58	  
	  
	   Further	  evidence	  of	  inter-­‐generational	  conservation	  by	  indigenous	  peoples	  of	  their	  
territories	   has	   been	  marshalled	   by	   studies	   conducted	   by	   the	   Forest	   Peoples	   Program	  
(FPP)	   in	   Bangladesh,	   Suriname,	   Guyana,	   Cameroon	   and	   Thailand.59 	   Much	   of	   this	  
evidence	   has	   played	   a	   key	   role	   in	   the	   emerging	   discourse	   around	   Indigenous	   Peoples	  
and	  Community	  Conserved	  Areas	   (ICCAs)	  under	  Element	  2	   (Governance,	  Participation,	  
Equity	  and	  Benefit	  Sharing)	  of	  the	  Program	  of	  Work	  on	  Protected	  Areas	  (PoWPA)	  within	  
the	   CBD	   framework.60	   The	   discourse	   around	   ICCAs	   is	   emblematic	   of	   the	   battle	   lines	  
between	   a	   state	   led	   technocratic	   approach	   of	   fencing	   off	   ‘protected	   areas’	   for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58.	  Ibid.	  See	  also	  Argumedo,	  Alejandro,	  Community	  Biocultural	  Protocols:	  Building	  Mechanisms	  for	  Access	  
and	  Benefit	  Sharing	  Amongst	  the	  Communities	  of	  the	  Potato	  Park	  Based	  on	  Quechua	  Customary	  
Norms,	  London:	  IIED,	  2011.	  
59	   Customary	  Sustainable	  Use	  of	  Biodiversity	  by	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  and	  Local	  Communities:	  Examples,	  
Challenges,	  Community	  Initiatives	  and	  Recommendations	  Relating	  to	  CBD	  Article	  10(c),	  A	  Synthesis	  
Paper	  by	  the	  FPP	  and	  Partner	  Organizations,	  October	  2010,	  
http://www.forestpeoples.org/topics/convention-­‐biological-­‐diversity-­‐cbd/publication/2010/synthesis-­‐
paper-­‐10c-­‐case-­‐studies.	  Retrieved	  13th	  September	  2011.	  
60	   The	  Programme	  of	  Work	  on	  Protected	  Areas	  (PoWPA)	  of	  the	  CBD	  was	  adopted	  in	  2004	  at	  the	  Seventh	  
Conference	  of	  the	  Parties.	  It	  enshrines	  the	  development	  of	  participatory,	  ecologically	  representative,	  
and	  effectively	  managed	  national	  and	  regional	  systems	  of	  protected	  areas,	  where	  necessary,	  
stretching	  across	  national	  boundaries.	  PoWPA	  consists	  of	  four	  interlinked	  elements:	  Element	  1:	  Direct	  
Actions	  for	  Planning,	  Selecting,	  Establishing,	  Strengthening,	  and	  Managing,	  Protected	  Area	  Systems	  
and	  Sites;	  Element	  2:	  Governance,	  Participation,	  Equity	  and	  Benefit	  Sharing;	  Element	  3:	  Enabling	  
Activities;	  Element	  4:	  Standards,	  Assessment,	  and	  Monitoring.	  See	  also,	  Stevens,	  Stan,	  “Implementing	  
the	  UN	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  and	  the	  International	  Human	  Rights	  Law	  












conservation	   purposes	   and	   the	   response	   by	   the	   ICCA	   Consortium61	   demanding	   legal	  
recognition	  of	  local	  conservation	  practices	  in	  the	  tradition	  of	  political	  ecology.62	  
	  
	   Pastoralists	  and	  livestock	  keepers	  across	  the	  world	  are	  also	  advocating	  biocultural	  
rights	   by	   seeking	   legal	   recognition	   of	   their	   role	   as	   creators	   of	   livestock	   breeds	   and	  
custodians	   of	   local	   ecosystems. 63 	   To	   this	   end	   the	   LIFE	   Network64 	   is	   advocating	  
biocultural	  rights	   in	  the	  form	  of	  rights	  of	   livestock	  keepers	  and	  pastoralists	  both	  under	  
the	  CBD	  and	  the	  Food	  and	  Agriculture	  Organization	  (FAO).65	   These	  rights	  outlined	  in	  the	  
LIFE	  Network	  facilitated	  2009	  Declaration	  on	  Livestock	  Keepers	  Rights66	   is	  endorsed	  by	  a	  
number	   of	   pastoralist	   and	   livestock	   keepers’	   organizations.	   The	   principles	   underlying	  
livestock	   keepers’	   rights	   are	   based	   on	   recognition	   of	   the	   integral	   links	   between	   the	  
livestock	   keepers,	   their	   breeds	   and	   the	   ecosystem	   and	   the	   conservation	   cycles	   that	  
these	  links	  engender.	   	  
	  
	   The	   emergence	   of	   farmers’	   rights	   under	   Article	   9	   of	   the	   International	   Treaty	   on	  
Plant	   Genetic	   Resources	   for	   Food	   and	   Agriculture	   (ITPGRFA)	   is	   a	   further	   example	   of	  
biocultural	  rights.	  The	  ITPGRFA	  came	  into	  force	  in	  June	  2004	  and	  currently	  has	  127	  state	  
parties	  who	  are	  obliged	  under	  Article	  9	  to	  recognize	  farmers’	  rights.	  While	  the	  ITPGRFA	  
does	  not	  define	  the	  rights,	  the	  generally	  agreed	  definition	  underscores	  their	  biocultural	  
nature.	   Farmers’	   rights	   are	   said	   to	   consist	  of	   the	   customary	   rights	  of	   farmers	   to	   save,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	   The	  ICCA	  Consortium	  is	  a	  global	  network	  of	  CBOs	  and	  NGOs	  working	  towards	  securing	  the	  rights	  of	  
indigenous	  peoples	  and	  local	  communities	  to	  govern	  and	  maintain	  their	  community	  conserved	  areas.	  
http://www.iccaworld.com/.	  Retrieved	  13th	  September	  2011.	  
62	   See	  generally,	  Shrumm,	  Holly	  et.al,	  “Exploring	  the	  Right	  to	  Diversity	  in	  Conservation	  Law,	  Policy	  and	  
Practice”,	  Policy	  Matters,	  Issue	  17,	  October	  2010,	  pp.10-­‐14.	  
63	   See	  generally,	  the	  declarations	  and	  decisions	  of	  pastoral	  peoples	  at	  www.pastoralpeoples.org.	  
Retrieved	  13th	  September	  2011.	  
64	   The	  LIFE	  Network	  is	  a	  global	  network	  of	  organizations	  and	  individuals	  who	  support	  community	  
conservation	  of	  livestock	  breeds.	  
65	   The	  FAO	  is	  an	  inter-­‐governmental	  organization	  with	  191	  Member	  Nations,	  two	  associate	  members	  and	  
one	  member	  organization-­‐	  the	  European	  Union.	  The	  FAO	  was	  set	  up	  with	  the	  mandate	  to	  raise	  levels	  
of	  nutrition,	  improve	  agricultural	  productivity,	  better	  the	  lives	  of	  rural	  populations	  and	  contribute	  to	  
the	  growth	  of	  the	  world	  economy.	  See	  www.fao.org.	  Retrieved	  14th	  March	  2012.	  












use,	   exchange	   and	   sell	   farm-­‐saved	   seed	   and	   propagating	   material,	   their	   rights	   to	   be	  
recognized,	  rewarded	  and	  supported	  for	  their	  contribution	  to	  the	  global	  pool	  of	  genetic	  
resources	   as	   well	   as	   to	   the	   development	   of	   commercial	   varieties	   of	   plants,	   and	   to	  
participate	  in	  decision	  making	  on	  issues	  related	  to	  crop	  genetic	  resources.67	  
	  
	   Significant	   gains	   regarding	   biocultural	   rights	   have	   been	   made	   within	   the	   CBD	  
through	   the	  Working	  Group	  on	  Article	   8(j)68	   and	  other	   related	  provisions.	  Article	   8(j),	  
which	   in	   1993	   seemed	   an	   anodyne	   provision,	   has	   been	   transformed	   into	   the	   cutting	  
edge	   of	   political	   ecology	   and	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	   local	   communities’	   rights.	  
Examples	  of	  this	  include	  the	  Akwé:Kon	  Guidelines	  on	  the	  conduct	  of	  social,	  cultural	  and	  
environmental	   impact	   assessments	   on	   developments	   on	   the	   lands	   of	   indigenous	   and	  
local	   communities69	   and	   the	   recent	   Tkarihwaié:ri	   Code	   of	   Ethical	   Conduct	   to	   ensure	  
respect	  for	  the	  cultural	  and	  intellectual	  heritage	  of	  indigenous	  and	  local	  communities.70	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	   See	  http://www.farmersrights.org/about/index.html	  for	  discussions	  on	  interpreting	  farmers’	  rights	  
under	  the	  ITPGRFA.	  Retrieved	  13th	  September	  2011.	  Article	  9	  of	  the	  ITPGRFA	  dealing	  with	  farmers’	  
rights	  states:	  9.1	  The	  Contracting	  Parties	  recognize	  the	  enormous	  contribution	  that	  the	  local	  and	  
indigenous	  communities	  and	  farmers	  of	  all	  regions	  of	  the	  world,	  particularly	  those	  in	  the	  centers	  of	  
origin	  and	  crop	  diversity,	  have	  made	  and	  will	  continue	  to	  make	  for	  the	  conservation	  and	  development	  
of	  plant	  genetic	  resources	  which	  constitute	  the	  basis	  of	  food	  and	  agriculture	  production	  throughout	  
the	  world;	  9.2	  The	  Contracting	  Parties	  agree	  that	  the	  responsibility	  for	  realizing	  Farmers'	  Rights,	  as	  
they	  relate	  to	  plant	  genetic	  resources	  for	  food	  and	  agriculture,	  rests	  with	  national	  governments.	  In	  
accordance	  with	  their	  needs	  and	  priorities,	  each	  Contracting	  Party	  should,	  as	  appropriate,	  and	  subject	  
to	  its	  national	  legislation,	  take	  measures	  to	  protect	  and	  promote	  Farmers'	  Rights,	  including:	  (a)	  
protection	  of	  traditional	  knowledge	  relevant	  to	  plant	  genetic	  resources	  for	  food	  and	  agriculture;	  (b)	  
the	  right	  to	  equitably	  participate	  in	  sharing	  benefits	  arising	  from	  the	  utilization	  of	  plant	  genetic	  
resources	  for	  food	  and	  agriculture;	  and	  (c)	  the	  right	  to	  participate	  in	  making	  decisions,	  at	  the	  national	  
level,	  on	  matters	  related	  to	  the	  conservation	  and	  sustainable	  use	  of	  plant	  genetic	  resources	  for	  food	  
and	  agriculture;	  9.3	  Nothing	  in	  this	  Article	  shall	  be	  interpreted	  to	  limit	  any	  rights	  that	  farmers	  have	  to	  
save,	  use,	  exchange	  and	  sell	  farm-­‐saved	  seed/propagating	  material,	  subject	  to	  national	  law	  and	  as	  
appropriate.	  
68	   See	  www.cbd.int	  for	  information	  about	  the	  Working	  Group	  on	  Article	  8(j)	  and	  its	  work.	  
69	   The	  Akwé:Kon	  Guidelines	  were	  developed	  pursuant	  to	  task	  9	  of	  the	  programme	  of	  work	  on	   	  
Article	  8(j)	  and	  adopted	  by	  the	  Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  of	  the	  CBD	  at	  its	  5th	  meeting	  2000.	  The	  
Guidelines	  state	  their	  purpose	  as	  providing	  a	  collaborative	  framework	  within	  which	  Governments,	  
indigenous	  and	  local	  communities,	  decision	  makers	  and	  managers	  of	  developments	  can:	  a)	  Support	  
the	  full	  and	  effective	  participation	  and	  involvement	  of	  indigenous	  and	  local	  communities	  in	  screening,	  
scoping	  and	  development	  planning	  exercises;	  b)	  Properly	  take	  into	  account	  the	  cultural,	  
environmental	  and	  social	  concerns	  and	  interests	  of	  indigenous	  and	  local	  communities,	  especially	  of	  
women	  who	  often	  bear	  a	  disproportionately	  large	  share	  of	  negative	  development	  impacts;	  c)	  Take	  













The	   most	   recent,	   and	   high	   profile,	   victory	   for	   biocultural	   rights	   is	   the	   Nagoya	  
Protocol	  on	  Access	  and	  Benefit	  Sharing,71	   which	  was	  adopted	   in	  October	  2010	  by	  193	  
state	   parties	   to	   the	   CBD.	   Four	   pivotal	   biocultural	   rights	   are	   established	   which	  
significantly	  affirm	  the	  self-­‐determination	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  local	  communities.	  
They	  are	  the	  right	  to:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
as	  part	  of	  environmental,	  social	  and	  cultural	  impact-­‐assessment	  processes,	  with	  due	  regard	  to	  the	  
ownership	  of	  and	  the	  need	  for	  the	  protection	  and	  safeguarding	  of	  traditional	  knowledge,	  innovations	  
and	  practices;	  d)	  Promote	  the	  use	  of	  appropriate	  technologies;	  e)	  Identify	  and	  implement	  appropriate	  
measures	  to	  prevent	  or	  mitigate	  any	  negative	  impacts	  of	  proposed	  developments;	  f)	  Take	  into	  
consideration	  the	  interrelationships	  among	  cultural,	  environmental	  and	  social	  elements.	  See	  
www.cbd.int/doc/publications/akwe-­‐brochure-­‐en.pdf.	  Retrieved	  13th	  September	  2011.	  
70	   The	  10th	  meeting	  of	  the	  Conference	  of	  Parties	  to	  the	  CBD	  in	  2010	  adopted	  the	  Tkarihwaié:ri	  Code	  of	  
Ethical	  Conduct	  in	  its	  decision	  X/42.	  Section	  2	  of	  the	  Code	  identifies	  one	  of	  its	  main	  aims	  as	  the	  
promotion	  of	  respect	  for	  the	  cultural	  and	  intellectual	  heritage	  of	  indigenous	  and	  local	  communities	  
relevant	  for	  the	  conservation	  and	  sustainable	  use	  of	  biological	  diversity	  as	  a	  way	  of	  contributing	  to	  the	  
achievement	  of	  the	  objectives	  of	  Article	  8(j)	  of	  the	  CBD.	  One	  of	  the	  main	  elements	  of	  the	  Code	  
relevant	  for	  biocultural	  rights	  is	  Principle	  20	  dealing	  with	  Traditional	  guardianship/custodianship.	  It	  
states	  that	  “Traditional	  guardianship/custodianship	  recognizes	  the	  holistic	  interconnectedness	  of	  
humanity	  with	  ecosystems	  and	  obligations	  and	  responsibilities	  of	  indigenous	  and	  local	  communities,	  
to	  preserve	  and	  maintain	  their	  traditional	  role	  as	  traditional	  guardians	  and	  custodians	  of	  these	  
ecosystems	  through	  the	  maintenance	  of	  their	  cultures,	  spiritual	  beliefs	  and	  customary	  practices.	  
Because	  of	  this,	  cultural	  diversity,	  including	  linguistic	  diversity,	  ought	  to	  be	  recognized	  as	  keys	  to	  the	  
conservation	  and	  sustainable	  use	  of	  biological	  diversity.	   	   Therefore,	  indigenous	  and	  local	  
communities	  should,	  where	  relevant,	  be	  actively	  involved	  in	  the	  management	  of	  lands	  and	  waters	  
traditionally	  occupied	  or	  used	  by	  them,	  including	  sacred	  sites	  and	  protected	  areas.	  Indigenous	  and	  
local	  communities	  may	  also	  view	  certain	  species	  of	  plants	  and	  animals	  as	  sacred	  and,	  as	  custodians	  of	  
biological	  diversity,	  have	  responsibilities	  for	  their	  well-­‐being	  and	  sustainability,	  and	  this	  should	  be	  
respected	  and	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  all	  activities/interactions.”	  See	  
http://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/?id=12308.	  Retrieved	  13th	  September	  2011.	  
71	   http://www.cbd.int/abs/text/.	  Retrieved	  13th	  September	  2011.	  In	  the	  African	  context,	  biocultural	  rights	  
preceded	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol	  through	  the	  African	  Model	  Law	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  the	  Rights	  of	  Local	  
Communities,	  Farmers	  and	  Breeders	  and	  for	  the	  Regulation	  of	  Access	  to	  Biological	  Resources	  prepared	  
in	  1997	  by	  an	  Organization	  of	  African	  Unity	  (OAU)	  Task	  Force.	  The	  OAU	  Ministerial	  Session,	  followed	  
by	  the	  OAU	  Summit	  of	  Heads	  of	  State	  and	  Government,	  adopted	  this	  Model	  Law	  in	  Ouagadougou	  in	  
1998,	  and	  recommended	  that	  it	  be	  the	  basis	  of	  African	  national	  law.	  Article	  16	  of	  the	  African	  Model	  
Law	  states:	  The	  state	  recognizes	  the	  rights	  of	  communities	  over	  the	  following:	   	  
	   i)	  their	  biological	  resources;	   	  
	   ii)	  the	  right	  to	  collectively	  benefit	  from	  the	  use	  of	  their	  biological	  resources;	   	  
	   iii)	  their	  innovations,	  practices,	  knowledge	  and	  technologies	  acquired	  through	  generations;	   	  
	   iv)	  the	  right	  to	  collectively	  benefit	  from	  the	  utilisation	  of	  their	  innovations,	  practices,	  knowledge	  and	  
technologies;	   	  
	   v)	  their	  rights	  to	  use	  their	  innovations,	  practices,	  knowledge	  and	  technologies	  in	  the	  conservation	  and	  
sustainable	  use	  of	  biological	  diversity;	   	  













i. Traditional	  knowledge	  
ii. Genetic	  resources	  
iii. Self-­‐governance	  through	  own	  laws	  and	  community	  protocols	  
iv. Benefit	   from	   the	   utilization	   of	   traditional	   knowledge	   and	   genetic	   resources	   by	  
third	  parties	  outside	  the	  traditional	  circle.72	  
	  
While	   none	   of	   these	   rights	   are	   unqualified	   and	   all	   allow	   for	   limited	   state	  
involvement,	   they	   should	   be	   seen	   as	   substantial	   gains	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   a	   political	  
ecology.	   	  
	  
(g)	  Towards	  a	  Biocultural	  Jurisprudence	  	  
Biocultural	   rights	  have	  been	  an	  unsung	  arrival	   on	   the	   international	   legal	   stage.	   This	   is	  
primarily	  due	  to	  three	  important	  reasons:	  
	  
1) The	   justificatory	   premise	   of	   biocultural	   rights	   had	   less	   to	   do	   with	   the	   third	  
generation	   ‘group	   or	   solidarity	   rights’73	   and	   more	   to	   do	   with	   the	   crisis	   of	  
biodiversity	  loss	  and	  its	  ramifications	  for	  food,	  health	  and	  economic	  security.	  As	  
a	  result	  of	  intensi e	  lobbying	  by	  environmental	  groups	  and	  a	  growing	  mountain	  
of	   empirical	   evidence,	   states	   have	   had	   to	   make	   a	   policy	   U-­‐turn	   from	   the	  
disastrous	   ‘fines	   and	   fences’	   approach74	   to	   conservation	   –	   an	   approach	   that	  
involved	   disenfranchising	   communities	   who	   had	   historically	   occupied	   common	  
lands	  in	  favour	  of	  state	  control	  or	  private	  ownership.	  This	  policy	  U-­‐turn	  meant,	  in	  
essence,	  that	  to	  ensure	  conservation	  and	  sustainable	  use	  of	  biodiversity,	  states	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	   These	  conclusions	  have	  been	  drawn	  from	  my	  interpretation	  of	  specific	  articles	  of	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol	  
on	  Access	  and	  Benefit	  Sharing,	  the	  rationale	  for	  which	  will	  be	  elaborated	  in	  chapter	  5.	  
73	   Supra	  n.	  52.	  
74	   See	  generally,	  Suich,	  Helene	  et.al,	  Eds.	  Evolution	  and	  Innovation	  in	  Wildlife	  Conservation:	  Parks	  and	  












needed	  to	  affirm	  and	  secure	  the	  rights	  of	  communities	  who	  were	  the	  custodians	  
of	  ecosystems	  for	  generations.	  
2) Biocultural	   rights	   were	   born	   as	   the	   shadow	   twin	   of	   third	   generation	   ‘group	  
rights’.	   But	   unlike	   these	   rights,	   which	   carried	   the	   undertone	   of	   self-­‐
determination,	  and	  made	  states	  nervous,	  biocultural	  rights	  were	  predominantly	  
lobbied	  for	  under	  the	  Rio	  Conventions	  as	  ‘environmental	  rights’	  of	  communities	  
to	   ensure	   biodiversity	   conservation.	   They	   initially	   appeared	   in	   non-­‐threatening	  
forms	  such	  as	  ‘farmers	  rights’,	  ‘livestock	  keepers’	  rights’	  and	  rights	  to	  traditional	  
knowledge,	   which,	   though	   hard	   won,	   were	   not	   seen	   as	   a	   threat	   to	   state	  
sovereignty.	  
3) Biocultural	  rights	  were	  advocated	  in	  international	  environmental	  negotiations	  as	  
a	   defence	   against	   ‘biopiracy’.	   Communities,	   in	   essence,	   demanded	   state	  
protection	   against	   corporate	   theft	   of	   their	   knowledge	   and	   resources.	  With	   the	  
politically	  fraught	  legal	  landscape	  of	  the	  TRIPS	  negotiations,	  developing	  countries	  
supported	  biocultural	  rights	  as	  state	  assertions,	  using	  communities	  as	  proxies	  of	  
the	   same	   kind	   of	   intellectual	   property	   rights	   that	   companies	   and	   individuals	  
claimed,	  albeit	  in	  a	  sui-­‐generis	  form.75	  
	  
As	   a	   subset	   of	   third	   generation	   rights,	   biocultural	   rights	   have	   elements	   of	   group	  
rights	   but	   differ	   from	   the	   latter	   in	   their	   explicit	   commitment	   to	   conservation	   and	   the	  
sustainable	  use	  of	  biodiversity.	   In	  many	  ways,	  biocultural	   rights	  have	  achieved	  greater	  
recognition	   than	   group	   rights	   because	   their	   unobjectionable	   nature	   thereby	   acts	   as	   a	  
bulwark	   for	   the	   more	   difficult	   claims	   of	   third	   generation	   rights	   such	   as	   self-­‐
determination.	   	  
	  
Currently	  there	  is	  no	  research	  that	  has	  comprehensively	  describing	  the	  development	  
of	   the	   nature	   and	   content	   of	   the	   ‘biocultural	   rights’	   that	   have	   emerged	   through	  
international	  environmental	   law.	  The	   lack	  of	  an	  effective	  description	  of	  the	  biocultural	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












tendency	   in	   international	   law	   has	   led	   to	   an	   issue	   based	   fragmentation	   of	   rights	   with	  
similar	  content.	  For	  example	  despite	  the	  seeming	  differences	  between	  livestock	  keepers	  
rights,	  farmers	  rights	  and	  rights	  of	  communities	  over	  their	  forests,	  genetic	  resources	  and	  
traditional	   knowledge,	   they	   all	   have	   the	   same	   pith	   and	   substance-­‐	   i.e.	   they	   seek	   to	  
secure	  the	  stewardship	  role	  of	  communities	  over	  their	  cultures,	  lands	  and	  waters.	  
	  
From	  a	  rights	  perspective,	  the	  failure	  to	  trace	  the	  development	  of	  biocultural	  rights	  
is	  a	  crisis	  of	  significant	  proportions.	  Little	  or	  no	  effort	  has	  been	  made	  to	  consolidate	  this	  
biocultural	   jurisprudence	   into	   a	   body	   of	   knowledge	   that	   can	   be	   used	   by	   the	   very	  
communities	   who	   struggled	   for	   it.	   There	   are	   a	   number	   of	   reasons	   for	   this	   lack	   of	  
description	   and	   consolidation	   of	   biocultural	   rights	   and	   they	   all	   involve	   a	   dominant	  
political,	   economic	   and	   social	   imagination,	   which	   is	   unable	   to	   reconfigure	   itself	   to	  
embrace	  the	  notion	  of	  stewardship	  ethics.	  This	   inability	  has	  much	  to	  do	  with	   the	  very	  
foundations	   of	   market	   economy,	   dominant	   discourses	   on	   private	   property	   and	   the	  
assumptions	   about	   the	   nature	   and	   role	   of	   human	   beings	   in	   this	   context.	   It	   is	   to	  
deconstruct	  these	  assumptions	  along	  with	  making	  the	  case	  for	  biocultural	  rights	  that	  we	  












CHAPTER	  II	  –	  HOMO	  ECONOMICUS	  ON	  TRIAL:	  TOWARDS	  AN	  ETHIC	  OF	  
STEWARDSHIP	  	  
Political	  economy	  proceeds	  from	  the	  fact	  of	  private	  property.	  It	  does	  not	  explain	  
it.	  It	  grasps	  the	  material	  process	  of	  private	  property,	  the	  process	  through	  which	  it	  
actually	  passes,	  in	  general	  and	  abstract	  formulae,	  which	  it	  then	  takes	  as	  laws.	  It	  does	  not	  
comprehend	  these	  laws;	  that	  is	  it	  does	  not	  show	  how	  they	  arise	  out	  of	  nature	  of	  private	  
property.	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Biocultural	   rights	  arise	   from	  the	  confluence	  of	   the	  movement	   for	   the	  commons,	  post-­‐
development	  and	  rights	  of	  communities.	   It	   is	   indigenous	  peoples,	   farmers,	  pastoralists	  
and	   traditional	   communities	   however	   who	   are	   at	   the	   forefront	   of	   the	   struggle	   for	  
biocultural	  rights.	  For	  these	  groups,	  the	  fight	  for	  biocultural	  rights	  is	  a	  campaign	  for	  their	  
very	  survival.	  The	  relationship	  communities	  have	  with	  their	  ecosystems	  is	  for	  most	  part	  
based	  on	  what	  they	  understand	  to	  be	  their	  role	  as	  guardians	  of	  their	  ecosystems.	   	  
	  
Biocultural	   rights	  are	   therefore	  collective	   rights	  with	  a	   specific	  aim	  of	  affirming	  
the	  right	  of	  stewardship	  of	  communities	  over	  their	  lands	  and	  waters.	  These	  rights	  differ	  
from	  private	  property	  rights	  in	  that	  they	  refuse	  to	  conceive	  of	  Nature	  as	  solely	  a	  fungible	  
and	   alienable	   commodity	   with	   exchange	   value.	   Rather	   they	   seek	   to	   safeguard	   the	  
stewarding	   relation	   between	   a	   community	   and	   its	   ecosystem.	   While	   for	   most	   part	  
biocultural	  rights	  are	  asserted	  by	  communities	  that	  have	  traditionally	  had	  strong	  cultural	  
and	  spiritual	  ties	  to	  their	  lands,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  why	  they	  should	  not	  also	  be	  claimed	  
by	  urban	  communities	  aspiring	  to	  prevent	  the	  destruction	  of	  their	  local	  parks,	  wetlands,	  
lakes	  and	  trees	  in	  the	  name	  of	  development.	  Nevertheless	  further	  research	  needs	  to	  be	  
done	  to	  establish	  whether	  urban	  communities	  are	  able	  to	  develop	  and	  assert	  the	  same	  
kinds	  of	  strong	  biocultural	  relationships	  to	  their	  lands	  as	  traditional	  communities	  have.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  














This	  chapter	  will	   lay	   the	  theoretical	   foundations	  of	  biocultural	   rights	  by	  making	  
the	  case	  that	  the	  widespread	  belief	  in	  the	  naturalness	  and	  universality	  of	  market	  values	  
lacks	   the	   rigour	   of	   proper	   historical	   analysis.	   The	   chapter	  will	   then	   go	   on	   to	   establish	  
that	   it	   is	   the	   ethic	   of	   stewardship	   or	   care	   that	   is	   widespread	   amongst	   traditional	  
communities	  across	  the	  world	  while	  the	  predominance	  of	  market	  values	   is	  a	  symptom	  
of	   late	   capitalism.	   An	   argument	   will	   be	   made	   here	   that	   the	   contemporary	   global	  
movement	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  traditional	  communities	  is	  a	  strategic	  assertion	  of	  
a	   set	   pre-­‐capitalist	   values	   in	   an	   unprecedented	   political	   space	   created	   due	   to	   the	  
ecological	  crisis	  caused	  by	  capitalism.	  
	  
The	   dominant	   legal	   paradigm	   based	   on	   the	  market	   economy	   presents	   private	  
property	   rights	   and	   the	   consequent	   commodification	   of	   Nature	   as	   ahistorical	   and	  
therefore	   ‘natural’.	   This	   approach	   is	   rooted	   in	   the	   American	   absolute	   ‘castle	   or	  
ownership’	   conception	   of	   property	   that	   views	   any	   legally	   imposed	   restrictions	   on	   the	  
ability	   to	   act	   freely	   on	   one’s	   own	   land	   as	   limitations	   on	   the	   rights	   of	   the	   owner	   and	  
presumptively	  illegitimate.	  The	  use	  of	  one’s	  property	  in	  such	  an	  approach	  is	  considered	  
to	  be	  a	  ‘self-­‐regarding	  act’	  which	  means	  that	  as	  long	  as	  one’s	  actions	  on	  one’s	  land	  does	  
not	  harm	  others	  in	  any	  tangible	  way,	  one	  is	  free	  to	  do	  what	  one	  pleases.	  The	  changes	  in	  
law	   and	  morals	   over	   the	   years	   with	   the	   rise	   of	   the	  market	   economy	  meant	   that	   the	  
ownership	  conception	  of	  property	  allowed	  owners	  to	  interpret	  their	  self-­‐regarding	  acts	  
as	  including	  the	  liberty	  to	  impose	  harm	  on	  others	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  their	  property	  rights.	  
Harm	  to	  others	  in	  the	  enjoyment	  of	  one’s	  property	  became	  a	  policy	  question	  that	  was	  
answered	   not	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   public	   morals	   but	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   whether	   certain	  
limitations	   on	   absoluteness	   of	   property	   rights	   would	   adversely	   affect	   the	   market	  
economy	  (which	  was	  deemed	  to	  be	  the	  greatest	  good).77	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   Singer,	  Joseph,	  “How	  Property	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  Externalities	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  Harvard	  Law	  School	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  Research	  Paper	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   This	  private	  property	  discourse	  arising	  out	  of	  the	  market	  economy	  makes	  absurd	  
the	   questions	   put	   by	   communities,	   who	   ask	   ‘how	   did	   land	   become	   property,	   trees	  
become	   lumber,	   knowledge	   become	   intellectual	   property	   and	   life	   become	   genetic	  
resources?’	  The	  dismissal	  of	  questions	  such	  as	  these	  and	  the	  near	  omnipotence	  of	  the	  
discourse	  that	  understands	  Nature	  in	  market	  terms	  is	  what	  we	  will	  deconstruct	  here.	  
	  
Private	   property	   rights	   are	   portrayed	   in	   classical	   economics	   as	   mirroring	   a	  
psychosocial	  reality	  where	  the	  assumption	  about	  the	  character	  of	  human	  beings	  is	  one	  
of	   the	   homo	   economicus	   (a	   narrowly	   self-­‐interested	   human)	   and	   the	   character	   of	  
communities	   is	  a	  collection	  of	  commodity	  owners	  and	  consumers	  coming	  together	   for	  
mutual	  self-­‐interest.78	   The	  dominance	  of	  the	  private	  property	  rights	  discourse	  is	  taken	  
as	   a	   given	   and	   remains	   unquestioned	   in	   societies	  where	  market	   relations	   override	   all	  
other	  forms	  of	  social	  relations.	  It	  is	  this	  dominance,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  later,	  that	  spawns	  a	  
legal	  system	  requiring	  biocultural	  rights	  to	  justify	  themselves,	  whereas	  private	  property	  
rights	   that	  perceive	  Nature	   in	  purely	  economic	   terms	  and	  communities	  as	   commodity	  
producers	  are	  viewed	  as	  natural	  and	  timeless.	  It	  is	  therefore	  pertinent	  to	  interrogate	  the	  
‘naturalness’	   of	   the	   homo	   economicus	   and	   to	   historicize	   private	   property	   rights	   -­‐	   in	  
effect	  to	  question	  the	  truth	  of	  Adam	  Smith’s	  understanding	  of	  human	  nature,	  when	  he	  
asserts	   in	  his	  work	  The	  Wealth	  of	  Nations	   that	   ‘it	   is	   not	   from	   the	  benevolence	  of	   the	  
butcher,	   the	  brewer	  or	   the	  baker	   that	  we	  expect	  our	  dinner,	  but	   from	  their	   regard	   to	  
their	  self-­‐interest’.79	   	  
	  
The	  hypothesis	  here	  is	  that	  evidence	  from	  history	  and	  anthropology	  suggest	  that,	  
far	   from	   being	   natural,	   the	   homo	   economicus,	   is	   a	   social	   construction	   resulting	   from	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  “Learning	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  Books	  I-­‐III,	  New	  York:	  Penguin	  












(and	  affirming)	  capitalist	  systems	  of	  production.	  It	  is	  at	  best	  a	  reification	  of	  a	  dimension	  
of	   human	   life,	   presented	   as	   natural	   and	   timeless,	   thereby	   reinforcing	   the	   ideology	   of	  
capitalism	   through	   a	   circular	   logic.	   The	   market	   economy	   is	   presented	   as	   the	   social	  
flowering	  of	  ‘human	  nature,’	  a	  euphemism	  for	  homo	  economicus,	  thereby	  presenting	  its	  
logic	  as	  a	  biological	  imperative.	  The	  market	  economy	  then	  successfully	  closes	  this	  circle	  
by	  forcing	   individuals	  to	  behave	  like	  the	  homo	  economicus	  by	  meticulously	  eliminating	  
all	  other	  social	  opportunities	  where	  people	  may	  behave	  otherwise.	  Social	  relations	  are	  
steadily	   replaced	   with	   market	   relations,	   thereby	   ensuring	   that	   the	   homo	   economicus	  
becomes	  a	  self-­‐fulfilling	  prophecy.	   It	   is	  only	  by	  understanding	  the	  atypical	  character	  of	  
the	  predominance	  of	   the	  market	  economy	  that	  we	  will	  understand	   the	  naturalness	  of	  
biocultural	  rights.	   	  
	  
It	  is	  to	  validate	  this	  hypothesis	  we	  shall	  now	  turn.	  
	  
(a) The	  Unnaturalness	  of	  the	  Market	  Values	  	  
Homo	  economicus	   is	  not	  behind	  us,	  but	  before,	   like	   the	  moral	  man,	   the	  man	  of	  
duty,	   the	  scientific	  man	  and	   the	   reasonable	  man.	   For	  a	   long	   time	  man	  was	  something	  
quite	   different;	   and	   it	   is	   not	   so	   long	   now	   since	   he	   became	   a	   machine-­‐	   a	   calculating	  
machine.	  
Marcel	  Mauss	  -­‐	  The	  Gift:	  Forms	  and	  Functions	  of	  Exchange	  in	  Archaic	  Societies80	  
	  
Adam	  Smith’s	  The	  Wealth	  of	  Nations81	   was	  published	  in	  England	  in	  1776.	  The	  impact	  of	  
this	  text	  cannot	  be	  overestimated	  since	  it	  laid	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  market	  economy,	  
and	  its	  ramifications	  are	  felt	  to	  this	  day.	  The	  market	  economy	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  
self-­‐regulating	   system	  or,	   in	  Adam	  Smith’s	   terms,	   ‘the	   invisible	  hand	  of	   the	  market’,82	  
which	  is	  the	  synergistic	  outcome	  of	  the	  interplay	  of	  individual	  self-­‐interest.	  This	  person	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	   Mauss,	  Marcel,	  The	  Gift:	  Forms	  and	  Functions	  of	  Exchange	  in	  Archaic	  Societies,	  New	  York:	  Norton	  
Library,	  1967,	  p.	  74.	  
81	   Smith,	  Adam,	  The	  Wealth	  of	  Nations,	  Books	  I-­‐III,	  New	  York:	  Penguin	  Classics,	  1986.	  












or	  the	  homo	  economicus,	   is	   the	  philosophical	  cornerstone	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  the	  market	  
economy,	  and	  is	  based	  on	  a	  two-­‐fold	  assumption	  that	  human	  beings	  are	  fundamentally	  
motivated	  by	  self-­‐gain	  and	  that	  they	  behave	  in	  a	  manner	  to	  maximize	  this	  self-­‐gain.	   	  
	  
Adam	   Smith	   saw	   the	   market	   economy	   as	   a	   spontaneous	   and	   self-­‐regulating	  
manifestation	   of	   the	   self-­‐interested	   activities	   of	   human	   beings.	   Based	   on	   this	  
understanding	  of	  human	  nature,	   the	  only	  rational	  economic	  system	  of	  production	  and	  
distribution	  we	  could	  envisage	  is	  one	  where	  all	  activities	  are	  motivated	  by	  private	  gain.	  
As	  Smith	  says,	  it	  is	  the	  human	  being’s	  natural	  propensity	  to	  ‘truck,	  barter	  and	  exchange	  
one	  thing	  for	  another’83	   that	  leads	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  market	  economy.	   	  
	  
It	   was	   only	   in	   1944	   that	   the	   assumptions	   of	   the	   homo	   economicus	   and	   the	  
‘naturalness’	   of	   the	  market	   economy	  was	   fundamentally	   challenged	   by	   the	   economic	  
historian	   Karl	   Polanyi	   in	   his	   ground	  breaking	  work	  The	  Great	   Transformation.84	   While	  
Polanyi	  did	  not	  challenge	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  economy	  in	  all	  societies,	  he	  disagreed	  with	  
the	   assertion	   of	   a	   number	   of	   economists	   that	   gain	   or	   profit	   seeking	   made	   through	  
commodity	  exchanges	  predominated	  in	  every	  society.	  Polanyi	  noted	  that	  historically	  the	  
production	   and	   distribution	   of	   goods	   in	   societies	   was	   rooted	   in	   maintaining	   social	  
relations	   and	   affirming	   community	   rather	   than	   in	   generating	   surplus	   for	   individual	  
profit.	   	   He	  says:	  
	  
The	   outstanding	   discovery	   of	   recent	   historical	   and	   anthropological	   research	   is	  
that	  man’s	  economy,	  as	  a	  rule,	  is	  submerged	  in	  his	  social	  relationships.	  He	  does	  
not	   act	   so	   as	   to	   safeguard	   his	   individual	   interest	   in	   the	   possession	   of	  material	  
goods;	  he	  acts	  so	  as	  to	  safeguard	  his	  social	  standing,	  his	  social	  claims,	  his	  social	  
assets.	  He	  values	  material	  goods	  only	  in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  serve	  this	  end.	  Neither	  the	  
process	   of	   production	   nor	   that	   of	   distribution	   is	   linked	   to	   specific	   economic	  
interests	   attached	   to	   the	   possession	   of	   goods;	   but	   every	   single	   step	   in	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83	   Supra	  n.	  81,	  see	  Chapter	  2,	  “Of	  the	  Principle	  which	  gives	  Occasion	  to	  the	  Division	  of	  Labour.”	  
84	   Polanyi,	  Karl,	  The	  Great	  Transformation:	  The	  Political	  and	  Economic	  Origins	  of	  Our	  Time,	  Boston:	  












process	   is	   geared	   to	  a	  number	  of	   social	   interests	  which	  eventually	  ensure	   that	  
the	   required	   step	   is	   taken…the	   economic	   system	  will	   be	   run	   on	   noneconomic	  
motives.85	  
	  
Marshall	   Sahlins	   in	  his	   seminal	  work	  Stone	  Age	  Economics86	   restates	   this	  point	  
by	  noting	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘economy’	  should	  not	  be	  understood	  as	  something	  separate	  
from	  society	  but	  rather	  as:	   	  
	  
[T]he	  process	  of	  provisioning	  society	   (or	   the	  “socio-­‐cultural	   system”).	  No	  social	  
relation,	  institution,	  or	  set	  of	  institutions	  is	  of	  itself	  “economic”.	  Any	  institution,	  
say	  a	   family	  or	   a	   lineage	  order,	   if	   it	   has	  material	   consequence	   for	  provisioning	  
society	   can	   be	   placed	   in	   an	   economic	   context	   and	   considered	   part	   of	   the	  
economic	  process.	  The	  same	  institution	  may	  be	  equally	  or	  more	  involved	  in	  the	  
political	   process,	   thus	   profitably	   considered	   as	   well	   in	   a	   political	   context.	   This	  
way	  of	   looking	  at	   economics	  or	  politics-­‐	   or	   for	   that	  matter,	   religion,	   education	  
and	   any	   number	   of	   other	   cultural	   processes-­‐	   is	   dictated	   by	   the	   nature	   of	  
primitive	  culture.	  Here	  we	  find	  no	  socially	  distinct	  “economy”	  or	  “government,”	  
merely	  social	  groups	  and	  relations	  with	  multiple	  functions,	  which	  we	  distinguish	  
as	  economic,	  political	  and	  so	  forth.87	  
	  
The	  crucial	  point	  made	  by	  both	  Polanyi	  and	  Sahlins	   is	  that,	  until	  the	  nineteenth	  
century,	  contrary	  to	  popular	  myth,	  the	  economy	  was	  embedded	  in	  social	  relations.	  The	  
modern	  phenomena	  of	  social	  relations	  being	  embedded	  in	  or	  defined	  by	  the	  economy	  
were	  strongly	  resisted	  by	  communities	  in	  the	  past.88	  
	  
Production	  and	  distribution	  was	  not	  based	  on	  the	  need	  to	  create	  surplus	  for	  the	  
purposes	   of	   trade	   and	   individual	   gain,	   but	   was	   designed	   to	   meet	   the	   needs	   of	   the	  
community.89	   Hence	   for	  Polanyi,	   the	  homo	  economicus	   is	  a	   fiction	  of	   relatively	   recent	  
vintage.	   Ethnographic	   accounts	   of	   production	   and	   distribution	   in	   traditional	   societies	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	   Ibid,	  at	  44.	  
86	   Sahlins,	  Marshall,	  Stone	  Age	  Economics,	  London:	  Tavistock	  Publications,	  1972.	  
87	   Ibid,	  at	  185-­‐186.	  
88	   See	  generally,	  supra	  n.	  84.	  












show	   that	   the	   economy	   was	   not	   based	   on	   exchange	   but	   on	   the	   principles	   of	  
householding,	  reciprocity	  and	  redistribution.	   	  
	  
Householding	   was	   production	   for	   one’s	   own	   use,	   and	   was	   predominant	   in	  
agricultural	   rather	   than	  hunter	  and	  gatherer	   societies.	  Householding	  meant	   that	  what	  
one	  used	  was	  not	  procured	  through	  the	  exchange	  of	  surplus	  for	  goods	  that	  one	  needed	  
to	  survive.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  one	  produced	  to	  meet	  one’s	  essential	  needs	  first,	  and,	  only	  
if	   there	  was	   any	   surplus,	  was	   it	   exchanged.	   The	   primary	  motivation	   for	   householding	  
was	  subsistence,	  not	  gain.	  Sufficiency	  and	  not	  profit	  or	  accumulation	  was	  the	  ethic.90	   	  
	  
Redistribution	  was	  based	  on	  the	  ethic	  of	  sharing,	  and	  was	  grounded	  in	  a	  pattern	  
Polanyi	  calls	   ‘centricity’.	  A	  portion	  of	  what	  was	  produced	  by	   the	  community	  members	  
was	   given	   to	   a	   central	   political	   authority,	   such	   as	   the	   chief,	   who	   in	   turn	   ensured	   its	  
redistribution	  -­‐	  again	  belying	  the	  myth	  of	  trucking	  or	  haggling	  for	  self-­‐gain.91	   Reciprocity	  
organized	  around	   the	  pattern	  of	   ‘symmetry’	   is	  based	  on	   the	  ethic	  of	   the	  caring	   in	   the	  
‘gift	  economy’	  where	  things	  were	  gifted	  away	  to	  the	  community,	  the	  giver	  secure	  in	  the	  
knowledge	  that	  the	  community	  would	  at	  some	  point	  in	  the	  future	  reciprocate	  in	  equal	  
measure.92	   	  
	  
The	   ethics	   of	   sufficiency,	   sharing	   and	   caring	   are	   all	   interlinked.	   They	   reject	  
avarice,	  self-­‐interest	  and	  opportunism,	  the	  values	  that	  undergird	  the	  homo	  economicus,	  
as	  unnatural.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  these	  ethics	  indicate	  that	  the	  glorification	  of	  free	  markets	  
disembodied	   from	   social	   relations	   is	   a	   reality	   peculiar	   to	   capitalist	   societies.	   Polanyi	  
highlights	   the	  dangers	  of	   sacrificing	   the	  ethics	  of	   care	   at	   the	  altar	  of	   accumulation	  by	  
noting:	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	   Supra	  n.	  84,	  at	  55-­‐59	  
91	   Supra	  n.	  84,	  at	  59-­‐60.	  












To	  allow	  the	  market	  mechanism	  to	  be	  sole	  director	  of	  the	  fate	  of	  human	  beings	  
and	   their	   natural	   environment…would	   result	   in	   the	   demolition	   of	  
society….Robbed	   of	   the	   protective	   covering	   of	   cultural	   institutions,	   human	  
beings	   would	   perish	   from	   the	   effects	   of	   social	   exposure….Nature	   would	   be	  
reduced	   its	   elements	   neighbourhoods	   and	   landscapes	   defiled,	   rivers	  
polluted…no	   society	   could	   stand	   the	   effects	   of	   such	   a	   system	  of	   crude	   fictions	  
even	  for	  the	  shortest	  stretch	  of	  time	  unless	  its	  human	  and	  natural	  substance	  as	  
well	  as	  its	  business	  organization	  was	  protected	  against	  the	  ravages	  of	  this	  satanic	  
mill.93	  
	  
The	   transformation	   of	   pre-­‐capitalist	   cultures	   to	   cultures	   where	   the	   market	  
economy	  predominates	  involves	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  homo	  socialis94	   to	  the	  homo	  
economicus.	  These	  transformations	  were	  not	  without	  resistance,	  and	  the	  anthropologist	  
Michael	   Taussig,	   in	   his	   important	   work	   The	   Devil	   and	   Commodity	   Fetishism	   in	   South	  
America,95	   has	   carefully	   documented	   the	   cultural	   resistance	   of	   peasants	   inexorably	  
being	   drawn	   into	   wage	   labour.	   Taussig	   documented	   rituals	   invoking	   the	   Devil	   by	  
displaced	   Afro-­‐American	   peasants	   employed	   as	   wage	   labour	   in	   the	   sugarcane	  
plantations	  of	  the	  Cauca	  valley	  in	  Colombia,	  and	  by	  the	  dislocated	  Amerindian	  peasantry	  
working	  as	  tin	  miners	  in	  the	  Bolivian	  highlands.	   	  
	  
These	   neophyte	   proletarians	   in	   Taussig’s	   work	   make	   sense	   of	   and	   resist	   their	  
growing	   proletarianization	   by	   interpreting	   this	   turn	   of	   events	   using	   pre-­‐capitalist	  
imagery.	  The	  Devil	  in	  these	  cultures	  represents	  a	  rapacious	  being	  with	  which	  a	  pact	  can	  
be	  made	   for	   short-­‐term	  monetary	   gain,	   the	   price	   of	  which	   is	   a	   long	  march	   down	   the	  
road	  to	  perdition.	  Taussig	  notes	  that	  these	  beliefs	  will	  erode	  once	  capitalism	  becomes	  
firmly	  established	  in	  the	  cultural	  consciousness	  of	  these	  peasant	  turned	  proletarians.	  In	  
the	  meantime,	  capitalism	  will	  be	  subjected	  to	  pre-­‐capitalist	  worldviews	  that	  see	  it	  as	  the	  
‘beginning	   of	   the	   end,’	   whereby	   these	   communities	   begin	   to	   lose	   control	   over	   their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	   Supra	  n.	  84,	  at	  77.	  
94	   I	  use	  the	  term	  ‘homo	  socialis’	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  self	  in	  pre-­‐capitalist	  societies	  that	  is	  construed	  as	  a	  locus	  
of	  social	  relations	  where	  social	  obligations	  override	  self-­‐interest.	  
95	   Taussig,	  Michael,	  The	  Devil	  and	  Commodity	  Fetishism	  in	  South	  America,	  Chapel	  Hill:	  University	  of	  North	  












means	  of	  production,	  the	  social	  relations	  that	  underlie	  such	  production	  and	  therefore	  a	  
life	  world	  itself.96	  
	  
Such	  resistance	  carries	  over	  all	  the	  way	  into	  the	  twenty	  first	  century	  despite	  the	  
near	  hegemony	  of	  the	  trope	  of	  the	  homo	  economicus.	  The	  continuing	  call	  for	  biocultural	  
rights	  of	  indigenous	  peoples,	  small	  farmers	  and	  pastoralists	  across	  the	  world	  is	  evidence	  
of	  this.	  Taussig	  cites	  Malinowski,	  who	  noted	  that	  the	  white	  traders	  in	  the	  Trobriands	  had	  
great	  difficulties	  with	  the	  native	  labour	  force	  that	  they	  used	  as	  pearl	  divers.	  No	  amount	  
of	   rewards	   could	   motivate	   them	   to	   work	   beyond	   what	   the	   natives	   thought	   was	  
absolutely	   necessary	   to	   exchange	   pearls	   for	   the	   tobacco	   that	   the	   traders	   bartered.	  
Malinowski	   noted	   that	   the	   Trobriander	   was	   contemptuous	   of	   the	   trader’s	   infantile	  
obsession	  with	  pearls	  and	  he	  says	  that:	  
	  
[T]he	  greatest	  bribery	  and	  economic	   lures,	  the	  personal	  pressures	  of	  the	  White	  
trader	  and	  competitive	  keenness	  of	  wealth,	  [could	  not]	  make	  the	  native	  give	  up	  
his	  own	  pursuits	  for	  those	  foisted	  upon	  him.	  “When	  the	  gardens	  are	  in	  full	  swing	  
the	   god-­‐damn	   niggers	   won’t	   swim	   even	   if	   you	   stuff	   them	   with	   kaloma	   and	  
tobacco”,	  as	  it	  was	  pointed	  out	  to	  me	  by	  one	  of	  my	  trader	  friends.97	  
	  
Taussig	  provides	  further	  examples	  of	  pre-­‐capitalist	  meaning	  systems	  interpreting	  
the	  capitalist	  turn	  by	  highlighting	  the	  resistance	  of	  the	  Bakweri	  of	  Western	  Cameroon	  to	  
German	   and	   British	   banana	   plantations.	   Those	   Bakweri	   who	   ended	   up	   becoming	  
financially	  better	  off	  by	  working	  as	  wage	   labour	   in	   the	  plantations	  were	   suspected	  by	  
their	  kinsmen	  of	  witchcraft.	  They	  were	  accused	  of	  killing	  their	  relatives	  and	  children,	  and	  
turning	  them	  into	  zombies	  that	  were	  made	  to	  work	  in	  distant	  mountains.98	   	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	   See	  generally,	  ibid.	  
97	   Malinowski,	  Bronislaw,	  The	  Coral	  Gardens	  and	  Their	  Magic,	  Vol.	  1,	  Bloomington:	  University	  of	  Indiana	  
Press,	  1965,	  pp.	  19-­‐20	  cited	  in	  ibid	  at	  19.	  
98	   Ibid,	  at	  20;	  Taussig	  notes	  that	  the	  word	  ‘zombie’	  comes	  from	  the	  word	  sombi	  meaning	  to	  pledge	  or	  












Polanyi’s	  conclusions	  about	  the	  ahistorical	  nature	  of	   the	  homo	  economicus	  and	  
Taussig’s	   evidence	   of	   the	   active	   resistance	   of	   pre-­‐capitalist	   cultures	   to	   this	   trope	   is	  
summed	   up	   by	   Max	   Weber	   in	   The	   Protestant	   Ethic	   and	   the	   Spirit	   of	   Capitalism.99	  
Highlighting	  the	  difficulty	  of	  substituting	  the	  homo	  socialis	  with	  the	  homo	  economicus,	  
Weber	  comments:	   	  
	  
Labour	  must…be	  performed	  as	  if	   it	  were	  an	  absolute	  end	  in	  itself,	  a	  calling.	  But	  
such	  an	  attitude	  is	  by	  no	  means	  a	  product	  of	  nature.	  It	  cannot	  be	  evoked	  by	  low	  
wages	   or	   high	   ones	   alone,	   but	   can	  only	   be	   the	   product	   of	   a	   long	   and	   arduous	  
process	   of	   education.	   Today,	   capitalism	   once	   in	   the	   saddle,	   can	   recruit	   its	  
labouring	  force	  in	  all	  industrial	  countries	  with	  comparative	  ease.	  In	  the	  past	  this	  
was	  in	  every	  case	  an	  extremely	  difficult	  problem.100	  
	  
	  
(b)	  The	  Ethics	  of	  Stewardship	  
	  
For	  it	  is	  in	  giving	  that	  we	  receive.	  
Prayer	  of	  St.	  Francis	  of	  Assisi101	  
	   	  
Environmental	   educationist,	   Chet	   Bowers,	   notes	   that	   our	   relationship	   with	   Nature	  
informs	  our	  ‘root	  metaphors’	  and	  vice	  versa.	  Root	  metaphors	  in	  language	  constitute	  our	  
worldview	  and	  become	  the	  furrows	  through	  which	  our	  thoughts	  flow	  -­‐	  creating	  thought	  
patterns	  or	  mind-­‐sets.	  While	  the	  central	  ‘root	  metaphor’	  of	  biocultural	  rights	  is	  that	  of	  a	  
‘web	   of	   life’	   the	   root	   metaphor	   of	   private	   property	   rights	   is	   one	   of	   the	   ‘homo	  
economicus’	   where	   Nature	   is	   understood	   as	   ‘resources’.	   On	   this	   metaphor	   is	   based	  
other	   secondary,	   or	   what	   Bowers	   terms	   iconic	   metaphors,	   such	   as	   the	   ‘gain’	   that	  
contributes	  to	  a	  market	  worldview,	  where	  Nature	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  ‘commodity’	  that	  must	  be	  
‘traded’	  and	  used	  ‘profitably’.102	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	   Weber,	  Max,	  The	  Protestant	  Ethic	  and	  the	  Spirit	  of	  Capitalism,	  New	  York:	  Charles	  Scribner’s	  Sons,	  1950.	  
100	   Ibid,	  at	  62.	  
101	   Page,	  Kirby,	  Living	  Courageously,	  New	  York:	  Farrar	  &	  Rinehart,	  Inc.,	  1936.	  
102	   Bowers,	  Chet,	  The	  Culture	  of	  Denial:	  Why	  the	  Environmental	  Movement	  needs	  a	  Strategy	  for	  













The	  principle	  of	  stewardship	  that	  forms	  the	  content	  of	  biocultural	  rights	  is	  based	  
on	   the	   root	   metaphor	   of	   the	   ‘web	   of	   life’.	   Ethics	   of	   sufficiency,	   sharing	   and	   caring	  
alluded	   to	  by	  Polanyi	   are	  at	   their	   core	   the	  glue	   that	  binds	  a	   community	   together	   and	  
directs	  their	  relationship	  with	  Nature.	   	  
	  
The	   Gunis,	   who	   are	   traditional	   healers	   in	   Central	   and	   Western	   India,	   name	  
themselves	  after	   the	  word	   ‘guna’,	  which	  means	  both	  healing	  and	  virtue.	  They	  believe	  
that	  the	  efficacy	  of	  their	  healing	  practices	  is	  linked	  to	  their	  spiritual	  bond	  with	  the	  plant	  
kingdom.	  In	  their	  biocultural	  community	  protocol	  they	  stress	  their	  kinship	  with	  the	  plant	  
world	  where	  plants	  appear	  in	  their	  dreams	  offering	  themselves	  as	  antidotes	  to	  ailments	  
the	   Gunis	   intend	   to	   treat.	   The	   Gunis	   then	   offer	   prayers	   to	   the	   plant	   requesting	   its	  
healing	  power	  and	  seeking	  permission	  to	  harvest	  a	  portion	  of	   it,	  promising	  not	  to	  hurt	  
the	   plant.	   Selfless	   service	   to	   the	   community	   is	   integral	   to	   the	   Guni	   dharma	   (ethical	  
duty),	   and	   the	   Gunis	   see	   themselves	   as	   guardians	   of	   both	   the	   physical	   and	   spiritual	  
wellbeing	  of	  all.103	  
	  
The	   Gunis	   have	   an	   aphorism	   in	   Hindi	   that	   sums	   up	   the	   Guni	   dharma:	   Daya	  
dharam	   ka	  mool	   hai,	   paap	   ka	  mool	   abhiman.	  This	   is	   translated	   as	   ‘compassion	   is	   the	  
root	  of	  virtue,	  and	  the	  root	  of	  wrongdoing	  is	  self-­‐centeredness’.	  This	  aphorism	  goes	  to	  
the	   heart	   of	   stewardship	   ethics	   of	   sufficiency,	   sharing	   and	   caring,	   and	   connects	   the	  
Gunis	  to	  other	  groups	  of	  traditional	  healers	  like	  the	  Vaidyas104	   of	  the	  Malayalee	  hills	  in	  
South	   India	   and	   the	   healers	   of	   Bushbuckridge105	   in	   South	   Africa:	   Groups	  with	   similar	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206.	  See	  also,	  Bowers,	  Chet,	  “Towards	  an	  Eco-­‐Justice	  Pedagogy”,	  
http://www.cabowers.net/CAbookarticle.php.	  Retrieved	  13th	  September	  2011.	   	  
103	   From	  the	  biocultural	  community	  protocol	  of	  the	  Gunis	  on	  the	  resources	  page	  of	  
www.naturaljustice.org.	  Retrieved	  13th	  September	  2011.	  Biocultural	  community	  protocols	  are	  
discussed	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  IX	  of	  this	  work.	  
104	   From	  the	  community	  protocol	  of	  the	  Vaidyas	  on	  the	  resources	  page	  of	  www.naturaljustice.org.	  
Retrieved	  13th	  September	  2011.	  
105	   From	  the	  community	  protocol	  of	  the	  traditional	  healers	  of	  Bushbuckridge	  on	  the	  resources	  page	  of	  












ethics	  that	  radically	  break	  from	  the	  values	  of	  the	  homo	  economicus	  notwithstanding	  the	  
diversity	  of	  their	  contexts	  and	  cultures,	  have	  nurtured	  their	  ecosystems	  as	  an	  extension	  
of	   themselves.	  The	  Vaidyas	   for	  example	  pick	   leaves	  of	  medicinal	  herbs	  only	  with	   their	  
thumb	  and	   little	   finger	   so	  as	   to	  minimize	  pain	   to	   the	  plant.	  Every	   time	   they	  harvest	  a	  
plant,	  they	  sprinkle	  its	  seeds	  upstream	  so	  the	  water	  would	  carry	  the	  seeds	  downstream	  
spreading	  them	  along	  its	  banks.106	  
	  
The	   ‘gift	   economy’	   of	   communities	   has	   been	   highlighted	   by	   ethnographers	   as	  
perhaps	   one	   of	   the	   most	   resounding	   arguments	   against	   the	   paradigm	   of	   the	   homo	  
economicus.	   Amongst	   the	   most	   written	   about	   examples,	   are	   those	   that	   have	   been	  
studied	   by	   Bronislaw	   Malinowski.	   He	   observes	   the	   Kula	   gift	   tradition	   of	   the	   Massim	  
peoples	   of	   the	   South	   Sea	   Islands	   near	   the	   eastern	   tip	   of	   New	   Guinea,	   as	   embodying	  
some	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  values	  of	  community.107	   The	  continual	  movement	  of	  Kula	  
gifts,	  as	  armbands	  or	  necklaces,	  around	  the	  Massim	  archipelago	  affirmed	  the	   leitmotif	  
of	  the	  ethic	  of	  stewardship	  through	  the	  circle	  of	  gift	  exchange.	   	  
	  
Malinowski	   makes	   a	   careful	   distinction	   between	   the	   Kula	   gift	   exchange	   and	  
barter	  by	  arguing:	   	  
	  
The	  main	  principle	  underlying	  the	  regulations	  of	  actual	  exchange	  is	  that	  the	  Kula	  
consists	   in	  bestowing	  of	  a	  ceremonial	  gift	  that	  must	  be	  repaid	  by	  an	  equivalent	  
counter-­‐gift….The	  natives	  sharply	  distinguish	   it	   from	  barter	  which	   they	  practice	  
extensively….Often,	   when	   criticizing	   an	   incorrect,	   too	   hasty,	   or	   indecorous	  
procedure	   of	   Kula,	   they	   will	   say-­‐“He	   conducts	   his	   Kula	   as	   if	   it	   were	   gimwali	  
(barter)”…the	  equivalence	  of	  the	  counter-­‐gift	  is	  left	  to	  the	  giver,	  and	  it	  cannot	  be	  
enforced	  by	  any	  kind	  of	  coercion.108	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  n.104.	  
107	   Malinowski,	  Bronislaw,	  Argonauts	  of	  the	  Western	  Pacific,	  London:	  Routledge	  and	  Sons,	  1922.	  
108	   Malinowski,	  Bronislaw,	  “The	  Kula”,	  Primitive	  Heritage:	  An	  Anthropological	  Anthology,	  Mead,	  Margaret	  












Making	  a	  sharp	  break	  from	  the	  myth	  of	  the	  homo	  economicus,	  Malinowski	  asks	  
what	  is	  it	  amongst	  the	  culture	  of	  the	  Massim	  people	  that	  ensured	  the	  counter-­‐gift?	  To	  
this	  question	  he	  responds:	   	  
	  
The	   great	  misconception	   of	   attributing	   to	   the	   savage	   a	   pure	   economic	   nature,	  
might	  lead	  us	  to	  reason	  incorrectly	  thus-­‐The	  passion	  of	  acquiring,	  the	  loathing	  to	  
lose	   or	   give	   away	   is	   the	   fundamental	   and	   most	   primitive	   element	   in	   man’s	  
attitude	  to	  wealth....	  The	  fundamental	  error	   in	  this	  reasoning	   is	  that	   it	  assumes	  
that	  “primitive	  man,”	  as	  represented	  by	  the	  present	  day	  savage,	  lives,	  at	  least	  in	  
economic	  matters	  untrammeled	  by	  conventions	  and	  social	  restrictions.	  Quite	  the	  
reverse	  is	  the	  case.109	  
	  
Malinowski	  concludes	  by	  emphasizing	   the	  strong	  social	  obligation	   to	   ‘give’	   that	  
overrides	  the	  economic	  imperative	  to	  ‘take	  or	  keep’:	   	  
	  
This	  (Kula)	  social	  code…lays	  down	  that	  to	  possess	  is	  to	  be	  great,	  and	  that	  wealth	  
is	  the	  indispensable	  appanage	  of	  social	  rank	  and	  attribute	  of	  personal	  virtue.	  But	  
the	   important	   point	   is	   that	   with	   them	   (the	  Massim)	   to	   possess	   is	   to	   give	   (my	  
emphasis)-­‐	  here	  the	  natives	  differ	  from	  us	  notably.110	  
	  
Every	  individual	  who	  receives	  a	  Kula	  gift	  is	  a	  recipient	  of	  an	  act	  of	  generosity	  and	  
he	  is	  therefore	  a	  steward	  of	  this	  ethic	  and	  must	  bestow	  generosity	  in	  equal	  measure	  on	  
another	  person.	  The	  gift	  cannot	  be	  used	  as	  capital	  nor	  is	  it	  based	  on	  a	  bargain.	  On	  the	  
contrary	   it	   is	  the	  vehicle	  through	  which	  the	   individual	  self-­‐expands	   into	  the	  communal	  
self.	  
	  
	   Lewis	  Hyde	  in	  his	  extraordinary	  work	  The	  Gift:	  How	  the	  Creative	  Spirit	  Transforms	  
the	  World,111	   analyses	  the	  ethos	  of	  stewardship	  that	  is	  developed	  through	  gift	  exchange	  
between	  the	  Maori	  and	  Nature.	  The	  Maori	  word	  hau	  is	  translated	  as	  ‘spirit’-­‐	  which	  is	  the	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   Ibid,	  at	  374.	  
110	   Ibid,	  at	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‘spirit’	  of	  the	  gift	  and	  of	  the	  forest	  that	  gives	  food.	  When	  hunters	  return	  with	  birds	  that	  
they	  have	  hunted,	  they	  give	  some	  of	  the	  kill	  to	  the	  priests,	  who	  cook	  it	  over	  the	  sacred	  
fire	  in	  a	  ceremony	  called	  whangai	  hau,	  which	  means	  nourishing	  the	  hau	  or	  feeding	  the	  
spirit.	  They	  then	  eat	  some	  of	   it	  and	  prepare	  a	   talisman,	  which	   is	  called	  the	  mauri,	   the	  
physical	  embodiment	  of	  hau	  of	   the	   forest.	  The	  mauri	   is	   then	  given	  back	   to	   the	   forest,	  
which	  is	  believed	  to	  cause	  the	  birds	  to	  be	  abundant.112	   	  
	  
	   Hyde	  emphasizes	   the	  point	   that	   the	  movement	  of	   the	  gift	  has	   to	  go	  beyond	   the	  
mutual	   reciprocity	   of	   two	   for	   it	   to	   become	   an	   ethic	   of	   giving.	   This	   ethic	   is	   born	   only	  
when	  what	  is	  valued	  is	  shared	  or	  given	  without	  an	  immediate	  expectation	  of	  equivalent	  
return.	  The	  value	  of	  the	  gift	  lies	  in	  its	  movement,	  and	  the	  movement	  of	  the	  gift	  from	  the	  
forest	  to	  the	  hunters	  to	  the	  priests	  and	  back	  to	  the	  forest,	  expands	  the	  tribe	  to	  include	  
Nature	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  widening	  ethical	  circle.	  Hyde	  says:	  
	  
Every	  gift	  calls	  for	  a	  return	  gift,	  and	  so,	  by	  placing	  the	  gift	  back	  in	  the	  forest,	  the	  
priests	   treat	   the	   birds	   as	   a	   gift	   of	   nature.	   We	   now	   understand	   this	   to	   be	  
ecological….Widening	   the	   study	   of	   ecology	   to	   include	   man	   means	   to	   look	   at	  
ourselves	   as	   a	   part	   of	   nature	   again,	   not	   its	   lord…So	   the	   circle	   is	   a	   sign	   of	   an	  
ecological	   insight	  as	  much	  as	  of	  gift	  exchange.	  We	  come	  to	  feel	  ourselves	  as	  one	  
part	   of	   a	   large	   self-­‐regulating	   system.	   The	   return	   gift,	   the	   “nourishing	   hau,”	   is	  
literally	   feedback,	   as	   they	   say	   in	   cybernetics.	  Without	   it,	   that	   is	   to	   say,	  with	   the	  
exercise	   of	   any	   greed	   or	   arrogance	   of	   will,	   the	   cycle	   is	   broken….The	   forest’s	  
abundance	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  consequence	  of	  man’s	  treating	  its	  wealth	  as	  a	  gift.113	   	  
	  
	   Redistribution	  and	  reciprocity	  is	  not	  restricted	  to	  the	  Massim	  or	  the	  Maori.	  Among	  
the	  /Xam	  San	  of	  the	  Northern	  Cape,	  if	  three	  hunters	  tracked	  and	  killed	  a	  springbok,	  the	  
division	  of	   the	  meat	  would	  be	  made	  by	   the	  other	   two	  hunters	  whose	   arrows	  did	   not	  
make	   the	   kill.	   Lorna	   Marshall	   records	   that	   with	   the	   !Xun-­‐speaking-­‐	   San	   of	   the	   Nyae	  
Nyae,	  the	  hunter	  was	  obliged	  to	  share	  the	  meat	  with	  the	  one	  who	  gave	  him	  the	  arrow	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   Ibid,	  at	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that	  secured	  the	  kill,	  who	  in	  turn	  shared	  the	  meat	  with	  another	  from	  whom	  he	  received	  
the	  arrow.	  She	  notes	  that	  the	  system	  of	  sharing	  meat	  and	  exchanging	  of	  arrows	  ensured	  
that	  the	  hunter	  who	  made	  the	  kill	  received	  less	  meat	  than	  those	  further	  down	  the	  line	  
of	   distribution,	   thus	   affirming	   the	   ethic	   of	   sharing	   and	   caring	   on	   which	   the	   clan	  
depended.	  As	  was	  pointed	  out	  by	  the	  missionary,	  Robert	  Moffat,	  amongst	  the	  /Xam,	  the	  
one	  who	  received	  food	  gifts	  from	  the	  Dutch	  farmers,	  retained	  the	  least	  for	  himself	  and	  
redistributed	  the	  rest.114	  
	  
	   The	   struggle	   by	   communities	   for	   biocultural	   rights	   should	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   struggle	  
against	   the	  dominance	  of	   the	  market	  economy	  and	   the	  erosion	  of	  an	  ethical	  universe	  
that	   accompanies	   such	   a	  mode	   of	   production.	   The	   ethics	   of	   stewardship	   asserted	   by	  
these	   communities	   have	   found	   unprecedented	   traction	   in	   emerging	   international	  
environmental	   law	   at	   a	   time	   when	   capitalism’s	   Achilles	   heel	   has	   been	   exposed:	   the	  
environmental	  crisis	  caused	  by	  the	  homo	  economicus.	  The	  call	  for	  biocultural	  rights	  no	  
longer	   seems	   an	   anachronistic	   claim	   of	   ‘primitive	   traditionalism’	   but	   a	   fight	   for	   our	  
collective	   future.	   In	   fact,	   these	   pre-­‐capitalist	   values	   in	   the	   form	  of	   stewardship	   ethics	  
appear	  as	  a	  clarion	  call	  for	  a	  world	  where	  our	  obligations	  to	  the	  planet	  are	  no	  longer	  the	  
epiphenomenon	  of	  market	  relations.	  
	  
	   In	   their	   biocultural	   community	   protocol,	   the	  Maldhari	   pastoralists	   of	   Kachchh	   in	  
Western	   India115	   describe	   their	   stewardship	  duties	   towards	   the	  Banni	   (the	  grasslands)	  
and	   their	   unique	   buffalo	   breeds,	   as	   being	   entrusted	   to	   them	  by	  Nature	   itself.	   Nature	  
here	   is	   the	   guardian	   of	   the	   Maldhari	   way	   of	   life,	   and	   the	   Maldharis	   have	   seen	  
themselves	  as	  its	  stewards	  for	  the	  last	  450	  years.	  The	  fragile	  Banni	  ecosystem,	  and	  the	  
harsh	  droughts	  of	  Kachchh,	  are	  the	  very	  conditions	  that	  hold	  the	  Maldhari	  communities	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together,	  and	  bind	  them	  to	  Nature.	  Unaided,	  the	  homo	  economicus	  will	  not	  survive	  the	  
fierceness	   of	   Kachchh,	   but	   sufficiency,	   sharing	   and	   caring	   have	   seen	   the	   Maldhari	  
through	  for	  nearly	  half	  a	  millennium.	  
	  
(c)	  The	  Philosophy	  of	  Praxis	   	  	  
	   ‘Ethnographic	  reports	  speak	  of	  “the	  transpersonal	  self”	  (Native	  Americans),	  of	  the	  
self	   as	   “a	   locus	   of	   shared	   social	   relations	   or	   shared	   biographies”	   (Caroline	   Islands),	   of	  
persons	  as	  “the	  plural	  and	  composite	  site	  of	  the	  relationships	  that	  produced	  them”	  (New	  
Guinea	   Highlands)….Clearly	   the	   self	   in	   these	   societies	   is	   not	   synonymous	   with	   the	  
bounded,	   unitary	   and	   autonomous	   individual….Rather,	   the	   individual	   is	   the	   locus	   of	  
multiple	  other	  selves	  with	  whom	  he	  or	  she	  is	  joined	  in	  mutual	  relations	  of	  being;	  even	  as,	  
for	  the	  same	  reason,	  any	  person’s	  self	  is	  more	  or	  less	  widely	  distributed	  among	  others.	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Marshall	  Sahlins,	  The	  Western	  Illusion	  of	  Human	  Nature116	  
	  
Historicizing	   the	   homo	   economicus	   and	   challenging	   its	   apparent	   universality	   with	  
examples	   of	   stewardship	   necessarily	   begs	   the	   question	   of	   the	   ‘essential’	   nature	   of	  
human	  beings.	  Is	  the	  human	  essence	  best	  represented	  by	  the	  homo	  economicus	  or	  the	  
homo	   socialis?	   Hitherto,	   efforts	   at	   providing	   ethnographic	   and	   historical	   evidence	   of	  
stewardship	  ethics	  amongst	  pre-­‐capitalist	  communities	  aimed	  to	  refute	  the	  universality	  
of	   the	   paradigm	   of	   homo	   economicus.	   	   The	   argument	   so	   far	   has	   attempted	   to	  
destabilize	   assertions	   by	   market	   economists	   from	   Adam	   Smith	   onwards,	   that	   the	  
essence	  of	  human	  beings	  is	  ‘self	  interest’,	  together	  with	  claims	  by	  political	  philosophers	  
of	   the	   ‘social	   contract’	   variety	   (which	   echo	   the	   Hobbesian	   view	   that	   in	   the	   state	   of	  
nature,	  the	  life	  of	  man	  is	  ‘solitary,	  poor,	  nasty,	  brutish	  and	  short.’117).	  
	  
	   Any	   question	   regarding	   the	   ‘essential	   nature’	   of	   human	   beings	   is	   moot	   since	   it	  
spawns	   an	   inconclusive	   debate,	   which	   presumes	   an	   immutable	   human	   essence	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116	   Sahlins,	  Marshall,	  The	  Western	  Illusion	  of	  Human	  Nature,	  Chicago:	  Prickly	  Paradigm	  Press,	  2008,	  p.	  48.	  
117	   Hobbes,	  Thomas,	  Leviathan	  or	  the	  Matter,	  Form	  and	  Power	  of	  the	  Commonwealth,	  London:	  Printed	  












stands	   outside	   history	   and	   the	   material	   conditions	   of	   life.	   Every	   example	   of	   human	  
altruism	   is	   presented	   with	   a	   counter	   example	   of	   human	   covetousness.	   Our	  
understanding	   of	   the	   struggle	   for	   biocultural	   rights	   disengages	   from	   this	   question	   by	  
presenting	  the	  struggle	  of	  communities	  as	  a	  ‘philosophy	  of	  praxis’.118	  
	  
	   The	   ‘philosophy	   of	   praxis’	   implies	   a	   unity	   between	   theory	   and	   practice,	   and	  
suggests	   that	   the	   essence	   of	   human	   beings	   is	   not	   a	   question	   that	   can	   be	   answered	  
outside	   history	   and	   social	   context,	   but,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   needs	   to	   be	   worked	   out	   in	  
practice	   or	   action.	   Such	   an	   understanding	   facilitates	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   political	  
mobilization	   of	   communities	   for	   biocultural	   rights	   as	   progressive	   action	   towards	   the	  
ethics	  of	  stewardship	  rather	  than	  merely	  romanticizing	  of	  a	  pre-­‐capitalist	  way	  of	  life.	  It	  is	  
imperative	   to	   bear	   in	  mind	   that	   the	   call	   for	   biocultural	   rights	   is	   not	   a	   call	   for	   cultural	  
relativism	  or	  for	  supporting	  everything	  traditional,	  but	  specifically	  a	  call	  for	  rejecting	  the	  
hegemony	  of	  market	  values	  and	  affirming	  the	  ethics	  of	  stewardship	  towards	  Nature.	  
	  
	   Among	   the	   most	   significant	   challenges	   to	   the	   notion	   of	   an	   immutable	   human	  
nature	  was	  the	  one	  posed	  by	  Marx	  who	  stated:	   	  
	  
It	  is	  not	  the	  consciousness	  of	  men	  that	  determines	  their	  existence,	  but	  their	  social	  
existence	  that	  determines	  their	  consciousness.119	   	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118	   The	  ‘philosophy	  of	  praxis’	  is	  a	  term	  used	  by	  the	  Italian	  Marxist	  Antonio	  Gramsci	  in	  his	  Prison	  
Notebooks	  to	  indicate	  ‘absolute	  historicism	  and	  the	  absolute	  bringing	  down	  to	  earth	  and	  worldliness	  
of	  thought’,	  infra	  n.	  131,	  at	  429.	  
119	   Marx,	  Karl,	  “Preface	  to	  A	  Contribution	  to	  the	  Critique	  of	  Political	  Economy”,	  supra	  n.	  76	  at	  425;	  Marx’s	  
statement	  here	  reflects	  the	  early	  disagreements	  that	  Marx	  and	  Engels	  had	  with	  the	  Young	  Hegelians	  
especially	  Ludwig	  Feuerbach,	  Bruno	  Bauer	  and	  Max	  Stirner.	  The	  Young	  Hegelians	  were	  left	  leaning	  
followers	  of	  Hegel	  who	  after	  his	  death,	  used	  aspects	  of	  his	  thought	  to	  reclaim	  for	  humanity	  its	  essence,	  
which	  they	  argued	  had	  been	  projected	  onto	  Christianity	  and	  the	  Prussian	  state,	  leaving	  human	  beings	  
empty.	  If	  the	  homo	  economicus	  is	  one	  universal	  model	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  humanity,	  the	  Young	  
Hegelians	  in	  their	  efforts	  to	  reclaim	  human	  essence	  from	  religion	  and	  the	  state	  were	  developing	  
another	  universal	  model	  of	  human	  essence.	  Marx’s	  criticism	  of	  the	  Young	  Hegelians	  stemmed	  from	  his	  
fundamental	  disagreement	  with	  the	  very	  quest	  for	  a	  universal	  human	  essence	  separate	  from	  the	  












	   In	  his	  Theses	  on	  Feuerbach120	   written	   in	  1845,	  Marx	   criticizes	   Ludwig	  Feuerbach	  
for	  his	  views	  that	  human	  beings	  alienate	  themselves	  from	  their	  essence	  by	  attributing	  to	  
God	   qualities	   that	   are	   the	   basis	   of	   humanity.	   The	   basis	   of	   Marx’s	   criticism	   was	   that	  
despite	  Feuerbach’s	  best	  intentions,	  he	  was	  calling	  for	  reclamation	  of	  a	  human	  essence,	  
which	  was	  presented	  as	  unhistorical	  and	  theoretical.	  Marx	  makes	  his	  disagreement	  clear	  
by	  stating	  that:	   	  
	  
Feuerbach	  resolves	  the	  religious	  essence	  into	  the	  human	  essence.	  But	  the	  human	  
essence	   is	  no	  abstraction	   inherent	   in	  each	  single	   individual.	   In	   its	   reality	   it	   is	   the	  
ensemble	  of	  the	  social	  relations	  (my	  emphasis).121	   	  
	  
	   Marx	   further	   goes	  on	   to	   state	   that	   this	   Feuerbach’s	   attempt	   to	   seek	   a	   universal	  
human	  essence	  forces	  him	  to:	  
	  
Abstract	   from	   the	   historical	   process	   and	   to	   fix	   the	   religious	   sentiment	   as	  
something	   by	   itself	   and	   to	   presuppose	   an	   abstract-­‐	   isolated-­‐	   human	  
individual….Feuerbach,	  consequently,	  does	  not	  see	  that	  the	  religious	  sentiment	  is	  
itself	  a	  social	  product,	  and	  that	  the	  abstract	  individual	  whom	  he	  analyses	  belongs	  
to	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  society.122	  
	  
	   For	   Marx,	   therefore,	   human	   essence	   is	   relational	   or	   what	   he	   terms	   as	   the	  
‘ensemble	  of	  social	  relations’.	  French	  Marxist	  philosopher,	  Etienne	  Balibar,	  refers	  to	  this	  
understanding	  of	  ‘human	  essence’	  as	  transindividuality.	   	  
	  
The	  only	  true	  subject	  (for	  Marx)	  is	  the	  practical	  subject	  or	  the	  subject	  of	  practice	  
or	   better	   still,	   that	   the	   subject	   is	   nothing	   other	   than	   practice	  which	   has	   always	  
already	  begun	  and	  continues	  indefinitely.123	   	  
	  
	   Marx	  and	  Engels	  elaborate	  on	  this	  practice	  in	  their	  work	  The	  German	  Ideology	  that	  
was	   also	   written	   in	   1845,	   after	   the	   initial	   notes	   that	   Marx	   made	   in	   the	   Thesis	   on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120	   Ibid,	  “Concerning	  Feuerbach”,	  at	  421.	  
121	   Ibid,	  at	  423.	  
122	   Ibid.	  












Feuerbach.124	   In	   The	   German	   Ideology,125	   Marx	   develops	   the	   thesis	   that	   there	   is	   no	  
human	  essence	  standing	  outside	  history,	  and	  human	  history	  begins	  with	  the	  production	  
of	  means	  of	  subsistence.	  Hence	  for	  Marx,	  ‘the	  nature	  of	  individuals	  thus	  depends	  on	  the	  
material	  conditions	  determining	  their	  production’.126	  
	  
	   Marx	   disagrees	   with	   philosophers	   who	   argue	   that	   ‘liberation’	   of	   humankind	   is	  
achieved	  by	  developing	  true	  ‘self-­‐consciousness’.	  He	  emphasizes	  that	  real	  liberation	  can	  
only	  be	  achieved	  in	  the	  ‘real	  world’	  using	  ‘real	  means’.127	   ‘Consciousness’	  then	  for	  Marx	  
is	   a	   social	   product;	   it	   is	   always	   a	   consciousness	  of	   something.	  Marx	   affirms	   that:	   ‘The	  
production	  of	  ideas,	  of	  conceptions,	  of	  consciousness,	  is	  at	  first	  directly	  interwoven	  with	  
the	  material	   activity	   and	   the	  material	   intercourse	  of	  men,	   the	   language	  of	   real	   life’128	  
and	  ‘Life	  is	  not	  determined	  by	  consciousness,	  but	  consciousness	  by	  life’.129	   In	  essence,	  
Marx’s	  argument	  is	  that	  human	  essence	  is	  not	  a	  ‘noun’	  but	  a	  ‘verb’.	  It	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  
continual	   dialectic	   between	   consciousness	   and	   the	   world.	   Hence	   our	   real	   nature	   or	  
essence	  cannot	  be	  determined	  outside	  of	  practice.	  We	  are	  or	  rather	  we	  become	  what	  
we	  do.	  
	  
	   Nearly	   60	   years	   after	  Marx’s	   polemic	   against	   the	   Young	   Hegelians,	   the	   eminent	  
American	  psychologist	  and	  philosopher	  William	  James	  corroborated	  these	  insights	   into	  
the	   nature	   of	   consciousness.	   James	   argued	   that	   the	   only	   thing	   that	   exists	   is	   pure	  
experience,	  which	   is	  split	   into	  the	  experiencing	  subject	  and	  the	  experienced	  object,	  or	  
knower	  and	  known.	  James	  concluded	  that:	   	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124	   Supra	  n.	  115.	  
125	   Marx,	  Karl	  and	  Engels,	  Friedrich,	  The	  German	  Ideology,	  http://faculty.rcc.edu/sellick/The	  German	  
Ideology.pdf.	  Retrieved	  13th	  September	  2011.	  
126	   Ibid,	  at	  5.	   	  
127	   Ibid,	  at	  14.	  
128	   Ibid,	  at	  7.	  












Experience...has	  no	  such	  inner	  duplicity;	  and	  the	  separation	  of	  it	  into	  consciousness	  
and	   content	   comes,	   not	   by	   way	   of	   subtraction,	   but	   by	   way	   of	   addition	   -­‐-­‐	   the	  
addition,	  to	  a	  given	  concrete	  piece	  of	  it	  (experience),	  other	  sets	  of	  experiences,	  in	  
connection	   with	   which	   severally	   its	   use	   or	   function	   may	   be	   of	   two	   different	  
kinds….Just	  so,	  I	  maintain,	  does	  a	  given	  undivided	  portion	  of	  experience,	  taken	  in	  
one	   context	   of	   associates,	   play	   the	   part	   of	   a	   knower,	   of	   a	   state	   of	   mind,	   of	  
'consciousness';	  while	  in	  a	  different	  context	  the	  same	  undivided	  bit	  of	  experience	  
plays	  the	  part	  of	  a	  thing	  known,	  of	  an	  objective	  'content.'	  In	  a	  word,	  in	  one	  group	  
it	  figures	  as	  a	  thought,	  in	  another	  group	  as	  a	  thing.130	  
	  
	   The	   endeavour	   towards	   biocultural	   rights	   then	   is	   not	   about	   establishing	   an	  
enduring	  ‘indigenous	  self’	  onto	  which	  the	  ecological	  movement	  can	  project	  its	  vision	  of	  
an	   ‘ideal’	   humanity.	  Much	  of	   this	   has	   already	   happened	  with	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	  
traditional	   communities	   having	   to	   bear	   the	   burden	   of	   living	   up	   to	   stereotypes	   of	   the	  
‘natural	   man’	   created	   by	   idealists	   disaffected	   by	   the	   market	   economy’s	   ravaging	   of	  
Nature.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  biocultural	  rights	  call	  for	  the	  reinforcing	  and,	  where	  necessary,	  
a	  restoration,	  of	  stewardship	  ethics	  prevalent	  in	  cultures	  still	  shielded	  from	  the	  cultural	  
defoliation	  of	  full-­‐blown	  capitalism.	   	  
	  
	   The	   political	   struggle	   for	   biocultural	   rights	   is	   neither	   the	   swan	   song	   of	   a	   fast	  
disappearing	  way	  of	  life	  nor	  a	  battle	  that	  can	  only	  be	  won	  by	  turning	  back	  the	  clock	  on	  
the	  means	  of	  production	  in	  capitalist	  societies.	  In	  fact,	  it	  embodies	  Gramsci’s	  argument	  
that	  the	  means	  and	  relations	  of	  production	  and	  the	  cultural	  and	  political	  institutions	  in	  
any	  society	  are	  inextricably	  intertwined,	  each	  interpenetrating	  and	  reinforcing	  the	  other	  
and	  forming	  a	  ‘historical	  bloc’.131	   	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130	   James,	  William,	  “Does	  Consciousness	  Exist?”	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy,	  Psychology,	  and	  Scientific	  
Methods,	  1,	  1904,	  pp.	  477-­‐491.	  
131	   Gramsci,	  Antonio,	  “Hegemony,	  Relations	  of	  Force,	  Historical	  Bloc”,	  in	  The	  Gramsci	  Reader:	  Selected	  












	   Biocultural	  rights	  are	  an	  effort	  to	  challenge	  the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  values	  of	  homo	  
economicus.	  The	  term	  ‘hegemony’132	   here	  is	  used	  in	  the	  Gramscian	  sense	  as	  a	  relation	  
that	  manufactures	  consent	  not	  merely	  by	  coercion	  but	  also	  by	  means	  of	  a	  political	  and	  
ideological	   leadership.	   The	   hegemony	   of	   the	   homo	   economicus	   is	   a	   result	   of	   the	  
reinforcing	   of	  market	   values	   through	   a	   range	   of	   institutions	   and	   alliances.	   Indigenous	  
peoples	   have	   begun	   to	   challenge	   this	   hegemony	   by	   forming	   alliances	   with	   farmers	  
groups,	  the	  environmental	  movement,	  livestock	  keepers	  and	  anti-­‐capitalist	  forces.	  They	  
counter	  this	  hegemony	  with	  intellectual	  reform133	   rooted	  in	  the	  ethics	  of	  stewardship.	  
They	  are	  not	  calling	  for	  a	  return	  to	  innocence	  but	  for	  a	  broad	  based	  struggle	  to	  protect	  
the	   Earth.	   Their	   struggle	   is	   one	   of	   praxis,	   and	   embodies	   Marx’s	   famous	   statement:	  
‘Philosophers	   have	   only	   interpreted	   the	  world	   in	   various	  ways;	   the	   point	   is	   to	   change	  
it.’134	  
	  
	   The	  persistence	  of	  the	  presumption	  of	  the	  homo	  economicus	  despite	  being	  belied	  
by	  anthropology	  and	  economic	  history	  is	  a	  curious	  phenomenon.	  Such	  persistence	  in	  the	  
face	  of	  overwhelming	  evidence	  to	  the	  contrary	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  by	  viewing	  the	  
homo	  economicus	  as	   symptomatic	  of	   something	  much	  deeper.	   It	   is	   the	  pursuit	  of	   this	  
first	  cause	  that	  we	  shall	  embark	  upon	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132	   Simon,	  Roger,	  Gramsci’s	  Political	  Thought-­‐	  An	  Introduction,	  London:	  Lawrence	  and	  Wishart,	  1991,	  p.	  
26.	  
133	   Ibid,	  at	  28.	  
134	   Marx,	  Karl,	  “Concerning	  Feuerbach”,	  supra	  n.	  76	  at	  423;	  this	  famous	  statement	  is	  also	  carved	  as	  an	  












CHAPTER	  III	  –	  FIGHTING	  FETISHISM:	  BIOCULTURAL	  READINGS	  OF	  SOCIAL	  
HIEROGLYPHS	   	  	  
To	  be	  radical	  is	  to	  grasp	  things	  by	  the	  root;	  but	  for	  man	  the	  root	  is	  man	  himself	  
Karl	  Marx,	  A	  Contribution	  to	  Hegel’s	  Philosophy	  of	  Right135	  
	  
The	  neoliberal	  turn	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  ensured	  that	  the	  market	  
economy	  would	   reach	   its	   zenith.136	   It	   is	   during	   such	   a	   ubiquity	   of	  market	   values	   that	  
questions	   regarding	  wellbeing	   and	   our	   relationship	  with	   Nature	   are	   being	   asked	  with	  
unprecedented	  urgency.	  The	  values	  of	  pre-­‐capitalist	  cultures	  are	  presented	  as	  a	  moral	  
compass	  that	  will	  deliver	  us	  from	  the	  ecological	  crisis	  to	  a	  post-­‐capitalist	  future.	  While	  
many	  of	   these	  values	  are	  being	  reconfigured	  using	  market	   terminology	   like	   the	   ‘green	  
economy’137	   or	   ‘payment	   for	   ecosystem	   services’138	   or	   ‘the	   economics	   of	   ecosystems	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135	   http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-­‐hpr/intro.htm.	  Retrieved	  13th	  September	  
2011.	  
136	   See	  generally,	  Harvey,	  David,	  A	  Brief	  History	  of	  Neoliberalism,	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  
2005.	  
137	   The	  United	  Nations	  Environment	  Program	  (UNEP)	  launched	  the	  Green	  Economy	  Initiative	  in	  late	  2008.	  
The	  Initiative	  consists	  of	  several	  components	  whose	  collective	  overall	  objective	  is	  to	  provide	  the	  
analysis	  and	  policy	  support	  for	  investing	  in	  green	  sectors	  and	  in	  greening	  environmental	  unfriendly	  
sectors.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  Green	  Economy	  Initiative,	  UNEP	  has	  developed	  a	  working	  definition	  of	  
a	  green	  economy	  as	  “one	  that	  results	  in	  improved	  human	  well-­‐being	  and	  social	  equity,	  while	  
significantly	  reducing	  environmental	  risks	  and	  ecological	  scarcities.	  In	  its	  simplest	  expression,	  a	  green	  
economy	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  one	  which	  is	  low	  carbon,	  resource	  efficient	  and	  socially	  inclusive.”	  UNEP	  
further	  explains	  the	  green	  economy	  as	  an	  economy	  “whose	  growth	  in	  income	  and	  employment	  is	  
driven	  by	  public	  and	  private	  investments	  that	  reduce	  carbon	  emissions	  and	  pollution,	  enhance	  energy	  
and	  resource	  efficiency,	  and	  prevent	  the	  loss	  of	  biodiversity	  and	  ecosystem	  services.	  These	  
investments	  need	  to	  be	  catalyzed	  and	  supported	  by	  targeted	  public	  expenditure,	  policy	  reforms	  and	  
regulation	  changes.	  This	  development	  path	  should	  maintain,	  enhance	  and,	  where	  necessary,	  rebuild	  
natural	  capital	  as	  a	  critical	  economic	  asset	  and	  source	  of	  public	  benefits,	  especially	  for	  poor	  people	  
whose	  livelihoods	  and	  security	  depend	  strongly	  on	  nature.”	  In	  July	  2011,	  UNEP	  released	  the	  Green	  
Economy	  Report	  titled	  Towards	  a	  Green	  Economy:	  Pathways	  towards	  Sustainable	  Development	  and	  
Poverty	  Eradication.	  The	  report	  according	  to	  UNEP	  seeks	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  greening	  of	  
economies	  is	  not	  generally	  a	  drag	  on	  growth	  but	  rather	  a	  new	  engine	  of	  growth;	  that	  it	  is	  a	  net	  
generator	  of	  decent	  jobs,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  also	  a	  vital	  strategy	  for	  the	  elimination	  of	  persistent	  poverty.	  
See	  http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy/Home/tabid/29770/Default.aspx.	  Retrieved	  13th	  September	  
2011.	  
138	   A	  deﬁnition	  for	  payment	  for	  ecosystem	  services	  (PES)	  that	  has	  become	  fairly	  well	  accepted	  has	  been	  
put	  forward	  by	  Sven	  Wunder,	  in	  which	  he	  explains,	  “A	  payment	  for	  environmental	  services	  scheme”	  is	  












and	  biodiversity,’139	   these	   still	   do	  not	   fundamentally	   challenge	   the	  paradigm	  of	  homo	  
economicus.	   	  
	  
	   This	   call	   for	  a	  discursive	   shift	   should	  not	  be	  caricatured	  as	  a	   call	   for	  a	   ‘return	   to	  
innocence’	   or	   a	   rejection	   of	   markets.	   Rather	   it	   should	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   call	   for	  
reclaiming	   social	   values	   that	   have	   been	   eclipsed	   by	   the	   values	   of	   the	   market.	   The	  
campaign	  for	  biocultural	  rights	  is	  an	  effort	  to	  realize	  this	  call.	  At	  its	  core	  this	  campaign	  
seeks	  to	  transfer	  control	  of	  ecosystems	  from	  distant	  markets	  and	  techno-­‐bureaucrats	  to	  
communities	   whose	   stewardship	   ethics	   have	   for	   generations	   protected	   these	  
ecosystems.	   	  
	  
	   Perhaps	  the	  greatest	  challenge	  for	  biocultural	  rights	  is	  what	  Gramsci	  refers	  to	  as	  a	  
‘passive	  revolution’,140	   which	  is	  a	  top-­‐down	  restructuring	  that	  occurs	  once	  the	  powerful	  
market	   interests	   are	   widely	   threatened.	   Popular	   uprisings	   and	   calls	   for	   self-­‐
determination	  and	  greater	  recognition	  by	  indigenous	  peoples	  or	  farmers	  groups	  are	  met	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to	  secure	  that	  service	  is	  bought	  by	  at	  least	  one	  ES	  buyer	  from	  a	  minimum	  of	  one	  ES	  provider	  if	  and	  
only	  if	  the	  provider	  continues	  to	  supply	  that	  service	  (conditionality).”	  Wunder,	  Sven	  2005,	  quoted	  on	  
CIFOR	  website:	  http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/pes/_ref/about/index.htm.	  Retrieved	  13th	  September	  2011.	  
The	  key	  characteristic	  of	  PES	  deals	  is	  that	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  maintaining	  a	  ﬂow	  of	  a	  speciﬁed	  ecosystem	  
“service”	  —	  such	  as	  clean	  water,	  biodiversity	  habitat,	  or	  carbon	  sequestration	  capabilities	  —	  in	  
exchange	  for	  something	  of	  economic	  value.	  The	  critical,	  deﬁning	  factor	  of	  what	  constitutes	  a	  PES	  
transaction,	  however,	  is	  not	  just	  that	  money	  changes	  hands	  and	  an	  environmental	  service	  is	  either	  
delivered	  or	  maintained.	  Rather,	  the	  key	  is	  that	  the	  payment	  causes	  the	  beneﬁt	  to	  occur	  where	  it	  
would	  not	  have	  otherwise.	  That	  is,	  the	  service	  is	  “additional”	  to	  “business	  as	  usual,”	  or	  at	  the	  very	  
least,	  the	  service	  can	  be	  quantiﬁed	  and	  tied	  to	  the	  payment.	  See,	  Payment	  for	  Ecosystem	  Services-­‐	  
Getting	  Started:	  A	  Primer,	  Nairobi:	  UNEP,	  Forest	  Trends	  and	  the	  Katoomba	  Group,	  2008,	  p.	  3.	  
139	   The	  Economics	  of	  Ecosystems	  and	  Biodiversity	  (TEEB)	  study	  is	  an	  international	  initiative	  to	  draw	  
attention	  to	  the	  global	  economic	  benefits	  of	  biodiversity.	  Its	  objective	  is	  to	  highlight	  the	  growing	  cost	  
of	  biodiversity	  loss	  and	  ecosystem	  degradation	  and	  to	  draw	  together	  expertise	  from	  the	  fields	  of	  
science,	  economics	  and	  policy	  to	  enable	  practical	  actions.	  The	  lack	  of	  market	  prices	  for	  ecosystem	  
services	  and	  biodiversity	  means	  that	  the	  benefits	  derived	  from	  these	  goods	  (often	  public	  in	  nature)	  are	  
usually	  neglected	  or	  undervalued	  in	  decision-­‐making.	  This	  in	  turn	  leads	  to	  actions	  that	  not	  only	  result	  
in	  biodiversity	  loss,	  but	  also	  impact	  on	  human	  wellbeing.	  TEEB	  therefore	  seeks	  to	  economically	  value	  
Nature	  as	  natural	  capital	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  ensuring	  that	  cost	  of	  ecosystem	  services	  are	  incorporated	  
rather	  than	  externalized	  in	  all	  policy	  and	  business	  decision-­‐making.	  See,	  The	  Economics	  of	  Ecosystems	  
and	  Biodiversity-­‐	  TEEB	  for	  Policy	  Makers,	  Summary-­‐	  Responding	  to	  the	  Value	  of	  Nature,	  Wesseling:	  
UNEP,	  2009.	  












with	  state	  controlled	  techno-­‐bureaucratic	  solutions	  designed	  to	  take	  the	  edge	  off	  these	  
demands	  and	  restate	  them	  as	  anodyne	  claims	  for	  conservation	  and	  wider	  redistribution	  
of	  market	  benefits.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  such	  a	  process,	  these	  top-­‐down	  solutions	  ensure	  that	  
the	  values	  of	  the	  homo	  economicus	  still	  remain	  sacrosanct,	  and	  reconciliatory	  discourses	  
like	   ‘sustainable	   growth’	   and	   ‘green	   incentives’	   are	  deployed.	  Once	  again	   ‘business	   as	  
usual’	  is	  restored	  with	  the	  primacy	  of	  the	  market	  ordering	  our	  social	  and	  moral	  universe	  
being	  unequivocally	  affirmed.	   	  
	  
	   It	   is	  therefore	  pertinent	  to	  ask	  ourselves	  the	  question:	  how	  has	  the	  model	  of	  the	  
homo	  economicus	  maintained	   its	   cultural	   hegemony	  despite	   its	  being	  unsubstantiated	  
by	   history	   and	   unfounded	   by	   ethnography?	   From	  where	   does	   it	   derive	   its	   enormous	  
strength?	   Communities	   have	   long	   puzzled	   over	   the	   way	   it	   has	   captured	   popular	  
imagination	   in	   capitalist	   societies,	   especially	   when	   support	   for	   market	   values	   comes	  
from	  across	  the	  class	  spectrum.	   	  
	  
	   The	  homo	  economicus	   is	  a	  secondary	  symptom	  whose	  first	  cause	  is	  the	  fetishism	  
of	  commodities	   in	  capitalist	  societies.	   It	   is	   the	  dominance	  of	  the	  commodity	  form	  that	  
gives	  rise	  to	  the	  homo	  economicus,	  not	  the	  other	  way	  round.	  By	  understanding	  the	  true	  
nature	  of	  commodities	  as	  the	  core	  of	  capitalism	  we	  can	  answer	  the	  question	  indigenous	  
peoples	  and	  traditional	  communities	  have	  often	  posed:	  ‘How	  did	  land	  become	  property,	  
trees	   become	   lumber,	   traditional	   knowledge	   become	   intellectual	   property	   and	   life	  
become	  genetic	   resources?’	  Fetishism	  of	  commodities	   is	  not	   restricted	   to	  markets	  but	  
profoundly	   influences	  both	   law	  and	  policy.	   If	   the	  aim	  of	   the	  proponents	  of	  biocultural	  
rights	   is	   to	   mount	   a	   foundational	   critique	   of	   the	   existing	   legal	   system,	   then	   an	  
understanding	   of	   the	   fetishism	   of	   commodities	   is	   imperative.	   Hence	   it	   is	   towards	   an	  
analysis	  of	   the	   commodity	   form	  and	   its	   consequences	   for	   law	  and	  policy	   to	  which	  we	  















(a)	  Fetishes,	  Phantoms	  and	  Hieroglyphics	   	  	  
	   It	   is	   absolutely	   clear	   that,	   by	   its	   activity	   humanity	   changes	   the	   form	   of	   the	  
materials	  of	  nature	   in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  make	  them	  useful	   to	   it.	  The	  form	  of	  wood,	   for	  
instance,	   is	  altered	   if	  a	   table	   is	  made	  out	  of	   it.	  Nevertheless	   the	   table	   continues	   to	  be	  
wood,	  an	  ordinary,	  sensible	  thing.	  But	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  emerges	  as	  a	  commodity,	  it	  changes	  
into	  a	  thing	  that	  transcends	  sensuousness.	  It	  not	  only	  stands	  with	  its	  feet	  on	  the	  ground,	  
but,	   in	   relation	   to	   all	   other	   commodities,	   it	   stands	   on	   its	   head,	   and	   evolves	   out	   of	   its	  
wooden	  brain	  grotesque	  ideas,	  far	  more	  wonderful	  than	  if	  it	  were	  to	  begin	  dancing	  of	  its	  
own	  free	  will.	   	  
Karl	  Marx,	  The	  Fetish	  Character	  of	  the	  Commodity	  and	  its	  Secret141	  
	  
Contemporary	   analyses	   on	   ‘commodification’	   in	   market	   economies	   owe	   a	   significant	  
debt	   to	   the	   work	   of	   Karl	   Marx.	   Marx’s	   analysis	   was	   groundbreaking;	   it	   created	   a	  
blueprint	   for	   understanding	   the	   mysterious	   nature	   of	   commodities.	   Marx	   himself	  
referred	   to	   commodities	   as	   ‘fetishes’,	   ‘social	   hieroglyphics’	   and	   ‘phantasmagorical’,	  
terms	  that	  alluded	  to	  their	  cryptic	  nature,	  and	  the	  title	  of	  the	  chapter	  in	  his	  work	  Capital	  
that	  deals	  with	  nature	  of	  commodities	  is	  mysteriously	  titled	  ‘The	  Fetish	  Character	  of	  the	  
Commodity	   and	   its	   Secret’.142	   In	   the	   above	   example	   of	   the	   wooden	   table,	   Marx	  
indicates	  the	  supernatural	  powers	  it	  acquires	  when	  it	  becomes	  a	  commodity	  and	  every	  
metaphor	  that	  Marx	  uses	  to	  describe	  commodities	  hints	  at	  their	  paranormal	  nature.	  
	  
	   The	  term	  hieroglyphic,	  though	  most	  commonly	  used	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Egyptology	  
originated	   in	   the	   late	   16th	   century	   and	   traces	   its	   roots	   to	   the	   Greek	   word	  
‘heirogluphikos’,	   with	   heiro	   meaning	   ‘sacred’	   and	   gluphe	   meaning	   ‘carving’. 143	  
‘Phantasmagoric’,	   is	  an	  early	  19th	  century	  word	  which	  refers	  to	  ghostly	  optical	   illusions	  
produced	   through	   the	   use	   of	   a	   magic	   lantern	   (an	   image	   projector)	   in	   theatrical	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141	   Marx,	  Karl,	  ‘The	  Fetish	  Character	  of	  the	  Commodity	  and	  its	  Secret’,	  Capital:	  A	  Critique	  of	  Political	  
Economy,	  Vol.	  1,	  trans.	  B.	  Fowkes,	  London:	  Penguin,	  1976,	  p.163.	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   Ibid.	  












exhibitions	  and	  séances.144	   ‘Fetish’	  or	  ‘fetishism’	  is	  a	  word	  coined	  in	  1757	  by	  Charles	  de	  
Brosses	   in	  his	  work	  comparing	  the	  religion	  of	  ancient	  Egypt	  and	  West	  Africa.	  The	  term	  
derives	   from	   the	  pidgin	   term	   fetisso	  used	   along	   the	   coast	   of	  West	  Africa	   around	   that	  
time,	  originating	  from	  the	  medieval	  Portuguese	  word	  fetico,	  meaning	  charm	  or	  sorcery.	  
The	  Portuguese	  traders	  used	  the	  term	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  unfathomable	  attachment	  
that	  some	  West	  African	  tribes	  had	  for	  certain	  objects.145	  
	  
	   By	   using	   these	   terms,	   Marx	   attempted	   to	   describe	   a	   phenomenon	   whereby	  
commodities	  are	  treated	  with	  reverence	  and	  given	  mysterious	  powers	  greater	  than	  the	  
abilities	  of	  the	  very	  humans	  that	  created	  them.	  These	  commodities	  then	  have	  a	  double	  
meaning:	   they	  are	   functional	   and	  have	  use	  value	   for	  humans,	  while	  at	   the	   same	   time	  
they	  take	  on	  a	  life	  of	  their	  own,	  extending	  far	  beyond	  their	  functionality.	  For	  Marx,	  the	  
fetishism	  of	  commodities	  in	  capitalist	  societies	  was	  not	  an	  obsession	  with	  commodities	  
per	  se,	  but	  rather	  an	  inability	  to	  see	  them	  for	  what	  they	  really	  are:	  products	  of	  human	  
labour	  created	  to	  meet	  specific	  human	  needs.	  We	  shall	  focus	  here	  on	  understanding	  this	  
amnesia	  regarding	  the	  origin	  of	  commodities	  peculiar	  to	  market	  economies.	   	  
	  
	   Marx	  began	  his	  quest	  by	  seeking	  to	  understand	  how	  things	  humans	  produce	  that	  
embody	   the	   richness	   of	   their	   experience,	   the	   skill	   of	   their	   hands,	   the	   depth	   of	   their	  
cultures	  become	  commodities	  or	  objects	  whose	  value	  is	  measured	  in	  terms	  of	  money?	  
Marx	   in	  many	  ways	   pre-­‐empted	   the	   incredulity	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	  when	   they	   are	  
asked	   to	  quantify	   in	   terms	  of	   cash	   the	  value	  of	   their	   forests	  or	   traditional	  knowledge.	  
This	   incredulity	   is	   commonly	   misunderstood	   as	   an	   inability	   of	   ‘primitive	   cultures’	   to	  
engage	   the	   market,	   rather	   than	   analysing	   the	   basic	   building	   blocks	   of	   the	   market	  
economy	  itself.	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   For	  Marx,	   like	   Polanyi	   after	   him,	  markets	   and	   commodities	   play	   a	   role	   in	   every	  
society,	   and	   the	   problem	   is	   not	   markets	   or	   even	   commodities	   themselves.	   The	   real	  
problem	   is	   the	   eclipsing	   of	   all	   social	   relations	   by	  market	   relations.	  Marx	   argued	   that	  
everything	  humans	  produce	  has	   ‘use	  value’,	   for	  example	   traditional	   knowledge	  or	   the	  
art	  works	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  has	  value	  for	  them.	  They	  are	  the	  result	  of	  unique	  skill,	  
cultural	  exchanges,	  spiritual	  norms	  and	  interactions	  with	  the	  ecosystem.	  In	  an	  economy	  
of	   householding,	   redistribution	   or	   reciprocity,	   these	   things	   are	   valued	   for	   themselves	  
rather	  than	  as	  compared	  to	  something	  else.	  For	  example	  corn	  is	  valued	  for	  its	  use	  value	  
rather	  than	  the	  quantity	  of	  meat	  that	  can	  be	  exchanged	  for	  it.	  In	  fact	  the	  corn	  is	  shared	  
and	   so	   is	   the	   meat,	   with	   the	   tacit	   understanding	   of	   the	   mutual	   interdependence	   of	  
individuals	  within	  the	  community.146	   	  
	  
	   ‘Use	   value’	   becomes	   ‘exchange	   value’	   in	   situations	   where	   barter	   comes	   in,	   i.e.,	  
when	   meat	   is	   exchanged	   or	   traded	   for	   corn.	   Marx	   makes	   the	   point	   that	   it	   is	   with	  
exchange	   value	   that	   markets	   and	   commodities	   come	   into	   existence,	   and,	   while	   all	  
societies	   have	   an	   aspect	   of	   their	   economy	   that	   is	   based	   on	   exchange	   value,	   its	  
omnipresence	  is	  a	  unique	  feature	  of	  our	  times.	  Use	  value	  is	  converted	  to	  exchange	  value	  
when	   the	   question	   of	   equivalence	   is	   posed.	   Ultimately	   according	   to	   Marx,	   the	  
equivalence	   would	   be	   established,	   based	   on	   the	   amount	   of	   labour	   it	   would	   take	   to	  
produce	  a	  kilogram	  of	  meat	  versus	  the	  amount	  of	   labour	  it	  would	  take	  to	  produce	  the	  
same	  quantity	  of	  corn.147	   	  
	  
	   The	   labour	  that	   is	  referred	  to	  here	   is	  a	  social	  average,	   i.e.,	  based	  on	  the	  average	  
time	   taken	  by	   a	   skilled	  worker.	  Of	   course	   things	   become	  more	   complicated	  when	  we	  
speak,	  for	  example,	  of	  computers	  where	  the	  social	  average	  of	  labour	  has	  to	  include	  the	  
labour	  of	  not	  just	  the	  hardware	  engineer	  who	  is	  assembling	  the	  computer	  but	  also	  the	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labour	  it	  takes	  to	  build	  the	  technology	  and	  the	  parts	  required	  to	  produce	  the	  computer.	  
An	   hour	   of	   an	   engineer’s	   labour	   is	   also	   valued	   more	   than	   an	   hour	   of	   an	   unskilled	  
labourer	  because	  of	   the	  need	   to	  account	   for	   the	   labour	   that	  went	   into	  producing	   the	  
engineer	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   Technology	   also	   changes	   the	   social	   average	   of	   labour;	   for	  
example	   the	   invention	   of	   the	   electric	   loom	   reduced	   the	   amount	   of	   labour	   it	   took	   to	  
produce	  fabric	  from	  a	  handloom.148	   	  
	  
	   Therefore,	   according	   to	   Marx,	   the	   basic	   unit	   of	   measurement	   to	   establish	  
equivalence	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   exchange	   value	   is	   human	   labour.	   But	   here	   we	   are	  
already	  getting	  into	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘abstract	  labour’,	  wherein	  human	  effort	  has	  become	  a	  
unit	   of	   measurement	   that	   is	   oriented	   towards	   generating	   exchange	   value.	   It	   is	  
effectively	  divorced	  from	  the	  real	  conditions,	  skills	  and	  needs	  of	  the	  producers.	  Abstract	  
labour	   then	  begins	   to	  appear	  as	  an	   impersonal	   force	  separate	   from	  the	  real	   labouring	  
humans	  who	  are	   its	   source.	  One	   can	   see	  how	   in	   a	  market	   economy,	  where	  exchange	  
value	  predominates,	   the	  exchange	   value	   (which	   is	   an	   abstraction)	   becomes	  more	   real	  
than	  use	   value	   (which	   is	   concrete).	  Here,	   there	   is	   a	   paradigm	   shift	   from	  pre-­‐capitalist	  
economies	   of	   householding,	   redistribution	   and	   reciprocity,	   where	   use	   value	  
predominates,	  to	  market	  economies	  where	  all	  production	  is	  necessarily	  the	  production	  
of	  commodities	  geared	  to	  gene ating	  exchange	  value.	  
	  
	   This	  level	  of	  abstraction	  is	  taken	  to	  its	  extreme	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  money,	  which	  
is	   the	  ultimate	   symbol	  of	   exchange	  value.	  Money	  has	  no	  use	   value	   in	   itself;	   it	   is	   pure	  
exchange	   value.	   For	   example,	   one	   cannot	   eat	   or	   drink	  money.	   According	   to	  Marx,	   it	  
represents	  abstract	  labour	  and	  therefore	  becomes	  a	  symbol	  of	  another	  symbol,	  thereby	  
the	  ultimate	  abstraction	  in	  a	  market	  economy.	  This	  ultimate	  abstraction	  then	  becomes	  
the	  ultimate	  reality	  in	  all	  capitalist	  societies.149	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   Money	   and	   commodities	   are	   abstractions	   that	   stand	   for	   each	   other.	   In	   market	  
economies	   the	   human	   labour	   that	   produces	   things	   for	   use	   value,	   becomes	   abstract	  
labour	   that	  produces	  commodities	   for	  exchange	  value,	  and	  money	   is	   the	   fundamental	  
symbol	   of	   exchange	   value.	   To	   decode	   the	   social	   hieroglyphic	   of	   a	   commodity	   is	   to	  
comprehend	   it	   as	   essentially	   a	   product	   of	   human	   labour	   valued	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	  
market	  exchange	  through	  abstract	  labour	  represented	  by	  money.	   	  
	  
	   Exchange	   value	   establishes	   equivalence	   between	   things	   that	   are	   fundamentally	  
different.	   Even	   though	   the	   effort,	   skill	   and	   the	   cultural	   context	   of	   corn	   growing	   (use	  
value)	  is	  very	  different	  from	  the	  effort,	  skill	  and	  the	  cultural	  context	  of	  hunting	  for	  meat,	  
equivalence	   is	   established	   between	   them	   by	   the	   market,	   based	   on	   abstract	   labour	  
represented	  by	  money.	  So	  we	  have	  the	  conclusion:	  5	  bushels	  of	  corn	  equal	  a	  kilogram	  of	  
meat	  or	  rather	  5	  bushels	  of	  corn	  costs	  20	  rands	  and	  a	  kilogram	  of	  meat	  costs	  20	  rands.	   	  
	  
	   Exchange	   value	   therefore	   is	   purely	   conceptual	   and	   has	   nothing	   to	   do	   with	   the	  
intrinsic	  properties	  of	  the	  commodity	  or	   its	  use	  value.	  For	   instance,	  a	  numeral	   like	  the	  
number	   ‘5’	   does	   not	   have	   any	  use-­‐value;	   it	   does	   not	   have	   any	   concrete	   ‘fiveness’.	   As	  
Marxist	  scholar	  Stephen	  Shapiro	  notes:	  
	  
‘Fiveness’	   belongs	   to	   the	   collection	   of	   five	   actual	   objects,	   let’s	   say	   apples.	   The	  
number	   ‘5’	   is	   only	   a	   conceptual	   device,	   an	   abstract	   marker	   that	   erases	   the	  
concrete	  differences	  between	  the	  individual	  apples,	  such	  as	  their	  particular	  shape,	  
colour,	  or	  taste.150	  
	  
	   Through	  the	  creation	  of	  exchange	  value,	  use	  value	  is	  masked	  or	  erased.	  Exchange	  
value	  has	  very	  little	  to	  do	  with	  the	  ‘sensory	  experience’	  of	  production	  and	  consumption	  
that	   is	   so	   prevalent	   in	   use	   value.	   Exchange	   value	   on	   the	   contrary	   has	   a	   ‘ghostly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












objectivity’	   (phantasmagoria),	  which	  accompanies	  the	  product	  of	   labour.	  Money	   is	   the	  
ultimate	   means	   of	   exchange	   value	   and	   becomes	   the	   universal	   economic	   equivalent	  
through	  which	  the	  value	  of	  every	  other	  commodity	  can	  be	  expressed.	  As	  Marx	  notes:	  
	  
The	  memory	  of	  use	   value,	   as	  distinct	   from	  exchange	  value,	  has	  become	  entirely	  
extinguished	  in	  this	  incarnation	  of	  pure	  exchange	  value.151	  
	  
	   Exchange	   value	   or	   ‘commodification’	   is	   in	   itself	   unavoidable	   in	   situations	   of	  
‘trucking,	   bartering	   or	   exchange’.	   As	   observed	   previously,	  many	   communities	   through	  
history	   have	   always	   had	   some	   form	   of	   market	   and	   conception	   of	   money.	   Even	  
Malinowski	   highlights	   that	   among	   the	  Massim	   peoples,	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   Kula	   gift	  
economy	  did	  not	  mean	   that	   there	  was	  no	  barter	  or	   trade	   for	  other	  essentials.152	   The	  
Maldharis	  of	  Kachchh	  are	  another	  classic	  example:	  they	  are	  renowned	  in	  the	  region	  for	  
the	  high	  price	  their	  Banni	  buffaloes	  fetch	  in	  the	  trade	  fairs.153	   But,	  as	  Marx	  points	  out,	  
the	   total	   eclipsing	   of	   all	   use	   value	   at	   the	   altar	   of	   exchange	   value	   is	   the	   hallmark	   of	  
capitalism:	  ‘all	  that	  is	  solid,	  melts	  into	  air,	  all	  that	  is	  holy	  is	  profaned.’154	   	  
	  
	   The	   discussion	   above	   shows	   that	   it	   is	   the	   ubiquity	   of	   exchange	   value	   in	  market	  
economies	   that	   gives	   rise	   to	   the	   fetishism	   of	   commodities.	   Unlike	   pre-­‐capitalist	  
economies,	  individuals	  within	  a	  market	  economy	  lose	  the	  ability	  to	  see	  commodities	  as	  
products	  of	  the	  labour	  of	  real	  people	  within	  specific	  contexts,	  i.e.	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  see	  
the	  social	  relations	  behind	  the	  production	  of	  goods	  and	  services.	  Instead,	  they	  perceive	  
commodities	  as	   ‘things	   in	  themselves’,	  divorced	  from	  the	  people	  who	  produced	  them,	  
and	  valued	  purely	   in	  terms	  of	  money.	  Social	  relations	  between	  people	  are	  replaced	  by	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relationships	   between	   commodities,	   and	   commodities	   acquire	   a	   transcendent	   power,	  
which	  they	  invest	  in	  those	  who	  possess	  them,	  rather	  than	  those	  who	  produce	  them.	   	  
	  
	   In	   market	   economies,	   commodities	   and	   money,	   which	   are	   abstractions	   of	  
exchange	   value,	   become	   the	   overriding	   reality	   that	   erase	   the	   memory	   of	   use	   value,	  
human	   labour	   and	   context	   of	   production:	   social	   relations	   are	   eclipsed	   by	   market	  
relations.	  As	  Marx	  observes:	   	  
	  
[T]he	   commodity-­‐form,	   and	   the	   value-­‐relation	   of	   the	   products	   of	   labour	   within	  
which	   it	   appears,	  have	  absolutely	  no	   connection	  with	   the	  physical	  nature	  of	   the	  
commodity	   and	   the	   material	   relations	   arising	   out	   of	   this.	   It	   (the	   commodity)	   is	  
nothing	   but	   the	   determinate	   social	   relation	   between	   people	   themselves	   that	  
assumes	   here,	   for	   them,	   the	   fantastic	   (phantasmagorical)	   form	   of	   a	   relation	  
between	   things….I	   call	   this	   the	   fetishism	   that	   attaches	   itself	   to	   the	   products	   of	  
labour	  as	  soon	  as	  they	  are	  produced	  as	  commodities…155	  
	  
	   To	  answer	  the	  question	  posed	  at	  the	  start:	  the	  transformation	  of	  land	  to	  property,	  
trees	  to	   lumber	  etc.	  occurs	  through	  the	  fetishism	  of	  commodities.	  When	  all	  aspects	  of	  
life	   begin	   to	   be	   articulated	   purely	   in	   terms	   of	   exchange	   value,	   land,	   trees,	   traditional	  
knowledge	   and	   life	   begin	   to	   be	   viewed	   primarily	   as	   property,	   lumber,	   intellectual	  
property	   and	   genetic	   resources.	   The	   memory	   of	   use	   value	   that	   pre-­‐capitalist	  
communities	   have	   with	   Nature	   is	   erased	   once	   Nature	   enters	   the	   market	   economy.	  
Everything	   begins	   to	   be	   viewed	   in	   terms	   of	   exchange	   value,	   giving	   birth	   to	   the	  homo	  
economicus.	   	  
	  
The	  memory	  of	  use	  value,	  however,	  is	  too	  strong	  for	  these	  communities	  to	  start	  
immediately	  viewing	  everything	  in	  terms	  of	  exchange	  value.	  Indigenous	  people	  who,	  for	  
example,	  protest	  against	  the	  conversion	  of	  a	  sacred	  site	  into	  a	  golf	  estate	  are	  branded	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












superstitious,	  and	  real	  estate	  developers,	  who	  buy	  into	  the	  phantasmagoria	  of	  
commodities	  by	  viewing	  all	  land	  as	  property,	  are	  hailed	  as	  pragmatic.	   	  
	  
(b)	  Estrangement:	  Rupturing	  Biocultural	  Relations	  
	  
Money,	   inasmuch	   as	   it	   possesses	   the	   property	   of	   being	   able	   to	   buy	   everything	  
and	  appropriate	  all	  objects,	  is	  the	  object	  most	  worth	  possessing.	  The	  universality	  of	  this	  
property	   is	   the	   basis	   of	  money’s	   omnipotence;	   hence	   it	   is	   regarded	   as	   an	   omnipotent	  
being….Money	  is	  the	  pimp	  between	  need	  and	  object,	  between	  life	  and	  man’s	  means	  of	  
life.	  But	  that	  which	  mediates	  my	  life	  also	  mediates	  the	  existence	  of	  other	  men	  for	  me.	  It	  
is	  for	  me	  the	  other	  person.156	   	  
That	  which	  exists	  for	  me	  through	  the	  medium	  of	  money,	  that	  which	  I	  can	  pay	  for,	  
i.e.	  which	  money	  can	  buy,	  that	  am	  I,	  the	  possessor	  of	  money.	  The	  stronger	  the	  power	  of	  
my	  money,	  the	  stronger	  am	  I.	  The	  properties	  of	  money	  are	  my,	  the	  possessor’s	  properties	  
and	  essential	  powers.	  Therefore	  what	  I	  am	  and	  what	  I	  can	  do	  is	  by	  no	  means	  determined	  
by	  my	  individuality.	   I	  am	  ugly	  but	  I	  can	  buy	  the	  most	  beautiful	  woman…I	  am	  lame,	  but	  
money	  procures	  me	  twenty-­‐four	  legs…I	  am	  a	  wicked,	  dishonest…but	  money	  is	  respected,	  
and	  so	  also	  is	  its	  owner.	  Money	  is	  the	  highest	  good,	  and	  consequently	  its	  owner	  is	  also	  
good…I	  am	  mindless,	  but	   if	  money	   is	  the	  true	  mind	  of	  all	   things,	  how	  can	   its	  owner	  be	  
mindless....	  Do	  I	  not	  possess	  all	  human	  abilities?	  Does	  not	  money	  therefore	  transform	  all	  
my	   incapacities	   into	   their	  opposite?	   If	  money	   is	   the	  bond,	  which	   ties	  me	  to	  human	   life	  
and	  society	   to	  me,	  which	   links	  me	  to	  nature	  and	  to	  man,	   is	  money	  not	   the	  bond	  of	  all	  
bonds?....It	   is	   the	   true	   agent	   of	   separation	   and	   the	   true	   cementing	   agent,	   it	   is	   the	  
chemical	  power	  of	  society.	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In	  a	  culture	  that	  celebrates	   the	  homo	  economicus	   it	  may	  be	  difficult	   to	  see	  a	  problem	  
with	  the	  fetishism	  of	  commodities	  and	  the	  omnipotence	  of	  money.	  For	  Marx,	  however,	  
the	   real	   problem	   with	   commodity	   fetishism	   is	   one	   of	   estrangement	   or	   alienation	   of	  
human	   beings	   from	   themselves,	   from	   the	   others	   and	   therefore	   from	   their	   common	  
humanity.	   Marx	   can	   be	   read	   as	   arguing	   that	   in	   capitalist	   societies	   commodities	   and	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money	   mediate	   peoples’	   lives	   and	   their	   relations	   with	   each	   other	   and	   Nature.	   Their	  
inability	  to	  see	  beyond	  the	  commodity	  form	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  realize	  themselves	  only	  
through	  purchasing	  other	  people’s	   labour	  blinds	   them	  to	   the	  reality	  of	  social	   relations	  
that	   underlie	   all	   production.	   They	   become	   two-­‐dimensional,	   estranged	   from	   the	  
richness	  of	  social	  relations,	  their	  own	  abilities	  and	  those	  of	  others.	   	  
	  
As	  Marx	  notes,	  we	  are	  an	  ‘ensemble	  of	  social	  relations,’158	   and	  our	  individuality	  
is	  a	   transindividuality159	   or	  an	   intersubjectivity	   that	  knows	   itself	   through	  practice,	   i.e.,	  
the	  things	  we	  create	  and	  the	  relationships	  we	  form.	  To	  be	  human,	  then,	  is	  to	  realize	  the	  
fullness	   of	   our	   existence	   in	   its	   most	   concrete	   form.	   The	   fetishism	   of	   commodities	   or	  
money	  is	  the	  belief	  in	  an	  illusion	  that	  estranges	  us	  from	  our	  real	  potential,	  other	  people	  
and	   the	   richness	   of	   life	   itself.	   While	   the	   truth	   is	   that	   commodities	   and	   money	   are	  
abstractions	  and	  therefore	  not	  concrete,	  we	  believe	   them	  to	  be	  so.	  This	  belief	   in	   turn	  
makes	  us	  treat	  what	  is	  real	  -­‐	  our	  abilities,	  other	  people	  and	  our	  relationship	  with	  Nature	  
-­‐	  as	  means	  to	  an	  end.	  We	  are	  tricked	  into	  becoming	  prisoners	  of	  our	  own	  doing.	   	  
	  
In	  a	  capitalist	  society,	  people	   in	  general	  and	  workers	   in	  particular,	  according	  to	  
Marx,	   are	   triply	   alienated.	   First,	   they	   are	   alienated	   from	   the	  products	   of	   their	   labour,	  
because	  what	  they	  produce	  is	  purely	  for	  exchange	  value,	  so	  the	  manifestation	  of	  their	  
labour	   or	   life	   force	   becomes	   a	   marketable	   commodity	   which	   is	   valued	   in	   terms	   of	  
abstract	   labour,	   divorced	   from	   the	   specific	   context	   or	   experience	   of	   the	   workers.	  
Secondly,	   the	   very	   process	   of	   production	   in	   market	   economies	   is	   alienating,	   since	  
production	  processes	  are	  geared	  only	  to	  generate	  exchange	  value	  and	  not	  to	  realize	  the	  
fullness	  of	  one’s	  being.	  When	   ‘work’	   is	   reduced	   to	   ‘labour’,	   and	   ‘worth’	   is	   reduced	   to	  
‘value’,	   the	   alienation	   of	   activity	   becomes	   the	   activity	   of	   alienation.160	   The	  more	   we	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produce,	   the	  more	  alienated	  we	  become,	  because	  work	  no	   longer	  has	  anything	   to	  do	  
with	  human	  fulfilment	  but	  is	  purely	  to	  generate	  exchange	  value.	   	  
	  
Thirdly,	  people	  in	  a	  capitalist	  society	  are	  alienated	  from	  their	  generic	  humanity.	  
Without	   attempting	   to	   define	   an	   essential	   humanity,	   if	   we	   understand	   humanity	   as	  
practice,	   then	   our	   practice	   is	   manifested	   through	   our	   relations	   with	   Nature	   and	  
community.	   Humanity	   is	   represented	   by	   what	   we	   create	   through	   Nature	   and	   each	  
other,	   and	   goes	   beyond	  merely	   fulfilling	   our	   primary	   needs.	   The	   books	  we	  write,	   the	  
buildings	  we	  build,	   the	  cultures	  we	   inhabit,	   the	  music	  we	  create,	   the	   relationships	  we	  
have,	  are	  all	  humanity	   in	  practice.	  When	  this	   richness	  of	  human	   life	   is	  boiled	  down	  to	  
pure	  exchange	  value,	  and	  the	  trope	  of	  homo	  economicus	   is	  paraded	  as	  the	  ‘essence	  of	  
humanity’,	  then	  people	  become	  alienated	  from	  each	  other	  and	  Nature.	  In	  fact	  Marx	  lists	  
the	  alienation	  of	  people	  from	  other	  people	  as	  a	  fourth	  kind	  of	  alienation	  separate	  from	  
the	   alienation	   of	   people	   from	   Nature.	   When	   a	   person	   is	   self-­‐estranged,	   then	   the	  
relationship	  she	  sets	  up	  with	  other	  people	   is	  also	  one	  of	  estrangement,	  where	  people	  
relate	  to	  each	  other	  through	  commodities:	  as	  within,	  so	  without.161	   	  
	  
In	   1844,	   at	   the	   age	   of	   26,	   Marx	   in	   his	   notes	   (posthumously	   discovered	   and	  
published	   as	   the	   Economic	   and	   Philosophical	   Manuscripts)	   had	   pre-­‐empted	   the	  
contemporary	   concerns	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	   traditional	   communities.	   He	   had	  
shown	   the	  denial	   by	   the	   state	   and	   the	  market	  of	   the	  depth	  of	   their	   relationship	  with	  
Nature.	   The	   humanism	   in	   early	  Marx	   that	   forms	   the	   basis	   of	   his	   later	  writing	   is	   clear	  
when	  he	  says:	   	  
	  
The	   universality	   of	   man	   manifests	   itself	   in	   practice	   in	   that	   universality	   which	  
makes	  the	  whole	  of	  nature	  his	   inorganic	  body,	  (1)	  as	  a	  direct	  means	  of	   life	  and	  
(2)	   as	   the	  matter,	   the	   object	   and	   the	   tool	   of	   his	   life	   activity.	   Nature	   is	   man’s	  
inorganic	  body,	  that	   is	  to	  say	  nature	  in	  so	  far	  as	   it	   is	  not	  the	  human	  body.	  Man	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












lives	   from	   nature,	   i.e.	   nature	   is	   his	   body,	   and	   he	   must	   maintain	   a	   continuing	  
dialogue	  with	  it	  if	  he	  is	  not	  to	  die.	  To	  say	  man’s	  physical	  and	  mental	  life	  is	  linked	  
to	   nature	   simply	   means	   that	   nature	   is	   linked	   to	   itself,	   for	   man	   is	   a	   part	   of	  
nature’162.	  Marx	  goes	  on	  to	  add:	  ‘estranged	  labour	  turns	  man’s	  species	  being	  (his	  
generic	  humanity)	  both	  nature	  and	  his	   intellectual	   species-­‐powers	   into	  a	  being	  
alien	   to	  him	  and	  a	  means	  of	  his	   individual	  existence.	   It	  estranges	  man	   from	  his	  
own	   body,	   from	   nature,	   as	   it	   exists	   outside	   him,	   from	   his	   spiritual	   essence	  
(Wesen),	  his	  human	  essence.163	  
	  
The	  ‘human	  essence’	  that	  Marx	  refers	  to	  here	  is	  not	  something	  innate,	  universal	  
and	  discovered	  outside	  history.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  we	  come	  to	  know	  who	  we	  are	  through	  
our	  works:	  life	  informs	  consciousness.	  The	  ‘personhood’	  that	  Marx	  advocates	  is	  one	  that	  
embraces	   its	   intersubjectivity	   and	   rebels	   against	   any	   kind	   of	   reductionism.	   Similar	   to	  
Kitaro	   Nishida’s164	   philosophy	   of	   Zen	   Buddhism	   (which	   does	   not	   advocate	   a	   human	  
essence	  but	  rather	  the	  blade	  of	  ‘pure	  experience’	  cutting	  through	  the	  ossified	  concepts	  
of	   subject/object	   (fetishes)	   and	   affirming	   interconnectedness)	   Marx	   too	   advocates	   a	  
breaking	   free	   from	   estrangement	   by	   destroying	   our	   fetishes.	   Such	   liberation	   from	  
estrangement	  can	  come	  from	  a	  consciousness	  of	  the	  fullness	  of	  our	  relational	  selves	  (we	  
are	  formed	  through	  our	  relations	  with	  others	  and	  Nature)	  and	  through	  political	  action	  
that	   contests	   the	   hegemony	   of	   exchange	   value	   and	   the	   fetishism	   of	   commodities	   it	  
engenders.	   	  
	  
(c)	  Fetishizing	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  
	  
Current	  efforts	   in	   law	  to	  protect	  the	  traditional	  knowledge	  of	  communities	   is	  a	  case	  in	  
point	  of	  how	  the	  articulation	  of	  rights	  in	  the	  language	  of	  the	  market	  economy	  may	  deny	  
a	  way	  of	   life.	  The	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity	   (CBD)	  seeks	  to	  protect	   traditional	  
knowledge	  as	   a	  way	  of	   combating	   the	   current	   environmental	   crisis.	   The	  measures	   for	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traditional	   knowledge	   protection	  within	   the	   CBD	   are	   based	   on	   three	   cornerstones:	   1)	  
the	  emerging	  evidence	  of	  the	  role	  that	  traditional	  knowledge	  plays	  in	  the	  conservation	  
of	  biodiversity;	  2)	  the	  need	  to	  conserve	  biodiversity	  through	  protecting	  the	  way	  of	  life	  of	  
communities	  embodying	  such	  traditional	  knowledge;	  and	  3)	  the	  importance	  of	  affirming	  
this	   way	   of	   life	   through	   requiring	   the	   consent	   of	   these	   communities	   prior	   to	   the	  
commercial	   or	   research	   use	   of	   their	   traditional	   knowledge	   and	   the	   fair	   and	   equitable	  
sharing	  of	  benefits	  arising	  from	  such	  use.165	  
	  
Article	   8(j)	   is	   progressive	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   it	   is	   an	   unprecedented	  
acknowledgement	  in	  an	  international	  treaty	  ratified	  by	  193	  countries	  that	  conservation	  
of	  biodiversity	  is	  integrally	  linked	  to	  a	  way	  of	  life.	  Nature,	  according	  to	  the	  way	  of	  life	  of	  
communities,	  is	  not	  perceived	  purely	  as	  a	  commodity	  but	  rather	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  
communal	   body	   constituted	   through	   the	   community’s	   biocultural	   relations	   with	   the	  
ecosystem.	   These	   relations	   override	  market	   relations,	   and	   any	   interface	   between	   the	  
two	   is	   regulated	   by	   their	   customary	   norms	   and	   values.	   Biocultural	   relations	   reject	  
estrangement	   by	   a	   practice	   of	   stewardship	   ethics,	   which	   affirm	   the	   intersubjectivity	  
between	  the	  community	  and	  Nature.	  
	   	   	  
The	   dominant	   interpretation	   of	   Article	   8(j)	   by	   states,	   however,	   fetishizes	  
traditional	   knowledge	   by	   limiting	   enforcement	   measures	   to	   allowing	   communities	   to	  
control	   their	   traditional	  knowledge,	  rather	  than	  by	  affirming	  a	  way	  of	   life.166	   Thus	  the	  
legal	  emphasis	  is	  on	  ensuring	  that	  communities	  provide	  prior	  informed	  consent	  for	  the	  
commercial	   and	   research	   utilization	   of	   their	   traditional	   knowledge,	   and	   ensuring	   that	  
they	   receive	   a	   fair	   share	   of	   the	   benefits	   that	   arise	   from	   such	   utilization.167	   It	   is	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important	   to	   note	   that	   recognition	   of	   community	   rights	   to	   traditional	   knowledge	   is	   a	  
significant	  achievement	  and	  should	  not	  be	  underestimated.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  subtext	  of	  
the	   measures	   employed	   by	   states	   towards	   protection	   of	   traditional	   knowledge	  
misconstrues	   it	   as	   a	   commodity	   and	   assumes	   biodiversity	   can	   be	   conserved	   by	  
incentivizing	  communities	  through	  profits	  generated	  from	  the	  exclusive	  rights	  to	  trade	  
in	  traditional	  knowledge.	  What	  is	  ignored	  here	  is	  that	  community	  conservation	  practices	  
have	   less	   to	   do	   with	   market	   benefits	   and	   more	   to	   do	   with	   a	   way	   of	   life,	   where	  
biocultural	  relations	  and	  not	  exchange	  values	  predominate.	  
	   	  
The	   recognition	  of	   community	   rights	   to	   traditional	   knowledge	  must	  go	  hand	   in	  
hand	  with	   recognition	  of	   the	  biocultural	   rights	  of	   communities	   to	   their	   territories	  and	  
their	   cultures.	   Instead	   fetishization	   of	   traditional	   knowledge	   is	   apparent	   in	   the	  
negotiations	   both	   under	   the	   CBD	   and	   the	   Intergovernmental	   Committee	   (IGC)	   of	   the	  
World	   Intellectual	   Property	   Organization	   (WIPO),	   where	   states	   in	   the	   name	   of	  
sovereignty	  suppress	   in-­‐depth	  discussions	  around	  recognition	  of	  rights	  of	  communities	  
to	  their	  lands	  and	  waters	  and	  to	  government	  of	  their	  territories	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  
customary	  laws.	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  the	  negotiations	  focus	  on	  ways	  to	  extend	  intellectual	  
property	   rights	  protection	   to	   traditional	   knowledge	  and	  preventive	  measures,	   such	   as	  
creating	  traditional	  knowledge	  databases.	  
	  
(d)	  The	  Hoodia	  Fetish:	  Estranging	  the	  San	  	  
The	   traditional	   knowledge	   of	   the	   San	   relating	   to	   the	   hunger	   staving	   qualities	   of	   the	  
Hoodia	  plant	  is	  an	  interesting	  example	  of	  commodity	  fetishism	  and	  the	  estrangement	  it	  
causes.	  The	  South	  African	  Council	  for	  Scientific	  and	  Industrial	  Research	  (CSIR)	  extracted	  
a	  bioactive	  compound	  relating	  to	  the	  Hoodia’s	  hunger	  staving	  properties	  based	  on	  San	  
traditional	  knowledge.	  The	  process	  of	  extraction	  and	  the	  use	  of	  the	  bioactive	  compound	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for	   appetite	   suppressant	   purposes	   was	   patented	   by	   the	   CSIR.	   This	   patent	   was	   then	  
licensed	   to	   a	  UK	   based	   company,	   Phytopharm,	  which,	   in	   turn,	   sublicensed	   it,	   first,	   to	  
Pfizer	  and	  then,	  later,	  Unilever	  to	  develop	  food	  supplements	  for	  the	  diet	  industry.168	   	  
	  
Recently	   Phytopharm	   returned	   the	   patent	   to	   the	   CSIR,	   since	   both	   Pfizer	   and	  
Unilever	  have	  for	  various	  reasons	  been	  unable	  to	  develop	  products	  based	  on	  the	  Hoodia	  
patent.	  After	  initial	  concerns	  raised	  by	  the	  San	  that	  the	  CSIR	  had	  commercially	  used	  San	  
traditional	  knowledge	  without	  their	  consent,	  the	  CSIR	  in	  2003	  negotiated	  an	  access	  and	  
benefit	   sharing	   (ABS)	   agreement	   with	   the	   San	   that	   involved	   payment	   to	   them	   of	   a	  
percentage	  of	  royalties	  received	  by	  the	  CSIR	  from	  Phytopharm.169	   	  
	  
The	  significance	  of	   the	  San	  Hoodia	  agreement	  cannot	  be	  overestimated.	   It	  was	  
one	  of	  the	  world’s	  first	  ABS	  agreements,	  and	  it	  was	  definitely	  the	  first	  such	  agreement	  in	  
Africa	   between	   a	   historically	   marginalized	   indigenous	   community	   and	   a	   commercial	  
entity.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  critical	  to	  note	  that,	  despite	  the	  San	  receiving	  some	  milestone	  
payments	  from	  the	  CSIR	  at	  specific	  stages	  of	  the	  clinical	  trials	  and	  product	  development,	  
the	   fetishizing	   of	   the	   San	   traditional	   knowledge	   brought	   with	   it	   a	   unique	   set	   of	  
problems.170	  
	  
The	   South	   African	   San	   Council,	   which	   negotiated	   the	   ABS	   agreement	  with	   the	  
CSIR,	  sought	  to	  represent	  the	  San	  of	  South	  Africa,	  Namibia,	  Angola	  and	  Botswana,	  since	  
it	   felt	   that	   all	   the	   San	   of	   the	   region	   collectively	   held	   the	   knowledge	   relating	   to	   the	  
Hoodia.	   However,	   the	   urgency	   of	   responding	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   CSIR	   had	   already	  
registered	  a	  patent	  based	  on	  San	  traditional	  knowledge	  meant	  that	  the	  ABS	  agreement	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  and	  Traditional	  Knowledge,	  
Charles	  McManis,	  Ed.,	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negotiations	  had	  to	  be	  hurried	  by	  the	  South	  African	  San	  Council	  without	  the	  necessary	  
consultations	  with	  the	  larger	  San	  community.171	  
	  
The	   negotiations	   between	   the	   San	   and	   the	   CSIR	   opened	   with	   the	  
incontrovertibility	   of	   the	   CSIR	   patent	   on	   the	   Hoodia.	   The	   patent	   had	   already	   been	  
registered	  and	  the	  San	  Council	  was	  informed	  that	  any	  commercial	  interest	  in	  the	  Hoodia	  
and	  potential	  financial	  benefits	  for	  the	  San	  was	  possible	  only	  if	  the	  San	  did	  not	  challenge	  
the	  patent.	  This	  meant	  that	  the	  San	  who	  had,	  until	   then,	  relied	  on	  their	  knowledge	  of	  
the	  Hoodia	  as	  use	   value	  were	  asked	   to	  engage	   in	   a	  negotiation,	  which	   regarded	   their	  
traditional	  knowledge	  as	  pure	  exchange	  value.	  The	  moment	  this	  transformation	  of	  use	  
value	  to	  absolute	  exchange	  value	  occurred,	  all	  other	  discussions	  around	  the	  context	   in	  
which	  knowledge	  about	  the	  Hoodia	  had	  been	  historically	  developed,	  used	  and	  shared	  by	  
the	   San	   were	   abandoned.	   Negotiations	   from	   thereon	   focused	   on	   market	   potential,	  
investment	  in	  research	  and	  development	  by	  the	  CSIR	  and	  its	  licensees,	  and	  the	  share	  of	  
benefits	  that	  the	  San	  could	  realistically	  expect	  from	  the	  ABS	  agreement.	   	  
	  
This	  was	   the	   first	   step	   towards	   estrangement,	  whereby	   the	   Hoodia	   traditional	  
knowledge	  was	  approached	  as	  a	  commodity	  delinked	  from	  the	  way	  of	  life	  of	  the	  San	  and	  
their	  history	  of	  discrimination.	  The	  discussions	  became	  less	  about	  the	  real	  needs	  of	  the	  
San,	  the	  breakdown	  of	  traditional	  leadership	  and	  the	  limited	  representational	  mandate	  
of	   the	   hurriedly	   constituted	   South	   African	   San	   Council,	   and	   more	   about	   traditional	  
knowledge	   itself	   and	   its	   commercial	   potential.	   The	   time	   required	   for	   substantial	  
consultation	  within	  the	  San	  community	  based	  on	  their	  customary	  values	  about	  the	  kind	  
of	  benefits	  needed	  and	  how	  they	  would	  be	  collectively	  shared	  was	  unavailable.172	   Like	  
all	   commercial	   negotiations,	   this	   too	   had	   to	   take	   place	   in	   ‘market	   time’,	   with	   an	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emphasis	  on	  quick	   and	  efficient	  drawing	  up	  of	   an	  agreement	   to	  utilize	   the	   traditional	  
knowledge	  and	  capitalizing	  on	  the	  ‘first	  mover	  advantage’.	   	  
	  
The	   second	   step	   towards	   estrangement	   came	   when	   the	   Hoodia	   traditional	  
knowledge	  became	  more	  real	  than	  the	  San	  themselves.	  The	  San	  were	  used	  as	  a	  part	  of	  a	  
marketing	  campaign	  around	  the	  appetite	  suppressant	  qualities	  of	  the	  Hoodia	  to	  combat	  
overeating.	   Pictures	   were	   beamed	   across	   the	   world	   of	   lithe	   San	   people,	   in	   their	  
traditional	   clothes,	   hunting	   with	   bows	   and	   arrows	   and	   set	   against	   the	   Kalahari	  
landscape.	  This	  bore	  no	  semblance	  to	  the	  reality	  of	  San	  life,	  of	  a	  people	  who	  are	  chronic	  
victims	  of	  discrimination	  and	  dispossession.	  The	  San’s	  fast	  disappearing	  way	  of	  life	  was	  
no	   longer	   viewed	   on	   its	   own	   terms,	   with	   necessary	   attention	   to	   its	   insurmountable	  
challenges,	   but	  merely	   as	   a	  means	   to	   an	  end,	   the	  end	  being	  profits	   from	  Hoodia	  diet	  
supplements.173	   	  
	  
The	   third	   form	   of	   estrangement	   was	   an	   alienation	   from	   Nature	   itself.	   The	  
growing	  demand	  for	  the	  Hoodia	  resulting	  from	  the	  extensive	  media	  coverage	  of	  the	  San-­‐
Hoodia	   case	   sparked	   off	   widespread	   illegal	   harvesting	   of	   the	   plant.	   This	   harvest	   put	  
Hoodia	   on	   the	   endangered	   plants	   list	   in	   South	   Africa.	   At	   the	   same	   time	   a	   number	   of	  
commercial	  farmers	  began	  to	  cultivate	  Hoodia	  for	  the	  export	  market.	  Significant	  profits	  
were	   made	   due	   to	   a	   spike	   in	   demand.	   Both	   the	   illegal	   harvesting	   and	   commercial	  
cultivation	   of	   Hoodia	   viewed	   the	   San	   traditional	   knowledge	   as	   primarily	   exchange	  
value.174	  
	   	  
For	   the	   San,	   this	   unprecedented	   interest	   in	  Hoodia	   by	   the	   anti-­‐obesity	  market	  
obscured	   the	   way	   of	   life	   from	   which	   this	   traditional	   knowledge	   arose.	   The	   ethics	   of	  
stewardship	   that	  underlies	   the	  San	   interactions	  with	   their	  ecosystem,	  and	   the	  context	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within	  which	   the	  Hoodia	   is	  used,	  was	  never	  mentioned	   in	   the	  market	   rhetoric	  around	  
the	  traditional	  knowledge.	  The	  fetishism	  of	  Hoodia	  and	  the	  emergent	  market	  interest	  in	  
it	   had	   the	   paradoxical	   effect	   of	   reinforcing	   an	   approach	   to	  Nature	   as	   exchange	   value	  
rather	  than	  an	  appreciation	  of	  the	  biocultural	  relations	  that	  the	  San	  historically	  had	  with	  
the	  Kalahari.	   	  
	  
Finally,	   the	   ABS	   agreement	   resulted	   in	   the	   CSIR	   gaining	   exclusive	   use	   rights	   to	  
traditional	   knowledge	   relating	   to	   Hoodia	   through	   the	   San	   acceptance	   of	   the	   CSIR’s	  
patent	   in	   exchange	   for	   benefits.	   This	   caused	   the	   fourth	   kind	   of	   estrangement,	   one	  
between	  the	  San	  and	  the	  Nama	  (another	  indigenous	  group	  that	  shared	  with	  the	  San	  the	  
knowledge	  about	  the	  Hoodia).175	   When	  this	  knowledge	  functioned	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  
use	  value,	  the	  San,	  the	  Nama	  and	  other	  communities	  in	  the	  region	  all	  freely	  shared	  and	  
exchanged	   it.	  However,	   the	  moment	  these	  social	   relations	  were	  overridden	  by	  market	  
relations	   through	   the	   CSIR	   patent,	   the	   result	   was	   an	   estrangement	   between	   two	  
communities	  that	  had	  lived	  in	  harmony	  for	  centuries.176	   	  
	  
The	  Nama	  felt	  that	  the	  San	  did	  not	  have	  the	  authority	  to	  grant	  exclusive	  rights	  to	  
the	  CSIR,	  and	  that	  they	  (the	  Nama)	  should	  also	  have	  been	   included	  as	  beneficiaries	  to	  
the	  ABS	  agreement.	  The	  San,	  however,	  argued	  that	  they	  (the	  San)	  were	  ‘primary	  rights	  
holders’	  since	  they	  were	  the	  original	  inhabitants	  of	  the	  region,	  the	  Nama	  having	  arrived	  
later.	  The	  entire	  debate	  was	  ironic	  as	  both	  these	  communities	  had	  co-­‐existed	  for	  several	  
hundred	  years	  in	  South	  Africa	  and	  Namibia,	  and	  their	  ancient	  social	  relations	  were	  now	  
precipitously	  punctuated	  with	  market	  terminology,	  such	  as	  ‘primary	  rights	  holders’	  and	  
‘profit	   percentages’.	   The	   San	   and	   the	   Nama	   have	   since	   entered	   into	   an	   agreement	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amongst	  themselves	  to	  share	  in	  the	  benefits	  arising	  from	  the	  San-­‐CSIR	  ABS	  agreement.	  
Divorcing	   traditional	  knowledge	   from	  the	  cultural	   context	   in	  which	   it	  was	  communally	  
used	   and	   shared	   however	   has	   the	   paradoxical	   effect	   of	   temporarily	   disrupting	   inter-­‐
community	   relations,	  which	  have	  played	  a	   crucial	   role	   in	   conserving	   the	  ecosystem	  of	  
the	  region.	   	   	  
	  
This	   analysis	   of	   the	   Hoodia	   case	   is	   not	   performed	   through	   the	   condescending	  
gaze	  of	  posterity	  nor	  is	  it	  a	  tirade	  against	  the	  commodification	  of	  traditional	  knowledge.	  
Roger	   Chennells,	   the	   lawyer	   representing	   the	   San	   did	   pioneering	   work	   in	   what	   is	  
considered	   one	   of	   the	   earliest	   ABS	   agreements	   between	   an	   indigenous	   group	   and	   a	  
commercial	   interest.	   It	   is	  also	  clear	  that	  the	  ABS	  agreement	  between	  the	  CSIR	  and	  the	  
San	  was	  an	  important	  forerunner	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  rights	  of	  communities	  to	  their	  
traditional	   knowledge	   and	   the	   right	   to	   benefit	   from	   the	   commercial	   uses	   of	   such	  
knowledge.	  During	  the	  negotiations	  many	  San	   leaders	  held	  a	  considered	  view	  that	  the	  
desperately	  poor	  community	  would	  clearly	  benefit	   from	  monies	  that	  would	  arise	  from	  
the	  agreement.	   	  
	  
The	  Hoodia	   case,	   however,	   is	   an	   example	  of	   how	  market	   forces	  deepened	   the	  
sense	   of	   estrangement	   in	   an	   already	   alienated	   community	   by	   overriding	   the	   San’s	  
biocultural	  values,	  and	  failing	  to	  deliberate	  on	  the	  consequences	  thereof.	  The	  very	  rights	  
to	   peoplehood	   that	   the	   San	   had	   been	   fighting	   for,	   which	   had	   been	   denied	   to	   them	  
through	  state	  discrimination,	  were	  undercut	  through	  the	  fetishization	  of	  their	  traditional	  
knowledge.	  Once	  again,	  the	  peoplehood	  of	  the	  San	  and	  their	  biocultural	  relations	  with	  
the	   Kalahari	   were	   reduced	   to	   a	   caricature	   of	   gaunt	   Bushmen	   peddling	   diet	   pills	   to	  
consumers	   who	   couldn’t	   stop	   overeating.	   The	   traditional	   knowledge	   relating	   to	   the	  
Hoodia	  became	  more	  real	  than	  the	  San	  from	  whom	  it	  came.	  The	  pith	  of	  the	  problem	  is	  
not	  commodities	  per	  se,	  but	   their	  phantasmagoric	  power	  within	  market	  economies	   to	  
delegitimize	  and	  erase	  all	  other	  ways	  of	  being	  and	  knowing	  that	  do	  not	  adhere	  to	  the	  













The	   legal	   system	  does	  not	  only	   reinforce	   the	   fetishism	  of	   commodities	  but	   the	  
latter	  in	  many	  situations	  constitutes	  the	  very	  basis	  of	  certain	  laws	  and	  judicial	  decisions.	  













CHAPTER	  IV	  –	  REIFICATION:	  THE	  LAW	  AS	  A	  COLLECTIVE	  CONSPIRACY	  
	  
Communism	   as	   the	   positive	   supersession	   of	   private	   property	   as	   human	   self-­‐
estrangement,	  and	  hence	  the	  true	  appropriation	  of	  the	  human	  essence	  through	  and	  for	  
humankind;	  hence	  as	  the	  complete	  return	  of	  humankind	  to	  itself	  as	  a	  social,	  i.e.	  human	  
humankind….This	  communism,	  as	   fully	  developed	  naturalism	  equals	  humanism,	  and	  as	  
fully	  developed	  humanism	  equals	  naturalism;	  it	   is	  the	  genuine	  resolution	  of	  the	  conflict	  
between	   humankind	   and	   nature,	   and	   within	   humankind,	   the	   true	   resolution	   of	   the	  
conflict	  between	  existence	  and	  essence,	  between	  objectification	  and	  self-­‐affirmation...	  
Marx,	  Economic	  and	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The	  fetishism	  of	  commodities	  is	  a	  result	  of	  an	  erasure	  of	  the	  memory	  of	  their	  ‘use	  value’	  
and	   their	   ‘exchange	  value’	  exercising	  a	  monopoly	  on	  social	   consciousness.	  This	   causes	  
an	  inversion	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  human	  beings	  and	  commodities.	  The	  human	  -­‐	  
and	  natural	  -­‐	  origins	  of	  commodities	  are	  erased;	  commodities	  take	  on	  a	  life	  of	  their	  own,	  
mediating	   the	   relations	   between	   the	   very	   humans	   whose	   labour	   created	   them.	   The	  
outcome	   of	   this	   divorce	   between	   commodities	   and	   their	   human	   roots	   is	   a	   sense	   of	  
estrangement.	  
	  
	   Estrangement	   or	   alienation	   is	   a	   palpable	   sense	   of	   a	   lack	   of	   wholeness	   or	   an	  
incompleteness	   of	   personhood,	   whereby	   aspects	   of	   ourselves,	   which	   we	   know	   from	  
experience	  as	   real,	   are	  denied.	  The	  Latin	  origin	  of	   the	  English	   term	   ‘alienation’	   comes	  
from	   alius	   meaning	   ‘other’	   and	   alienus	   meaning	   ‘belonging	   to	   another	   person	   or	  
place’.178	   Alienation	   or	   estrangement	   should	   not	   be	   crudely	   equated	   with	   buying	   or	  
selling,	   or	   markets	   per	   se.	   If	   we	   extend	   our	   personhood	   to	   include	   everything	   we	  
produce,	   then	   the	  very	  act	  of	   giving	  whether	   it	   is	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	   redistribution	  or	  
reciprocity	  is	  also	  a	  kind	  of	  alienation.	  Alienation	  in	  its	  real	  sense	  should	  be	  understood	  
as	   the	   antithesis	   between	   labour	   and	   capital.	   As	   Marx	   notes:	   ‘labour,	   the	   subjective	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essence	  of	   private	   property	   as	   exclusion	  of	   property,	   and	   capital,	   objective	   labour,	   as	  
exclusion	  of	  labour,	  constitute	  private	  property.’179	  
	  
	   It	   is	   critical	   here	   to	   understand	   the	   nuance	   that	   has	   been	   ignored	   in	   the	   crude	  
forms	   of	   state	   socialism.	   The	   ‘fetishism	   of	   commodities’	   or	   the	   ‘fetishism	   of	   private	  
property’	   is	   one	   and	   the	   same	   thing.	   Private	  property	   is	   a	   kind	  of	   commodity	   since	   it	  
signifies	  pure	  exchange	  value.	  The	  key	  point	  here	  is	  that	  human	  labour	  or	  effort	  is	  what	  
creates	  value.	   	  
	  
	   The	   traditional	   knowledge	   of	   the	   San	   for	   example	   is	   a	  manifestation	   of	   the	   San	  
way	  of	  life,	  their	  labour	  and	  their	  biocultural	  relations	  with	  their	  land.	  This	  ‘way	  of	  life’	  is	  
the	   subjective	   essence	   of	   private	   property;	   in	   this	   case	   the	   San’s	   way	   of	   life	   is	   the	  
subjective	   essence	   of	   their	   traditional	   knowledge.	   But	   this	  way	   of	   life	   is	   paradoxically	  
excluded	   when	   traditional	   knowledge	   is	   fetishized	   as	   pure	   exchange	   value.	   So	   it	   is	  
‘private	  property	  as	  exclusion	  of	  property’,	  since	  the	  real	  property	  here	  is	  the	  San	  way	  of	  
life	  and	  their	  labour,	  but	  this	  is	  denied	  by	  converting	  traditional	  knowledge	  to	  capital	  or	  
objective	  labour,	  as	  exclusion	  of	  labour.	  This	  implies	  that,	  while	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  San	  to	  
their	   traditional	   knowledge	   is	   upheld,	   their	   right	   to	   their	   way	   of	   life-­‐	   the	   subjective	  
essence	   of	   property	   is	   denied.	   Private	   property,	   then,	   is	   both	   the	   cause	   and	   the	  
consequence	  of	  alienation.	   	  
	  
	   ‘Objective	   labour’	   is	   dead	   labour.	   It	   is	   human	   labour	   congealed	   into	  
commodities.180	   Thus,	  when	  traditional	  knowledge	  is	  viewed	  purely	  as	  a	  commodity,	  we	  
do	   not	   see	   that	   it	   was	   developed	   through	   living	   labour	   or	   a	   way	   of	   life.	   Instead	   we	  
fetishize	   it	   as	   a	   tradable	   commodity.	   The	   consequence	   is	   a	   lack	   of	   attention	   to	   the	  
importance	  of	  ownership	  or	  rights	  over	  the	  ‘means	  of	  production’.	  In	  capitalist	  societies,	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this	  appears	   in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  worker,	  whose	  labour	  produces	  the	  commodity	  (which	  is	  
objectified	   human	   labour)	   having	   no	   control	   over	   the	   production	   processes.	   She	   is	  
reduced	  to	  a	  mere	  cog	  in	  the	  wheel,	  and	  the	  real	  power	  is	  vested	  in	  the	  commodity.	  In	  
the	   context	   of	   indigenous	   peoples,	   the	   lack	   of	   attention	   to	   their	   biocultural	   relations	  
with	   their	   territories	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   fetishization	   of	   their	   traditional	   knowledge	  
(which	  is	  a	  result	  of	  such	  relations)	  results	  in	  a	  denial	  of	  their	  rights	  over	  the	  means	  of	  
production	  (their	  territories	  and	  cultures).	   	  
	  
	   The	   current	   legal	   focus	   on	   traditional	   knowledge	   and	   genetic	   resources	   of	  
communities	  as	  a	  tradable	  commodity,	  without	  the	  concomitant	  respect	  for	  a	  way	  of	  life	  
or	  rights	  to	  territory	  and	  systems	  of	  governance,	  leads	  to	  estrangement.	  This	  term	  refers	  
to	  a	  loss	  of	  wholeness,	  where	  the	  part	  (traditional	  knowledge)	  is	  misunderstood	  as	  the	  
whole,	   and	   the	   memory	   of	   the	   whole	   is	   erased.	   It	   is	   the	   kind	   of	   estrangement	   that	  
results	  in	  the	  conflict	  between	  humankind	  and	  Nature.	   	  
	  
	   To	  resolve	  this	  conflict	  a	  vital	  question	  must	  now	  be	  posed:	  Despite	  the	  alienation	  
or	  estrangement	  that	  fetishism	  of	  commodities	  causes,	  why	  do	  we	  find	  it	  so	  difficult	  to	  
challenge	   this	   estrangement	  within	   the	   law?	  Or	   rather:	  What	   is	   it	   about	   the	   law	   that	  
makes	  us	  believe	  that	  the	  way	  things	  are,	   is	  the	  way	  they	  ought	  to	  be?	  It	   is	  to	  answer	  
this	  question	  that	  we	  shall	  now	  turn.	   	  
	  
(a)	  The	  Juridical	  Subject	  as	  Homo	  Economicus181	  	  
The	  law,	  in	  its	  majestic	  equality,	  forbids	  the	  rich	  as	  well	  as	  the	  poor	  to	  sleep	  under	  
bridges,	  to	  beg	  in	  the	  streets,	  and	  to	  steal	  bread.	  
Anatole	  France,	  Le	  Lys	  Rouge	  (The	  Red	  Lily)	  1894182	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181	   See	  generally,	  Balbus,	  Isaac	  (infra	  n.	  185)	  and	  Evgeny	  Pashukanis	  (infra	  n.	  187)	  who	  originally	  worked	  
out	  the	  link	  between	  the	  commodity	  form	  and	  the	  legal	  form	  and	  the	  relative	  autonomy	  of	  the	  law.	  












As	   we	   have	   seen	   previously,	   in	   market	   economies	   or	   capitalist	   societies,	   there	   is	   an	  
inversion	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  commodities	  and	  humans.	  Commodities	  become	  
real	   and	   humans	   merely	   shadows	   of	   their	   former	   selves,	   leading	   to	   a	   sense	   of	  
estrangement.183	   In	  the	  context	  of	  communities,	  for	  example,	  their	  ‘genetic	  resources’	  
or	  ‘intellectual	  property’	  become	  real,	  and	  become	  ‘objects’	  to	  be	  purchased.	  Their	  way	  
of	   life	   and	   their	   plural	   and	   composite	   relationships	  with	  Nature	   that	   give	   rise	   to	   such	  
knowledge	   and	   biodiversity,	   however,	   become	   mere	   footnotes	   to	   the	   language	   of	  
markets.	   	  
	  
	   The	   law	   in	   market	   economies	   works	   to	   normalize	   estrangement.	   Simplistic	  
‘instrumentalist’	  approaches	  to	  law,	  as	  the	  handmaid	  of	  the	  rich	  and	  the	  powerful,	  will	  
not	   work	   here.	   Every	   example	   of	   case	   law	   or	   legislation	   that	   is	   antithetical	   to	   the	  
interests	  of	   indigenous	  peoples	  and	  traditional	  communities	  can	  be	  countered	  by	  case	  
law	   or	   legislation	   that	   countenances	   their	   interests.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   ‘formalist’	  
approaches	   to	   law	   that	   speak	   of	   law	   as	   an	   autonomous	   neutral	   system	  with	   its	   own	  
internal	   rules	   that	   are	   not	   biased	   towards	   any	   particular	   class	   or	   interest	   group,	   are	  
equally	  simplistic.	  Any	  hard-­‐bitten	  lawyer	  based	  on	  her	  courtroom	  experience	  will	  tell	  us	  
otherwise:	   the	   law	   is	   politics. 184 	   A	   useful	   way	   to	   understand	   the	   law	   is	   by	  
comprehending	   its	   ‘relative	   autonomy’.	   This	   goes	   beyond	   the	   simplistic	   binary	   of	   the	  
formalists	  versus	  the	  instrumentalists.	  The	  relative	  autonomy	  of	  the	  law	  requires	  us	  to	  
look	  at	  the	  deep	  structure	  of	  the	  law	  -­‐	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  so	  to	  speak.	  In	  the	  present	  
case,	  it	  asks	  us	  to	  look	  at	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  ‘juridical	  subject’	  itself.185	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183	   See	  Lukacs,	  Georg,	  History	  and	  Class	  Consciousness:	  Studies	  in	  Marxist	  Dialectics,	  Cambridge:	  MIT	  
Press,	  1971;	  providing	  a	  rigorous	  analysis	  of	  commodity	  fetishism	  and	  the	  alienation	  it	  causes.	  
184	   See	  generally,	  Kelman,	  Mark,	  A	  Guide	  to	  Critical	  Legal	  Studies,	  Boston:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1987.	  
185	   Balbus,	  Isaac,	  “Commodity	  Form	  and	  Legal	  Form:	  An	  Essay	  on	  the	  Relative	  Autonomy	  of	  the	  Law”,	  11	  
Law	  and	  Society,	  Winter	  1977,	  pp.	  571-­‐588,	  at	  p.	  575;	  Here	  Balbus	  explains	  the	  ‘legal	  form’	  as:	  If,	  in	  a	  
capitalist	  mode	  of	  production,	  products	  take	  on	  the	  form	  of	  individual	  commodities,	  people	  take	  on	  
the	  form	  of	  individual	  citizens;	  he	  exchange	  of	  commodities	  is	  paralleled	  by	  the	  exchange	  of	  
citizens….An	  individual	  citizen,	  to	  begin	  with,	  is	  a	  qualitatively	  distinct,	  concrete	  subject	  with	  
qualitatively	  distinct	  human	  needs	  or	  interests….At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  individual	  citizens	  are	  not	  
only,	  and	  not	  immediately,	  subjects	  with	  needs	  but	  also	  and	  rather	  objects	  of	  exchange	  who	  exist	  in	  













	   The	   skeleton	   around	   which	   the	   juridical	   subject	   is	   fleshed	   out	   is	   based	   on	   the	  
institution	  of	  private	  property,	  or	  more	  specifically	  the	  ‘commodity	  form’.	  The	  impact	  of	  
the	   commodity	   form	   on	   the	   legal	   form	   was	   initially	   introduced	   by	   Marx	   but	   more	  
substantially	  worked	  out	  by	  Isaac	  Balbus186	   and	  Evgeny	  Pashukanis	  in	  his	  work	  Law	  and	  
Marxism.187	   Anatole	  France’s	  ironic	  remark	  above,	  about	  the	  formal	  equality	  of	  the	  law	  
is	  a	  useful	  point	  of	  reference	  when	  we	  analyse	  here	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  commodity	  form	  
on	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  juridical	  subject.	   	  
	  
	   In	   2008	   the	   US	   Ninth	   Circuit	   Court	   in	   Navajo	   Nation	   v.	   U.S.	   Forest	   Service188	  
passed	  down	  a	  telling	  decision.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  Navajo	  Nation	  along	  with	  several	  other	  
Native	   American	   tribes	   who	   hold	   the	   San	   Francisco	   Peaks	   of	   Northern	   Arizona	   as	   a	  
sacred	   site	   for	   their	   religious	   ceremonies	   (like	   the	   Navajo	   Blessingway	   Ceremony),	  
challenged	   a	   permit	   given	   by	   the	   U.S.	   Forest	   Service.	   The	   permit	   allowed	   the	   use	   of	  
recycled	  water	  containing	  traces	  of	  human	  waste	  from	  the	  Snowbowl	  ski	  area	  to	  make	  
artificial	   snow	   to	   use	   for	   recreational	   activities,	   such	   as	   skiing	   on	   the	   San	   Francisco	  
Peaks.	  The	   land	  on	  which	   the	  San	  Francisco	  Peaks	   stood	  was	  public	   land	  belonging	   to	  
the	  Federal	  Government.	  The	  Navajo	  Nation	  and	  its	  co-­‐plaintiffs	  argued	  that	  the	  use	  of	  
recycled	   water	   desecrated	   one	   of	   their	   most	   sacred	   sites	   and	   would	   violate	   the	   U.S.	  
Religious	  Freedom	  Restoration	  Act	  of	  1993.189	  
	  
	   The	   Ninth	   Circuit	   Court,	   relying	   on	   the	   1988	   Supreme	   Court	   decision	   in	   Lyng	   v.	  
Northwest	  Indian	  Cemetery	  Protective	  Association,190	   found	  that	  the	  Navajo	  Nation	  had	  
no	   legal	   standing.	   The	   Court	   rationalized	   its	   decision	   by	   arguing	   that,	   if	   it	   upheld	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
or	  representation	  thus	  requires	  that	  qualitatively	  distinct	  individuals	  with	  otherwise	  incommensurable	  
interests	  enter	  into	  a	  formal	  relationship	  of	  equivalence	  with	  one	  another.	  
186	   Ibid.	  
187	   Pashukanis,	  Evgeny,	  Law	  and	  Marxism:	  A	  General	  Theory,	  London:	  Ink	  Links,	  1978.	  
188	   535	  F.3d	  1058	  (9th	  Cir.	  2008).	  
189	   Ibid.	  












religious	  claims	  of	  every	  citizen	  over	  state	  owned	  land,	  then	  it	  would	  establish	  a	  de	  facto	  
beneficial	  ownership	  that	  would	  destabilize	  the	  property	  right	  itself.	   	  
	  
	   In	  Lyng,	  Native	  American	   tribes	  had	  challenged	   the	  approval	  given	  by	   the	  Forest	  
Service	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  logging	  road	  in	  the	  Chimney	  Rock	  area	  of	  the	  Six	  Rivers	  
National	  Forest	  in	  California.	  The	  tribes	  contended	  that	  the	  construction	  would	  interfere	  
with	  their	  free	  exercise	  of	  religion	  by	  disturbing	  a	  sacred	  area.	  The	  area	  was	  an	  integral	  
and	   indispensible	   part	   of	   the	   tribes’	   religious	   practices,	   and	   a	   Forest	   Service	   study	  
concluded	   that	   the	   construction	   ‘would	   cause	   serious	   and	   irreparable	   damage	   to	   the	  
sacred	  areas’.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  held	  that:	  
	  
However	  much	  we	  might	  wish	   that	   it	  were	  otherwise,	   government	   simply	   could	  
not	   operate	   if	   it	   were	   required	   to	   satisfy	   every	   citizen’s	   religious	   needs	   and	  
desires….No	   disrespect	   for	   these	   practices	   is	   implied	  when	   one	   notes	   that	   such	  
beliefs	  could	  easily	  require	  de	  facto	  beneficial	  ownership	  of	  some	  rather	  spacious	  
tracts	  of	  public	  property….Whatever	  rights	  the	  Indians	  may	  have	  to	  the	  use	  of	  the	  
area,	  however,	  those	  rights	  do	  not	  divest	  the	  Government	  of	  its	  right	  to	  use	  what	  
is,	  after	  all,	  its	  land.191	   	  
	  
	   Despite	   the	   elaborate	   reasoning	   of	   the	   courts,	   both	   Navajo	   Nation	   and	   Lyng	  
turned	  on	  one	  important	  question:	  should	  the	  spiritual	  and	  cultural	  beliefs	  of	  the	  tribes	  
be	   allowed	   to	  make	   inroads	   into	   the	   institution	   of	   private	   property?	   Another	  way	   of	  
posing	   the	   same	   question	   would	   be	   to	   ask	   ‘should	   “use	   value”	   in	   certain	   cases	   be	  
allowed	   to	   trump	  “exchange	  value”?’	  or	   simply	  put,	   ‘should	   the	   richness	  of	   the	   tribes	  
relationship	   with	   the	   land	   be	   allowed	   to	   override	   the	   property	   rights	   of	   the	   federal	  
government?’	  
	  
	   The	   fetishization	   of	   private	   property	   that	   occurred	   in	   the	   court’s	   reasoning	   is	   a	  
telling	   reminder	   on	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   commodity	   form	   in	   the	   development	   of	   the	  
legal	   form:	  private	  property	  rights	  are	  presented	  almost	  as	   if	   they	  are	  natural	  and	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












desire	  of	  the	  tribes	  to	  protect	  their	  sacred	  site	  as	  unreasonable.	  Land	  as	  a	  commodity	  is	  
fetishized,	  whereby	  the	  commodity	  is	  more	  real	  than	  the	  relationships	  that	  tribes	  have	  
with	   their	   sacred	  site.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  property	   rights,	   justice	  has	  been	  done,	  
and	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  Ninth	  Circuit	  Court	  will	  have	  precedent	  value	  that	  can	  be	  used	  in	  
other	  situations	  to	  uphold	  the	  sanctity	  of	  private	  property.	  From	  the	  biocultural	   rights	  
approach,	   however,	   the	   stewardship	   ethic	   has	   been	   violated,	   and	   the	   law	   has	   no	  
auditory	  space	  for	  a	  discourse	  of	  stewardship,	  which,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  tribes	  
is	  a	  grave	  injustice.	  
	  
	   If	  one	  observes	  the	  reasoning	  of	  the	  courts	   in	  both	  these	  cases,	   it	   is	  plain	  to	  see	  
that	   the	   ‘commodity	   form’	   has	   given	   rise	   to	   a	   legal	   form,	   that	   of	   a	   particular	   type	   of	  
juridical	  subject.	  It	  is	  germane	  at	  this	  juncture	  to	  ask	  the	  question:	  how	  can	  the	  Native	  
American	  tribes	  feel	  a	  palpable	  sense	  of	  injustice	  when	  the	  courts	  have	  upheld	  the	  right	  
to	  property?	  One	  could	  hypothesize	  that	  the	  feeling	  of	  being	  ‘hard	  done	  by’	  has	  to	  do	  
with	   the	   right	   to	  property	  accommodating	   the	   fullness	  of	   the	   tribes’	   relationship	  with	  
the	  land.	  
	  
	   Land	  as	  private	  property	  is,	  in	  essence,	  land	  as	  a	  commodity,	  and,	  as	  noted	  earlier,	  
when	   use	   value	   is	   turned	   into	   exchange	   value	   it	   erases	   the	   memory	   of	   use	   thereby	  
flattening	   life	   worlds;	   land	   becomes	   property,	   trees	   become	   lumber,	   traditional	  
knowledge	   becomes	   intellectual	   property,	   life	   becomes	   genetic	   resources	   and	   human	  
beings	  become	  property	  owners.	  No	  other	  kind	  of	  relationship,	  be	  it	  social	  or	  spiritual,	  
can	  be	  entertained	  outside	  the	  bounds	  of	  the	  commodity	  relationship.	  The	  relationship	  
between	   human	   beings	   has	   now	   become	   a	   relationship	   between	   commodities,	   and	  
humans	  can	  only	  interact	  with	  each	  other	  as	  commodity	  owners.	  In	  Marx’s	  words:	  
	  
In	   order	   that	   these	   objects	   may	   enter	   into	   relations	   with	   each	   other	   as	  
commodities,	  their	  guardians	  must	  place	  themselves	  in	  relation	  to	  one	  another	  as	  
persons	  whose	  will	  resides	   in	  these	  objects,	  and	  must	  behave	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  












except	   through	   an	   act	   to	   which	   both	   parties	   consent.	   The	   guardians	   must	  
therefore	  recognize	  each	  other	  as	  owners	  of	  private	  property.192	   	  
	  
If	   the	   commodity	   is	   formed	  when	  use	  value	   is	   turned	   into	  pure	  exchange	  value,	  
then,	   similarly,	   the	   juridical	   subject	   is	   born	   when	   human	   beings	   with	   their	   diverse	  
contexts	  and	  cultures	  are	  flattened	  into	  uniform,	  inter-­‐changeable,	  atomistic	  bearers	  of	  
rights.	   There	   is	   a	   two-­‐step	   process	   at	   play	   here.	   In	   the	   first	   step	   individuals	   and	  
communities	   with	   their	   complex	   histories	   and	   different	   interests	   are	   turned	   into	  
abstract	   citizens.	   What	   is	   unequal	   or	   different	   is	   made	   equal,	   just	   as	   the	  
incommensurable	  nature	  of	  use	  value	  is	  equalized	  through	  exchange	  value.	  
	  
In	   the	   second	  step,	   these	  abstract	   citizens	  who	   in	  effect	  are	   ‘unequal’	   are	  made	  
‘equal’,	   and	   this	   formal	   equality	   is	   presented	   as	   the	   reality.	   To	   paraphrase	   Anatole	  
France:	   The	   law,	   in	   its	  majestic	   equality,	   forbids	   the	   Navajo	   as	   well	   as	   the	   banker	   to	  
worship	  on	  federal	  property,	   to	  hunt	   in	  the	  forests,	  and	  to	  harvest	  medicinal	  plants	  on	  
private	   land.	  The	   law,	   like	  money,	  as	   the	  universal	  political	  equivalent	  has,	   through	   its	  
creation	   of	   the	   abstract	   juridical	   subject,	   in	   effect,	   extinguished	   the	   memory	   of	   the	  
different	  cosmovisions.	  As	  Marx	  says:	   	  
	  
The	   state	   abolishes	   after	   its	   fashion,	   the	   distinctions	   established	   by	   birth,	   social	  
rank,	   education,	   occupation,	   when	   it	   decrees	   that	   birth,	   social	   rank,	   education,	  
occupation	   are	   non-­‐political	   distinctions;	   when	   it	   proclaims,	   without	   regard	   to	  
these	  distinctions	  that	  every	  member	  is	  an	  equal	  partner	  in	  popular	  sovereignty.193	  
	  
The	  juridical	  subject	  then	  is	  a	  hollow	  individual,	  with	  real	  rights	  but	  an	  artificial	  life,	  
alienated	   from	   his/her	   social	   existence,	   equal	   in	   theory	   and	   unequal	   in	   practice.	   The	  
experience	  of	  the	  Navajo	  Nation	  in	  the	  Ninth	  Circuit	  Court	  is	  one	  where	  their	  life	  world	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is	   denied	   in	   the	   name	   of	   equal	   rights	   to	   property	   to	   which	   all	   juridical	   subjects	   are	  
entitled.	  
	   	  
(b)	  Legal	  Order	  as	  the	  Super	  Ego	  of	  the	  Public	  Self	  	  
People	   “believe	   in”	   the	   legal	   order	   because	   the	   legal	   order	   substitutes	   as	  
harmonious	   abstract	   world	   for	   the	   concrete	   alienation	   that	   characterizes	   their	   lived	  
experience.	  Thus,	  while	   legal	  thought	  represses,	   it	  also	  reassures;	   it	   is,	  so	  to	  speak,	  the	  
superego	   of	   the	   public	   self	   at	   the	   level	   of	   social	   interpretation.	   The	   character	   of	   this	  
repressive	   thought	   is	   accurately	   described	   by	   the	   word	   “reification”	   which	   is	   properly	  
understood	  as	  a	  certain	  sort	  of	  distortion	  of	  meaning	  that	  occurs	  within	  communication.	  
This	  distortion	  is	  sometimes	  called	  “the	  fallacy	  of	  misplaced	  concreteness”	  because	  when	  
we	   “reify,”	   we	   draw	   an	   abstraction	   from	   a	   concrete	   milieu	   and	   then	   mistake	   the	  
abstraction	  for:	  the	  concrete.	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Peter	  Gabel,	  R ification	  in	  Legal	  Reasoning194	  
	  
	   The	  mere	  argument	   that	   the	   legal	   form	  through	   the	   juridical	   subject	  mirrors	   the	  
commodity	   form	   is	   insufficient	   to	   explain	   the	   persistence	   of	   the	   legal	   form.	   As	   noted	  
previously,	  we	  have	  to	  plumb	  the	  depths	  of	  the	  ‘relative	  autonomy	  of	  the	  law’.	  We	  must	  
ask	  ourselves,	  how	  do	  we	  end	  up	  consenting	  to	  a	  palpable	  sense	  of	  estrangement?	  Or,	  
rather,	  how	  is	  it	  that	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  courts	  in	  the	  Navajo	  Nation	  and	  Lyng	  appear	  as	  
the	   way	   things	   ought	   to	   be	   rather	   than	  militating	   against	   our	   basic	   sense	   of	   what	   it	  
means	  to	  be	  human.	   	  
	  
	   Critical	  legal	  studies	  theorist,	  Peter	  Gabel,	  points	  out	  in	  the	  passage	  above	  that	  the	  
belief	  in	  the	  legal	  order	  is	  a	  result	  of	  the	  substitution	  of	  a	  harmonious	  abstract	  world	  for	  
the	   concrete	   sense	   of	   alienation	   that	   people	   experience	   every	   day.	   The	   law	   both	  
represses	   and	   reassures:	   it	   represses	   through	   legal	   forms	   that	   create	   and	   legitimize	  
estrangement,	  and	  it	  reassures	  by	  creating	  the	  impression	  that	  the	  abstract	  legal	  system	  
is	  both	   realistic	   (it	   takes	   into	  account	  how	   things	   really	   are)	   and	  normative	   (it	   aspires	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












towards	   how	   things	   ought	   to	   be).	   This	   simultaneous	   repression	   and	   reassurance	   is	  
carried	  out	  through	  a	  process	  of	  reification.195	  
	  
	   In	  many	  ways	  reification	  is	  what	  sustains	  the	  juridical	  subject	  in	  capitalist	  societies.	  
It	   is	   the	   transformer	   that	   converts	   the	   commodity	   form	   into	   a	   legal	   form.	   As	   Gabel	  
notes,	   reification	   occurs	   when	   we	   draw	   an	   abstraction	   from	   a	   concrete	   milieu	   and	  
mistake	   the	   abstraction	   for	   the	   concrete.	   The	   fetishization	   of	   commodities	   in	  market	  
economies	  is	  a	  result	  of	  reification.	  The	  creation	  of	  exchange	  value	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  
the	   market	   is	   an	   aspect	   of	   all	   complex	   societies.	   To	   abstract	   exchange	   value	   as	   a	  
dimension	  of	  the	  economy,	  however,	  and	  then	  to	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  the	  only	  form	  of	  value,	  
is	   to	   engage	   in	   reification.	   Another	   example	   of	   reification	   is	   the	   homo	   economicus,	  
which	   is	  clearly	  an	  abstraction	  of	  an	  aspect	  of	  human	  behaviour	   that	   is	  generalized	  as	  
human	  nature	  itself,	  and	  therefore	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  juridical	  subject.	   	  
	  
	   For	   Gabel,	   reified	   communication	   is	   a	   three-­‐step	   process:	   1)	   the	   speaker	  
misunderstands	  by	  asserting	  that	  the	  abstract	  is	  concrete;	  2)	  the	  speaker	  knows	  that	  she	  
misunderstands;	   3)	   she	   denies	   to	   both	   herself	   and	   the	   listener	   her	   knowledge	   of	   this	  
misunderstanding,	   thereby	   affirm ng	   that	   the	   communication	   is	   true.196	   In	   reified	  
communication,	  one	  has	  a	   sense	   that	  what	   is	  being	   said	  does	  not	  entirely	   correspond	  
with	  the	  reality	  of	  experience	  and	  yet	  simultaneously	  denies	  that	  one	  is	  communicating	  
a	  false	  concrete.	  For	  example,	  when	  the	  law	  speaks	  of	  traditional	  knowledge	  or	  genetic	  
resources	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  as	  commodities,	  it	  is	  not	  unaware	  that	  this	  knowledge	  
is	  an	  aspect	  of	  a	  way	  of	  life.	  Yet	  it	  unconsciously	  denies	  to	  the	  listeners,	  and	  to	  itself,	  this	  
deeper	  truth.	   	  
	  
	   In	  fact,	  reification	  is	  what	  sustains	  estrangement.	  We	  would	  never	  know	  that	  we	  
were	   estranged,	   if	   we	   didn’t	   feel	   unease	   at	   some	   deep	   level.	   For	   example,	   we	   know	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subconsciously	  that	  the	  universality	  of	  the	  homo	  economicus	  is	  a	  false	  concrete,	  since	  it	  
does	  not	  bear	  out	  in	  all	  our	  experiences.	  Yet	  we	  behave	  as	  if	  it	  is	  universal,	  and	  thereby	  
actively	   make	   it	   universal.	   We	   are	   both	   victims	   and	   agents	   of	   reification,	   and	   we	  
constantly	   ‘other’	  ourselves.	  We	  participate	   in	  a	  collective	  conspiracy,	   like	  a	  truth	  that	  
dare	  not	  speak	  its	  name,	  for	  the	  fear	  of	  derailing	  society	  from	  the	  well-­‐grooved	  tracks	  of	  
social	  communication.	  The	   law	  as	  reified	  communication	  reassures	  by	   its	  denial	  of	  our	  
collective	   feeling	   of	   estrangement.	   It	   fuses	   both	   the	   concrete	   and	   the	   normative,	   by	  
stating	  that	  what	   ‘is’,	   ‘ought’	  to	  be;	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	   law,	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  both	  Navajo	  
and	  Lyng,	  is	  legitimation.	  
	  
	   Reification	  in	  legal	  processes	  necessarily	  involves	  restoring	  a	  systemic	  equilibrium.	  
The	   judge	   for	   the	   most	   part	   unconsciously	   plays	   the	   part	   of	   legitimating	   the	   market	  
economy,	   or,	   rather,	   the	  market	   economy	   legitimizes	   itself	   through	   the	   judge.	   In	   the	  
case	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   the	   institution	   of	   private	   property	   is	   legitimized	   to	   the	  
exclusion	  of	  all	  other	  possible	  biocultural	  relations.	   	  
	  
	   The	  first	  step	  in	  this	  process	  of	  legitimation	  is	  to	  take	  a	  set	  of	  facts	  that	  has	  caused	  
disequilibrium	   in	   the	   reified	   system,	   and	   fit	   them	   into	   neat	   legal	   categories,	   such	   as	  
owner,	  property,	  occupier	  etc.	  The	  facts	  are	  then	  restated	  in	  a	  way	  that	  allows	  for	  these	  
legal	   categories	   to	   play	   out	   their	   interlocking	   functions.	   In	   this	   way,	   the	   ‘is’	   of	   life	   is	  
fused	  with	  the	  ‘ought’	  of	  the	  law,	  ensuring	  that	  the	  law	  is	  a	  true	  representation	  of	  life.	  
Private	  property	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  legal	  category,	  but	  a	  fact	  of	  life.	   	  
	  
	   The	   next	   step	   in	   the	   process	   of	   judicial	   legitimation	   is	   to	   fit	   the	   individuals	   to	   a	  
dispute	   into	  one	  of	   the	  avatars	  of	   the	   juridical	   subject.	  Thus,	   just	  as	  a	  commodity	   is	  a	  
generic	   category	   that	   signifies	   pure	   exchange	   value,	   but	   allows	   for	   the	   existence	   of	  
different	   types	   of	   commodities,	   the	   juridical	   subject	   too	   is	   a	   generic	   category	   that	  
spawns	   a	   variety	   of	   different	   types	  of	   actors,	   such	   as	   sellers,	   buyers,	   owners,	   tenants	  












variations	  of	  the	  rights	  and	  duties	  universal	  juridical	  subject.	  The	  roles,	  rights	  and	  duties	  
of	  the	  different	  actors	  are	  presented	  as	  both	  a	  norm	  and	  a	  practice.	   	  
	  
	   Reification	   in	   legal	   reasoning	   then	   presents	   itself	   both	   as	   an	   accurate	  
representation	   of	   life	   and	   how	   life	   ought	   to	   be	   lived.	   Property	   owners	   behave	   as	  
property	  owners	  because,	  according	  to	  the	  law,	  they	  ought	  to,	  and	  because	  they	  behave	  
so,	  the	  ‘ought’	  is	  justified	  as	  a	  representation	  of	  reality.	  Reification	  is	  a	  result	  of	  people	  
being	   ‘passivized’	   into	  particular	  variations	  of	   the	   juridical	  subject,	  and	  this	  passivity	   is	  
both	  the	  cause	  and	  the	  consequence	  of	  estrangement.197	   	  
	  
	   The	  final	  step	  in	  judicial	  decision-­‐making	  is	  then	  to	  apply	  the	  law	  to	  a	  set	  of	  facts	  
that	  have	  already	  been	  pre-­‐moulded	  to	  fit	  the	  law.	  The	  relative	  autonomy	  of	  the	  law	  in	  
market	   economies	   ensures	   that	   we	   do	   not	   have	   uniformity	   in	   decision-­‐making.	  
Sometimes	   property	   owners	   win	   and	   at	   other	   times	   tenants.	   But	   in	   general,	   an	  
equilibrium	  is	  maintained	  that	  does	  not	  disrupt	  the	  internal	   logic	  of	  capitalism,	   i.e.	  the	  
institution	   of	   private	   property	   and	   the	   trope	   of	   the	   homo	   economicus	   remains	  
unchallenged.	   	  
	  
	   This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  dice	  are	  always	  loaded	  or	  that	  the	  fight	  is	  always	  fixed,	  
and	  that	  there	  is	  no	  hope	  for	  biocultural	  rights	  or	  stewardship	  ethics.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  
the	   point	   is	   that	   communities	   should	   be	   aware	   that	   their	   call	   for	   biocultural	   rights,	  
challenges	  the	  very	  cell	  structure	  of	  the	  market	  economy:	  the	  commodity	  form.	  The	  self-­‐
adjusting	  response	  of	  the	  system	  in	  such	  a	  case	  will	  be	  to	  include	  within	  the	  commodity	  
form	   these	   community	   claims;	   for	   example,	   the	   right	   of	   communities	   to	   sell	   their	  
traditional	  knowledge	  and	  genetic	  resources.	   It	   is	  therefore	  critical	   for	  communities	  to	  
hold	  fast	  to	  the	  position	  that	  the	  call	  for	  biocultural	  rights	  should	  not	  be	  misunderstood	  
as	  a	  demand	  for	  pre-­‐capitalist	  communities	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  market	  economy.	  It	  is,	  
instead,	  a	  call	  for	  a	  foundational	  rethink	  of	  our	  relationship	  with	  Nature.	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  














(c)	  Reification	  in	  Practice:	  Nkosi	  v.	  Bührmann198	  	  
	  
The	  2001	  decision	  of	  the	  South	  African	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Nkosi	  v.	  
Bührmann199	   is	   a	  good	  example	  of	   reification	   in	  practice.	  The	   facts	  of	   the	   case	  are	  as	  
follows:	  Grace	  Nkosi	  wanted	  to	  bury	  her	  son	  Petros	  Nkosi	  on	  a	   farm	  that	  belonged	  to	  
Gideon	  Bührmann.	  He	  refused	  to	  allow	   it.	  Grace	  had	  moved	  to	   the	  Bührmann	  farm	   in	  
1966	  with	  her	  husband	  and	   family	  as	   farm	   labourers.	  As	  was	   the	  practice	   then,	  Grace	  
and	  her	   family	  were	   in	   return	   for	   their	   services	  allowed	   to	   live	  on	   the	   farm	  and	  graze	  
their	   few	   livestock	  and	   raise	   some	  crops.	  While	  Grace’s	  husband	  worked	  as	   a	   general	  
labourer	  and	  tractor	  driver,	  she	  worked	  as	  domestic	  help	   in	  the	  Bührmann	  household.	  
Petros	  was	  born	  on	  the	  farm	  in	  1968.	  Grace	  informed	  the	  court	  that	  Gideon’s	  father,	  the	  
elder	  Bührmann,	  had	  previously	  allowed	  her	   to	  bury	  her	  grandchild	  on	  an	  area	   in	   the	  
farm.	  Thereafter	  seven	  other	  family	  members	  including	  her	  mother-­‐in-­‐law	  and	  brother-­‐
in-­‐law	  were	  also	  buried	  in	  this	  area.	  
	  
	   Grace	   communicated	   to	   the	   court	   the	   significance	   of	   her	   relationship	   with	   the	  
land,	  one	   that	  went	  beyond	  viewing	   it	   purely	  as	  private	  property.	   She	  explained,	   that	  
prior	  to	  the	  first	  burial:	   	  
	  
Consistent	   with	   our	   tradition	   and	   cultural	   beliefs,	   my	   husband	   and	   his	   mother	  
performed	  the	  rituals	  necessary	  to	  declare	  and	  introduce	  that	  piece	  of	  ground	  as	  
an	  official	  home	  for	  our	  ancestors.	  I	  must	  state	  that	  it	  is	  our	  custom	  and	  religious	  
belief	  that	  when	  a	  member	  of	  our	  family	  passes	  away,	  he/she	  gets	  only	  physically	  
separated	  from	  us	  but	  spiritually	  that	  person	  will	  always	  be	  with	  us	  and	  is	  capable	  
of	   sharing	   a	   day	   to	   day	   life	  with	   us	   though	   in	   a	   different	   form.	   It	   is	   against	   this	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background	  that	  a	  graveyard	  to	  us	  is	  not	  only	  a	  place	  to	  bury	  our	  deceased,	  but	  a	  
second	  home	  for	  those	  of	  us	  who	  live	  in	  the	  world	  of	  spirits.	  Once	  a	  certain	  piece	  
of	  ground	  is	  declared	  a	  home	  to	  our	  ancestors,	  it	  remains	  so	  until	  another	  ritual	  is	  
accordingly	  performed	  by	  the	  elders	  clothed	  with	  the	  necessary	  ability...200	   	  
	  
	   Except	   for	   a	   period	   of	   6	   intervening	   years,	   from	   1981-­‐86,	   the	   Nkosis	   lived	   as	  
labourers	  on	  the	  Bührmann	  farm	  for	  a	  total	  of	  29	  years.	  The	  farm	  was	  not	  simply	  their	  
home.	  The	  area	  had	  become	   the	  abode	  of	   their	  dear	  departed.	   It	  was	   for	   this	   reason	  
that	  Grace	  had	  wanted	  to	  bury	  her	  son	  Petros	  on	  the	  site	  where	  he	  could	  join	  his	  kin	  in	  
the	   spirit	   world	   and	   yet	   stay	   close	   to	   Grace.	   The	   five	   judges	   of	   the	   South	   African	  
Supreme	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   were	   unanimous	   in	   concurring	   that	   the	   Bührmann	   right	   to	  
private	  property	  trumped	  any	  possible	  relation	  Grace	  may	  have	  to	  the	  spiritual	  home	  of	  
her	  deceased	  family.	  
	  
	   The	  three	  step	  legitimizing	  process	  of	   legal	  reification	  highlighted	  in	  the	  previous	  
section	  was	   applied.	   These	   three	   steps,	   however,	   are	   not	   necessarily	   sequential;	   they	  
occur	  simultaneously.	  In	  his	  judgment,	  Judge	  Craig	  Howie	  reinterpreted	  and	  slotted	  the	  
facts	  into	  legal	  categories.	   	  
	  
	   At	  the	  outset	  the	  facts	  had	  to	  be	  restated	  as	  a	  conflict	  between	  Grace	  Nkosi’s	  right	  
to	   practise	   her	   ‘religion’	   versus	   Bührmann’s	   right	   to	   private	   property.	   Relying	   on	   an	  
interpretation	   of	   the	   South	   African	   Constitution201	   and	   the	   Extension	   of	   Security	   of	  
Tenure	   Act,202	   Judge	   Howie	   distinguished	   the	   current	   case	   from	   two	   other	   previous	  
Constitutional	  Court	  decisions	  by	  stating	  that:	   ‘in	  neither	  case	  was	   it	  said	  or	  suggested	  
that	  for	  the	  practice	  of	  one’s	  religion	  one	  may	  demand	  assistance,	  whether	  financial	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200	   Ibid,	  at	  paragraph	  6.	  
201	   Constitution	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  South	  Africa,	  Act	  108	  of	  1996.	  












patrimonial	   from	   another,	   much	   less	   that	   one	   may	   actively	   diminish	   another’s	  
patrimony	  by	  way	  of	  appropriation.’203	   	  
	  
	   An	   interesting	   judicial	   sleight	  of	  hand	  took	  place	   in	   this	  case.	  The	   Judge	  reduced	  
Grace	  Nkosi’s	  claim	  to	  one	  of	  freedom	  of	  religion.	  By	  doing	  this,	  he	  masked	  what	  Marx	  
points	   out	   as	   the	   conflict	   between	   labour	   and	   capital	   or	   use	   and	  ownership.	   The	   fact	  
that	  Grace’s	  family	  had	  lived	  laboured	  and	  died	  on	  the	  land	  over	  a	  period	  29	  years	  did	  
not	   provide	   them	   with	   any	   ownership	   rights.	   Their	   labour	   had	   been	   estranged	   from	  
them	  and	  converted	  to	  capital,	  and	  Bührmann	  owned	  the	  capital.	  Capital	  or	  the	  means	  
of	  production	  was	  vested	  in	  Bührmann	  through	  the	  right	  to	  private	  property.	  For	  Grace	  
Nkosi,	  her	  living	  labour	  and	  the	  relations	  she	  had	  developed	  with	  the	  land	  through	  the	  
life	  that	  she	  had	  built	  around	  and	  through	  her	  labour,	  was	  estranged	  from	  her.	  She	  was	  
paid	  her	  wages,	  and	  that	  was	  that.	  As	  we	  can	  see,	  the	  facts	  were	  tamed	  by	  sidestepping	  
the	  heart	  of	  the	  matter.	  Now	  it	  was	  a	  question	  of	  balancing	  the	  right	  to	  practise	  religion	  
versus	  the	  right	  to	  private	  property.	  The	  unruly	  facts	  that	  spelt	  disequilibrium	  had	  been	  
massaged	  back	  into	  the	  system,	  where	  they	  could	  be	  neatly	  categorized.	  
	  
	   When	  Grace	  Nkosi’s	  claim	  had	  been	  reduced	  to	  her	  desire	  to	  practice	  her	  faith,	  the	  
facts	   were	   again	   interpreted	   to	   show	   that	   her	   freedom	   of	   religion	   had	   not	   been	  
restricted.	  The	  Judge	  noted:	   	  
	  
What	   the	  evidence	   in	   this	   case	   shows	   is	   that	   the	  appellant’s	  beliefs	  are	   that	   the	  
existing	  family	  graves	  constitute	  a	  spiritual	  home	  for	  her	  ancestors	  and	  therefore	  
the	   site	   where	   subsequent	   family	   dead	   should	   be	   buried.	   What	   renders	   this	  
particular	  land	  appropriate	  for	  the	  burial	  (apart	  from	  its	  convenience)	  is	  that	  it	  has	  
been	   consecrated	   for	   family	   burials.	   She	   does	   not,	   and	   cannot,	   claim	   that	   this	  
gravesite	   comprises	   the	   only	   place	   where	   her	   religious	   burial	   dictates	   could	  
possibly	  be	  satisfied.	  Obviously	  that	  was	  not	  the	  position	  before	  she	  lived	  on	  the	  
farm	  or	  when	  her	   residence	   there	  was	   interrupted	   for	   some	   six	   years.	  Nor	  does	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












she	  allege,	  as	   I	  have	  said,	  that	  burial	  of	  Petros’s	  body	  anywhere	  else	  would	  pose	  
problems	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  expense	  or	  logistics.	  In	  other	  words	  she	  is	  able	  
to	  bury	  her	  son.204	  
	  
	   When	   the	   Judge	   severed	   the	   connection	   between	   Grace	   Nkosi’s	   way	   of	   life,	   or	  
living	   labour	   and	   the	   land,	   it	   was	   quite	   possible	   for	   him	   to	   reduce	   the	   problem	   to	  
‘expense,	   logistics	   and	   choice’.	   He	   made	   the	   point	   that,	   clearly,	   not	   everyone	   in	   the	  
history	  of	   the	  Nkosi	   family	  had	  been	  buried	  on	   the	  Bührmann	   land,	  nor	  did	   they	  bury	  
kinsfolk	  there	  during	  the	  6	  years	  when	  the	  Nkosis	  did	  not	  live	  on	  the	  farm.	  Hence	  Grace	  
had	   other	   options,	   and	   her	   link	   to	   the	   land	   was	   not	   strong	   enough	   to	   override	  
Bührmann’s	  right	  to	  private	  property.	  The	  internal	  logic	  of	  the	  system	  had	  been	  satisfied	  
through	   ensuring	   the	   coexistence	   of	   competing	   rights.	   Grace	   still	   had	   the	   right	   to	  
practise	   her	   religion,	   but	   not	   on	   Bührmann’s	   land,	   and	   Bührmann’s	   right	   to	   private	  
property	  was	  affirmed.	   	   	  
	  
	   The	  next	  phase	  of	   legitimation	  was	  one	  of	   reconciliation	  and	  affirmation,	  where	  
necessary	   exceptions	   to	   the	   absolute	   right	   to	   private	   property	   were	   created	   as	   an	  
assurance	   that	   private	   property	   was	   not	   the	   taproot	   of	   South	   African	   society.	   By	  
allowing	   for	   other	   kinds	   of	   relations	   to	   the	   land	   to	   be	   recognized	   under	   exceptional	  
circumstances,	   however,	   this	   phase	   affirmed	   the	   normalcy	   of	   private	   property	   as	   the	  
very	  cell	  structure	  of	  society.	  The	  Judge	  pointed	  out:	   	  
	  
[T]his	  does	  not	  exclude	   the	  possibility,	  however,	   that	  where	   religious	  or	   cultural	  
beliefs	   are	   so	   inherently	   attached	   to	   particular	   land	   that	   the	   right	   to	   hold	   and	  
practice	  them	  would	  be	  denied	  if	  the	  rights	  of	  ownership	  are	  asserted,	  the	  latter	  
rights	  might	  be	  required	  to	  give	  way.	  That	  does	  not	  arise	  in	  the	  present	  case.205	   	  
	  
	   The	   crux	  of	   this	   statement	   symbolized	  a	   fetish	  of	  private	  property	   to	   the	  extent	  
that	  it	  no	  longer	  needed	  to	  justify	  itself,	  irrespective	  of	  whether	  it	  was	  an	  inheritance	  by	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an	  individual,	  who	  had	  little	  or	  no	  connection	  to	  the	  land,	  or	  a	  purchase	  validated	  by	  a	  
title	   deed	   on	   a	   piece	   of	   paper.	   Private	   property	  was	   an	  a	   priori	   given.	   All	   other	   right	  
claimants,	  if	  challenging	  this	  fetish,	  would	  have	  the	  burden	  of	  establishing	  their	  claim	  -­‐	  
one	  that	  would	  be	  entertained	  only	  in	  the	  most	  extreme	  of	  cases.	  
	  
	   In	  addition	  to	  highlighting	  these	  exceptional	  circumstances,	  the	  Judge	  seemed	  to	  
issue	  a	  caveat,	  that	  too	  many	  exceptions	  would	  undermine	  the	  abstract	  universality	  of	  
the	  juridical	  subject.	  Exceptions,	  which	  represented	  lived	  experience,	  and	  went	  against	  
the	   grain	   of	   abstraction	   of	   the	   commodity	   form,	   were	   a	   threat	   that	   needed	   to	   be	  
contained.	  The	  limitation	  on	  too	  many	  exceptions	  was	  presented	  as	  the	  state’s	  duty	  to	  
treat	  all	   its	  citizens	  equally,	  since	  all	   juridical	  subjects	   (in	  abstraction)	  were	  necessarily	  
equal.	  The	  Judge	  presented	  the	  caveat	  as	  follows:	   	  
	  
Outside	   the	   jurisdiction	  of	   a	   local	   authority	  one	   is	  necessarily	  dependent	  on	   the	  
consent	  of	  the	  landowner,	  be	  it	  the	  state	  a	  juristic	  person	  or	  an	  individual.	  These	  
are	   legal	   constraints	   that	   bind	   everyone.	   No	   religion	   can	   demand	   more	   than	  
another.	  Although	  the	  Act	  (The	  Extension	  of	  Security	  of	  Tenure	  Act)	  aims	  to	  treat	  
occupiers	  specially,	  the	  right	  of	  religious	  freedom	  is	  the	  right	  of	  all.206	  
	  
	   Shrinking	   Grace	   Nkosi’s	   challenge	   to	   the	   internal	   coherence	   of	   the	   system	   to	   a	  
minor	   misunderstanding	   completed	   the	   process	   of	   legitimation.	   The	   Judge	   therefore	  
concluded:	   	  
	  
(T)hat	  the	  right	  to	  freedom	  of	  religion	  and	  religious	  practice	  has	  internal	  limits.	  It	  
does	  not	  confer	  unfettered	   liberty	   to	  choose	  a	  grave	  site	  nor	  does	   it	   include	  the	  
right	   to	   take	   a	   grave	   site	   without	   the	   consent	   of	   the	   owner	   of	   the	   land	  
concerned.207	  
	  
(d)	  Fighting	  Estrangement:	  The	  Case	  for	  Biocultural	  Rights	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The	   juridical	   subject,	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   is	   both	   the	   cause	   and	   the	   consequence	   of	  
reification	   of	   the	   commodity	   form	   into	   the	   legal	   form.	   The	   case	   for	   biocultural	   rights	  
therefore	   is	   not	   merely	   one	   that	   asks	   for	   recognition	   of	   stewardship	   relations	   that	  
indigenous	  peoples	  and	   traditional	   communities	  have	  with	  Nature.	  On	   the	  contrary,	   it	  
makes	   the	   case	   that	   stewardship	   of	   Nature	   is	   impossible	   without	   deconstructing	   our	  
understanding	   of	   human	   nature,	   a	   euphemism	   for	   the	  homo	   economicus	   in	   capitalist	  
societies.	   Going	   further,	   the	   fight	   for	   biocultural	   rights	   is	   a	   fight	   against	   the	  
estrangement	  that	  is	  experienced	  when	  market	  relations	  eclipse	  all	  social	  relations.	   	  
	  
	   This	  fight	  is	  not	  an	  easy	  one,	  since	  it	  has	  to	  confront	  the	  fetishism	  of	  commodities	  
or	   the	   predominance	   of	   exchange	   value	   at	   every	   turn.	   Indigenous	   peoples	   and	  
traditional	  communities	  bear	  a	  grave	  responsibility	   to	  help	  us	  remember	  pre-­‐capitalist	  
stewardship	   values,	   and	   to	   use	   them	   to	   navigate	   our	   way	   towards	   a	   post-­‐capitalist	  
world.	   	  
	  
	   With	   the	   growing	   momentum	   around	   biocultural	   rights	   in	   international	   law,	  
communities,	  whose	   life	  world	   is	   one	  where	   exchange	   value	   has	   not	   yet	   eclipsed	   the	  
memory	   of	   use	   value,	   have	   begun	   to	   provide	   us	   with	   a	   lens	   to	   help	   address	   our	  
collective	   estrangement	   from	   Nature.	   The	   language	   these	   communities	   rely	   upon	   is	  
distinctly	  pre-­‐capitalist	  -­‐	  they	  use	  terms	  such	  as	  ‘Mother	  Earth’,	  and	  rely	  on	  narratives	  of	  
kinship	   with	   animals	   and	   value	   systems	   that	   say	   everything	   is	   not	   for	   sale.	   But	   it	   is	  
precisely	  this	  language	  that	  is	  able	  to	  identify	  our	  estrangement	  and	  turn	  on	  the	  lights	  in	  
a	  phantasmagoria	  of	  commodities.	   	  
	  
	   Indigenous	   peoples	   and	   traditional	   communities	   certainly	   understand	   exchange	  
value,	  as	  they	  too	  participate	  in	  markets.	  They	  also	  know,	  however,	  that	  a	  world	  hidden	  
by	   exchange	   value,	   where	   all	   social	   relations	   are	   embedded	   in	   market	   relations,	  












Such	  a	  world	  has	  no	  place	  for	  stewardship.	  Stewardship	  at	  its	  core	  resists	  alienation	  by	  
requiring	   the	   expansion	   of	   the	   self	   to	   include	   one’s	   community	   and	   Nature.	   It	   is	   the	  
contention	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  that	  stewardship	  and	  not	  private	  property	  that	  is	  natural.	   	  
	  
The	   fight	   for	  biocultural	   rights	   is	  a	   fight	  against	   the	  dominant	   reification	  of	  our	  
times.	  It	  says	  that	  we	  are	  more	  than	  just	  abstract	  juridical	  subjects,	  interchangeable	  and	  
alienated.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   our	   lives	   are	   lived	   through	   dense	   relationships	   with	   our	  
communities	   and	   our	   lands.	   At	   the	   core	   of	   biocultural	   rights,	   is	   a	   challenge	   to	   the	  
fetishism	   of	   the	   law.	   It	   refuses	   to	   accept	   that	   we	   are	   creations	   of	   the	   law.	   Rather	   it	  
insists	  that	  the	  law	  is	  our	  creation.	   	  
	  
Many	   communities	   have	   now	   opened	   up	   a	   new	   front	   against	   the	   homo	  
economicus.	   Their	   struggle	   says	   that	  we	  are	  more	   than	  owners	  of	   real	   estate;	  we	  are	  
stewards	   of	   the	   earth.	   Sahlins	   sums	   this	   sentiment	   in	   his	   critique	   of	   the	   homo	  
economicus	  when	  he	  says:	  
	  
Natural	  self-­‐interest?	  For	  the	  greater	  part	  of	  humanity,	  self-­‐interest	  as	  we	  know	  
it	   is	   unnatural	   in	   the	   normative	   sense:	   it	   is	   considered	   madness…Rather	   than	  
expressing	  a	  pre-­‐social	  human	  nature,	  such	  avarice	  is	  generally	  taken	  for	  a	  loss	  of	  
humanity.	   It	   puts	   in	   abeyance	   the	  mutual	   relationships	   of	   being	   that	   define	   a	  
human	   existence.	   Yet	   if	   the	   self,	   the	   body,	   experience,	   pleasure,	   pain,	   agency	  
and	  intentionality,	  even	  death	  itself,	  are	  transpersonal	  relationships	   in	  so	  many	  
societies	  and	  in	  all	  likelihood	  through	  so	  many	  eons	  of	  human	  history,	  it	  follows	  
that	   the	   native	   Western	   concept	   of	   man’s	   self-­‐regarding	   animal	   nature	   is	   an	  
illusion	  of	  world-­‐anthropological	  proportions.208	  
	  
So	  how	  have	  communities	  begun	  to	  legal	  reification	  and	  the	  estrangement	  that	  it	  
causes?	   What	   are	   their	   methods	   and	   how	   successful	   are	   they?	  We	   shall	   attempt	   to	  
answer	   these	   questions	   in	   the	   next	   chapter	   by	   exploring	   the	   strategic	   role	   played	   by	  
communities	   in	   the	   negotiations	   towards	   the	   Nagoya	   Protocol	   on	   Access	   and	   Benefit	  
Sharing.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












CHAPTER	  V	  –	  FIGHTING	  REIFICATION:	  TOWARDS	  A	  PEOPLES’	  HISTORY	  OF	  
THE	  LAW	  
	  
So	  advance	  but	  do	  not	  use	  your	  feet	  
Seize	  but	  do	  not	  use	  your	  arms	  
Cut	  but	  do	  not	  use	  your	  sword	  
Fight	  but	  do	  not	  use	  your	  own	  power	  
Lao	  Tzu,	  Tao	  Te	  Ching,	  verse	  69209	  
	  
Legal	   reification	   is	   not	   without	   its	   challengers.	   The	   struggle	   for	   biocultural	   rights	   is	  
emblematic	   of	   the	   agency	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	   traditional	   communities	   to	   re-­‐
member	   their	   wholeness	   from	   the	   dismembering	   or	   estrangement	   wreaked	   by	  
capitalism	  and	   the	   juridical	   subject	   it	   spawns.	   It	   is	   to	  understand	   the	  dynamics	  of	   this	  
struggle	  that	  we	  shall	  now	  turn.	   	  
	  
The	  English	  Marxist	  historian,	  E	  P	  Thompson,	   in	  his	  classic	  work	  The	  Making	  of	  
the	   English	   Working	   Class,210	   marshals	   rich	   evidence	   of	   a	   history	   from	   below	   which	  
challenges	   the	   history	   that	   is	   written	   as	   if	   it	   were	   a	   result	   of	   great	   figures	   or	   global	  
forces.	  According	  to	  Thompson	  history	  is	  not	  made	  by	  the	  forces	  of	  the	  market	  only	  but	  
also	  by	  the	  struggles,	  aspirations	  and	  hopes	  of	  ordinary	  people	  striving	  to	  influence	  the	  
condition	   of	   their	   lives.	   For	   Thompson,	   people,	   by	   making	   history,	   also	   make	  
themselves.	   To	   perceive	   the	   struggles	   of	   communities	   for	   biocultural	   rights,	   we	  must	  
move	  away	  from	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  law	  as	  purely	  repressive	  to	  an	  understanding	  
of	  the	  law	  as	  a	  ‘site	  of	  struggle’-­‐	  where	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  law	  is	  frequently	  challenged	  
by	  the	  agency	  of	  the	  subaltern.	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In	  his	  effort	  to	  interrogate	  a	  functionalist	  approach	  to	  history,	  Thompson	  writes:	  
‘I	   am	   seeking	   to	   rescue	   the	   poor	   stockinger,	   the	   Luddite	   cropper,	   the	   “obsolete”	  
handloom	   weaver,	   the	   “utopian”	   artisan….from	   the	   enormous	   condescension	   of	  
posterity.’211	   This	   ‘enormous	   condescension	   of	   posterity’	   becomes	   obvious	  when,	   for	  
example,	   we	   speak	   of	  multilateral	   environmental	   agreements	   like	   the	   Convention	   on	  
Biological	  Diversity	  (CBD).	   	  
	  
We	   refer	   to	   the	   CBD	   as	   an	   international	   treaty	   between	   193	   state	   parties	   to	  
conserve	   the	   environment,	   thereby	   conveying	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   is	   the	   result	   of	   state	  
action	  stemming	  from	  enlightened	  politicians	  reacting	  responsibly	  to	  crisis	  warnings	  by	  
scientists.	  Such	  an	  understanding	  hides	  as	  much	  as	   it	   reveals.	  While	   it	   is	   true	   that	   the	  
negotiations	   leading	   up	   to	   the	   CBD	   did	   involve	   enlightened	   politicians	   and	  
knowledgeable	   scientists,	  what	   is	   hidden	   is	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   negotiations	   and	  
the	  years	  preceding	   them	  as	  a	   terrain	  of	   struggle,	  one	   in	  which	  communities	  and	  civil	  
society	   organizations	   deployed	   strategies,	   formed	   alliances,	   occupied	   and	   expanded	  
legal	  space	  and	  made	  significant	  rights	  advances.	   	  
	  
On	   the	   face	   of	   it,	   multilateral	   environmental	   negotiations	   in	   supra-­‐national	  
forums	  seem	  like	  the	  typical	  UN	  model	  of	  negotiations	  between	  sovereign	  states.	  This	  
impression	  is	  reinforced	  by	  a	  doctrinaire	  approach	  to	  public	  international	  law	  commonly	  
taught	  in	  law	  schools.	  Here	  the	  sources	  of	  international	  law	  are	  typically	  understood	  as	  
those	  listed	  in	  Article	  38	  of	  the	  Statute	  of	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  This	  states	  
that:	  
	  
1.	   The	  Court,	  whose	   function	   is	   to	  decide	   in	  accordance	  with	   international	   law	  
such	  disputes	  as	  are	  submitted	  to	  it,	  shall	  apply:	   	  
a.	   international	   conventions,	   whether	   general	   or	   particular,	   establishing	   rules	  
expressly	  recognized	  by	  the	  contesting	  states;	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












b.	  international	  custom,	  as	  evidence	  of	  a	  general	  practice	  accepted	  as	  law;	   	  
c.	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  law	  recognized	  by	  civilized	  nations;	   	  
d.	  subject	  to	  the	  provisions	  of	  Article	  59,	   judicial	  decisions	  and	  the	  teachings	  of	  
the	  most	  highly	  qualified	  publicists	  of	   the	  various	  nations,	   as	   subsidiary	  means	  
for	  the	  determination	  of	  rules	  of	  law.212	   	  
	  
Anyone	  seasoned	  in	  international	  negotiations,	  however,	  would	  argue	  that	  there	  
is	  more	   to	   international	   law	  making	   than	  Article	  38.	   The	   last	   six	   years	  of	  negotiations	  
towards	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol	  on	  Access	  and	  Benefit	  Sharing	  under	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  
CBD	  was	   a	   typical	   example	  of	   the	   role	  played	  by	  highly	  organized	   indigenous	  peoples	  
groups	  to	  advance	  the	  discourse	  on	  biocultural	  rights	  and	  to	  secure	  specific	  rights	  gains.	  
Reports	  on	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol	  that	  hailed	  its	  successes	  or	  decried	  its	  limitations,	  were	  
unaware	   of	   the	   ethnography	   of	   subaltern	   strategies	   in	   the	   negotiations.	   Instead	   the	  
reports	   present	   the	   Protocol	   as	   a	   fait	   accompli	   that	   exemplifies	   either	   the	  wisdom	  of	  
state	  parties	  or	  the	  lack	  of	  it.	  Reporting	  of	  this	  nature	  is	  typically	  guilty	  of	  the	  ‘enormous	  
condescension	   of	   posterity’,	   and	   misses	   what	   political	   scientist	   and	   anthropologist	  
James	   Scott	   refers	   to	   as	   ‘infrapolitics’	   and	   the	   ‘hidden	   transcripts’	   that	   underlie	   such	  
politics.213	  
	  
In	  his	  work	  Domination	  and	  the	  Arts	  of	  Resistance,214	   Scott	  seeks	  to	  show	  how	  
‘each	  realm	  of	  open	  resistance	  to	  domination	  is	  shadowed	  by	  an	  infrapolitical	  twin	  sister	  
who	  aims	  at	  the	  same	  strategic	  goals	  but	  whose	  low	  profile	  is	  better	  adapted	  to	  resisting	  
an	   opponent	   who	   could	   probably	   win	   any	   open	   confrontation’.215	   Speaking	   of	   the	  
hidden	  transcripts	  of	  infrapolitics,	  Scott	  points	  out	  that	  the	  ‘hidden	  transcript	  is	  not	  just	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212	   Statute	  of	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  http://www.icj-­‐
cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0.	  Retrieved	  on	  23rd	  March	  2012.	  
213	   Scott,	  James,	  Domination	  and	  the	  Arts	  of	  Resistance:	  Hidden	  Transcripts,	  New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  
Press,	  1990.	  
214	   Ibid.	  
215	   Scott,	  James,	  “The	  Infrapolitics	  of	  Subordinate	  Groups”,	  in	  Global	  Resistance	  Reader,	  Louise	  Amoore,	  












behind-­‐the-­‐scenes	  griping	  and	  grumbling;	   it	   is	  enacted	   in	  a	  host	  of	  down-­‐to-­‐earth,	   low	  
profile	   stratagems	   designed	   to	   minimize	   appropriation’.216	   However,	   these	   hidden	  
transcripts	  must	  ‘largely	  be	  inferred	  by	  practice	  -­‐	  a	  quiet	  practice	  at	  that’.217	  
	  
The	   strategic	   lobbying	   of	   communities	   for	   their	   biocultural	   rights	   in	   supra-­‐	  
national	   forums	   like	   the	   CBD	   may	   seem	   small	   compared	   to	   massive	   on	   the	   ground	  
popular	  protests,	  but	  under	  ‘appropriate	  conditions,	  the	  accumulation	  of	  petty	  acts	  can,	  
rather	   like	   snowflakes	  on	  a	   steep	  mountainside,	   set	  off	  an	  avalanche’.218	   Arguing	   that	  
the	   art	   of	   understanding	   infrapolitics	   lies	   in	   cultivating	   a	   gaze	   that	   is	   able	   to	   read	  
between	  the	  lines,	  Scott	  points	  out	  that:	  
	  
The	  strategic	   imperatives	  of	   infrapolitics	  make	   it	  not	   simply	  different	   in	  degree	  
from	   the	   open	   politics	   of	   modern	   democracies;	   they	   impose	   a	   fundamentally	  
different	   logic	  of	  political	  action.	  No	  public	   claims	  are	  made;	  no	  open	  symbolic	  
lines	  are	  drawn.	  All	  political	  action	  takes	  forms	  that	  are	  designed	  to	  obscure	  their	  
intentions	  or	  to	  take	  cover	  behind	  an	  apparent	  meaning.	  Virtually	  no	  one	  acts	  in	  
his	  own	  name	   for	  avowed	  purposes,	   for	   that	  would	  be	  self-­‐defeating.	  Precisely	  
because	   such	   political	   action	   is	   studiously	   designed	   to	   be	   anonymous	   or	   to	  
disclaim	   its	   purpose,	   infrapolitics	   requires	   more	   than	   a	   little	   interpretation.	  
Things	  are	  not	  exactly	  as	  they	  seem.219	  
	  
The	  emerging	  discourse	  on	  biocultural	  rights	  in	  international	  environmental	  law,	  
and	  its	  challenges	  to	  the	  trope	  of	  the	  homo	  economicus,	  owe	  as	  much	  to	  open	  activism	  
by	   communities	   on	   the	   streets	   and	   in	   the	   courts	   as	   it	   does	   to	   the	   painstaking,	   well-­‐
organized	   infrapolitical	   movements	   occurring	   amidst	   the	   well-­‐ordered	   multilateral	  
environmental	   treaty	  negotiations.	  A	  close	  examination	  of	   the	  negotiations	   leading	  up	  
to	   the	  Nagoya	  Protocol	  on	  Access	  and	  Benefit	   Sharing	  will	   provide	  an	   insight	   into	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216	   Ibid,	  at	  68.	  
217	   Ibid,	  at	  69.	  
218	   Ibid,	  at	  70.	  












profound	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   communities	   have	   begun	   to	   secure	   their	   right	   to	  
stewardship	  in	  international	  law.	   	  
	  
	   (a)	  The	  Nagoya	  Protocol	  on	  Access	  and	  Benefit	  Sharing:	  The	  Background	  
	  
The	  Nagoya	   Protocol	   is	   an	   international	   treaty	   that	  was	   recently	   adopted	   by	   the	   193	  
Parties	   to	   the	   CBD.	   The	   Protocol	   was	   intensely	   negotiated	   over	   six	   years	   under	   the	  
framework	   of	   the	   CBD.	   To	   comprehend	   the	   success	   of	   infrapolitics	   behind	   the	  
community	  rights	  gains	  the	  Protocol	   should	   be	   analysed	  with	   the	   aid	   of	   three	   guiding	  
questions:	  
	  
i. What	  was	  the	  status	  quo	  prior	  to	  the	  Protocol?	  
ii. What	  did	  communities	  seek	  to	  achieve	  through	  th 	  Protocol	  and	  how	  did	  they	  go	  
about	  doing	  this?	   	  
iii. What	  is	  the	  outcome	  of	  these	  community	  efforts	  in	  the	  Protocol?	  
	  
The	  aim	  of	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol	  on	  Access	  and	  Benefit	  Sharing	  was	  to	  give	  effect	  to	  
the	  fair	  and	  equitable	  benefit	  sharing	  provisions	  of	  the	  CBD.	  Article	  1	  of	  the	  latter	  lists	  its	  
three	  objectives	  as:	   i)	  the	  conservation	  of	  biological	  diversity;	   ii)	  the	  sustainable	  use	  of	  
its	  components;	  and	  iii)	  the	  fair	  and	  equitable	  sharing	  of	  benefits	  arising	  from	  such	  use.	  
While	   these	   objectives	   seem	   simple	   enough,	   the	   deep	   structure	   of	   the	   CBD	   seeks	   to	  
straddle	  both	  a	  rights	  and	  an	  incentive	  based	  approach	  to	  biodiversity	  conservation.	  The	  
CBD	   recognizes	   the	   sovereign	   rights	   of	   states	   over	   genetic	   resources	   found	   in	   in	   situ	  
conditions	   within	   their	   territories.	   This	   is	   unprecedented	   in	   international	   law	   to	   the	  
extent	   that	   it	   once	   and	   for	   all	   lays	   to	   rest	   the	   claim	   that	   genetic	   resources	   are	   the	  
common	  heritage	  of	  humankind.220	   Instead	  the	  CBD,	  through	  its	  Article	  15,221	   vests	   in	  
states,	  absolute	  rights	  over	  naturally	  occurring	  genetic	  resources.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220	   Schroeder,	  Doris	  et	  al.,	  “Justice	  and	  the	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity,”	  Ethics	  and	  International	  













In	   many	   ways,	   Article	   15	   was	   a	   reaction	   by	   developing	   countries	   against	   the	  
increasing	  number	  of	  patents	   taken	  out	  by	   research	  and	  commercial	   sectors	   from	  the	  
developed	   world	   over	   pharmaceutical,	   agricultural	   and	   other	   biotechnological	  
innovations	   based	   on	   genetic	   resources	   freely	   accessed	   from	   developing	   countries.222	  
Developing	  countries	  challenged	  the	  appropriation	  of	  genetic	  resources	  drawn	  from	  the	  
common	  heritage	  of	  humankind	  through	  Article	  15,	  which	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  gave	  states	  
absolute	  rights	  over	  their	  naturally	  occurring	  genetic	  diversity.223	   	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221	   Article	  15,	  Access	  to	  Genetic	  Resources	   	  
1.	  Recognizing	  the	  sovereign	  rights	  of	  states	  over	  their	  natural	  resources,	  the	  authority	  to	  determine	  
access	  to	  genetic	  resources	  rests	  with	  the	  national	  governments	  and	  is	  subject	  to	  national	  legislation.	   	  
2.	  Each	  Contracting	  Party	  shall	  endeavour	  to	  create	  conditions	  to	  facilitate	  access	  to	  genetic	  resources	  
for	  environmentally	  sound	  uses	  by	  other	  Contracting	  Parties	  and	  not	  to	  impose	  restrictions	  that	  run	  
counter	  to	  the	  objectives	  of	  this	  Convention.	   	  
3.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  Convention,	  the	  genetic	  resources	  being	  provided	  by	  a	  Contracting	  Party,	  as	  
referred	  to	  in	  this	  Article	  and	  Articles	  16	  and	  19,	  are	  only	  those	  that	  are	  provided	  by	  Contracting	  
Parties	  that	  are	  countries	  of	  origin	  of	  such	  resources	  or	  by	  the	  Parties	  that	  have	  acquired	  the	  genetic	  
resources	  in	  accordance	  with	  this	  Convention.	   	  
4.	  Access,	  where	  granted,	  shall	  be	  on	  mutually	  agreed	  terms	  and	  subject	  to	  the	  provisions	  of	  this	  
Article.	   	  
5.	  Access	  to	  genetic	  resources	  shall	  be	  subject	  to	  prior	  informed	  consent	  of	  the	  Contracting	  Party	  
providing	  such	  resources,	  unless	  otherwise	  determined	  by	  that	  Party.	   	  
6.	  Each	  Contracting	  Party	  shall	  endeavour	  to	  develop	  and	  carry	  out	  scientific	  research	  based	  on	  
genetic	  resources	  provided	  by	  other	  Contracting	  Parties	  with	  the	  full	  participation	  of,	  and	  where	  
possible	  in,	  such	  Contracting	  Parties.	   	  
7.	  Each	  Contracting	  Party	  shall	  take	  legislative,	  administrative	  or	  policy	  measures,	  as	  appropriate,	  and	  
in	  accordance	  with	  Articles	  16	  and	  19	  and,	  where	  necessary,	  through	  the	  financial	  mechanism	  
established	  by	  Articles	  20	  and	  21	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  sharing	  in	  a	  fair	  and	  equitable	  way	  the	  results	  of	  
research	  and	  development	  and	  the	  benefits	  arising	  from	  the	  commercial	  and	  other	  utilization	  of	  
genetic	  resources	  with	  the	  Contracting	  Party	  providing	  such	  resources.	  Such	  sharing	  shall	  be	  upon	  
mutually	  agreed	  terms.	  
222	   See	  generally,	  Nijar,	  Gurdial	  Singh,	  In	  Defence	  of	  Local	  Community	  Knowledge	  and	  Biodiversity:	  A	  
Conceptual	  Framework	  and	  the	  Essential	  Elements	  of	  a	  Rights	  Regime,	  Penang:	  Third	  World	  Network,	  
1996;	  Mooney,	  P.R.,	  Seeds	  of	  the	  Earth:	  A	  Private	  or	  Public	  Resource?	  London:	  International	  Coalition	  
for	  Development	  Action,	  1979;	  Egziabher,	  Tewolde,	  “The	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity,	  
Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  and	  the	  Interests	  of	  the	  South”,	  in	  Shiva,	  Vandana,	  Ed.,	  Biodiversity	  
Conservation:	  Whose	  Resources?	  Whose	  Knowledge?	  New	  Delhi:	  Indian	  National	  Trust	  for	  Art	  and	  
Cultural	  Heritage,	  1994,	  pp.	  198–215.	   	   	  
223	   See,	  Rifkin,	  J.,	  The	  Biotech	  Century:	  Harnessing	  the	  Gene	  and	  Remaking	  the	  World,	  New	  York:	  Jeremy	  P.	  












Many	   developing	   countries	   saw	   the	   CBD	   as	   an	   effective	   vehicle	   to	   reclaim	   the	  
political	  ground	  that	  had	  been	  lost	  under	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  (WTO)	  and	  the	  
Trade	   Related	   Aspects	   of	   Intellectual	   Property	   Rights	   (TRIPS)	   agreement.224	   The	   CBD	  
went	  further	  to	  realize	  its	  third	  objective	  by	  declaring	  in	  Article	  15	  that	  any	  commercial	  
or	  research	  use	  of	  genetic	  resources	  would	  require	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  state	  from	  within	  
whose	  jurisdiction	  these	  resources	  were	  accessed	  and	  the	  fair	  and	  equitable	  sharing	  of	  
benefits	   arising	   from	   such	   use	  with	   the	   state	   in	   question.	   The	   obligation	   to	   get	   prior	  
informed	  consent	  and	  to	  share	  benefits	  extended	  beyond	  the	  use	  of	  genetic	  resources	  
to	  include	  traditional	  knowledge.225	   	  
	  
With	   respect	   to	   traditional	   knowledge,	  Article	   8(j)	   of	   the	  CBD	  makes	   a	   critical	   link	  
between	   the	   knowledge,	   innovations	   and	   practices	   (traditional	   knowledge)	   of	  
indigenous	   peoples	   and	   traditional	   communities226 	   and	   conservation	   of	   biological	  
diversity.	   It	   requires	   states	   to	   protect	   and	   promote	   such	   traditional	   knowledge	   by	  
securing	   the	   rights	   of	   communities	   to	   consent	   to	   any	   non-­‐traditional	   uses	   of	   their	  
knowledge	  and	   the	   right	   to	   share	   in	  any	  benefits	   that	  may	  arise	   from	  the	   research	  or	  
commercial	   uses	   of	   that	   knowledge.	   The	   CBD	   broke	   radically	   new	   ground	   in	  
international	   treaty	   law	   by	   recognizing	   the	   significant	   role	   played	   by	   communities	   in	  
biodiversity	   conservation,	   and	   by	   obliging	   states	   to	   secure	   the	   rights	   of	   these	  
communities	  to	  their	  traditional	  knowledge	  relevant	  for	  biodiversity	  conservation.	  
	  
In	   sum,	   the	   CBD	   in	   Articles	   15	   and	   8(j)	   recognizes	   the	   rights	   of	   both	   states	   and	  
communities	   to	   their	   genetic	   resources	   and	   traditional	   knowledge,	   respectively,	   and	  
emphasizes	  the	  duty	  to	  share	  benefits	  arising	  from	  commercial	  and	  research	  use.	  Nearly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224	   Based	  on	  informal	  conversations	  between	  the	  authors	  and	  the	  delegates	  from	  developing	  countries.	  
See	  generally,	  Bragdon,	  Susan	  et.al,	  “Safeguarding	  Biodiversity:	  The	  Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity	  
(CBD)”,	  in	  The	  Future	  Control	  of	  Food,	  Geoff	  Tansey	  and	  Tasmin	  Rajotte,	  Eds.,	  London:	  Earthscan,	  2008,	  
p.	  82.	  
225	   Decision	  V/16	  of	  the	  Conference	  of	  Parties	  to	  the	  CBD.	  
226	   The	  phrase	  that	  Article	  8(j)	  uses	  is	  ‘indigenous	  peoples	  and	  local	  communities’.	  However	  for	  the	  












11	  years	  after	  the	  CBD	  came	  into	  force	  in	  1993,	  developing	  countries	  and	  communities	  
began	  to	  push	  for	  an	  international	  regime	  on	  access	  and	  benefit	  sharing	  to	  counteract	  
the	   complete	   non-­‐implementation	   of	   their	   CBD	   obligations	   by	   developed	   states,	  
especially	   when	   it	   came	   to	   legally	   obliging	   research	   and	   commercial	   sectors	   based	  
within	   their	   jurisdictions	   to	   seek	   consent	   prior	   to	   accessing	   genetic	   resources	   and	  
traditional	  knowledge	  and	  sharing	  benefits	  arising	  from	  their	  utilization.	  
	  
Initially	   the	   negotiations	   toward	   an	   international	   regime	   on	   access	   and	   benefit	  
sharing	  (which	  later	  took	  the	  form	  of	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol)	  were	  driven	  by	  an	  imperative	  
of	   ‘justice	   in	   exchange’.227	   It	   was	   less	   about	   turning	   Nature	   and	   knowledge	   into	  
commodities	   and	   more	   about	   ensuring	   fair	   and	   equitable	   sharing	   of	   benefits	   and	  
challenging	  appropriation	  by	  the	  commercial	  and	  research	  sector	  of	   innovations	  based	  
resources	  accessed	  from	  the	  ‘commons’.	  Over	  the	  six	  years	  of	  negotiations	  that	  it	  took	  
for	  Parties	  to	  agree	  on	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol,	  however,	  there	  was	  a	  discursive	  shift	  from	  
the	  environmental	  objectives	  of	  the	  CBD	  and	  the	   ideology	  of	  equitable	  benefit	  sharing	  
to	  an	  incentive	  based	  approach	  to	  conservation.	   	  
	  
In	  the	  words	  of	  one	  of	  the	  key	  negotiators	  of	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol,	  the	  negotiations	  
seemed	   increasingly	   to	   resemble	   trade	   negotiations,	   a	   far	   cry	   from	   its	   loftier	  
objectives.228	   Both	   developed	   and	   developing	   countries	   fought	   pitched	   battles	   for	  
control	  over	  genetic	  resources.	  The	  talk	  was	  largely	  about	  monetary	  incentives	  to	  offset	  
the	   opportunity	   costs	   incurred	   by	   developing	   countries	   in	   biodiversity	   conservation.	  
Developed	   countries,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   constantly	   reiterated	   the	   position	   of	   their	  
industry	   and	   research	   sectors:	   that	   the	   transaction	   costs	   incurred	   through	   onerous	  
access	   and	   benefit-­‐sharing	   requirements	  would	   affect	   efficiency	   and	   profitability.	   The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227	   See	  generally,	  Schroeder,	  Doris	  and	  Pisupati,	  Balakrishna,	  Ethics,	  Justice	  and	  the	  Convention	  on	  
Biological	  Diversity,	  Nairobi:	  UNEP,	  2010.	  
228	   Based	  on	  a	  conversation	  between	  the	  author	  (who	  acted	  as	  the	  legal	  advisor	  to	  the	  African	  Group	  of	  
Countries	  in	  their	  negotiations	  towards	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol)	  and	  one	  of	  the	  lead	  negotiators	  from	  












history	  of	  appropriation	  of	  knowledge	  and	  resources	  through	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  
was	  countered	  with	  the	  discourse	  of	  private	  property	  and	  exchange	  value.229	   	  
	  
Amidst	  these	  heated	  discussions	  between	  states,	  the	  greatest	  causalities	  seemed	  to	  
be	   the	   value	   of	   stewardship	   and	   the	   biocultural	   rights	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	  
traditional	   communities	   to	   their	   lands,	   waters	   and	   cultures.	   There	   was	   little	   or	   no	  
discussion	  about	  challenging	  market	  values	  and	  offering	  instead	  social	  values	  of	  sharing	  
and	  exchange.	   Instead,	   the	  persistent	   theme	   seemed	   to	  be	   that	   the	  only	  way	   to	   save	  
Nature	  would	  be	  to	  put	  a	  price	  on	   it	  or	  to	  speak	  of	   it	   in	  terms	  of	  exchange	  value.	   It	   is	  
precisely	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  these	  fraught	  conditions	  however	  that	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  
traditional	   communities	   deployed	   the	   infrapolitics	   of	   resistance.	   It	   is	   the	   hidden	  
transcripts	  of	  these	  infrapolitics	  that	  will	  now	  be	  analysed.	  
	  
(b)	  The	  Calm	  before	  the	  Storm:	  Status	  Quo	  Prior	  to	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol	  
	  
The	  decision	  of	  the	  7th	  Conference	  of	  Parties	  (COP)	  to	  the	  CBD	  in	  2004	  in	  Kuala	  Lumpur	  
was	  a	  significant	  one.	  The	  specific	  paragraph	  of	  the	  COP	  7	  decision	  that	  sowed	  the	  seed	  
of	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol	  reads:	  
	  
Decides	   to	   mandate	   the	   Ad	   Hoc	   Open-­‐ended	   Working	   Group	   on	   Access	   and	  
Benefit-­‐sharing	  with	  the	  collaboration	  of	   the	  Ad	  Hoc	  Open	  ended	   Inter-­‐Sessional	  
Working	  Group	  on	  Article	  8(j)	  and	  Related	  Provisions,	  ensuring	  the	  participation	  of	  
indigenous	  and	  local	  communities,	  non-­‐	  governmental	  organizations,	  industry	  and	  
scientific	  and	  academic	  institutions,	  as	  well	  as	  intergovernmental	  organizations,	  to	  
elaborate	   and	   negotiate	   an	   international	   regime	   on	   access	   to	   genetic	   resources	  
and	   benefit-­‐sharing	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   adopting	   an	   	   instrument/instruments	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229	   From	  2007	  onwards	  the	  author	  has	  been	  the	  first	  the	  rapporteur	  and	  later	  the	  legal	  adviser	  to	  the	  
African	  Group	  of	  countries	  in	  its	  negotiations	  towards	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol	  on	  Access	  and	  Benefit	  
Sharing.	  The	  author	  actively	  participated	  in	  all	  the	  negotiations	  of	  the	  Working	  Group	  on	  ABS	  since	  
2007	  and	  also	  worked	  as	  a	  legal	  drafter	  of	  the	  African	  Group’s	  submissions	  to	  the	  Working	  Group.	  
Many	  of	  the	  statements	  made	  in	  this	  chapter	  are	  based	  on	  the	  personal	  experience	  of	  the	  author	  as	  












effectively	   implement	   the	   provisions	   in	   Article	   15	   and	   Article	   8(j)	   of	   the	  
Convention	  and	  the	  three	  objectives	  of	  the	  Convention;230	   	  
	  
	   The	  COP	  7	  decision	  was	  a	  result	  of	  intensive	  lobbying	  by	  developing	  countries	  that	  
gathered	  momentum	  with	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Bonn	  Guidelines231	   by	  the	  6th	  COP	  at	  The	  
Hague	  in	  2002.	  The	  primary	  concern	  of	  developing	  countries	  was	  that	  since	  the	  coming	  
into	  force	  of	  the	  CBD	  in	  1993,	  user	  countries232	   had	  done	  little	  to	  meet	  their	  compliance	  
obligations	   under	   the	   CBD	   in	   effect	   nullifying	   its	   third	   objective,	   which	   is	   ‘fair	   and	  
equitable	  benefit	  sharing’.	  The	  inclusion	  of	  Article	  8(j)	  as	  an	  article	  that	  would	  need	  to	  
be	  implemented	  along	  with	  Article	  15	  is	  in	  itself	  testimony	  to	  the	  efforts	  of	  indigenous	  
peoples	  and	  traditional	  communities.233	  
	  
For	  these	  communities,	  Article	  8(j)	  was	  a	  seemingly	  harmless	  Trojan	  horse,	  which	  
once	   introduced	   into	   the	   citadel	   of	   the	   Protocol	   negotiations	  would	   beget	   a	   range	   of	  
biocultural	  rights	  to	  genetic	  resources	  and	  traditional	  knowledge.	  To	  get	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  
status	   quo	  prior	   to	   the	  Nagoya	   Protocol	   is	   to	   comprehend	   the	   innocuous	   and	   limited	  
nature	  of	  Article	  8(j)	  of	  the	  CBD.	  It	  reads	  as	  follows:	   	  
	  
Each	  contracting	  Party	  shall	  as	  far	  as	  possible	  and	  as	  appropriate,	  subject	  to	   its	  
national	  legislation,	  respect,	  preserve	  and	  maintain	  knowledge,	  innovations	  and	  
practices	   of	   indigenous	   and	   local	   communities	   embodying	   traditional	   lifestyles	  
relevant	   for	   the	   conservation	   and	   sustainable	   use	   of	   biological	   diversity	   and	  
promote	   their	   wider	   application	   with	   the	   approval	   and	   involvement	   of	   the	  
holders	   of	   such	   knowledge,	   innovations	   and	   practices	   and	   encourage	   the	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   COP	  decision	  VII/19,	  http://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/?id=7756.	  Retrieved	  13th	  September	  2011.	  
231	   The	  Bonn	  Guidelines	  on	  Access	  to	  Genetic	  Resources	  and	  the	  Fair	  and	  Equitable	  Sharing	  of	  Benefits	  
Arising	  out	  of	  their	  Utilization,	  http://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-­‐bonn-­‐gdls-­‐en.pdf.	  Retrieved	  
13th	  September	  2011.	   	   	  
232	   Parties	  to	  the	  CBD	  in	  whose	  jurisdictions	  a	  predominant	  number	  of	  commercial	  users	  of	  genetic	  
resources	  were	  located.	  
233	   Based	  on	  conversations	  between	  the	  author	  and	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  International	  Indigenous	  












equitable	  sharing	  of	  the	  benefits	  arising	  from	  the	  utilization	  of	  such	  knowledge,	  
innovations	  and	  practices.234	   	  
	  
From	  a	  purely	  rights	  perspective	  Article	  8(j)	  is	  not	  strong.	  It	  presents	  itself	  as	  an	  
outcome	   of	   politically	   difficult	   negotiations,	  which	   states	   peppered	  with	   a	   number	   of	  
‘exit	   clauses’.	   It	   begins	   with	   the	   words	   ‘shall	   as	   far	   as	   possible	   and	   as	   appropriate,	  
subject	  to	  its	  national	  legislation’.	  In	  negotiations-­‐speak,	  words	  like	  this	  are	  hard	  fought,	  
‘get	  out	  of	  jail	  free’	  passes,	  designed	  to	  weaken	  state	  obligation	  and	  to	  limit	  any	  inroads	  
into	   national	   sovereignty.	   The	   modification	   of	   state	   obligations	   continues	   with	   the	  
words	   ‘promote	   their	   wider	   application	   with	   the	   approval	   and	   involvement	   of	   the	  
holders	   of	   such	   knowledge,	   innovations	   and	   practices	   and	   encourage	   the	   equitable	  
sharing	   of	   the	   benefits’.	   Note	   that	   nowhere	   does	   Article	   8(j)	   speak	   of	   the	  mandatory	  
nature	   of	   the	   ‘prior	   informed	   consent’	   and	   ‘benefit	   sharing’	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	  
utilization	   of	   traditional	   knowledge	   (or	  what	   is	   referred	   to	   as	   knowledge,	   innovations	  
and	  practices)	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  traditional	  communities.	  
	  
Article	   15,	  which	   is	   the	  main	   article,	   the	   implementation	  of	  which	   the	   7th	   COP	  
asked	   the	   Working	   Group	   on	   ABS	   to	   negotiate,	   makes	   no	   mention	   of	   any	   rights	   of	  
indigenous	   peoples	   and	   local	   communities	   over	   genetic	   resources.	   It	   begins	   with	   an	  
unassailable:	   	  
	  
Recognizing	   the	   sovereign	   rights	   of	   states	   over	   their	   natural	   resources,	   the	  
authority	   to	   determine	   access	   to	   genetic	   resources	   rests	   with	   the	   national	  
governments	  and	  is	  subject	  to	  national	  legislation.235	   	  
There	   are	   no	   ‘exit	   clauses’	   here	   and,	   compared	   with	   Article	   8(j),	   states	   wanted	   to	  
eliminate	   any	   doubts	   and	   establish	   irrefutably	   their	   absolute	   rights	   over	   their	   genetic	  
resources.	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   The	  full	  text	  of	  the	  CBD	  can	  be	  accessed	  at	  http://www.cbd.int/convention/text/.	  Retrieved	  13th	  
September	  2011.	  













Jurisprudentially	   speaking,	   prior	   to	   the	   commencement	   of	   the	   negotiations	   of	  
the	   Working	   Group	   on	   ABS,	   the	   rights	   of	   communities	   within	   the	   CBD	   system	   were	  
enervated.	   This	   early	   state	   of	   play	   begs	   our	   second	   question:	   What	   did	   indigenous	  
peoples	  and	  local	  communities	  seek	  to	  achieve	  through	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol,	  and	  how	  
did	  they	  go	  about	  doing	  this?	   	  
	  
(c)	  The	  Arts	  of	  Resistance:	  Negotiating	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol	  
	  
James	   Scott,	   labels	   as	   ‘masks	   of	   power’	   public	   performances	   that	   are	   designed	   to	  
placate	  both	  the	  dominant	  and	  the	  subordinate	  groups.236	   But	  what	  goes	  on	  behind	  the	  
scenes,	  or	  what	  Scott	  calls	  the	  ‘hidden	  transcripts’,	  reveal	  the	  real	  nature	  of	  resistance.	  
From	  this	  perspective,	  the	  setting	  of	  the	  Working	  Group	  on	  ABS	  is	  a	  theatre,	  where	  an	  
elaborate	  charade	  is	  enacted	  with	  diplomats	  referring	  to	  each	  other	  by	  the	  names	  of	  the	  
states	  they	  represent,	  giving	  politely	  indignant	  speeches	  about	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  CBD	  and	  
with	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  traditional	  communities	  abiding	  by	  UN	  rules	  clearly	  biased	  
towards	   states.	   But	   witnessing	   these	   negotiations	   tells	   us	   little	   about	   the	   hidden	  
transcripts	  of	   feverish	   lobbying,	   threats,	  deal-­‐making	  and	  political	   sleight	  of	  hand	   that	  
happens	  behind	  the	  scenes.	   	  
	  
While	   the	   negotiations	  within	   the	  Working	   Group	   on	   ABS	   from	   2004	   onwards	  
proceeded	  with	  regularity,	  they	   lacked	  direction,	  since	  there	  was	  very	   little	  agreement	  
amongst	  Parties	  as	  to	  even	  the	  primary	  elements	  of	  an	  international	  agreement	  on	  ABS.	  
Decision	   IX/12	   of	   9th	   CBD	   Conference	   of	   Parties	   (COP)	   in	   Bonn	   marked	   a	   radical	  
departure	   from	   this	   state	   of	   affairs	   thanks	   to	   four	   significant	   points	   of	   convergence	  
amongst	  Parties.	  They	  were:	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












i. The	  agreement	  on	  Annex	  1	  of	  Decision	  IX/12,	  which	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  2004	  
provided	  the	   framework	  and	  the	  elements	  of	  an	   ‘international	   regime’	  on	  ABS.	  
The	  elements	  were	  divided	  along	  a	   ‘bricks’	  and	  ‘bullets’	  formula,	  where	  ‘bricks’	  
were	  those	  elements	  of	  an	  ‘international	  regime’	  whose	  inclusion	  in	  the	  regime	  
Parties	  agreed	  upon	  but	  which	  still	  needed	  further	  elaboration.	  ‘Bullets’,	  on	  the	  
other	  hand,	  were	  those	  possible	  elements	  which	  required	  further	  consideration	  
because	   there	  was	  no	  consensus	  as	   to	  whether	   they	  should	  be	   included	   in	   the	  
‘international	  regime’.	  
ii. An	  agreement	  to	  begin	  text	  based	  negotiations	  through	  an	  invitation	  to	  Parties,	  
inter-­‐governmental	   organizations,	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	   local	   communities	  
and	   other	   relevant	   stakeholders	   to	   submit	   operational	   text	   and	   explanations	  
based	  on	  the	  elements	  listed	  in	  Annex	  1	  of	  Decision	  IX/12.	  
iii. The	  establishment	  of	  three	  Groups	  of	  Technical	  and	  Legal	  Experts	  to	  advise	  the	  
Working	  Group	  on	  ABS	  on:	   i)	  Concepts,	   terms,	  working	  definitions	  and	  sectoral	  
approaches;	  ii)	  compliance;	  and	  iii)	  traditional	  knowledge	  associated	  with	  genetic	  
resources.	  
iv. The	   agreement	   on	   escalating	   the	   pace	   and	   the	   intensity	   of	   the	   negotiations	  
through	  the	  scheduling	  of	  three	  meetings	  of	  the	  Working	  Group	  on	  ABS,	  each	  for	  
an	  extended	  period	  of	  seven	  days	  to	  ensure	  the	  completion	  of	  the	  negotiations	  
towards	  an	  international	  regime	  on	  ABS	  in	  time	  for	  the	  deadline	  of	  the	  tenth	  COP	  
in	  Nagoya.237	   	  
	  
The	   first	   crucial	   opportunity	   for	   communities	   to	   substantially	   influence	   the	  
negotiations	   of	   the	  Working	   Group	   on	   ABS	   presented	   itself	   in	   Hyderabad	   at	   the	   July	  
2009	   meeting	   of	   the	   Group	   of	   Technical	   and	   Legal	   Experts	   (GTLE)	   on	   Traditional	  
Knowledge	  associated	  with	  Genetic	  Resources.	  The	  Working	  Group	  on	  ABS	  set	  up	   this	  
meeting	  at	  the	  9th	  COP	  in	  Bonn.	  The	  9th	  COP	  also	  set	  up	  two	  other	  GTLEs	  on	  ‘Concepts,	  
Terms	  and	  Definitions’	   and	   ‘Compliance’.	   The	   establishment	  of	   the	  GTLE	  nearly	   broke	  
the	  negotiations	  with	  the	  Like	  Minded	  Mega	  Diverse	  Countries	  (LMMC)	  grouping	  which	  
threatened	   to	   walk	   out	   of	   the	   negotiations,	   arguing	   that	   GTLEs	   were	   a	   time	   wasting	  
tactic	   by	   the	   developed	   countries.	   The	   African	   Group,	   however,	   supported	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












establishment	  of	  GTLEs	  with	  the	  express	  intent	  of	  getting	  expert	  views	  on	  some	  of	  the	  
issues	  that	  were	  deadlocked.238	   	  
	  
The	   Secretariat	   of	   the	   CBD	   in	   its	   selection	   of	   country	   nominated	   experts,	   chose	  
individuals	  who	  were	  well	   versed	  with	   community	   concerns.	   This	  was	   fortuitous	   since	  
the	  experts	  who	  had	  a	  good	  grounding	  on	  community	  issues	  were	  also	  sympathetic	  to	  
community	   concerns.	   Except	   for	   experts	   who	   represented	   Canada	   and	   industry,	   the	  
remainder	  knew	  each	  other	  and	  tended	  to	  agree	  on	  virtually	  every	  issue.	  Furthermore,	  a	  
sizeable	   number	   of	   chosen	   experts	   were	   from	   indigenous	   communities	   and	   some	   of	  
chaired	  the	  various	  sessions	  of	  the	  GTLE,	  thereby	  palpably	  shifting	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  
towards	  community	  interests.	  
	  
The	  Working	   Group	   on	   ABS	   had	   provided	   the	   GTLE	  with	   a	   set	   of	   questions	   to	   be	  
answered,	   and	   it	  was	   in	   answering	   these	   questions	   that	   the	   first	   cache	   of	   biocultural	  
rights	   within	   the	   Trojan	   horse	   of	   Article	   8(j)	   emerged.	   The	   GTLE	   achieved	   a	  
jurisprudential	  feat	  by	  expansively	  interpreting	  Article	  8(j)	  in	  a	  way	  that	  had	  never	  been	  
done	   before.	   Through	   the	   GTLE	   process,	   there	   were	   five	   critical	   victories	   for	  
communities	  the	  fruits	  of	  which	  are	  seen	  in	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol.	  They	  were:	  
	  
i. An	   inseparable	   link	   between	   genetic	   resources	   and	   traditional	   knowledge	  was	  
established	   thereby	   paving	   way	   for	   a	   discourse	   on	   the	   rights	   of	   communities	  
over	  genetics	  resources.	  
ii. The	   absolute	   requirement	   for	   prior	   informed	   consent	   and	   benefit	   sharing	   in	  
relation	   to	   traditional	   knowledge	   of	   communities	   was	   read	   into	   Article	   8(j)	  
thereby	  closing	  the	  ‘exit	  clauses’	  that	  states	  had	  given	  themselves.	  
iii. The	  need	  to	  comply	  with	  customary	  laws	  and	  community	  level	  procedures	  when	  
accessing	   community	   resources	   and	   knowledge	   was	   affirmed,	   introducing	   an	  
element	  of	  self-­‐determination	  into	  Article	  8(j).	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   See,	  Summary	  of	  the	  Ninth	  Conference	  of	  Parties	  to	  the	  CBD,	  Earth	  Negotiations	  Bulletin,	  Vol.9,	  No.	  












iv. The	   ‘subject	   to	   national	   law’	   component	   within	   Article	   8(j)	   was	   substantially	  
weakened	   by	   interpreting	   it	   as	   the	   duty	   of	   states	   to	   facilitate	   the	   rights	   of	  
communities,	   i.e.	   states	  had	  no	  discretion	   to	  decide	  whether	  or	  not	   to	  uphold	  
these	  rights.	  
v. Clear	  reference	  was	  made	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Declaration	  
on	   the	  Rights	  of	   Indigenous	  Peoples	   (UNDRIP)	   in	   interpreting	   the	  provisions	  of	  
the	  CBD	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  Protocol.239	  
	  
In	  the	  15	  months	  from	  July	  2009	  to	  Nagoya	  in	  October	  2010,	  there	  were	  a	  number	  of	  
negotiations	  that	  ranged	  from	  the	  Working	  Group	  on	  ABS	  meetings	  to	  Friends	  of	  the	  Co-­‐
Chairs	   meetings	   to	   the	   Inter-­‐regional	   Negotiating	   Group	   sessions	   to	   the	   Co-­‐Chairs	  
Informal	  Inter-­‐regional	  Consultations.	  Communities	  strategically	  used	  every	  one	  of	  these	  
negotiations	   to	   shore	   up	   the	   victories	   that	   resulted	   from	   the	   GTLE	   meeting	   on	  
traditional	  knowledge.	  Their	  methods	  ranged	  from	  intensively	  lobbying	  delegates	  during	  
the	  negotiations,	  to	  working	  closely	  with	  governments	  sympathetic	  to	  indigenous	  issues	  
in	   the	   inter-­‐sessional	  period	   to	  networking	  with	   indigenous	  peoples	  groups	  across	   the	  
world	  in	  order	  convince	  them	  to	  lobby	  their	  governments.	   	  
	  
At	  the	  9th	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Working	  Group	  on	  ABS	  in	  Cali,	  the	  Co-­‐Chairs	  provided	  the	  
Parties	  with	  a	  Co-­‐Chairs’	  text	  to	  break	  the	  stalemate	  that	  had	  plagued	  the	  negotiations	  
until	   then.	   The	   Co-­‐Chairs	   presented	   their	   text	   as	   a	   ‘package	   deal’	   that	   balanced	   the	  
interests	  of	  the	  different	  Parties	  and	  asked	  the	  Parties	  to	  begin	  their	  negotiations	  based	  
on	  this	  text.240	   While	  the	  Co-­‐Chairs’	  text	  was	  carefully	  drafted	  to	  cut	  the	  Gordian	  knot	  
of	  the	  negotiations,	  for	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  traditional	  communities	  it	  was	  the	  first	  
step	  towards	  locking	  in	  the	  gains	  from	  the	  GLTE	  report.	   	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239	   See,	  Report	  of	  the	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Group	  of	  Technical	  and	  Legal	  Experts	  on	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  
Associated	  with	  Genetic	  Resources	  in	  the	  Context	  of	  the	  International	  Regime	  on	  Access	  and	  Benefit-­‐
Sharing,	  UNEP/CBD/WG-­‐ABS/9/2.	  
240	   See,	  Summary	  of	  the	  Ad-­‐hoc	  Open	  Ended	  Working	  Group	  on	  Access	  and	  Benefit	  Sharing	  of	  the	  
Convention	  on	  Biological	  Diversity,	  Earth	  Negotiations	  Bulletin,	  http://www.iisd.ca/biodiv/abs9/.	  












The	  Co-­‐Chairs’	  text	  was	  avowedly	  minimalist.	  It	  ensured	  prior	  informed	  consent	  and	  
benefit	   sharing	  provisions	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  communities	  when	  their	   traditional	  knowledge	  was	  
used.	   It	   also	   required	   Parties	   to	   ensure	   that	   such	   consent	   and	   benefit	   sharing	  was	   in	  
accordance	  with	   the	   community’s	   customary	   laws	  and	   community	  protocols.	   The	   text	  
however	  was	  completely	  silent	  on	  compliance	  provisions	  obliging	  Parties	  to	  prevent	  the	  
misappropriation	   of	   traditional	   knowledge.	   It	   also	   made	   no	   mention	   of	   rights	   of	  
communities	   over	   genetic	   resources. 241 	   The	   first	   omission	   was	   in	   favour	   of	   the	  
European	   Union’s	   (EU)	   position	   that	   the	  WIPO	   Intergovernmental	   Committee	   should	  
deal	   with	   all	   compliance	   provisions	   relating	   to	   traditional	   knowledge.	   The	   second	  
omission	   had	   to	   do	   with	   the	   absence	   of	   Party	   support	   for	   rights	   of	   communities	   to	  
genetic	  resources.	  
	  
The	  Co-­‐Chairs’	  text	  was	  intensely	  negotiated.	  When	  the	  second	  resumed	  session	  of	  
the	  Inter-­‐regional	  Negotiating	  Group	  (ING)	  met	  on	  the	  13th	  of	  October	  2010	  in	  Nagoya	  
for	  the	  final	  round	  of	  negotiations,	  it	  had	  before	  it	  a	  heavily	  bracketed242	   draft	  Protocol	  
that	  had	  come	  out	  of	  the	  ING	  meeting	  in	  Montreal	  a	  month	  before.	  India	  and	  China	  had	  
reintroduced	  the	  term	  ‘subject	  to	  national	  law’	  to	  the	  provision	  requiring	  prior	  informed	  
consent	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	   local	   communities.	   Furthermore	   the	   EU	  bracketed	  
references	  to	  customary	  laws	  and	  community	  protocols	  acting	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  France.	   	  
	  
Indigenous	  peoples	  groups	  reintroduced	  to	  the	  preamble	  section	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  
UNDRIP,	  which	  was	  immediately	  bracketed	  by	  Canada.	  They	  also	  introduced	  a	  provision	  
on	   the	   rights	   of	   communities	   over	   their	   genetic	   resources,	   which	   some	   Parties	  
transformed	   into	   three	  possible	   text	  options	  all	  of	  which	  were	  promptly	  bracketed	  by	  
other	   Parties.	   In	   fact	   this	   provision	   was	   so	   heavily	   contested	   by	   the	   Group	   of	   Latin	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241	   See,	  Annex	  1	  to	  the	  Report	  of	  the	  First	  Part	  of	  the	  Ninth	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Ad-­‐Hoc	  Open	  Ended	  Working	  
Group	  on	  Access	  and	  Benefit	  Sharing,	  UNEP/CBD/WG-­‐ABS/9/3.	  
242	   Text	  based	  negotiations	  between	  states	  of	  UN	  resolutions	  or	  treaties	  work	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  
consensus.	  Bracketing	  of	  portions	  of	  text	  being	  negotiated	  indicates	  that	  a	  state	  party	  or	  a	  group	  of	  
state	  parties	  do	  not	  agree	  to	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  text;	  See,	  Annex	  to	  the	  document,	  Meeting	  of	  the	  












American	  Countries	  (GRULAC)	  in	  the	  September	  2010	  round	  of	  negotiations	  in	  Montreal	  
that,	  after	  hours	  of	  discussion,	  the	  co-­‐chairs	  to	  the	  small	  group	  negotiating	  the	  provision	  
suggested	  dropping	   it	  altogether.	  This	  resulted	   in	  a	  walk	  out	  by	  the	  representatives	  of	  
the	   International	   Indigenous	   Forum	   on	   Biodiversity	   (IIFB).	   They	   stated	   that,	   as	   far	   as	  
they	  were	  concerned,	  this	  was	  a	  non-­‐negotiable	  issue.	  The	  outcome	  of	  these	  politically	  
charged	  negotiations	  was	  that	  Parties	   in	  the	  small	  group	  agreed	  to	  keep	  these	  options	  
and	  take	  them	  back	  to	  the	  ING	  for	  a	  resolution.243	  
	  
How	   did	   communities	   overcome	   these	   odds	   that	   were	   so	   heavily	   stacked	   against	  
them?	  The	  odds	  were	  not	  simply	  relating	  to	  some	  Parties’	  white-­‐knuckled	  reactions	  to	  
what	   they	  perceived	  as	  a	   ‘rights	  overreach’	  of	   the	   limited	  scope	  Article	  8(j).	  The	  most	  
insurmountable	   of	   odds	   was	   the	   cold	   fact	   that	   communities	   as	   per	   UN	   rules	   could	  
participate	  in	  the	  negotiations,	  but	  would	  require	  the	  explicit	  support	  of	  a	  Party	  for	  any	  
text	   that	   they	  wanted	   to	   introduce	   or	   retain	   in	   the	   Protocol.	   As	   the	   COP	  10	   deadline	  
loomed,	   the	   negotiations	   became	   increasingly	   frenetic	   and	   Parties	   began	   to	   make	  
compromises,	  which	  exacerbated	  the	  danger	  that	  community	  concerns	  would	  be	  lost	  as	  
collateral	  damage.	   	  
	  
(d)	  The	  Optimism	  of	  Will	  against	  the	  Pessimism	  of	  Intellect:	  The	  Gains	  of	  
Nagoya	  
	  
When	   the	   final	   round	   of	   negotiations	   began	   in	   Nagoya,	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	  
traditional	   communities	   were	   clear	   that	   they	   had	   to	   secure	   five	   key	   positions	   in	   a	  
potential	  ABS	  Protocol	  for	  it	  were	  to	  have	  any	  rights	  potential.	  These	  key	  positions	  were:	  
	  
i. To	   eliminate	   the	   Article	   8(j)	   term	   ‘subject	   to	   national	   law’	   from	   the	   Protocol	  
provisions	   dealing	  with	   rights	   of	   communities	   over	   their	   traditional	   knowledge	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243	   See,	  Summary	  of	  the	  Interregional	  Negotiating	  Group	  on	  Access	  and	  Benefit	  Sharing,	  18-­‐21st	  
September,	  2010,	  Earth	  Negotiations	  Bulletin,	  












and	  genetic	   resources	  before	   it	   became	  a	   legal	   ‘term	  of	   art’	   and	   started	  being	  
used	  in	  other	  COP	  resolutions.	  
ii. To	   secure	   rights	   of	   communities	   over	   their	   genetic	   resources	   in	   the	   Protocol	  
thereby	  creating	  a	  precedent	  for	  dynamic	   interpretation	  of	  the	  CBD	  in	  the	  light	  
of	   the	   United	   Nations	   Declaration	   on	   the	   Rights	   of	   Indigenous	   Peoples	  
(UNDRIP).244	  
iii. To	   retain	   references	   to	   compliance	   with	   customary	   laws	   and	   community	  
protocols	  of	  communities	   in	   the	  text	  of	   the	  Protocol	   thereby	  securing	   in	   treaty	  
law	  obligations	  of	  states	  to	  respect	  community	  systems	  of	  governance.	  
iv. To	   ensure	   reference	   to	   the	   UNDRIP	   in	   the	   preamble	   of	   the	   Protocol	   thereby	  
locking	  in	  the	  legal	  opportunity	  to	  interpret	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Protocol	  from	  
the	  perspective	  of	  the	  UNDRIP.	  
v. To	   prevent	   the	   forum	   shifting	   to	   Intergovernmental	   Committee	   of	   the	   World	  
Intellectual	   Property	   Organization	   (WIPO-­‐IGC) 245 	   of	   compliance	   provisions	  
relating	   to	   traditional	   knowledge	   and	   affirm	   that	   the	   Protocol	   is	   the	   main	  
instrument	  to	  enforce	  CBD	  related	  rights.246	  
	  
These	   key	   positions	   had	   two	   dimensions:	   First,	   they	   were	   ends	   in	   themselves	   as	  
significant	  ‘rights	  victories’	  that	  secured	  the	  rights	  of	  communities	  over	  their	  traditional	  
knowledge	   and	   genetic	   resources.	   Secondly,	   the	   hard-­‐nosed	   pragmatists	   understood	  
that	  the	  outcomes	  of	  Nagoya	  would	  not	  be	  perfect	  but	  that	  these	  positions	  should	  be	  
viewed	  as	  levers	  for	  greater	  gains	  in	  the	  long	  run	  under	  the	  CBD	  and	  related	  WIPO,	  WTO	  
and	  UNFCCC	  processes.	   	  
	  
The	   elimination	   of	   the	   term	   ‘subject	   to	   national	   law’	   was	   a	   crucial	   hurdle	   to	  
overcome.	  It	  had	  found	  itself	  back	  into	  the	  Co-­‐Chairs’	  text	  in	  Montreal	  and	  some	  Parties	  
were	  sticking	  to	   their	  guns	  about	   the	  provision	  being	  retained.	   Interestingly,	  countries	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244	   United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly	  Resolution	  61/295	  adopted	  on	  13	  September	  2007.	  
245	   Established	  by	  the	  WIPO	  General	  Assembly	  in	  October	  2000	  (document	  WO/GA/26/6),	  the	  WIPO	  
Intergovernmental	  Committee	  on	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Genetic	  Resources,	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  
and	  Folklore	  (IGC)	  is	  undertaking	  text-­‐based	  negotiations	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  reaching	  agreement	  on	  
a	  text	  of	  an	  international	  legal	  instrument	  (or	  instruments)	  which	  will	  ensure	  the	  effective	  protection	  
of	  traditional	  knowledge	  (TK),	  traditional	  cultural	  expressions	  (TCEs)/folklore	  and	  genetic	  resources.	  
See	  also,	  supra	  n.	  40.	  













like	  New	  Zealand	  and	  Canada	  had	  begun	   to	  have	   reservations	  about	   the	   term	  since	   it	  
undermined	   the	   treaties	   that	   they	   already	   had	   with	   their	   indigenous	   peoples.	   These	  
were	  not	  ‘subject	  to	  national	  law’	  but	  were	  akin	  to	  agreements	  between	  nations.	   	  
	  
The	  African	  Group	  of	   states	   proposed	   a	  way	  out	   by	   replacing	   this	   term	  with	   a	  
more	  temperate	  ‘in	  accordance	  with	  national	  law’.	  This	  would	  retain	  the	  facilitative	  role	  
of	  the	  state	  in	  situations	  where	  Parties	  argued	  that	  communities	  within	  their	  jurisdiction	  
needed	  state	  protection	  against	  exploitation.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  it	  would	  affirm	  the	  GTLE	  
interpretation	   of	   Article	   8(j)	   that	   the	   rights	   of	   communities	   under	   the	   CBD	   are	   not	  
dependent	  on	  the	  discretion	  of	  states.	  This	  way	  forward	  was	  readily	  accepted	  by	  New	  
Zealand	  and	  Canada,	  and	  Article	  7	  in	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol	  finally	  read:	  
	  
In	  accordance	  with	  domestic	  law,	  each	  Party	  shall	  take	  measures,	  as	  appropriate,	  
with	   the	   aim	   of	   ensuring	   that	   traditional	   knowledge	   associated	   with	   genetic	  
resources	  that	  is	  held	  by	  indigenous	  and	  local	  communities	  is	  accessed	  with	  the	  
prior	   and	   informed	   consent	   or	   approval	   and	   involvement	   of	   these	   indigenous	  
and	   local	   communities,	   and	   that	   mutually	   agreed	   terms	   have	   been	  
established.247	  
	  
While	  Article	  7	  was	  not	  perfect,	   it	  had	  clearly	  achieved	  what	   it	  set	  out	  to	  do.	   It	  
had	  eliminated	  the	  term	  ‘subject	  to	  national	  law’,	  reinterpreted	  Article	  8(j)	  in	  favour	  of	  
community	  rights	  and	  created	  a	  new	  legal	  term	  of	  art	  that	  could	  henceforth	  be	  used	  in	  
other	  parts	   of	   the	  Protocol	   and	   future	  COP	  decisions.	   This	   term	   -­‐	   ‘in	   accordance	  with	  
domestic	  law’	  -­‐	  was	  clearly	  a	  lever	  that	  would	  lead	  to	  big	  gains	  in	  the	  future.	  
	  
The	   next	   hurdle	   was	   the	   retention	   of	   references	   to	   ‘customary	   laws	   and	  
community	  protocols’	   in	   the	   text	  of	   the	  Protocol.	   France,	  at	  a	   rather	   late	   stage	   in	   the	  
negotiations,	   had	   received	   instructions	   from	   its	   foreign	   ministry	   to	   withhold	   any	  
agreement	  to	  references	  to	  ‘customary	  laws,	  community	  protocols	  and	  indigenous	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












local	   community	   laws’	   in	   the	   draft	   Protocol.	   The	   French	   negotiators	   argued	   that	   this	  
would	  affect	  the	  interests	  of	  France	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  their	  overseas	  territories	  and	  would	  create	  
a	   new	   precedent	   of	   references	   to	   customary	   laws	   in	   international	   treaties	   between	  
states.	  
	  
It	  was	  clear	  that,	  as	   far	  as	  France	  was	  concerned,	   legal	  pluralism	  was	  definitely	  
non-­‐negotiable,	   and,	   through	   France’s	   insistence,	   the	   rest	   of	   EU	   had	   to	   back	   this	  
position.	  France	  proposed	  ‘community	  level	  procedures’	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  ‘customary	  
laws	   and	   community	   protocols’.	   This	   phrase	   however	   was	   rejected	   by	   the	   African	  
indigenous	   peoples	   organizations	   (through	   the	   African	   Group)	   that	   argued	   that	  
‘community	   level	   procedures’	   was	   a	   euphemism	   for	   state	   control	   and	   lacked	   the	  
authenticity	  of	  genuine	  community	  processes.	  
	  
The	  final	  wording	  in	  Article	  12	  (1)	  of	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol	  now	  reads:	  
	  
In	  implementing	  their	  obligations	  under	  this	  Protocol,	  Parties	  shall	  in	  accordance	  
with	   domestic	   law	   take	   into	   consideration	   indigenous	   and	   local	   communities’	  
customary	   laws,	   community	   protocols	   and	   procedures,	   as	   applicable,	   with	  
respect	  to	  traditional	  knowledge	  associated	  with	  genetic	  resources.248	  
	  
How	  did	  communities	  manage	  to	  retain	   references	   to	  customary	   laws	  and	  community	  
protocols	  despite	  the	  opposition?	  
	  
The	  short	  history	  of	  this	  un-­‐bracketed	  text	  is	  that	  an	  agreement	  was	  reached	  in	  
the	  margins	  of	  the	  negotiations	  between	  France,	  the	  African	  Group	  and	  the	  IIFB	  about	  
the	   retention	  of	   the	   term	   ‘customary	   laws	   and	   community	   protocols’	   in	   exchange	   for	  
removal	  of	  the	  reference	  to	  ‘indigenous	  and	  local	  community	  laws’.	  The	  African	  Group	  
and	   the	   IIFB	   felt	   that	   the	  words	   ‘customary	   laws’	  would	   in	  any	  case	  cover	   ‘indigenous	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












and	  local	  community	   laws’.	  France	  was	  also	  placated	  by	  the	  addition	  of	   ‘in	  accordance	  
with	  domestic	  law’,	  the	  phrase	  that	  had	  replaced	  ‘subject	  to	  national	  law’,	  and	  was	  now	  
beginning	  to	  reap	  dividends.	   	  
	  
France,	   in	   return,	   had	   to	   agree	   to	   the	   use	   of	   the	   phrase	   ‘Parties	   shall’	   at	   the	  
beginning	  of	   the	  Article,	   thereby	  making	   it	  a	  binding	  obligation	  on	  Parties	   to	  take	   into	  
consideration	   ‘customary	   laws	   and	   community	   protocols’	   in	   implementing	   their	  
obligations	   under	   the	   Protocol.	   Thanks	   to	   some	   very	   shrewd	   negotiating,	   the	   door	   in	  
international	   law	   to	   legal	  pluralism,	  and	   self-­‐determination	  of	   indigenous	  peoples	  and	  
local	  communities,	  was	  now	  ajar.	   	  
	  
The	  next	  crucial	  step	  was	  to	  secure	  the	  rights	  of	  communities	  over	  their	  genetic	  
resources.	  This	  had	  always	  been	  a	  long	  shot	  in	  the	  negotiations	  since	  the	  CBD	  made	  no	  
provision	  for	  such	  a	  right	  and	  one	  thing	  was	  clear	  in	  the	  September	  ING	  in	  Montreal:	  no	  
Party	   would	   go	   out	   of	   its	   way	   to	   support	   this	   claim.	   On	   the	   penultimate	   day	   of	   the	  
negotiations	   in	   Nagoya,	   there	   was	   still	   no	   support	   for	   this	   claim	   and	   the	   Co-­‐Chairs	  
constituted	   a	   small	   closed	   group	   (restricted	   to	   Parties)	   to	   discuss	   the	   still	   bracketed	  
provisions	   relating	   to	   communities.	   A	   suggestion	   was	   made	   to	   drop	   this	   provision	  
altogether.	  The	  African	  Group,	  however,	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  IIFB	  suggested	  that	  a	  decision	  
such	  as	  this	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  within	  a	  closed	  group	  but	  should	  be	  discussed	  within	  
the	  larger	  group.	  
	   	  
In	   the	   larger	   group	  Parties	   repeated	   that,	  while	   they	  were	  willing	   to	   recognize	  
the	  rights	  of	  communities	  over	  genetic	  resources,	  it	  had	  to	  be	  strictly	  limited	  to	  national	  
discretion,	  especially	  since	  the	  CBD	  did	  not	  recognize	  such	  a	  right.	  Communities,	  on	  the	  
other	   hand	   stated	   that	   they	   had	   emerging	   rights	   to	   genetic	   resources	   through	   the	  
UNDRIP,	   which	   despite	   being	   a	   UN	   General	   Assembly	   resolution,	   and	   therefore	   not	  
legally	   binding,	   had	   the	   moral	   authority	   that	   obliged	   countries	   to	   take	   it	   seriously.	  












their	  rights	  over	  genetic	  resources	  in	  national	  law,	  they	  also	  wanted	  a	  clear	  reference	  to	  
their	  rights	  in	  international	  law.	  This	  argument	  was	  promptly	  rejected	  by	  the	  GRULAC.	  
	  
Finally,	  a	  compromise	  text	  was	  developed	  and	  agreed	  to	  by	  all	  Parties	  and	  is	  now	  
in	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol.	  Article	  6	  (2)	  of	  the	  Protocol	  reads:	  
	  
In	  accordance	  with	  domestic	  law,	  each	  Party	  shall	  take	  measures,	  as	  appropriate,	  
with	   the	   aim	   of	   ensuring	   that	   the	   prior	   informed	   consent	   or	   approval	   and	  
involvement	   of	   indigenous	   and	   local	   communities	   is	   obtained	   for	   access	   to	  
genetic	  resources	  where	  they	  have	  the	  established	  right	  to	  grant	  access	  to	  such	  
resources.249	  
	  
Two	   legal	   victories	   are	   worthy	   of	   note.	   First,	   the	   sentence	   begins	   with	   ‘in	  
accordance	  with	  domestic	  law’	  thereby	  eliminating	  the	  ‘subject	  to	  law’	  term	  and	  making	  
this	   a	   facilitative	   provision.	   The	   obligation	   on	   Parties	   is	   phrased	   as	   ‘shall’,	   which	   is	  
mandatory.	   The	   sentence	   ends	   with	   ‘where	   they	   have	   the	   established	   right	   to	   grant	  
access	  to	  such	  resources’.	  The	  words	  ‘established	  right’	  are	  unqualified	  thereby	  leaving	  
it	   to	   interpretation	   as	   to	   whether	   these	   rights	   are	   established	   in	   national	   or	  
international	   law.	   In	   negotiations	   speak	   this	   is	   known	  as	   a	   ‘strategic	   ambiguity’,	   i.e.	   a	  
shrewd	  silence,	  that	  leaves	  enough	  room	  for	  interpretation	  and	  jurisprudential	  growth.	   	  
	  
If	  we	  approach	  the	  law	  as	  a	  site	  of	  struggle,	  Article	  6	  (2)	  of	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol	  is	  
a	  monumental	  achievement	  by	  communities.	   It	   is	   testimony	   to	   six	  years	  of	  hard	  work	  
and	   careful	   lobbying,	   and	   it	   has	   extended	   the	   scope	   of	   Article	   8(j)	   in	  ways	   that	  were	  
inconceivable	   in	   1993.	   It	   capitalized	   on	   the	   important	   victory	   in	   the	   GLTE	   report	   on	  
traditional	   knowledge,	   i.e.	   for	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	   local	   communities,	   there	   is	   an	  
inseparable	   link	   between	   genetic	   resources	   and	   traditional	   knowledge.	  What	   is	  more,	  
the	  preamble	  to	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol	  explicitly	  recognizes	  this	  link	  in	  the	  paragraph:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












Noting	   the	   interrelationship	   between	   genetic	   resources	   and	   traditional	  
knowledge,	   their	   inseparable	  nature	   for	   indigenous	  and	   local	   communities,	   the	  
importance	   of	   the	   traditional	   knowledge	   for	   the	   conservation	   of	   biological	  
diversity	   and	   the	   sustainable	   use	   of	   its	   components,	   and	   for	   the	   sustainable	  
livelihoods	  of	  these	  communities.250	  
	  
The	  last	  two	  hurdles	  for	  communities	  were	  to	  ensure	  that	  compliance	  provisions	  
relating	   to	   traditional	  knowledge	  were	   retained	   in	   the	  Protocol,	  and	   that	   the	  Protocol	  
made	  reference	  to	  the	  UNDRIP	  in	  its	  preamble.	  For	  both	  these	  provisions	  communities	  
had	   significant	   support	   from	   states.	   Regarding	   the	   compliance	   provisions	   relating	   to	  
traditional	   knowledge,	   a	   deal	   was	   finally	   made	   with	   the	   EU	   that,	   in	   exchange	   for	   a	  
paragraph	  in	  the	  COP	  10	  decision	  (that	  required	  the	  Parties	  to	  the	  Protocol	  to	  take	  note	  
of	   the	   developments	   at	   the	   WIPO	   IGC),	   the	   EU	   would	   agree	   to	   un-­‐bracketing	   these	  
provisions.	  The	  agreed	  text	  in	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol	  under	  Article	  15	  reads:	  
	  
1.	   Each	  Party	  shall	  take	  appropriate,	  effective	  and	  proportionate	  legislative,	  
administrative	   or	   policy	   measures,	   as	   appropriate,	   to	   provide	   that	   traditional	  
knowledge	  associated	  with	  genetic	  resources	  utilized	  within	  their	  jurisdiction	  has	  
been	   accessed	   in	   accordance	   with	   prior	   informed	   consent	   or	   approval	   and	  
involvement	   of	   indigenous	   and	   local	   communities	   and	   that	   mutually	   agreed	  
terms	  have	  been	  established,	  as	  required	  by	  domestic	  access	  and	  benefit	  sharing	  
legislation	  or	  regulatory	  requirements	  of	  the	  other	  Party	  where	  such	  indigenous	  
and	  local	  communities	  are	  located.	   	  
2.	   Each	  Party	  shall	   take	  appropriate,	  effective	  and	  proportionate	  measures	  
to	   address	   situations	  of	  non-­‐compliance	  with	  measures	   adopted	   in	   accordance	  
with	  paragraph	  1.	  
3.	   Parties	  shall,	  as	   far	  as	  possible	  and	  as	  appropriate	  cooperate	   in	  cases	  of	  
alleged	  violation	  of	  domestic	  access	  and	  benefit-­‐sharing	  legislation	  or	  regulatory	  
requirements	  referred	  to	  in	  paragraph	  1.251	  
	  
Regarding	  the	  reference	  to	  the	  UNDRIP	  in	  the	  preamble	  of	  the	  Protocol,	  Canada	  
ended	  up	  being	  the	  only	  Party	  that	  refused	  to	  accept	  accede.	  In	  order	  to	  goad	  Canada	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into	  un-­‐bracketing	  this	  provision,	  the	  terms	  were	  made	  more	  acceptable	  by	  phrasing	  it	  
as:	  ‘Noting	  the	  United	  Nations	  Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples’.252	  
	   	  
On	   the	   last	   day	   of	   the	   negotiations	   in	   Nagoya,	   Canada,	   after	   late	   night	  
consultations	   with	   their	   capital,	   finally	   relented	   to	   un-­‐bracket	   this	   text.	   This	   decision	  
owes	   a	   great	   debt	   to	  media	   releases,	   press	   conferences	   and	   lobbying	   undertaken	   by	  
Canadian	  indigenous	  peoples’	  organizations	  in	  both	  Canada	  and	  Japan.253	   In	  many	  ways	  
Canada’s	   acceptance	   of	   this	   paragraph	   also	   contributed	   to	   the	   recent	   Canadian	  
endorsement	  of	  the	  UNDRIP.	  While	  Canada	  had	  remained	  the	  last	  country	  that	  opposed	  
even	  a	   reference	   to	   the	  UNDRIP	   in	   the	  Nagoya	  Protocol,	   a	  number	  of	  other	   countries	  
were	   unwilling	   to	   have	   any	   strong	   affirmation	   of	   UNDRIP	   in	   the	   preamble	   to	   the	  
Protocol.	   Indigenous	   peoples	   organizations	   however	   repeatedly	   asserted	   that	   the	  
UNDRIP	   is	   customary	   international	   law	   and	   the	   CBD	  would	   have	   to	   be	   interpreted	   in	  
harmony	  with	  it.	  In	  this	  context	  it	  would	  be	  useful	  to	  note	  the	  views	  of	  James	  Anaya	  (the	  
UN	  Special	  Rapporteur	  on	  the	  situation	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  fundamental	  freedoms	  of	  
indigenous	  people)	  in	  his	  15th	  July	  2010	  statement	  before	  the	  Expert	  Mechanism	  on	  the	  
Rights	   of	   Indigenous	   Peoples	   where	   he	   made	   the	   case	   that	   UNDRIP	   should	   be	  
recognized	  as	  customary	  international	  law	  by	  arguing	  thus:	   	  	  
Of	  course	  it	  can	  be	  conceded	  that,	  as	  a	  resolution	  of	  the	  General	  Assembly,	  the	  
Declaration	   (UNDRIP)	   is	   by	   its	   nature,	   not	   in	   an	   of	   itself	   legally	   binding….But	  
understanding	  about	  the	  normative	  significance	  and	  legal	  obligations	  related	  to	  
the	   Declaration	   does	   not	   end	   there.	   First,	   whatever	   its	   legal	   significance,	   the	  
Declaration	   has	   a	   significant	   normative	   weight	   grounded	   in	   its	   high	   degree	   of	  
legitimacy.	   This	   legitimacy	   is	   a	   function	   of	   not	   only	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   has	   been	  
formally	  endorsed	  by	  an	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  UN	  Member	  States,	  but	  also	  
the	   fact	   that	   it	   is	   the	  product	  of	   years	  of	   advocacy	   and	   struggle	  by	   indigenous	  
peoples	  themselves.	  The	  Declaration	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  cross-­‐cultural	  dialogue	  that	  
took	  place	  over	  decades,	   in	  which	   indigenous	  peoples	   took	  a	   leading	   role.	   The	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norms	   of	   the	   Declaration	   substantially	   reflect	   indigenous	   peoples	   own	  
aspirations,	  which	  after	  years	  of	  deliberation	  have	  come	  to	  be	  accepted	  by	  the	  
international	   community.	   The	  Declaration's	  wording,	  which	  has	  been	  endorsed	  
by	   Members	   States,	   explicitly	   manifests	   a	   commitment	   to	   the	   rights	   and	  
principles	   the	   Declaration	   embodies.	   It	   is	   simply	   a	   matter	   of	   good	   faith	   that	  
States	  adhere	   to	   that	  expression	  of	   commitment	   to	   the	  norms	   that	   indigenous	  
peoples	   themselves	  have	  advanced.	   Furthermore,	  even	   though	   the	  Declaration	  
itself	   is	   not	   legally	   binding	   in	   the	   same	   way	   that	   a	   treaty	   is,	   the	   Declaration	  
reflects	  legal	  commitments	  that	  are	  related	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  Charter,	  other	  
treaty	  commitments	  and	  to	  customary	  international	  law.	  The	  Declaration	  builds	  
upon	   the	   general	   human	   rights	   obligations	   of	   States	   under	   the	   Charter	   and	   is	  
grounded	   in	   fundamental	   human	   rights	   principles	   such	   as	   non-­‐discrimination,	  
self-­‐determination	   and	   cultural	   integrity	   that	   are	   incorporated	   into	   widely-­‐
ratified	   human	   rights	   treaties,	   as	   evident	   in	   the	  work	   of	  United	  Nations	   treaty	  
bodies.	  In	  addition,	  core	  principles	  of	  the	  Declaration	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  connect	  to	  a	  
consistent	  pattern	  of	   international	  and	  state	  practice,	  and	  hence	  to	  that	  extent	  
they	  reflect	  customary	  international	  law...254	  
	  
(e)	  Field	  Notes	  from	  the	  Frontline:	  The	  Emergence	  of	  Biocultural	  Jurisprudence	  
	  
The	   previous	   sections	   endeavoured	   to	   take	   seriously	   Thompson’s	   advice	   to	   avoid	   the	  
‘profound	   condescension	   of	   posterity’	   by	   mapping	   the	   biocultural	   rights	   gains	   in	   the	  
Nagoya	   Protocol	   resulting	   from	   six	   ears	   of	   painstaking	   negotiations.	   The	   rights	   of	  
communities	  we	  see	  in	  the	  Protocol	  today	  cannot	  be	  attributed	  to	  manna	  from	  heaven	  
or	  the	  munificence	  of	  Parties.	  They	  are	  the	  result	  of	  hard	  fought	  battles	  by	  the	  IIFB	  over	  
every	   comma	   and	   every	   word.	   With	   the	   strong	   support	   of	   sympathetic	   Parties,	  
especially	   the	   African	   Group,	   Philippines,	   Peru	   and	   Norway,	   communities	   gained	  
significant	  ground	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  their	  rights	  over	  traditional	  knowledge	  and	  genetic	  resources	  
and	  the	  recognition	  of	  their	  customary	  laws.	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The	  oft-­‐quoted	  homily	   in	   the	  ABS	  negotiations	  was	   ‘perfection	   is	   the	  enemy	  of	  
the	  good’.	  While	   there	  were	  times	  when	   it	   sounded	  trite,	   it	   rings	   true	  when	  analysing	  
the	   Nagoya	   Protocol.	   The	   rights	   that	   were	   gained	   by	   communities	   in	   the	   Nagoya	  
Protocol	   may	   not	   be	   perfect,	   but	   they	   are	   undeniably	   a	   giant	   gain	   from	   the	   tame	  
provisions	  of	  Articles	  8	   (j)	   and	  10	   (c)	  of	   the	  CBD.	  Going	  back	   to	   the	  guiding	  questions	  
posed	   at	   the	   outset	   -­‐	   to	   truly	   understand	   the	   colossal	   achievement	   regarding	  
community	  rights	  in	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol,	  we	  must	  learn	  to	  see	  how	  far	  we	  have	  come	  
since	  1993.	  Slowly	  but	  surely	  indigenous	  peoples	  groups	  have	  started	  transforming	  their	  
non-­‐binding	   rights	   in	   the	   UNDRIP	   into	   binding	   rights	   in	   treaty	   law	   relying	   on	   nothing	  
more	  than	  the	  moral	  force	  of	  the	  Declaration.	   	  
	  
Every	  gain	  in	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol	  is	  not	  an	  end	  in	  itself	  but	  the	  flat	  end	  of	  a	  lever	  
inserted	  into	  the	  interstices	  of	  other	  negotiations	  to	  pry	  open	  community	  rights	  under	  
TRIPS,	  WIPO	  IGC,	  FAO	  and	  the	  UNFCCC.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  negotiations,	  this	  is	  the	  
fine	  art	  of	  cross-­‐leveraging	  rights,	  i.e.	  to	  take	  gains	  from	  one	  Convention	  and	  insist	  that	  
they	   be	   respected	   in	   another	   Convention	   dealing	   with	   similar	   subject	   matter.	   This	  
emphasis	  by	  communities	  on	  a	  rights	  based	  approach	  to	  all	  multilateral	  environmental	  
negotiations	  is	  an	  effective	  nostrum	  against	  the	  tendency	  of	  the	  law	  to	  fragment	  life	  by	  
splitting	   it	   up	   into	  different	   legal	   subjects,	   such	   as	   land,	   intellectual	   property,	   cultural	  
issues	  etc.	  
	  
So,	  how	  do	  we	  begin	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  emerging	  rights	  discourse?	  In	  the	  first	  
place	  this	  growing	  phenomenon	  must	  be	  named.	  If	  thrown	  into	  the	  general	  grab	  bag	  of	  
rights,	  both	  community	  lawyers	  and	  organisations	  will	  insufficiently	  understand	  the	  full	  
potential	   of	   these	   new	  hard-­‐fought	   rights.	   This	   possibility	   has	   led	   to	   their	   inadequate	  
use	  in	  domestic	  activism,	  which	  has	  allowed	  states	  to	  ignore	  international	  commitments	  













To	  begin	  the	  naming	  process:	  in	  the	  last	  two	  decades,	  through	  the	  movement	  for	  
indigenous	  peoples’	  rights,	  a	  discourse	  of	  third	  generation	  rights	  called	  ‘group	  rights	  or	  
collective	  rights’	  has	  developed.	  These	  are	  different	   from	  the	   first	  generation	  civil	  and	  
political	   rights,	   and	   the	   second-­‐generation	   social	   and	   economic	   rights.	   While	   group	  
rights	  cover	  the	  gamut	  of	  rights	  required	  for	  the	  survival	  and	  flourishing	  of	   indigenous	  
peoples	   and	   ethnic	   groups,	   a	   sub-­‐set	   of	   third	   generation	   rights	   has	   emerged	   almost	  
unnoticed	  as	  an	  offshoot	  of	  ‘group	  rights’.	  This	  sub-­‐set	  of	  rights	  is	  what	  is	  being	  termed	  
as	  ‘biocultural	  rights.’255	  
	  
Biocultural	  rights	  are	  group	  rights,	  but	  they	  differ	  from	  the	  general	  category	  of	  third	  
generation	   rights	   through	   their	   explicit	   link	   to	   conservation	   and	   sustainable	   use	   of	  
biological	   diversity.	   Indigenous	   peoples	   and	   traditional	   communities	   who	   assert	  
biocultural	  rights,	  base	  their	  claims	  on	  two	  foundations:	  
	  
i. Conservation	  and	  sustainable	  use	  of	  biological	  diversity	  by	  communities	  is	  reliant	  
on	  a	  way	  of	  life,	  and	  biocultural	  rights	  must	  protect	  this	  way	  of	  life.	  
ii. The	   way	   of	   life	   relevant	   for	   conservation	   and	   sustainable	   use	   of	   biological	  
diversity	   is	   linked	   to	   secure	   land	   tenure,	   use	   rights	   and	   rights	   to	   culture,	  
knowledge	  and	  practices.	  
	  
Biocultural	  rights	  make	  the	  link	  between	  the	  community	  or	  what	  we	  refer	  to	  here	  as	  
people	   and	   ecosystems.	   This	   link	   however	   is	   worked	   out	   through	   the	   assertion	   of	   a	  
bundle	  of	  property	  rights.	  It	  is	  critical	  to	  understand	  the	  spirit	  of	  biocultural	  rights	  as	  not	  
a	   pure	   property	   claim	   by	   a	   hitherto	   excluded	   group	   in	   the	   typical	   market	   sense	   of	  
property	   being	   universally	   commensurable,	   commodifiable	   and	   alienable.	   On	   the	  
contrary,	   biocultural	   assertions	   of	   property	   rights	   are	   claims	   in	   the	   form	   of	   use,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255	   The	  term	  ‘biocultural	  rights’	  is	  a	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  term	  that	  we	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  here	  to	  distinguish	  this	  set	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  rights	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  ‘group	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  of	  yet,	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  not	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  Regarding	  the	  
three	  generations	  of	  human	  rights	  see	  generally,	  Vasak,	  Karel,	  "Human	  Rights:	  A	  Thirty-­‐Year	  Struggle:	  
the	  Sustained	  Efforts	  to	  give	  Force	  of	  law	  to	  the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights",	  UNESCO	  












stewardship	   and	   fiduciary	   rights	   that	   emphasize	   use	   over	   exchange	   value.	   The	  
‘peoplehood’	  of	  biocultural	  communities	  is	  integrally	  linked	  to	  the	  rights	  to	  stewardship	  
of	   their	   lands	   and	   concomitant	   traditional	   knowledge	   through	   a	   complex	   system	   of	  
customary	  use	  rights	  and	  fiduciary	  duties.	   	  
	  
Biocultural	   jurisprudence	   then	   is	   the	   theory	   and	   practice	   of	   applying	   a	   biocultural	  
rights	   framework	   to	   law	   and	   policy,	   when	   such	   law	   and	   policy	   affects	   a	   community	  
whose	  peoplehood	   is	   integrally	   tied	   to	   their	   traditional	   stewardship	   role	  and	   fiduciary	  
duties	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  their	  lands	  and	  concomitant	  knowledge.	  The	  infrapolitics	  of	  communities	  
in	   the	   negotiations	   towards	   the	   Nagoya	   Protocol	   have	   firmly	   established	   biocultural	  
rights	   in	  hard	   law.	  The	  story	  of	   these	  biocultural	   rights	  needs	   to	  be	   told	  and	  retold	   to	  
ensure	   their	   realization	   on	   the	   ground.	   It	   is	   by	   repeated	   public	   declamation	   and	  
proactive	   use	   that	   these	   bio-­‐cultural	   rights	   will	   come	   alive.	   The	   Nagoya	   Protocol	   is	   a	  
significant	   event,	   and	   it	   is	   only	   by	   celebrating	   its	   gains	   that	   we	   can	   fully	   honour	   the	  
indigenous	  peoples	  and	  local	  communities	  who	  made	  it	  happen.256	   	  
	  
The	   establishment	   of	   biocultural	   rights	   through	   multilateral	   environmental	  
negotiations	   have	   begun	   to	   make	   their	   impact	   felt	   in	   property	   jurisprudence.	   In	   fact	  
biocultural	   jurisprudence	   seems	   to	   draw	   its	   strength	   from	   historicizing	   and	  
deconstruction	   of	   the	   legal	   discourse	   of	   private	   property	   to	   challenge	   its	   naturalness.	  
Biocultural	   rights	   make	   the	   claim	   that	   it	   is	   not	   property	   that	   should	   determine	  
personhood	  or	  peoplehood	  but	  the	  other	  way	  round.	  It	  is	  to	  explore	  the	  veracity	  of	  this	  
radical	  claim	  that	  we	  shall	  turn	  to	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	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   Parts	  of	  this	  chapter	  have	  been	  published	  in,	  Bavikatte,	  Kabir	  and	  Robinson,	  Daniel,	  “Towards	  a	  
Peoples	  History	  of	  the	  Law:	  Biocultural	  Jurisprudence	  and	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol	  on	  Access	  and	  Benefit	  
Sharing”,	  The	  Law,	  Environment	  and	  Development	  Journal,	  7/1,	  http://www.lead-­‐












CHAPTER	  VI	  –	  RETHINKING	  PROPERTY:	  A	  BIOCULTURAL	  APPROACH	  
	  
The	  first	  person	  who,	  having	  fenced	  off	  a	  plot	  of	  ground,	  took	  it	  into	  his	  head	  to	  
say	  ‘this	  is	  mine’	  and	  found	  people	  simple	  enough	  to	  believe	  him,	  was	  the	  true	  founder	  of	  
civil	  society.	  What	  crimes,	  wars,	  murders,	  what	  miseries	  and	  horrors	  would	  the	  human	  
race	  have	  been	  spared	  by	  someone	  who,	  uprooting	  the	  stakes	  or	  filling	  in	  the	  ditch	  had	  
shouted	  to	  his	  fellow-­‐men:	  Beware	  of	  listening	  to	  this	  imposter;	  you	  are	  lost	  if	  you	  forget	  
that	  the	  fruits	  belong	  to	  all	  and	  the	  earth	  to	  no	  one!	  
Jean-­‐Jacques	  Rousseau:	  Discourse	  on	  the	  Origin	  and	  Foundations	  of	  Inequality	  (1755)257	  
	  
The	   emergence	   of	   biocultural	   rights	   asks	   for	   a	   fundamental	   rethink	   of	   property	  
jurisprudence	  itself.	  The	  understanding	  of	  property	  in	  law	  has	  never	  been	  constant,	  and	  
discussions	  around	  the	  concept	  are	  among	  the	  most	  contested	  areas	  of	   jurisprudence.	  
In	   fact	   if	   we	   approach	   law	   as	   politics,	   then	   the	   discourse	   of	   property	   perhaps	   the	  
epicentre.	   The	   very	   notion	   of	   personhood,	   and	   hence	   the	   juridical	   subject	   in	   liberal	  
democracies,	  is	  based	  on	  an	  assumption	  that	  a	  right	  to	  property	  is	  integral	  to	  what	  we	  
understand	  as	  person.258	   	  
	  
The	   courts	   in	   liberal	   democracies,	   where	   property	   litigation	   is	   conducted,	   are	  
also	   sites	   where	   our	   personhood	   is	   defined,	   contested	   and	   redefined.	   In	   their	  
challenging	   of	   commodity	   or	   private	   property	   fetishism,	   and	   the	   estrangement	   it	  
engenders,	  communities	  are	  relying	  on	  biocultural	  jurisprudence	  as	  a	  means	  to	  counter	  
the	  two	  main	  fallacies	  regarding	  property	  in	  capitalist	  societies.	  
	  
The	   first	   fallacy	   is	   one	  where	   property	   is	   understood	   as	   a	   thing	   rather	   than	   a	  
right.	   The	   influential	   Canadian	   political	   scientist	   C.B.	   Macpherson	   in	   his	   analysis	   of	  
property	  notes:	  ‘In	  current	  common	  usage,	  property	  is	  things;	  in	  law	  and	  in	  the	  writers,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257	   Rousseau,	  Jean-­‐Jacques,	  The	  First	  and	  Second	  Discourses	  of	  Rousseau,	  Masters,	  Roger	  and	  Judith,	  Eds.,	  
trans.,	  Roger	  D.	  Masters,	  New	  York:	  St.	  Martin’s	  Press,	  1964.	  
258	   Social	  contract	  theories	  of	  various	  shades	  that	  form	  the	  philosophical	  foundations	  of	  liberal	  
democracies	  all	  understand	  personhood	  as	  incorporating	  a	  bundle	  of	  individual	  rights	  including	  the	  












property	   is	   not	   things,	   but	   rights,	   rights	   in	  or	   to	   things.’259	   The	   second	   fallacy	   is	   one	  
where	  property	  is	  understood	  as	  predominantly	  private	  property.	  It	  is	  therefore	  treated	  
as	   an	   individual	   exclusive	   right;	   a	   right	   to	   exclude	   others	   from	   use	   or	   benefit.	   Again	  
Macpherson	  says	  that:	  ‘Another	  difficulty	  is	  that	  property,	  in	  the	  works	  of	  most	  modern	  
writers,	  is	  usually	  treated	  as	  identical	  with	  private	  property,	  an	  exclusive	  individual	  right,	  
my	   right	   to	   exclude	   you	   from	   some	   use	   or	   benefit	   of	   something.’260	   The	   reason	  why	  
these	  two	  dominant	  perceptions	  of	  property	  are	  fallacies	  is	  because	  both	  of	  them	  are	  a	  
product	  of	  historical	  circumstances,	  specifically	  of	  the	  dominance	  of	  market	  economies,	  
which	  like	  the	  homo	  economicus	  are	  passed	  off	  as	  ahistorical	  and	  natural.	  
	  
(a)	  What	  is	  Property?	  	  
Property	   in	   its	  most	   fundamental	  sense	   is	  a	  political	   relationship;	   it	  distinguishes	   itself	  
from	   mere	   possession	   by	   establishing	   a	   right	   or	   a	   claim	   that	   is	   supported	   by	   law,	  
custom,	   state	   or	   society.	   At	   this	   elemental	   level,	   property	   is	   not	   a	   thing,	   but	   an	  
enforceable	  claim.	  While	  the	  morality	  of	  any	  property	  claim	  is	  subject	  to	  contestation,	  it	  
is	   undeniable	   that	   to	   assert	   a	   property	   right	   is	   to	   lay	   claim	   to	   a	   particular	   political	  
relationship.	  
	  
The	  transformation	  of	  property	  from	  a	  political	  relation	  to	  a	  thing	  is	  tied	  to	  the	  
dominance	  of	  the	  market	  economy	  and	  the	  fetishism	  of	  commodities	  it	  engenders.	  The	  
erasure	  of	  use	  value	  and	  the	  predominance	  of	  exchange	  value	  result	  in	  a	  phenomenon	  
where	   commodities	   and	   not	   people	   become	   ends	   in	   themselves.	   As	   long	   as	  markets	  
were	  embedded	  in	  social	  relations,	  notions	  of	  property	  were	  based	  on	  rights	  to	  access,	  
use	  and,	  under	  certain	  conditions,	  exchange.	  The	  moment	  markets	  began	  to	  eclipse	  all	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   Macpherson,	  C.B.,	  “The	  Meaning	  of	  Property,”	  in	  Property:	  Mainstream	  and	  Critical	  Positions,	  
Macpherson,	  C.B.,	  Ed.,	  Oxford:	  Basil	  Blackwell,	  1978,	  p.	  2.	  












social	  relations,	  the	  emphasis	  palpably	  shifted	  from	  the	  rights	  to	  access	  and	  use,	  to	  the	  
rights	  to	  exclude	  and	  alienate.	  
	   	  
Macpherson	  notes:	  
	  
The	  change	   in	  common	  usage,	   to	   treating	  property	  as	   things	   themselves,	  came	  
with	   the	   spread	   of	   the	   full	   capitalist	   market	   economy	   from	   the	   seventeenth	  
century	   on,	   and	   the	   replacement	   of	   the	   old	   limited	   rights	   in	   land	   and	   other	  
valuable	   things	   by	   virtually	   unlimited	   rights.	   As	   rights	   in	   land	   became	   more	  
absolute,	   and	   parcels	   of	   land	   became	  more	   freely	  marketable	   commodities,	   it	  
became	  natural	   to	   think	  of	   the	   land	   itself	   as	   property….	   It	   appeared	   to	  be	   the	  
things	  themselves,	  not	  just	  rights	  in	  them	  that	  were	  exchanged	  in	  the	  market.	  In	  
fact	   the	   difference	   was	   not	   that	   things	   rather	   than	   rights	   in	   things	   were	  
exchanged,	  but	  that	  previously	  unsalable	  rights	   in	  things	  were	  now	  saleable;	  or	  
to	   put	   it	   differently,	   that	   limited	   and	  not	   always	   saleable	   rights	   in	   things	  were	  
being	  replaced	  by	  virtually	  unlimited	  saleable	  rights	  to	  things.261	  
	  
The	   blurring	   between	   right	   and	   thing	   in	   contemporary	   property	   discourse	   is	   a	  
result	   of	   universal	   commoditization	   wrought	   by	   capitalism.262	   The	   transformation	   of	  
property	  from	  a	  right	  to	  a	  thing,	  also	  transformed	  the	  notion	  of	  personhood263	   from	  the	  
homo	  socialis	  to	  the	  homo	  economicus.	  If	  who	  we	  are	  is	  an	  ‘ensemble	  of	  social	  relations’	  
or	   ‘nodes	   in	   a	  web	  of	   social	   relations’,	   then	  how	  we	  understand	  property	  determines	  
the	  extent	  of	  our	   relationality	  and	   thereby	  our	  very	  notion	  of	   self.	  Property	  as	  a	   right	  
affirms	  relationality	  since	  the	  human	  being	   is	   the	  ultimate	  end,	  whereas	  property	  as	  a	  
thing	  results	   in	  estrangement	  since	  the	  commodity	  and	  not	  the	  human	  being	  becomes	  
the	  legitimate	  end.	   	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261	   Ibid,	  at	  7-­‐	  8.	  
262	   See	  generally,	  Sandel,	  Michael	  J,	  “What	  Money	  Can’t	  Buy:	  The	  Moral	  Limits	  of	  Markets,”	  The	  Tanner	  
Lectures	  on	  Human	  Values,	  Oxford,	  1998.	  
www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/sandel00.pdf.	  Retrieved	  13th	  September	  2011.	  
263	   See,	  Radin,	  Margaret	  Jane,	  “Property	  and	  Personhood,”	  Stanford	  Law	  Review,	  Vol.	  34,	  No.	  5,	  May	  












The	  second	  fallacy	  that	  Macpherson	  highlights	  is	  the	  conflation	  of	  property	  with	  
private	  property,	  a	  conflation	  that	  goes	  back	  no	  further	  than	  the	  seventeenth	  century.	  
While	   debates	   about	   property	   are	   as	   old	   as	   political	   theory	   itself,	   private	   property	  
historically	  has	  always	  been	  contentious.	  According	  to	  Macpherson,	  this	  is	  not	  surprising	  
since	  private	  property,	  which	  involved	  the	  right	  to	  exclude	  and	  alienate,	  was	  not	  just	  an	  
economic	  but	  also	  a	  moral	  issue.	  Property,	  as	  a	  right	  rather	  than	  a	  thing,	  was	  viewed	  as	  
a	  bundle	  of	  access	  and	  use	  claims.	  In	   this	   regard	   customary	   law	   jurist	   Thomas	  Bennett	  
notes	  that:	  
	  
The	   great	  watershed	   in	   the	   formation	   of	   a	   fully-­‐fledged	   concept	   of	   ownership	  
was	   clearly	   trade.	   	   Before	   this	   occurred,	   property	   of	   economic	   significance	  
attracted	   many	   highly	   specific	   rights,	   each	   of	   which	   could	   vest	   in	   a	   different	  
person….	   If	   the	   optimum	   condition	   of	   a	   free	  market	  was	   to	   be	   realized,	   these	  
goods	  had	  to	  be	  loosened	  from	  the	  specific	  rights	  of	  particular	  interest	  holders.	  
Ownership	   provided	   the	   answer.	   	   It	   was	   a	   concept	   applicable	   to	   any	   type	   of	  
property	   and	   it	  was	   available	   to	   all	   traders….The	  proprietary	   rights	  of	   the	  pre-­‐
trade	   era	   can	   be	   distinguished	   from	   ownership	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   former	  
usually	  implied	  a	  number	  of	  specific	  interests	  vesting	  in	  various	  different	  holders,	  
whereas	  ownership	  implies	  a	  collection	  of	  interests	  vesting	  in	  a	  single	  holder.264	   	  	  
	   In	   fact,	   the	  predominant	   conception	  of	  property	  until	   the	   seventeenth	   century	  
was	  that	  of	  common	  property,	  with	  private	  property	  being	  as	  a	  subset.	  Echoing	  Polanyi’s	  
argument	  of	  the	  recent	  vintage	  of	  the	  market	  economy,	  Macpherson	  argues:	  
	  
From	   the	   sixteenth	   and	   seventeenth	   centuries	   on,	  more	   and	  more	  of	   the	   land	  
and	   resources	   in	   settled	   countries	  was	  becoming	  private	  property,	   and	  private	  
property	  was	  becoming	  an	  individual	  right	  unlimited	  in	  amount,	  unconditional	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264	   Bennett,	  Thomas	  W.,	  Customary	  Law	  in	  South	  Africa,	  Landsdowne:	  Juta,	  2004,	  p.	  375;	  Bennett	  also	  
notes	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  ownership	  as	  an	  indefeasible	  right	  is	  no	  longer	  appropriate	  to	  describe	  
contemporary	  proprietary	  relations	  (or	  the	  requirements	  of	  modern	  society).	  Nevertheless	  this	  notion	  
of	  absolute	  ownership	  lingers	  even	  in	  the	  contemporary	  Hohfeldian	  understanding	  of	  ownership	  as	  a	  
bundle	  of	  rights	  and	  powers,	  which	  do	  not	  include	  any	  rights	  for	  others.	  See	  also	  Herskovits,	  Melville,	  
Economic	  Anthropology,	  New	  York:	  Knopf,	  1952,	  p.	  325	  and	  Van	  der	  Walt	  in	  Van	  der	  Walt,	  A.J.,	  Ed.,	  













the	   performance	   of	   social	   functions,	   and	   freely	   transferable,	   as	   it	   substantially	  
remains	  to	  the	  present	  day…the	  modern	  right,	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  feudal	  right	  
which	  preceded	  it,	  may	  be	  called	  an	  absolute	  right	  in	  two	  senses:	  it	  is	  a	  right	  to	  
dispose	  of,	  or	  alienate	  as	  well	  as	  to	  use;	  and	  it	  is	  a	  right	  which	  is	  not	  conditional	  
on	  the	  owner’s	  performance	  of	  any	  social	  function.265	  
	  
The	  displacement	  of	  common	  property	  and	  the	  consequent	  conflation	  of	  private	  
property	   with	   property	   as	   a	   whole	   have	   had	   dire	   consequences	   for	   liberal	   political	  
theory.	   If	   the	  grundnorm	  of	   liberal	  democracy	   is	   the	   right	  of	  all	   individuals	   to	  develop	  
their	   potential,	   it	   becomes	  extremely	  difficult	   to	   reconcile	   this	   ethic	  with	   the	   growing	  
concentration	  of	  ownership	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  few.	  The	  notion	  of	  personhood	  in	  liberal	  
democracies	   is	   linked	   to	   some	   form	   of	   property	   rights	   without	   which	   the	   person	   is	  
unable	   to	   flourish	   or	   even	   remain	   a	   person.	   However,	   according	   to	  Macpherson,	   the	  
erosion	   of	   common	   property	   in	   favour	   of	   private	   property	   with	   highly	   concentrated	  
ownership	  adversely	  affected	  the	  liberal	  understanding	  of	  full	  and	  effective	  personhood.	   	  
	  
Pre-­‐empting	  a	  biocultural	  jurisprudence,	  Macpherson	  asserts:	  
	  
[P]roperty…need	  not	  be	  confined,	  as	  liberal	  theory	  has	  confined	  it,	  to	  a	  right	  to	  
exclude	   others	   from	   the	   use	   or	   benefit	   of	   something,	   but	   may	   equally	   be	   an	  
individual	   right	   not	   to	   be	   excluded	   by	   others	   from	   the	   use	   or	   benefit	   of	  
something.	  When	  property	   is	  so	  understood,	   the	  problem	  of	   liberal-­‐democratic	  
theory	   is	   no	   longer	   a	   problem	   of	   putting	   limits	   on	   the	   property	   rights,	   but	   of	  
supplementing	  the	   individual	   right	   to	  exclude	  others	  by	  the	   individual	   right	  not	  
to	  be	  excluded	  by	  others.	  The	  latter	  right	  may	  be	  held	  to	  be	  the	  one	  that	  is	  most	  
required	  by	  the	  liberal-­‐democratic	  ethic,	  and	  most	  implied	  in	  a	  liberal	  concept	  of	  
the	  human	  essence.	  The	  right	  not	  to	  be	  excluded	  by	  others	  may	  provisionally	  be	  
stated	  as	  the	  individual	  right	  to	  equal	  access	  to	  the	  means	  of	  labour	  and/or	  the	  
means	  of	  life.266	  
	  
(b)	  John	  Locke	  and	  Justifications	  for	  Private	  Property	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   Supra	  n.	  260,	  at	  10.	  













Though	  the	  Earth	  and	  all	  inferior	  Creatures	  be	  common	  to	  all	  Men,	  yet	  every	  Man	  
has	  a	  Property	  in	  his	  own	  Person.	  This	  no	  Body	  has	  any	  Right	  to	  but	  himself.	  The	  Labour	  
of	  his	  Body,	  and	   the	  Work	  of	  his	  Hands,	  we	  may	   say,	  are	  properly	  his.	  Whatsoever	  he	  
removes	   out	   of	   the	   state	   that	  Nature	   hath	   provided,	   and	   left	   it	   in,	   he	   hath	  mixed	   his	  
Labour	   with,	   and	   joined	   to	   it	   something	   that	   is	   his	   own,	   and	   thereby	   makes	   it	   his	  
Property.	  It	  being	  by	  him	  removed	  from	  the	  common	  state	  Nature	  placed	  it	  in,	  it	  hath	  by	  
this	  labour	  something	  annexed	  to	  it,	  that	  excludes	  the	  common	  right	  of	  other	  Men.	  For	  
this	  Labour	  being	  the	  unquestionable	  Property	  of	  the	  Labourer,	  no	  Man	  but	  he	  can	  have	  
a	  right	  to	  what	  that	  is	  once	  joined	  to,	  at	  least	  where	  there	  is	  enough,	  and	  as	  good	  left	  in	  
common	  for	  others.	  
John	  Locke,	  Second	  Treatise	  of	  Government267	  
	  
An	  understanding	  of	  the	  views	  of	  the	  English	  philosopher	  John	  Locke,	  first	  published	  in	  
1689,	   could	   usefully	   inform	   the	   current	   discussion	   around	   the	   nature	   of	   property.	   A	  
critical	   reading	   of	   Locke	   provides	   us	   with	   an	   insight	   into	   what	   happened	   in	   the	  
seventeenth	  century	  to	  justify	  unlimited	  private	  property.	   	  
	  
By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  seventeenth	  century	  Locke	  had	  for	  the	  first	  time	  developed	  a	  
political	   theory	   that	   justified	   the	   right	   of	   individuals	   to	   limitless	   appropriation	   and	  
accumulation	  of	  property.268	   As	  we	  shall	  see	  later,	  historically,	  private	  property	  in	  land	  
was	   always	   a	   morally	   contentious	   issue	   that	   required	   justification.	   Macpherson	  
comments:	  
	  
His	  (Locke’s)	  case	  remained	  the	  standby	  of	  those	  who	  shaped	  the	  thinking	  of	  the	  
ruling	  class	  in	  England,	  from	  the	  Whig	  Revolution	  for	  a	  century	  or	  more,	  and	  the	  
eighteenth	  century.	  His	   justification	  of	  property	  was	  thus	   in	  effect	  written	   into,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267	   Locke,	  John,	  “Two	  Treatises	  of	  Government,”	  Locke’s	  Two	  Treatises	  of	  Government:	  A	  Critical	  Edition	  
with	  an	  Introduction	  and	  Apparatus	  Criticus,	  Laslett,	  Peter,	  Ed.,	  New	  York:	  New	  American	  Library,	  
1965,	  excerpt	  from	  supra	  n.	  260,	  at	  18.	  
268	   See	  generally,	  Macpherson,	  C.B,	  The	  Political	  Theory	  of	  Possessive	  Individualism:	  Hobbes	  to	  Locke,	  












or	  at	   least	  was	   implied	   in,	   the	  constitutions	  of	   the	   first	  great	  modern	  capitalist	  
nation-­‐states.269	   	  
	  
It	  is	  uncanny	  how	  close	  Locke’s	  notion	  of	  personhood	  and	  its	  link	  to	  property	  is	  
to	  Marx’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  labour	  theory	  of	  value,	  and	  the	  estrangement	  that	  wage	  
labour	  causes	  due	  to	  the	  worker’s	  lack	  of	  control	  over	  the	  means	  of	  production.	  This	  is	  
perhaps	   where	   the	   similarities	   between	  Marx	   and	   Locke	   also	   end,	   but	   this	   similarity	  
nevertheless	  is	  worthy	  of	  note.	  As	  Locke	  observes	  in	  the	  excerpt	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  
section:	   ‘every	   Man	   has	   a	   Property	   in	   his	   own	   Person.’270	   This	   observation	   is	   the	  
cornerstone	  of	  Locke’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  link	  between	  property	  and	  personhood	  and	  
the	  building	  block	  of	  his	  theory	  on	  property.	   	  
	  
If	  a	  person	  has	  a	  property	   in	  his	  own	  person,	   then	  Locke	  proceeds	   to	  say	   that,	  
‘The	  Labour	  of	  his	  Body,	  and	   the	  Work	  of	  his	  Hands,	  we	  may	  say,	  are	  properly	  his.’271	  
The	  basis	  of	  Locke’s	  argument	  is	  that	  a	  person	  owns	  what	  his	  body	  labours	  over	  because	  
he	   owns	   his	   body.	   His	   labour	   is	   an	   extension	   of	   his	   body	   or	   his	   personhood	   and	  
therefore	  what	  his	  labour	  contributes	  to	  belong	  to	  him:	  ‘Whatsoever	  he	  removes	  out	  of	  
the	  state	  that	  Nature	  hath	  provided,	  and	  left	   it	   in,	  he	  hath	  mixed	  his	  Labour	  with,	  and	  
joined	  to	  it	  something	  that	  is	  his	  own,	  and	  thereby	  makes	  it	  his	  Property.’272	  
	  
Locke’s	   justification	   for	   property	   by	   linking	   it	   to	   personhood	   is	   simple	   enough,	  
and	  even	  Marx	  would	  not	  disagree	  with	  him.	  What	  is	  interesting	  though	  is	  Locke’s	  need	  
to	   justify	   appropriation.	   This	   need	   provides	   us	   with	   a	   window	   into	   the	   predominant	  
moral	   principle	   of	   Locke’s	   time;	   that	   God	   gave	   the	   earth	   in	   common	   to	   humankind,	  
implying	  that	  what	  is	  common	  is	  natural,	  and	  private	  property	  is	  a	  moral	  exception	  that	  
would	  need	  to	  be	  justified.	  Locke	  says:	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   Supra	  n.	  260,	  at	  13.	  
270	   Supra	  n.	  269.	  
271	   Supra	  n.	  269.	  












‘Whether	  we	  consider	  natural	  Reason,	  which	  tells	  us	  that	  Men,	  being	  once	  born,	  
have	  a	  right	  to	  their	  Preservation,	  and	  consequently	  to	  Meat	  and	  Drink,	  and	  such	  
other	  things,	  as	  Nature	  affords	  for	  their	  subsistence:	  Or	  Revelation	  which	  gives	  us	  
an	  account	  of	  those	  Grants	  God	  made	  of	  the	  World	  to	  Adam	  and	  to	  Noah,	  and	  
his	  Sons,	  ‘tis	  very	  clear,	  that	  God,	  as	  King	  David	  says,	  Psal	  CXV.xvj,	  has	  given	  the	  
Earth	   to	   the	   Children	   of	  Men,	   given	   it	   to	  Mankind	   in	   common.	   But	   this	   being	  
supposed,	  it	  seems	  to	  some	  a	  very	  great	  difficulty	  how	  any	  one	  should	  ever	  come	  
to	  have	  a	  Property	  in	  anything.’273	  
	  
For	   Locke,	   the	   first	   step	   to	   a	   theory	   of	   private	   property	   is	   to	   justify	   the	   act	   of	  
taking	   something	  out	  of	   the	  commons	  and	  enclosing	   it.	   Locke,	  as	  we	  have	   seen,	  does	  
this	  by	  establishing	  an	  ownership	  over	  one’s	  body	  and,	  by	  extension,	  an	  ownership	  over	  
things	   that	   one’s	   body	   expends	   labour	   over.	   Property	   then	   is	   an	   extension	   of	   one’s	  
bodily	   exertions	   and	   integrally	   tied	   to	   personhood.	   Up	   to	   this	   point	   Locke	  would	   not	  
have	  faced	  much	  opposition,	  but	  he	  still	  had	  a	  way	  to	  go	  to	  be	  able	  to	  justify	  unlimited	  
accumulation	   of	   private	   property.	   Locke	   acknowledges	   the	   moral	   limits	   to	   private	  
property	  when	  he	  says:	  
	  
It	  will	  perhaps	  be	  objected	  to	  this,	  That	  if	  gathering	  the	  Acorns,	  or	  other	  Fruits	  of	  
the	  Earth,	  &	  c.	  makes	  a	  right	  to	  them,	  then	  any	  one	  may	   ingross	  as	  much	  as	  he	  
will.	  To	  which	  I	  Answer,	  Not	  so.	  The	  same	  Law	  of	  Nature,	  that	  does	  by	  this	  means	  
give	  us	  Property,	  does	  also	  bound	  that	  Property	  too.	  God	  has	  given	  us	  all	  things	  
richly,	  1	  Tim.	  Vi.	  17.	  Is	  the	  Voice	  of	  Reason	  confirmed	  by	  Inspiration.	  But	  how	  far	  
has	   he	   given	   to	   us?	   To	   enjoy.	   As	   much	   as	   anyone	   can	   make	   use	   of	   to	   any	  
advantage	   of	   life	   before	   it	   spoils….Whatever	   is	   beyond	   this,	   is	   more	   than	   his	  
share	   and	   belongs	   to	   others.	   Nothing	   was	   made	   by	   God	   for	   Man	   to	   spoil	   or	  
destroy.274	  
	  
Here	  Locke	  acknowledges	  a	  clear	  moral	  dictum	  of	  his	  time,	  which	  is	  the	  ‘spoilage	  
limitation’,	   a	   limitation	   that	   was	   also	   noted	   by	   Polanyi	   and	   Sahlins	   in	   economies	  
preceding	   fully-­‐fledged	   market	   economies.	   The	   limitation	   states	   that	   one	   can	   only	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appropriate	   for	   one’s	   essential	   needs.	   Any	   accumulation	   beyond	   one’s	   needs,	   to	   the	  
extent	   that	   what	   is	   accumulated	   is	   not	   used	   or	   is	   spoiled	   amounts	   to	   breach	   of	   this	  
moral	  code	  of	  sufficiency.	   	  
	  
The	   spoilage	   limitation	   is	   buttressed	   by	   the	   other	   moral	   dictum	   which	   is	   the	  
‘sufficiency	   or	   the	   distribution	   limitation’.	   This	   limitation	   states	   that	   one	   should	   not	  
appropriate	  so	  much	  as	  to	  prejudice	  others	  from	  having	  access	  to	  the	  same	  resources.	  
Locke	  notes	  this	  limitation	  too	  when	  he	  states:	  
	  
For	  this	  Labour	  being	  the	  unquestionable	  Property	  of	  the	  Labourer,	  no	  Man	  but	  
he	  can	  have	  a	  right	  to	  what	  that	  is	  once	  joined	  to,	  at	  least	  where	  there	  is	  enough,	  
and	  as	  good	  left	  in	  common	  for	  others.275	  
	  
At	   this	   stage,	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   see	   how	   Locke	   could	   have	   overcome	   three	   very	  
powerful	  moral	  limits	  that	  common	  property	  sets	  on	  private	  property:	  i)	  The	  earth	  and	  
everything	  on	  it	  is	  common	  property	  and	  we	  can	  only	  appropriate	  that	  to	  which	  we	  have	  
joined	   our	   labour;	   ii)	   We	   can	   only	   appropriate	   enough	   to	   meet	   our	   needs	   but	   not	  
beyond	  what	  we	  can	  use;	  and	  iii)	  The	  amount	  we	  appropriate	  should	  still	  leave	  enough	  
for	   others	   to	   fulfil	   their	   personhood.	   Locke	   however	   transcends	   the	   spoilage	   and	  
sufficiency	  limitation	  by	  arguing	  that:	  
	  
That	  the	  same	  Rule	  of	  Propriety,	  (viz.)	  that	  every	  man	  should	  have	  as	  much	  as	  he	  
could	  make	   use	   of,	  would	   hold	   still	   in	   the	  World,	  without	   straitning	   any	   body,	  
since	  there	  is	  Land	  enough	  in	  the	  World	  to	  suffice	  double	  the	  Inhabitants	  had	  not	  
the	   Invention	  of	  Money,	   and	   the	   tacit	  Agreement	  of	  Men	   to	  put	  a	   value	  on	   it,	  
introduced	  (by	  Consent)	  larger	  Possessions,	  and	  a	  Right	  to	  them....276	  
	  
Locke	  goes	  on	  to	  add:	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That	   in	  the	  beginning,	  before	  the	  desire	  of	  having	  more	  than	  Men	  needed,	  had	  
altered	  the	  intrinsick	  value	  of	  things,	  which	  depends	  only	  on	  their	  usefulness	  to	  
the	  Life	  of	  Man;	  of	  (Men)	  had	  agreed,	  that	  a	   little	  piece	  of	  yellow	  Metal,	  which	  
would	  keep	  without	  wasting	  or	  decay	  should	  be	  worth	  a	  great	  piece	  of	  Flesh,	  or	  a	  
whole	   heap	  of	   Corn;	   though	  Men	  had	   a	   Right	   to	   appropriate,	   by	   their	   Labour,	  
each	  one	  to	  himself,	  as	  much	  of	   the	  things	  of	  Nature,	  as	  he	  could	  use;	  Yet	  this	  
could	  not	  be	  much,	  nor	  to	  the	  Prejudice	  of	  others,	  where	  the	  same	  plenty	  was	  
still	  left,	  to	  those	  who	  would	  use	  the	  same	  Industry.	  To	  which	  let	  me	  add,	  that	  he	  
who	  appropriates	  land	  to	  himself	  by	  his	  labour,	  does	  not	  lessen	  but	  increase	  the	  
common	  stock	  of	  mankind.	  For	  the	  provisions	  serving	  to	  the	  support	  of	  humane	  
life,	  produced	  by	  one	  acre	  of	  inclosed	  and	  cultivated	  land,	  are…ten	  times	  more,	  
than	   those,	   which	   are	   yielded	   by	   an	   acre	   of	   land,	   of	   an	   equal	   richnesse,	   lying	  
wast	  in	  the	  common.277	  
	  
In	  the	  above	  two	  excerpts	  Locke,	  with	  a	  single	  stroke,	  makes	  two	  assertions	  that	  
represent	  the	   ideology	  of	  seventeenth	  century	  mercantilism	  shot	  back	  through	  history	  
and	  presented	  as	   the	  natural	  evolution	  of	   the	  homo	  economicus.	  The	   first	  assertion	   is	  
that	   the	   invention	  of	  money,	   and	   the	   tacit	   consent	   to	   it	   in	   terms	  of	   a	   social	   contract,	  
overrides	  the	  spoilage	  limitation.	  Money	  or	  gold	  does	  not	  spoil	  and	  therefore	  as	  long	  as	  
one	   is	   earning	   money	   or	   converting	   to	   exchange	   value	   what	   is	   appropriated	   from	  
common	  property,	  one	  is	  not	  breaching	  any	  moral	  code.	  The	  real	  sin	  for	  Locke’s	  version	  
of	  mercantilism	  is	  when	  money	  or	  capital	  is	  hoarded.	  As	  long	  as	  money	  is	  put	  to	  work,	  or	  
is	  kept	  in	  circulation,	  to	  generate	  more	  money,	  unlimited	  appropriation	  is	  justified.278	   	  
	  
Locke’s	  second	  assertion	  in	  the	  seventeenth	  century	  resonates	  nearly	  280	  years	  
later	  with	  the	  views	  of	  Garett	  Hardin	  in	  his	  essay	  on	  the	  ‘Tragedy	  of	  the	  Commons’.279	  
Long	  before	  Hardin,	   Locke	   had	  begun	  dismantling	   the	   sufficiency	   limitation	   to	   private	  
property	  by	  stating	  that	  private	  property	  incentivizes	  production,	  which	  benefits	  society	  
as	   a	   whole,	   and	   common	   property	   leads	   to	   waste.	   Locke’s	   point	   that	   one	   acre	   of	  
enclosed	   land	   leading	   to	   an	   output	   that	   exceeds	   ten	   acres	   of	   land	   in	   the	   commons	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strategically	  shifts	  the	  discourse	  of	  social	  wellbeing	  from	  sufficiency	  to	  profit:	  society	  as	  
a	   whole	   benefits	   not	   when	   each	   takes	   from	   the	   commons	   only	   what	   she	   needs	   but	  
when	  profit	  seeking	  is	  incentivized	  by	  lifting	  the	  limits	  on	  private	  property.	   	  
	  
It	   is	  useful	  to	  observe	  the	  gradual	  development	  and	  normalization	  of	  the	  figure	  
of	   the	  homo	   economicus	  over	   the	   last	   three	   hundred	   years.	   Locke	   had	   to	  work	   a	   lot	  
harder	  to	  justify	  unlimited	  private	  property	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  moral	  climate	  leaned	  in	  
favor	   of	   common	   property.	   Locke	   even	   had	   to	   develop	   the	   fictional	   theory	   of	   social	  
contract,	   which	   argued	   that	   society	   as	   a	   whole	   had	   tacitly	   agreed	   to	   lift	   limits	   to	  
accumulation	  by	   its	  adoption	  of	  money.	  Mercantilist	  economy	  had	   to	  be	  portrayed	  as	  
the	  natural	  outcome	  of	  social	  evolution	  rather	  than	  as	  the	  interest	  of	  a	  capitalist	  class.	   	  
	  
Locke’s	   assumption	   about	   the	   naturalness	   of	   wage	   labour	   in	   his	   theory	   of	  
property	   is	   also	   intriguing.	   According	   to	   Locke’s	   first	   principle,	   if	   one	   can	   rightfully	  
appropriate	   what	   one	   mixes	   with	   labour,	   it	   becomes	   difficult	   to	   justify	   the	   capitalist	  
accumulating	   the	   product	   of	   a	   worker’s	   labour	   in	   exchange	   for	   wages.	   According	   to	  
Locke’s	  theory	  the	  labourer	  could	  well	  have	  a	  right	  over	  the	  means	  of	  production	  itself	  
since	  labour	  is	  joined	  to	  the	  system	  of	  production.	  Locke	  deftly	  overcomes	  this	  obstacle	  
by	  implying	  in	  his	  theory	  that,	  if	  one	  owns	  one’s	  labour	  through	  the	  ownership	  of	  one’s	  
body,	  then	  one	  also	  has	  the	  right	  to	  alienate	  or	  dispose	  of	  one’s	  labour	  in	  exchange	  for	  
wages.	   	  
	  
By	  this	  implication,	  Locke	  provides	  a	  justification	  for	  capitalism	  wherein	  the	  wage	  
labourer	   freely	   consents	   to	   the	   estrangement	   or	   alienation	   of	   her	   labour	   and	   its	  
products	   in	  an	  exercise	  of	  her	   rights	  over	  her	  body.	  This	  was	  a	   justification	   that	  Marx	  
would	  spend	  his	  life	  dismantling.	  Locke	  notes:	  
	  
Thus	   the	  Grass	  my	  Horse	   has	   bit;	   the	   Turfs	  my	   Servant	   has	   cut;	   and	   the	  Ore	   I	  
have	  digg’d	   in	  any	  place	  where	   I	  have	  a	   right	   to	   them	   in	  common	  with	  others,	  












that	  was	  mine,	  removing	  them	  out	  of	  that	  common	  state	  they	  were	  in,	  hath	  fixed	  
my	  Property	  in	  them.280	  
	  
It	   is	   obvious	   here	   that	   Locke	   by	   developing	   a	   theory	   of	   private	   property	   in	  
seventeenth	  century	  England	  transposed	  the	  class	  relations	  prevalent	  in	  his	  time	  back	  to	  
the	  history	  of	  humankind	   itself,	  where	  wage	  labour	   in	  the	  form	  of	  ownership	  over	  the	  
‘Turfs	  my	  Servant	  has	  cut’	  is	  assumed	  as	  completely	  ‘natural’.	   	  
	  
Working	   through	   Macpherson’s	   interrogation	   of	   contemporary	   property	  
jurisprudence	  and	  its	  historical	  justifications,	  beginning	  with	  Locke,	  has	  better	  equipped	  
us	  to	  analyse	  critically	  the	  issues	  that	  biocultural	  jurisprudence	  would	  need	  to	  confront,	  
and	  potential	  dangers	  along	  the	  way.	   It	   is	  to	  undertake	  such	  a	  critical	  analysis	  that	  we	  
must	  now	  turn.	  
	  
(c)	  The	  ‘Bioculture’	  in	  Biocultural	  Rights	  	  
The	  political	   justification	   for	  biocultural	   rights	  by	   communities	   is	   for	  most	  part	   rooted	  
within	   the	   liberal	   rights	   discourse	   and	   relies	   on	   advocacy	   within	   national	   and	  
supranational	  law	  and	  policy	  forums.	  When	  farmers’	  groups,	  pastoralists	  and	  indigenous	  
peoples’	   activists	   demand	   biocultural	   rights,	   they	   are	   also	   demanding	   the	   right	   to	  
common	   property	   or,	   in	   Macpherson’s	   terms,	   the	   right	   not	   to	   be	   excluded	   through	  
private	   property	   or	   state	   appropriations	   of	   their	   lands,	   waters	   and	   cultures.	   For	  
example,	  farmers’	  rights	  challenge	  seed	  monopolies	  of	  agribusinesses	  by	  asserting	  their	  
common	   property	   rights	   to	   save	   and	   exchange	   their	   seeds;	   pastoralists	   declare	   their	  
right	   to	   their	   historical	   grazing	   commons	   and	   indigenous	   peoples	   affirm	   the	   right	   to	  
collectively	  manage	  and	  govern	  their	  forests.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












As	  was	  previously	   noted,	   the	   successes	  of	   the	  movement	   for	   biocultural	   rights	  
are	  undeniable	  with	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol	  on	  Access	  and	  Benefit	  Sharing	  being	  a	  case	  in	  
point.	   Unless	   there	   is	   great	   clarity,	   however,	   in	   what	   constitutes	   the	   ethic	   of	  
stewardship,	  biocultural	   rights	  within	  market	  economies	   could	  end	  up	  being	   co-­‐opted	  
into	  a	  discourse	  of	  private	  property	   rights.	   This	   co-­‐option	   could	   then	   individualise	   the	  
collective,	  wherein	  claimant	  groups	  begin	  to	   interpret	   their	  newly	  acquired	  biocultural	  
rights	  as	  akin	  to	  rights	  of	  corporate	  entities	  to	  exclude	  others	  from	  collective	  property	  
and	  alienate	  it.	   	  
	  
This	  real	  possibility	  has	  been	  well	  documented	  by	  anthropologists	  Jean	  and	  John	  
Comaroff	   in	   their	   book	  Ethnicity	   Inc.	  where	   they	  explore	   the	   incorporation	  of	   identity	  
and	  commodification	  of	  culture	  by	  analysing	  the	  San-­‐Hoodia	  case	  (previously	  discussed	  
here)	   and	  Royal	   Bafokeng	  Nation’s	   the	  platinum	  mining	   interests.281	   Such	   a	   co-­‐option	  
could	  possibly	  stymie	  the	  real	  potential	  of	  the	  movement	  for	  biocultural	  rights,	  which	  is	  
a	  movement	  that	  challenges	  both	  the	  conflation	  of	  property	  with	  private	  property	  and	  
the	  justification	  of	  limitless	  accumulation	  through	  reducing	  property	  from	  a	  right	  to	  pure	  
capital	  (thing).	   	  
	  
The	   right	   to	   common	   property,	   where	   property	   is	   a	   right	   that	   guarantees	  
wellbeing,	   has	   slowly	   transformed	   into	   the	   right	   to	   unlimited	  private	   property,	  where	  
property	   is	  understood	  as	  capital.	   It	   is	  submitted	  that	   the	  reinterpretation	  of	  property	  
then	  should	  not	  be	  reduced	  to	  access	  to	  capital	  but	  should	  be	  enlarged	  to	  include	  access	  
to	  wellbeing	  which	  is	  underpinned	  by	  a	  right	  to	  common	  property.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  
that	   common	   property	   is	   an	   unregulated	   ‘free	   for	   all’,	   but	   rather	   is	   regulated	   by	   the	  
ethic	  of	  stewardship	  that	  emphasizes	  responsibility	  to	  collective	  wellbeing	  and	  restricts	  
unlimited	  private	  appropriation	  or	  enclosure.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol	  on	  Access	  and	  Benefit	  Sharing,	  one	  could	  
well	   argue	   that	   the	   recognition	   of	   the	   rights	   of	   communities	   to	   their	   traditional	  
knowledge	   is	   essentially	   recognition	   of	   private	   property	   rights	   to	   enclose	   such	  
knowledge	  and	  exclude	  non-­‐community	  members	   from	  using	   it.	  While	   this	   is	   clearly	  a	  
possibility,	   the	   ethos	   of	   biocultural	   rights	   within	   the	   Nagoya	   Protocol	   makes	   the	   link	  
between	  the	  right	  to	  a	  way	  of	   life	  that	  embodies	  stewardship	  and	  the	  conservation	  of	  
ecosystems.	  This	  ethos	  stems	  less	  from	  the	  need	  to	  establish	  private	  property	  rights	  for	  
the	   purposes	   of	   exchange	   value	   and	   more	   from	   a	   need	   to	   affirm	   common	   property	  
rights	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  a	  right	  to	  use	  value,	  one	  that	  is	  integrally	  linked	  to	  the	  way	  of	  
life	  of	  indigenous	  people	  and	  traditional	  communities,	  and	  hence	  to	  their	  wellbeing.	   	  
	  
As	  noted	  previously,	  the	  campaign	  for	  biocultural	  rights	  is	  not	  a	  campaign	  against	  
commodification	   or	   markets	   per	   se.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   it	   is	   a	   campaign	   for	   the	   re-­‐
embedding	  of	  the	  market	  within	  social	  relations	  or	  reasserting	  the	  predominance	  of	  use	  
over	  exchange	  value.	  It	  is	  a	  campaign	  against	  the	  complete	  eclipse	  of	  all	  social	  relations	  
by	  market	  relations	  through	  an	  assertion	  of	  the	  duty	  of	  stewardship	  over	  the	  unbridled	  
absolutism	  of	  private	  property	  discourses.	   	  
	  
The	   fact	   that	   communities	   will	   rely	   on	   their	   biocultural	   rights	   to	   enter	   into	  
commercial	   benefit	   sharing	   agreements	   with	   potential	   users	   of	   their	   resources	   and	  
knowledge	   is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  bad	   thing.	  Commodification	  by	  communities	  of	  natural	  
products	  and	  the	  knowledge	  relating	  to	  it	  have	  a	  long	  history,	  one	  that	  both	  Polanyi	  and	  
Sahlins	   acknowledge	   when	   they	   theorize	   on	   the	   role	   of	   markets	   in	   pre-­‐capitalist	  
societies.282	   The	  real	  value	  of	  biocultural	  rights	  however	   lies	   in	  the	  re-­‐centering	  of	  the	  
community’s	   stewardship	   values	   and	   its	   challenge	   to	   the	   preponderance	   of	   market	  
values.	   	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












Biocultural	   rights	   therefore	   establish	   both	   the	   right	   of	   communities	   to	   set	   the	  
terms	   of	   access	   by	   outsiders	   to	   their	   cultures,	   territories	   and	   resources	   while	   at	   the	  
same	   time,	   affirming	   the	   community’s	   ethic	   of	   stewardship	   over	   what	   is	   considered	  
common	   property	   belonging	   to	   the	   whole	   community.	   Biocultural	   rights	   in	   effect	  
challenge	   the	   current	   conflation	   of	   property	  with	   private	   property	   thereby	   expanding	  
the	  concept	  of	  property	  to	  reclaim	  the	  rightful	  place	  of	  common	  property	  and	  the	  rights	  
of	  those	  who	  are	  its	  stewards.	   	  
	  
(d)	  Putting	  Personhood	  in	  Property	  
	  
Most	   people	   possess	   certain	   objects	   they	   feel	   are	   almost	   part	   of	   themselves.	  
These	  objects	  are	  closely	  bound	  up	  with	  personhood	  because	  they	  are	  part	  of	  the	  way	  we	  
constitute	  ourselves	  as	  continuing	  personal	  entities	  in	  th 	  world.	  They	  may	  be	  different	  
as	  people	  are	  different,	  but	  some	  common	  examples	  might	  be	  a	  wedding	  ring,	  a	  portrait,	  
an	  heirloom,	  or	  a	  house….The	  opposite	  of	  holding	  an	  object	  that	  has	  become	  a	  part	  of	  
oneself	   is	   holding	   an	   object	   that	   is	   perfectly	   replaceable	   with	   other	   hoods	   of	   equal	  
market	  value.	  One	  holds	  such	  an	  object	  for	  purely	   instrumental	  reasons.	  The	  archetype	  
of	   such	   a	   good	   is,	   of	   course,	   money,	   which	   is	   almost	   always	   held	   to	   but	   other	  
things….Other	  examples	  are	  a	  wedding	  ring	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  jeweler,	  the	  automobile	  
in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   dealer,	   the	   land	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   developer…I	   shall	   call	   these	  
theoretical	  opposites-­‐property	  that	  is	  bound	  up	  with	  a	  person	  and	  property	  that	  is	  held	  
purely	  instrumentally-­‐	  personal	  property	  and	  fungible	  property	  respectively.	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While	  Marx	  highlighted	  the	  loss	  of	  personhood	  through	  alienation	  caused	  by	  exchange	  
value,	   Locke	   argued	   the	   opposite	   by	   stating	   that	   personhood	   is	   affirmed	   through	   the	  
freedom	   to	   alienate.	   However	   both	   Marx	   and	   Locke	   seemed	   to	   acknowledge	   that	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personhood	   was	   not	   purely	   an	   internal	   subjectivity,	   with	   the	   external	   world	   being	  
somehow	   separate.	   Their	   notion	   of	   personhood	   extended	   beyond	   the	   self	   as	   an	  
enclosed	  subject	  to	  a	  subjectivity	  that	  included	  objects	  of	  one’s	  labour.	  For	  Marx,	  wage	  
labour	   led	   to	   estrangement,	   since	   one’s	   labour	   and	   its	   object	  were	   intimately	   tied	   to	  
one’s	   self.	   Locke	   also	   agreed	   that	   one’s	   labour	   was	   a	   part	   of	   oneself,	   but,	   precisely	  
because	  of	   this,	   one	  had	   the	   right	   to	   alienate	  one’s	   labour	   for	   a	  wage	  or	   appropriate	  
that	  which	  one’s	  labour	  was	  joined	  with.	  Neither	  Marx	  nor	  Locke	  however	  developed	  a	  
nuanced	   understanding	   of	   what	   aspects	   of	   the	   world	   constituted	   integral	   aspects	   of	  
personhood	  and	  what	  could	  be	  could	  be	  understood	  as	  fungible.	   	  
	  
The	   above	   excerpt	   by	  Margaret	   Jane	   Radin,	   arguably	   one	   of	   the	   most	   significant	  
contemporary	   property	   jurists,	   offers	   us	   an	   insight	   into	   the	   critical	   importance	   of	  
examining	   the	  nature	  of	  personhood	  and	  developing	  an	  understanding	  of	  property	  on	  
this	  basis.	  For	  Marx,	  the	  erasure	  of	  use	  value	  through	  the	  hegemony	  of	  exchange	  value	  
results	   in	   a	   fetishism	   of	   commodities,	   which	   causes	   an	   estrangement	   from	   our	   real	  
personhood.	   	  
	  
Personhood	  for	  Marx,	  as	  we	  noted	  previously,	  is	  an	  ensemble	  of	  social	  relations,	  and	  
the	   transforming	   of	   all	   social	   relations	   into	   market	   relations	   makes	   our	   lives	   one	  
dimensional	   thereby	   alienating	   us	   from	   the	   fullness	   of	   our	   lived	   experience.	   Polanyi,	  
however,	   said	   that	   the	  market	   or	   commodification	   per	   se	   is	   not	   a	   bad	   thing,	   since	   a	  
number	  of	  societies	  through	  history	  had	  engaged	  in	  market	  exchanges.	  The	  danger	  was	  
when	  markets	  were	  no	  longer	  embedded	  in	  society.	  Instead	  society	  had	  to	  justify	  itself	  
in	  market	  terms.	   	  
	  
It	   is	  precisely	  Polanyi’s	  argument	  that	  Radin	  works	  through	  to	  its	   logical	  conclusion	  
by	  asking	  the	  following	  question,	  one	  that	  is	  restated	  in	  different	  ways	  to	  highlight	  the	  













i) What	  are	  the	  moral	  limits	  of	  commodification?	  Or	   	  
ii) What	   should	   our	   understanding	   of	   personhood	   or	   ‘human	   flourishing’	   be	   in	  
order	  to	  enable	  us	  to	  distinguish	  between	  personal	  property	  that	  should	  not	  be	  
commodified	  and	  fungible	  property	  that	  can	  be?	  Or	  
iii) What	  are	  the	  different	  kinds	  of	  rights	  that	  should	  be	  available	  to	  people,	  to	  offer	  
them	  different	  kinds	  of	  protection	  depending	  on	  whether	  property	  is	  personal	  or	  
fungible?	  
	  
By	   asking	   these	   questions,	   Radin	   was	   going	   to	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   matter:	   ‘human	  
flourishing’.	  Such	  a	  flourishing	  for	  Radin	  depended	  on	  our	  understanding	  of	  personhood	  
and	   thereby	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   distinction	   between	   personal	   and	   fungible	  
property.	   From	   this	   basis,	   we	   could	   develop	   a	   theory	   of	   what	   should	   be	   ‘market	  
alienable’,	  i.e.	  freely	  bought	  and	  sold	  in	  the	  market	  to	  which	  an	  economic	  rationality	  can	  
be	  applied	  and	  what	  should	  be	  market	  inalienable,	   i.e.	  should	  not	  be	  viewed	  as	  purely	  
fungible	  because	  they	  are	  so	  integral	  to	  personhood	  that	  a	  purely	  economic	  rationality	  
cannot	  be	  applied.	  Radin	  makes	  this	  point	  with	  great	  clarity	  when	  she	  notes:	  
	  
In	   conceiving	  of	   all	   rights	   as	   property	   rights	   that	   can	   (at	   least	   theoretically)	   be	  
alienated	  in	  markets,	  economic	  analysis	  has	  (at	  least	  in	  principle)	  invited	  markets	  
to	  fill	  the	  social	  univ rse.	  It	  has	  invited	  us	  to	  view	  all	  (market)	  inalienabilities	  as	  
problematic…Indeed	   I	   try	   to	   show	   that	   the	   characteristic	   rhetoric	   of	   economic	  
analysis	  is	  morally	  wrong	  when	  it	  is	  put	  forward	  as	  the	  sole	  discourse	  of	  human	  
life….I	   think	   we	   should	   evaluate	   inalienabilities	   in	   connection	   with	   our	   best	  
current	  understanding	  of	  human	  flourishing.284	  
	  
The	   point	   that	   Radin	  makes	   includes	   our	   earlier	   discussion	   of	   common	   versus	  
private	   property.	   This	   is	   because	   the	   key	   issue	   at	   hand	   is	   not	   the	   legal	   distinction	  
between	   common	   and	   private	   property	   but	   rather	   the	   different	   ways	   in	   which	  
personhood	   or	   flourishing	   is	   tied	   to	   access	   and	   use	   of	   certain	   ‘things’,	   be	   they	   land,	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culture	   or	   resources.	   The	   question	   therefore	   is	   ‘what	   kind	   of	   rights	   do	  we	   require	   in	  
order	  to	  safeguard	  integral	  aspects	  of	  personhood,	  including	  rights	  to	  common	  property	  
or	   stewardship	   duties	   over	   community	   territories’	   or	   even	   rights	   to	   certain	   kinds	   of	  
property	   which	   are	   partly	   fungible	   and	   partly	   personal.	   The	   incisiveness	   of	   Radin’s	  
argument	  lies	  in	  the	  manner	  it	  brings	  any	  discourse	  on	  property	  back	  to	  personhood.	   	  
	  
Radin’s	  value	  also	  lies	  in	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  she	  breaks	  out	  of	  the	  straitjacket	  of	  
commodity	   fetishism	   that	   Marx	   warned	   about.	   She	   refuses	   to	   fetishize	   property	   by	  
treating	   it	   as	   a	   thing	   in	   itself.	   Property	   for	   Radin	   must	   have	   a	   reason,	   and	   the	   only	  
legitimate	  reason	  it	  could	  have	  is	  its	  contribution	  to	  human	  flourishing	  or	  wellbeing.	  By	  
putting	  human	   flourishing	   and	  personhood	  at	   the	   centre	  of	  property	  discourse,	  Radin	  
provides	  us	  with	  an	  ethical	  compass	  with	  which	  to	  negotiate	  property	  jurisprudence.	   	  
	  
In	  essence,	  Radin’s	  compass	  works	  by	  asking	  two	  questions,	  the	  answering	  of	  which	  
provides	  us	  with	  an	  ethical	  solution	  to	  a	  property	  conundrum.	  They	  are:	  Is	  a	  ‘thing’	  (be	  it	  
land,	  resources,	  culture	  etc.)	  absolutely	  integral	  to	  the	  flourishing	  of	  one’s	  personhood?	  
If	  so,	  would	  the	  loss	  of	  such	  a	  thing	  adversely	  affect	  one’s	  personhood	  or	  curtail	  one’s	  
flourishing?	   	  
	  
Radin	  concludes	  that:	  
	  
Where	  we	  can	  ascertain	  that	  a	  given	  property	  right	  is	  personal,	  there	  is	  a	  prima	  
facie	  case	  that	  that	  right	  should	  be	  protected	  to	  some	  extent	  against	  invasion	  by	  
government	   and	   against	   cancellation	   by	   conflicting	   fungible	   property	   claims	   of	  
other	   people.	   This	   case	   is	   strongest	   where	   without	   the	   claimed	   protection	   of	  
property	  as	  personal	  (my	  emphasis),	  the	  claimants’	  opportunities	  to	  become	  fully	  
developed	   persons	   in	   the	   context	   of	   our	   society	   would	   be	   destroyed	   or	  
significantly	   lessened…Where	  we	  can	  ascertain	  that	  a	  property	  right	   is	  fungible,	  
there	  is	  a	  prima	  facie	  case	  that	  that	  right	  should	  yield	  to	  some	  extent	  in	  the	  face	  
of	   conflicting	   recognized	  personhood	   interests,	   not	  embodied	   in	  property.	   This	  












the	  claimants	  opportunity	   to	  become	  fully	  developed	  persons	   in	   the	  context	  of	  
our	  society	  would	  be	  destroyed	  or	  significantly	  lessened.285	  
	  
Note	  that	  Radin	  makes	  two	  critical	  points	  here.	  Firstly,	  where	  property	  claims	  are	  
personal	  the	  claims	  should	  in	  general	  override	  fungible	  property	  claims.	  For	  example	  an	  
individual’s	  property	  claim	  to	  her	  home	  should	  override	  a	  real	  estate	  developer’s	  claim	  
to	  the	  same	  piece	  of	  property.	  Secondly,	  even	  where	  the	  claimant	  may	  not	  have	  a	  legal	  
property	   claim,	   but	  merely	   a	   strong	  personhood	   interest,	   such	   an	   interest	   should	   still	  
override	  a	   fungible	  property	   claim.	  For	  example	  a	   claim	   to	  a	   sacred	   site	  on	   state	   land	  
that	  is	  to	  be	  leased	  to	  a	  golf	  resort.	   	  
	  
Radin	   of	   course	   understands	   the	   difficulty	   of	   identifying	   objective	   criteria	   for	  
human	   flourishing	   for	   the	   things	   that	   are	   essential	   for	   personhood.	   In	   an	   age	   of	  
commodity	  fetishism,	  so	  much	  of	  people’s	  sense	  of	  self	  is	  tied	  up	  with	  the	  acquiring	  or	  
possessing	   of	   things.	   Wellbeing	   has	   been	   replaced	   by	   ‘well-­‐having’	   and	   questions	  
regarding	  what	  is	  essential	  for	  the	  good	  life	  or	  what	  Aristotle	  termed,	  as	  eudaimonia	  are	  
lost	   in	  the	  maelstrom	  of	  commodities.	   In	  such	  circumstances,	   it	  seems	  a	  formidable,	   if	  
not	   impossible,	   task	   to	   delineate	   criteria	   for	   when	   personal	   property	   or	   personhood	  
interests	  must	  be	  allowed	  to	  trump	  fungible	  property	  claims.	  Radin	  in	  her	  seminal	  1982	  
Stanford	   Law	   Review	   article	   ‘Property	   and	   Personhood’	   clearly	   outlines	   this	   problem	  
when	  she	  says	  that:	  
	  
It	   intuitively	   appears	   that	   there	   is	   such	   a	   thing	   as	   property	   for	   personhood	  
because	  people	  become	  bound	  up	  with	  “things”.	  But	  this	  intuitive	  view	  does	  not	  
compel	  the	  conclusion	  that	  property	  for	  personhood	  deserves	  moral	  recognition	  
or	  legal	  protection,	  because	  arguable	  there	  is	  bad	  as	  well	  as	  good	  in	  being	  bound	  
up	   with	   external	   objects.	   If	   there	   is	   a	   traditional	   understanding	   that	   a	   well-­‐
developed	  person	  must	  invest	  herself	  to	  some	  extent	  in	  external	  objects,	  there	  is	  
no	   less	   a	   traditional	   understanding	   that	   one	   should	   not	   invest	   oneself	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












wrong	  way	  or	  to	  too	  great	  an	  extent	   in	  external	  objects.	  Property	   is	  damnation	  
as	  well	  as	  salvation,	  object-­‐fetishism	  as	  well	  as	  moral	  groundwork.286	  
	  
Radin	   nevertheless	   concludes	   that,	   as	   with	   most	   things	   in	   life,	   there	   are	   no	  
absolutes	   but	   rather	   a	   spectrum	   where,	   at	   the	   one	   end	   we	   have	   things	   that	   are	  
absolutely	  fungible	  and,	  at	  the	  other,	  things	  that	  are	  essentially	  personal.	  We	  then	  have	  
things	  that	  fall	  somewhere	  along	  this	  continuum,	  some	  lying	  more	  to	  the	  fungible	  end	  
and	  others	   to	   the	  personal	  end.	   Judges	   then	  have	   to	  engage	   in	   the	   task	  of	   identifying	  
what	  is	  personal	  and	  what	  is	  fungible	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.	  In	  any	  event,	  judges	  make	  
this	  distinction	  unconsciously,	  be	   it	   in	  deciding	   the	  amount	  of	  damages	   to	  be	  paid	   for	  
pain	   and	   suffering	   in	   tort	   law	   or	   in	   determining	  whether	   the	   state	   can	   expropriate	   a	  
residential	  neighbourhood	  for	  some	  public	  works.	   	  
	  
Five	   years	   later,	   in	   1987,	   Radin	   published	   her	  much-­‐acclaimed	   article	   ‘Market-­‐
Inalienability’	   in	   the	   Harvard	   Law	   Review.	   This	   article	   was	   a	   decisive	   response	   to	  
advocates	  of	  universal	  commodification	  led	  by	  Richard	  Posner	  of	  the	  Law	  and	  Economics	  
school	  of	   jurisprudence.287	   Here	  Radin	  had	   further	  developed	  her	  argument	   regarding	  
criteria	  for	  determining	  property	  for	  personhood	  by	  attempting	  to	  distinguish	  between	  
those	  goods	  and	  services	   that	  are	  market	  alienable	  or	   can	  be	  commodified	  and	   those	  
that	  ought	  to	  be	  market	  inalienable	  or	  should	  not	  be	  commodified.	   	  
	  
Radin’s	  attempts	  brought	  her	  back	  to	  the	  same	  question	  that	  she	  had	  posed	   in	  
1982	  albeit	  from	  a	  different	  angle.	   If	  the	  question	  posed	  in	  ‘Property	  and	  Personhood’	  
was	   ‘how	   do	   we	   distinguish	   between	   personal	   property	   or	   personhood	   interest	   and	  
fungible	   property?’	   then	   the	   question	   that	   Radin	   posed	   in	   ‘Market-­‐Inalienability’	   was	  
‘how	  do	  we	  distinguish	  between	  those	  things	  that	  can	  be	  commodified	  and	  those	  that	  
shouldn’t?’	   The	   answer	   to	   both	   these	   questions	   lay	   in	   the	  most	   ancient	   of	   all	   human	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quests:	   to	   understand	   what	   constitutes	   ‘wellbeing’	   or,	   in	   Radin’s	   terms,	   ‘human	  
flourishing’.	  
	  
There	   is	   ultimately	   only	   one	   question	   here,	   which	   can	   be	   asked	   in	   various	  
different	  ways.	  The	   fact	   remains	   that,	   in	  whichever	   the	   fashion	  we	  pose	   this	  question	  
the	  answer	  will	  ultimately	  come	  down	  to	  a	  shared	  understanding	  of	  human	  flourishing.	  
One	  cannot	  answer	  the	  question	  ‘what	  is	  property?’	  without	  answering	  the	  question	  of	  
‘what	   is	  personhood?’;	  And	  one	  cannot	  answer	   the	   latter	  question	  without	  answering	  
‘what	  is	  wellbeing?’	  A	  shared	  understanding	  of	  wellbeing	  informs	  our	  understanding	  of	  
personhood	  and	  the	  rights	  that	  must	  be	  availed	  to	  affirm	  such	  a	  personhood.	  A	  common	  
conception	  of	  personhood	  would	  then	  clarify	  what	  constitutes	  personhood	  interests	  or	  
personal	  property	  and	  what	  constitutes	  fungible	  or	  market	  alienable	  property.	   	  
	  
When	  Marx	  accused	  the	  commodity	  form	  of	  being	  the	  very	  cell	  of	  capitalism,	  he	  
was	   essentially	   criticizing	   capitalism’s	   caricature	   of	   personhood	   through	   universal	  
commodification.	   Estrangement	   or	   alienation	   for	   Marx	   was	   a	   separation	   from	   our	  
essence	   or	   personhood	   caused	   by	   the	   commodification	   of	   what	   is	   most	   intimate	   or	  
integral	  to	  who	  we	  are.	  For	  Marx,	  the	  human	  essence	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  our	  social	  being:	  
we	  are	  both	  homo	  faber	  and	  homo	  socialis,	  we	  are	  our	  works	  and	  an	  ensemble	  of	  social	  
relations.	   Radin,	   despite	  her	  differences	  with	  Marx,	   does	  not	  diverge	   too	   far	   from	  his	  
humanism	  in	  her	  conclusions	  about	  what	  constitutes	  human	  flourishing.	  On	  the	  contrary	  
Radin	  nuances	  Marx’s	  humanism	  by	  identifying	  three	  interrelated	  aspects	  or	  criteria	  for	  
personhood:	  freedom,	  identity	  and	  contextuality.288	  
	  
Rather	  than	  resting	  her	  understanding	  of	  personhood	  on	  any	  one	  particular	  trait,	  
Radin	  argues	  that	  it	  involves	  a	  balance	  of	  all	  these	  three	  traits.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  she	  is	  
pragmatic	   enough	   to	   note	   that	   we	   live	   in	   a	   non-­‐ideal	   world	   with	   unequal	   power	  
relations	  that	  sometimes	  result	   in	  personal	  property	  being	  traded	  as	  fungible	  property	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












or	  being	   incompletely	  commodified.	  Commercial	   sex	  work	   is	  a	   typical	  example,	  where	  
the	   lines	  are	  blurred	  between	  the	  body	  as	  personal	  property	  and	  the	  body	  as	  fungible	  
property.	   Another	   example	   is	   a	   community	   deciding	   to	   lease	   its	   ancestral	   lands	   to	   a	  
logging	   company.	   These	   are	   cases	   of	   a	   moral	   ‘double	   bind’289	   where	   it	   would	   be	  
patronizing	  to	  tell	  the	  unemployed	  woman	  with	  children	  to	  feed	  or	  a	  desperately	  poor	  
community	  that	  needs	  an	  income	  that	  the	  body	  or	  ancestral	  lands	  are	  personal	  property	  
that	  should	  not	  be	  commodified.	  In	  fact	  to	  force	  these	  people	  to	  do	  otherwise	  curtails	  
their	   freedom	   to	  make	   choices,	   choices	   that	   are	   sometimes	   ‘desperate	   exchanges.’290	  
For	   Radin	   however	   these	   situations	   should	   not	   be	   presented	   as	   examples	   of	   the	  
possibility	   of	   universal	   commodification	   but	   rather	   as	   situations	   of	   incomplete	  
commodification,	  where	  the	  woman’s	  body	  or	  the	  community’s	  ancestral	  lands	  are	  still	  
personal	  property	  that	  in	  certain	  non-­‐ideal	  situations	  are	  commodified.	  
	  
The	   above	   examples	   could	   represent	   the	   freedom	   or	   autonomous	   aspect	   of	  
personhood,	  which	  highlights	  will	  or	  the	  ability	  to	  make	  one’s	  own	  choices.	  Freedom	  is	  
nevertheless	   not	   the	   only	   aspect	   of	   personhood.	   For	   Radin,	   personhood	   includes	  
‘identity’	  and	   ‘contextuality’.	  The	   identity	  aspect	   involves	  the	   integrity	  or	  continuity	  of	  
the	  self,	  which	  is	  necessary	  for	  ind viduation.	  Our	  personhood	  is	  based	  on	  an	  enduring	  
self.	  This	  self	  of	  course	  goes	  through	  various	  transformations	  in	  an	  individual’s	  lifetime,	  
but	   it	   nevertheless	   is	   the	  manifestation	   of	   a	  memory	   that	   knits	   together	   the	   various	  
events	  that	  this	  self	  experiences.	   	  
	  
Personhood	  in	  the	  context	  of	  identity	  is	  analogous	  to	  a	  node	  or	  a	  knot	  in	  a	  web	  
of	   relations	   wherein	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   knot	   is	   nothing	   if	   not	   the	   various	   strands	   of	  
relations.	   It	   is	  also	  clear	  however	  that	  these	  relations	  can	  only	  become	  real	   if	  they	  are	  
embodied	  through	  the	  knot	  or,	  so	  to	  speak,	  through	  the	  person.	  The	  identity	  aspect	  of	  
personhood	   then	   contextualizes	   the	   freedom	  aspect.	   Identity	   constitutes	   the	   self	   that	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   Supra	  n.	  285,	  at	  1915-­‐1916.	  












exercises	  the	  freedom	  to	  choose	  what	  is	  important	  to	  it,	  a	  self	  that	  is	  able	  to	  distinguish	  
between	  what	  is	  personal	  and	  what	  is	  fungible.	   	  
	  
Marx’s	  notion	  of	  estrangement	  in	  capitalist	  societies	  is	  in	  essence	  one	  where	  the	  
self	  or	  identity	  is	  slowly	  being	  cut	  off	  from	  the	  ensemble	  of	  social	  relations	  within	  which	  
it	  is	  embedded.	  The	  homo	  economicus	   is	  an	  estranged	  being	  because	  it	  recognizes	  and	  
affirms	  only	  one	  kind	  of	  relation,	  which	  is	  the	  market	  relation,	  thereby	  denying	  all	  other	  
social	  relations	  that	  constitute	  the	  self.	  It	  is	  this	  idea	  of	  the	  self	  as	  an	  ensemble	  of	  social	  
relations	   that	   Radin	   develops	   in	   attributing	   contextuality	   as	   the	   third	   aspect	   of	  
personhood.	  Radin	  elaborates:	  
	  
The	   contextuality	   aspect	   of	   personhood	   focuses	   on	   the	   necessity	   of	   self-­‐
constitution	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  environment	  of	  things	  and	  other	  people.	  In	  order	  
to	   be	   differentiated	   human	   persons,	   unique	   individuals,	   we	   must	   have	  
relationships	  with	   the	   social	   and	   natural	   world….I	   focus	   primarily	   on	   a	   certain	  
view	  of	  contextuality	  and	  its	  consequences:	  the	  view	  that	  connections	  between	  
the	  person	  and	  her	  environment	  are	  integral	  to	  personhood.291	  
	  
Then	  again	  Radin	  adds:	  
	  
The	   relationship	   b tween	   personhood	   and	   context	   requires	   a	   positive	  
commitment	   to	   act	   so	   as	   to	   create	   and	   maintain	   particular	   contexts	   of	  
environment	  and	  community….Universal	  commodification	  undermines	  personal	  
identity	  by	  conceiving	  of	  personal	  attributes,	  relationships,	  and	  philosophical	  and	  
moral	   commitments	   as	   monetizable	   and	   alienable	   from	   self.	   A	   better	   view	   of	  
personhood	   should	   understand	  many	   kinds	   of	   particulars-­‐	   one’s	   politics,	  work,	  
religion,	  family,	  love,	  sexuality,	  friendships,	  altruism,	  experiences,	  wisdom,	  moral	  
commitments,	  character	  and	  personal	  attributes-­‐	  as	  integral	  to	  the	  self.292	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  n.	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  at	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Radin	  makes	   three	   critical	   contributions	   to	   property	   jurisprudence	   that	   greatly	  
aids	  us	  in	  distinguishing	  different	  kinds	  of	  property	  and	  how	  they	  must	  be	  treated.	  The	  
significance	   of	   the	   first	   contribution	   is	   the	   link	   between	   property	   and	   personhood	  
thereby	  breaking	  free	  from	  the	  fetishism	  that	  is	  caused	  by	  discussing	  property	  as	  a	  thing	  
in	   itself,	   disassociated	   from	   its	   link	   to	   human	   flourishing.	   Within	   this	   framework	   of	  
‘property	   for	   personhood’,	   Radin’s	   second	   contribution	   is	   her	   understanding	   of	  
personhood	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   human	   flourishing.	   Personhood	   is	   not	  merely	   an	  
exercise	  of	  freedom	  and	  identity	  but	  also	  contextuality.	  The	  self	  therefore	  is	  not	  simply	  
free	   but	   also	   relational,	   and	   this	   relationality	   is	   integral	   to	   human	   flourishing	   and	  
positive	   liberty.	   Radin’s	   third	   major	   contribution	   is	   to	   tie	   perso al	   property	   or	  
personhood	   interests	   to	   contextuality,	   arguing	   that	   the	   non-­‐precedence	   of	   personal	  
property	   or	   personhood	   interests	   over	   fungible	   property	   in	   capitalist	   societies	   is	  
detrimental	  to	  contextuality	  and	  thereby	  to	  human	  flourishing	  and	  personhood	  itself.293	   	  
	  
(e)	  Property	  for	  Peoplehood	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
293	   There	  is	  growing	  research	  on	  wellbeing	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  CBD	  and	  ABS.	  Some	  researchers	  have	  
applied	  the	  ‘capabilities	  framework’	  developed	  by	  Martha	  Nussbaum	  and	  Amartya	  Sen.	  The	  
capabilities	  framework	  helps	  to	  describe	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  a	  social	  group	  (community)	  whose	  members	  
have	  made	  decisions	  within	  the	  ‘freedoms	  given	  to	  them’	  and	  available	  ‘capabilities’	  (including	  natural	  
endowments,	  skills,	  norms,	  values	  and	  markets).	  It	  does	  not	  presuppose	  wellbeing	  based	  solely	  on	  
‘rational	  economic	  choice’,	  but	  anchors	  wellbeing	  in	  both	  moral	  and	  economic	  choices.	  Other	  
researchers	  such	  as	  Mathew	  Clarke	  have	  attempted	  to	  measure	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  nations	  by	  
correlating	  it	  to	  the	  achievement	  of	  Maslow’s	  ‘hierarchical	  framework	  of	  human	  needs’,	  which	  include	  
‘basic	  needs’,	  ‘safety’,	  ‘belonging’,	  ‘self-­‐esteem’	  and	  ‘Self-­‐actualization’.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  interesting	  
tools	  to	  measure	  wellbeing	  is	  developed	  by	  M.S.	  Suneetha	  and	  Balakrishna	  Pisupati	  where	  Clarke’s	  
application	  of	  the	  Maslow	  framework	  is	  used	  in	  tandem	  with	  the	  Sen	  and	  Nussbaum	  ‘capabilities	  
framework’.	  The	  result	  is	  a	  framework	  of	  needs	  and	  related	  indicators	  to	  measure	  wellbeing	  where:	  
Basic	  needs:	  is	  captured	  by	  indicators	  related	  to	  food,	  health	  and	  shelter;	  Safety	  needs:	  captured	  by	  
indicators	  related	  to	  settled	  lives	  and	  security	  from	  risks,	  including	  economic	  and	  natural	  risks;	  
Belonging	  needs:	  is	  captured	  by	  indicators	  related	  to	  social	  groups	  and	  equity	  in	  transactions,	  including	  
gender	  equity	  and	  non-­‐	  discrimination	  and;	  Self-­‐esteem	  and	  self-­‐actualization	  needs:	  is	  captured	  by	  
indicators	  related	  to	  autonomy,	  confidence	  and	  education.	  See	  generally,	  Nussbaum,	  Martha	  C.	  and	  
Amartya	  Sen,	  Eds.,	  The	  Quality	  of	  Life,	  Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1996;	  Clarke,	  Matthew,	  “Assessing	  
Well-­‐being	  using	  Hierarchical	  Needs”,	  in	  McGillivray,	  Mark	  and	  Matthew	  Clarke,	  Eds.,	  Understanding	  
Human	  Well-­‐being,	  Tokyo:	  United	  Nations	  University	  Press,	  2006;	  cited	  in	  Suneetha,	  M.S.	  and	  
Balakrishna	  Pisupati,	  Learning	  from	  the	  Practitioners:	  Benefit	  Sharing	  Perspectives	  from	  Enterprising	  












Radin	  made	   a	  meticulous	   case	   for	   personhood	   as	   the	   very	   raison	   d’être	   of	   property,	  
arguing	   that	   the	   litmus	   test	   for	   any	   property	   jurisprudence	   is	   whether	   it	   positively	  
contributes	   to	  human	   flourishing	  and	  thereby	   to	  personhood.	  Radin’s	  arguments	  have	  
had	   a	   far-­‐reaching	   impact	   on	   the	   emerging	   jurisprudence	   for	   the	   rights	   of	   indigenous	  
peoples	   to	   their	   territories,	   sacred	   sites	   and	   cultures.	   In	   2009	   the	   Yale	   Law	   Journal	  
published	   a	   pivotal	   article	   entitled	   ‘In	   Defense	   of	   Property.’294	   The	   article	   was	   co-­‐
authored	  by	  three	  professors	  of	   law,	  Angela	  Riley,	  Kristen	  Carpenter	  and	  Sonia	  Katyal.	  
These	  authors,	  twenty-­‐seven	  years	  after	  Radin’s	  seminal	  arguments	  on	  the	  relationship	  
between	  property	  and	  personhood,	  sought	  to	  adapt	  her	  ideas	  to	  argue	  for	  the	  rights	  of	  
American	  Indians	  to	  their	  cultural	  property.	   	  
	  
A	  year	  before	   in	  2008,	  Kristen	  Carpenter	   in	  her	  article	  titled	   ‘Real	  Property	  and	  
Peoplehood’295	   had	  reasoned	  that	  if,	  according	  to	  Radin,	  the	  protection	  of	  certain	  kinds	  
of	  property	  was	  relevant	  for	  personhood,	  then	  equally	  the	  protection	  of	  some	  kinds	  of	  
property	  interests	  was	  critical	  for	  ‘peoplehood’.	  Carpenter	  explained:	  
	  
Much	   in	  the	  way	  that	  Radin’s	  discussion	  of	  “personhood”	   invokes	  what	   is	  most	  
essential	  to	  the	  individual	  human	  condition,	  “peoplehood”	  refers	  to	  the	  qualities	  
that	   define	   a	   group	   and	   inspire	   individuals	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   collective.	   In	  
common	   parlance,	   peoplehood	   is	   the	   state	   of	   being	   a	   people	   or	   the	   sense	   of	  
belonging	  to	  a	  people.296	   	  
	  
Carpenter	  in	  her	  article	  argued	  that	  American	  Indians	  as	  a	  people	  have	  rights	  to	  
the	  use	  and	  management	  of	  sacred	  sites	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  sites	  were	  on	  public	  
lands	  owned	  by	   the	  government.	  The	  rights	  of	  American	   Indians	   to	   their	   sacred	  rights	  
were	   similar	   to	  Radin’s	  notion	  of	   rights	   to	  personal	  property	  or	  personhood	   interests,	  
which	   in	   most	   cases	   would	   trump	   fungible	   property	   rights.	   Carpenter	   argued	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294	   Riley,	  Angela	  et.al,	  “In	  Defense	  of	  Property,”	  Yale	  Law	  Journal,	  118,	  2009,	  pp.1022-­‐1125.	  
295	   Carpenter,	  Kristen,	  “Real	  Property	  and	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  Stanford	  Environmental	  Law	  Journal,	  Vol.	  27:313,	  
2008.	  












American	  Indians	  had	  rights	  to	  peoplehood	  interests	  in	  their	  sacred	  sites	  since	  their	  very	  
existence	   as	   a	   people	   depended	   on	   access,	   use	   and	   management	   of	   these	   sites.	  
Therefore	  these	  peoplehood	  interests	  must	  override	  any	  state	  directive	  that	  determines	  
the	  use	  of	  the	  public	  lands	  in	  ways	  that	  would	  profane	  sacred	  sites.	   	  
	  
Carpenter’s	   thesis	  made	   a	   strong	   case	   for	   the	   legal	   recognition	   of	   peoplehood	  
interests	   in	  property	  despite	   the	   lack	  of	   formal	  ownership.	  The	  basis	  of	  her	  argument	  
was	   that	   the	   flourishing,	  or	   sometimes	   the	  very	   survival	  of	   certain	  groups	  or	  peoples,	  
depended	   on	   access	   and	   control	   of	   these	   properties.	   In	   2009,	   Riley,	   Carpenter	   and	  
Katyal	   further	   developed	   this	   argument	   into	   a	   fully-­‐fledged	   theory	   for	   the	   right	   to	  
‘cultural	  property’	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  peoplehood.	  They	  proposed	  that:	  
	  
Peoplehood,	   we	   argue,	   dictates	   that	   certain	   lands,	   resources,	   and	   expressions	  
are	  entitled	  to	  legal	  protection	  as	  cultural	  property	  because	  they	  are	  integral	  to	  
the	   group	   identity	   and	   cultural	   survival	   of	   indigenous	   peoples…some	   cultural	  
resources	  are	  so	  sacred	  and	  intimately	  connected	  to	  a	  people’s	  collective	  identity	  
and	   experience	   that	   they	   deserve	   special	   consideration	   as	   a	   form	   of	   cultural	  
property….Classic	   ownership	   theory	   tends	   to	   overlook	   the	   possibility	   of	   non-­‐
owners	   exercising	   custodial	   duties	   over	   tangible	   and	   intangible	   goods	   in	   the	  
absence	  of	  title	  or	  possession.	  Yet	  indigenous	  peoples	  have	  historically	  exercised	  
such	   custodial	   duties….Indigenous	   cultural	   property	   claims…thus	   reflect	   a	  
fiduciary	   approach	   to	   cultural	   property	   and	   takes	   into	   account	   indigenous	  
peoples’	   collective	   obligations	   toward	   land	   and	   resources….To	   the	   extent	   that	  
indigenous	   peoples’	   cultural	   property	   claims	   are	   premised	   on	   custodial	   duties	  
toward	   specific	   properties,	   we	   argue	   that	   such	   claims	   are	   more	   appropriately	  
characterized	   through	   the	   paradigm	   of	   stewardship	   rather	   than	  
ownership…cultural	   property	   law...seeks	   to	   distribute	   entitlements	   along	   a	  
spectrum	  so	  as	  to	  accommodate	  both	  the	  ownership	  and	  stewardship	   interests	  
that	   attach	   to	   owners	   and	   non-­‐owners.	   We	   contend	   that	   indigenous	   cultural	  
property	   claims	   can	   be	   both	   explained	   and	   justified	   by	   this	   more	   expansive	  
understanding	   of	   property,	   which	   we	   articulate	   through	   peoplehood	   and	  
stewardship.297	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  













Tracing	   the	   genealogy	   of	   a	   critical	   understanding	   of	   property	   beginning	   with	  
Marx,	  through	  Macpherson	  and	  Radin	  and	  leading	  to	  Riley	  et	  al,	  one	  can	  see	  a	  common	  
theme	   emerging	   despite	   the	   different	   angles	   through	   which	   each	   of	   these	   theorists	  
approached	  property.	  The	  theme	  is	  one	  that	  deconstructs	  the	  fetishism	  of	  property	  as	  a	  
sacrosanct	  legal	  concept	  from	  which	  people	  derive	  certain	  rights.	  It	  argues	  that	  property	  
has	  human	  origins,	   and	   that	   it	   is	  not	  human	  beings	  and	  communities	  who	  need	   to	   fit	  
within	   the	   framework	  of	  property,	  but	   the	  discourse	  of	  property	   that	  must	  align	   itself	  
with	  our	  collective	  understanding	  of	  flourishing	  of	  personhood	  and	  peoplehood.	   	  
	  
Among	  the	  valuable	  contributions	  Riley	  et	  al	  make	  to	  a	  critical	  understanding	  of	  
property	   jurisprudence	   is	   the	   notion	   of	   cultural	   property	   and	   its	   significance	   for	  
peoplehood.	   Cultural	   property	   is	   analogous	   to	  Radin’s	   notion	  of	   personhood	   interests	  
and	   personal	   property,	   except	   that	   the	   former	   applies	   to	   peoplehood	   interests	   or	  
‘peoples’	   property’.	   Notions	   of	   cultural	   property	   also	   resonate	   with	   Macpherson’s	  
notions	   of	   common	   property	   with	   a	   bundle	   of	   access	   and	   use	   rights.	   The	   denial	   of	  
cultural	  property	  rights	  result	   in	  a	  phenomenon	  very	  similar	  to	  what	  Marx	  refers	  to	  as	  
alienation	  or	  estrangement.	  Except	  that	  the	  kind	  of	  estrangement	  Riley	  et	  al.	  refer	  to	  is	  
the	   alienation	   of	   a	   people	   from	   what	   they	   understand	   to	   be	   the	   essence	   of	   their	  
peoplehood.	   	  
	  
The	   groundbreaking	   proposition	   made	   by	   Riley	   et	   al	   is	   that	   stewardship	   or	  
custodianship	   by	   communities	   of	   certain	   lands	   and	   waters	   should	   entitle	   them	   to	  
cultural	  property	  rights	  integral	  to	  peoplehood.	  Such	  cultural	  property	  rights	  should	  be	  
available	  irrespective	  of	  whether	  the	  community	  owns	  the	  lands	  or	  waters.	  In	  situations	  
where	  the	  land	  is	  owned	  by	  the	  state	  or	  privately	  owned,	  fungible	  interests	  should	  make	  
space	   for	   peoplehood	   interests	   rather	   than	   excluding	   the	   latter	   simply	   because	   it	   is	  
private	  property	  entailing	  an	  absolute	  right	  to	  exclude	  and	  alienate.	  Using	  an	  approach	  












waters	  and	  sacred	  sites	  entitle	  them	  to	  cultural	  property	  rights,	  Riley	  et	  al	  persuasively	  
argue	  that:	  
	  
Fluid	  conceptions	  of	  property	  underlie	  indigenous	  peoples’	  group	  claims	  to	  those	  
items	   most	   closely	   and	   intimately	   tied	   to	   peoplehood	   and	   group	   identity:	  
indigenous	  cultural	  property.	  Once	  indigenous	  peoples’	  cultural	  property	  claims	  
are	   examined	  within	   the	   framework	   of	   stewardship,	   as	   opposed	   to	   ownership	  
alone,	  a	  more	  nuanced	  conception	  of	  property	  emerges	  that	  captures	  the	  unique	  
ways	  in	  which	  indigenous	  groups	  may	  exercise	  cultural	  property	  entitlements	  as	  
non-­‐owners.	   Consider,	   for	   example,	   the	   complexities	   that	   arise	   when	   dealing	  
with	  certain	  objects	  that	  may	  not	  be	  owned	  at	  all,	  those	  that	  are	  inalienable	  by	  
definition,	   or	   those	   for	   which	   possession	   is	   subject	   to	   shifting	   custodial	  
arrangements	   rather	   than	   absolute	   rights	   of	   title.	   In	   many	   such	   cases,	   the	  
custody	   of	   such	   items	  may	   in	   fact	   be	   situated	   in	   the	   fiduciary	   obligations	   of	   a	  
collective	  “people,”	  rather	  than	  rooted	  in	  the	  claims	  of	  individual	  ownership.298	  
	  
The	  pertinence	  of	  the	  arguments	  of	  Riley	  et	  al	  to	  biocultural	  rights	  is	  significant.	  
The	   notion	   of	   cultural	   property	   rights	   based	   on	   stewardship	   and	   their	   relevance	   for	  
peoplehood	   makes	   an	   effective	   case	   for	   biocultural	   rights.	   The	   difference	   between	  
rights	  to	  cultural	  property	  and	  biocultural	  rights	  however	  is	  threefold.	  First,	  biocultural	  
rights	  are	  not	  restricted	  to	  a	  people	  in	  terms	  of	  indigenous	  peoples,	  but	  also	  extend	  to	  
other	   traditional	   communities.	   Secondly,	   biocultural	   rights	   are	   those	   rights	   that	   are	  
essential	  for	  a	  community	  to	  look	  after	  the	  ecosystems	  they	  inhabit.	  Thirdly,	  biocultural	  
rights	   derive	   their	   legitimacy	   not	   so	   much	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   property	   is	   vital	   for	  
peoplehood	  but	  rather	  from	  the	  stewardship	  role	  that	  certain	  communities	  play	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  
their	   lands	   and	  waters.	   In	   fact	   the	   stewardship	   of	   ecosystems	   is	   the	   raison	   d’être	   of	  
biocultural	  rights.	   	  
	  
Biocultural	   rights	   trace	   their	   origins	   not	   through	   property	   jurisprudence	   but	  
through	  the	  crucial	  paradigm	  shift	  in	  environmental	  law	  over	  the	  last	  two	  decades,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












the	   call	   for	   the	   legal	   protection	   of	   the	   roles	   played	   by	   communities	   in	   conserving	  
ecosystems.	   The	   growing	   strength	   of	   these	   rights	   in	   environmental	   law	   and	   policy	  
however	   have	   had	   a	   huge	   impact	   on	   property	   jurisprudence	   gradually	   forcing	   a	  
paradigm	   shift	   from	   the	   private	   property	   imperatives,	   which	   have	   had	   an	   adverse	  
impact	  on	  ecosystems,	  to	  a	  stewardship	  ethic,	  which	  has	  conserved	  these	  ecosystems.	   	  
	  
Biocultural	   rights	  begin	   from	  the	  perspective	   that	  human	   flourishing	  cannot	  be	  
disassociated	   from	   the	   flourishing	   of	   ecosystems.	   Human	   flourishing	   is	   also	   based	   on	  
nurturing	   the	   contextuality	   aspect	   of	   personhood,	   (which	   Radin	   identifies)	   or	   the	  
relational	  aspect	  of	  the	  self	  (which	  Marx	  identifies).	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  biocultural	  
rights,	   however,	   human	   flourishing	   will	   always	   be	   warped	   if	   such	   a	   contexuality	   or	  
relationality	  does	  not	  give	  due	  regard	  to	  our	  relationship	  with	  Nature.	   	  
	  
The	  foundational	  ethic	  for	  biocultural	  rights	  is	  not	  peoplehood	  per	  se	  but	  rather	  
the	  stewardship	  ethic	   that	   some	  communities	  have	  with	   their	   lands	  and	  waters.	  Third	  
generation	   rights	   foreground	   peoplehood	   or	   group	   rights	   and	   are	   rooted	   in	   a	  
communitarian	   ethic	   that	   identifies	   human	   flourishing	   as	   being	   dependent	   on	   strong	  
and	  vibrant	  communities.	  While	  the	  first-­‐	  and	  second-­‐generation	  rights	  address	  civil	  and	  
political,	   and	   socio-­‐economic	   rights,	   respectively,	   which	   are	   critical	   for	   human	  
flourishing,	   third	   generation	   rights	   assert	   that	   our	   individual	   wellbeing	   is	   tied	   to	   the	  
flourishing	  of	  communities	  to	  which	  we	  belong:	  Personhood	  attains	  its	  full	  meaning	  not	  
only	   through	   the	   fulfilling	   of	   our	   individual	   potential	   but	   also	   through	   belonging	   to	  
communities.	   	  
	  
Biocultural	  rights	  add	  a	  vital	  element	  to	  this	  discourse	  of	  group	  rights	  by	  making	  
the	  case	  that	  the	  flourishing	  of	  some	  communities,	  and	  hence	  their	  individual	  members,	  
is	  dependent	  on	   securing	   the	   stewardship	   relation	   these	  communities	  have	  with	   their	  
ecosystems.	  Biocultural	  rights	  therefore	  add	  a	  stewardship	  dimension	  to	  group	  rights	  by	  












that	   the	   demand	   for	   biocultural	   rights	   does	   not	   take	   as	   its	   point	   of	   departure	   the	  
inherent	   right	   of	   a	   group	   or	   community	   to	   flourish,	   but	   rather	   from	   the	   ethic	   of	  
stewardship:	   it	   is	   the	   ethic	   of	   stewardship	   and	  not	   the	   group	  per	   se	   that	   justifies	   the	  
right.	   	  
	  
Among	  the	  most	  significant	  of	  Radin’s	  contributions	  to	  property	  jurisprudence	  is	  
her	   forcing	   any	   discourse	   of	   property	   to	   justify	   itself	   from	   the	   standpoint	   of	   human	  
wellbeing.	   While	   Radin	   is	   commonly	   acknowledged	   as	   making	   the	   all-­‐important	   link	  
between	   property	   and	   personhood,	   her	   efforts	   at	   developing	   an	   ethical	   grammar	   of	  
personhood	  needs	  greater	  attention.	  Radin’s	  advocacy	  of	  an	  evolutionary	  pluralism	  that	  
constantly	  aspired	  towards	  a	  better	  view	  of	  personhood	  is	  both	  the	  beginning	  and	  the	  
end	   of	   her	   intellectual	   labours.	   She	   embarked	   on	   a	   critique	   of	   private	   property	  
jurisprudence	  since	  the	  personhood	  it	  relied	  upon	  was	  that	  of	  the	  ‘homo	  economicus’,	  
which,	  denied	  the	  fullness	  of	  human	  potential,	  and	  the	  richness	  of	  life.	  Radin	  concluded	  
her	   critique	   by	   advocating	   a	   ‘better	   view	   of	   personhood’	   and	   thereby	   a	   different	  
understanding	  of	  property	  that	  would	  sustain	  this	  ‘better	  person.’	   	  
	  
Biocultural	   rights	   in	  many	  ways	   engage	   in	   the	   same	   exercise	   in	   the	   context	   of	  
communities.	   They	  begin	  by	   requiring	  property	   jurisprudence	   to	   justify	   itself	   from	   the	  
standpoint	  of	  peoplehood	  or	  community.	  Biocultural	  rights	  do	  not	  stop	  there	  however.	  
They	   aspire	   towards	   a	   ‘better	   view	   of	   community	   or	   peoplehood’	   by	   arguing	   that	  
communities	  that	  have	  stewarded	  territories	  have	  rights	  to	  use	  and	  manage	  these	  lands	  
and	  waters	  simply	  by	  virtue	  of	  having	  cared	  for	  them.	  It	   is	  the	  ethic	  of	  care	  for	  Nature	  
that	  is	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  biocultural	  rights:	  Communities	  that	  have	  historically	  cared	  for	  
their	   ecosystems	   should	   have	   the	   rights	   to	   use	   and	   manage	   their	   lands	   and	   waters	  
irrespective	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  have	  a	  formal	  title	  to	   it.	  The	   increasing	  number	  of	  
international	  and	  domestic	  environmental	  law	  and	  policies	  that	  have	  begun	  to	  recognize	  
biocultural	   rights	  of	   communities	   is	  a	   testimony	   to	   their	  moral	   force	   in	   the	   face	  of	  an	  













The	  operative	  question	  at	  this	  stage	  is	  whether	  this	  ‘better	  view	  of	  community	  or	  
peoplehood’	   has	   had	   any	   notable	   impact	   on	   how	   judges	   have	   begun	   to	   decide	   cases	  
involving	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  traditional	  communities	  and	  their	  lands.	  It	  is	  to	  survey	  
a	  possible	  emergence	  of	  a	  biocultural	  tendency	   in	  the	   jurisprudence	  of	  regional	  courts	  












CHAPTER	   VII	   –	   A	   JURISPRUDENCE	   OF	   STEWARDSHIP:	   CREATING	  
BIOCULTURAL	  PRECEDENTS	  
	   	  
	   In	  the	  language	  of	  my	  people	  .	  .	  .	  there	  is	  a	  word	  for	  land:	  Eloheh.	  This	  same	  word	  
also	  means	  history,	  culture	  and	  religion.	  We	  cannot	  separate	  our	  place	  on	  earth	  from	  our	  
lives	  on	  the	  earth	  nor	   from	  our	  vision	  nor	  our	  meaning	  as	  people.	  We	  are	  taught	  from	  
childhood	  that	  the	  animals	  and	  even	  the	  trees	  and	  plants	  that	  we	  share	  a	  place	  with,	  are	  
our	  brothers	  and	   sisters.	   So	  when	  we	   speak	  of	   land,	  we	  are	  not	   speaking	  of	   property,	  
territory,	  or	  even	  a	  piece	  of	  ground	  upon	  which	  our	  houses	  sit	  and	  our	  crops	  are	  grown.	  
We	  are	  speaking	  of	  something	  truly	  sacred.	  
Peter	  Mathiessen	  quoting	  Jimmie	  Durham,	  a	  Cherokee	  litigant	  in	  a	  sacred	  sites	  case299	  
	  
On	  the	  31st	  of	  August	  2001,	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  handed	  down	  a	  
landmark	   judgment	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Mayagna	   (Sumo)	   Awas	   Tingni	   Community	   v.	  
Nicaragua.300	   It	  was	  the	  first	  ever	  legally	  binding	  decision	  by	  an	  international	  tribunal	  to	  
secure	  the	  collective	  and	  resource	  rights	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  when	  a	  state	  failed	  to	  do	  
so.	   The	   Awas	   Tingni	   case	   is	   therefore	   a	   useful	   starting	   point	   to	   begin	   tracing	   the	  
emergence	  of	  biocultural	  rights	  in	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  the	  regional	  tribunals.301	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   Mathiessen,	  Peter,	  Indian	  Country,	  New	  York:	  Penguin,	  1984,	  at	  119.	  
300	   Inter-­‐Am.	  C.H.R.,	  No.	  79,	  Ser.	  C	  (2001),	  available	  at	  
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_79_ing.pdf.	  Retrieved	  13th	  September	  2011.	  
301	   ‘The	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  an	  affiliate	  of	  the	  Organization	  of	  American	  states,	  has	  
jurisdiction	  to	  adjudicate	  claims	  alleging	  violations	  of	  the	  American	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  
to	  issue	  decisions	  binding	  upon	  states	  that	  are	  parties	  to	  the	  Convention	  and	  that	  have	  formally	  
acceded	  to	  the	  Court’s	  jurisdiction,	  as	  has	  Nicaragua.	  Cases	  may	  be	  brought	  to	  the	  Court	  either	  by	  the	  
states	  that	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  Court’s	  jurisdiction	  or,	  as	  is	  typically	  done,	  by	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  
Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  the	  principal	  human	  rights	  investigative	  and	  monitoring	  body	  of	  the	  
Inter-­‐American	  system.	  The	  Inter-­‐American	  Commission	  initiated	  the	  proceedings	  before	  the	  Court	  in	  
the	  Awas	  Tingni	  case	  in	  June	  of	  1998	  with	  its	  filing	  of	  a	  complaint	  against	  Nicaragua,	  after	  having	  
investigated	  the	  case	  and	  found	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  Community.	   	   The	  Community	  itself—through	  its	  
Síndico,	  or	  principal	  leader,	  and	  with	  the	  assistance	  of	  legal	  counsel—had	  submitted	  a	  petition	  in	  
October	  of	  1995	  seeking	  the	  Commission’s	  intervention	  to	  abate	  the	  threats	  to	  its	  land	  and	  resource	  
tenure.’	  see	  Anaya,	  James	  S.	  and	  Grossman,	  Claudio,	  “The	  Case	  of	  Awas	  Tingni	  v.	  Nicaragua:	  A	  New	  
Step	  in	  the	  International	  Law	  of	  Indigenous	  Peoples,”	  Arizona	  Journal	  of	  International	  and	  













The	   Awas	   Tingni	   is	   a	   community	   among	   the	   many	   Mayagna	   indigenous	  
communities	   in	  Nicaragua	   living	   in	   the	  dense	   jungles	  of	   the	  Atlantic	  Coast	   region.	  The	  
Mayagna	  is	  one	  of	  the	  three	  groups	  native	  to	  the	  region	  and	  has	  lived	  in	  the	  area	  since	  
the	  14th	  century	  at	  least	  and	  speaks	  Mayagna	  as	  a	  common	  language.	  The	  Awas	  Tingni	  
number	   around	  150	   families	  or	   650	   individuals	   and	   they	  hold	   their	   lands	   communally	  
and	   subsist	   on	  hunting,	   fishing	   and	   agriculture.	   Each	   family	   has	   several	   plantations	   of	  
about	  a	  hectare	  and	  a	  half	   each	  where	   they	  practice	  a	   traditional	   form	  of	   swidden	   or	  
‘slash	   and	   burn’	   agriculture	   that	   is	   common	   amongst	   the	   indigenous	   peoples	   of	   the	  
Americas.302	   The	   swidden	   system	   of	   farming	   under	   certain	   conditions	   is	   considered	  
ecologically	  sustainable	  and	  mimics	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  natural	  forest	  pattern.303	  
	  
The	  Awas	  Tingni	   grow	  beans,	   rice,	   plantains,	   corn	  and	  bananas	   and	   cultivate	   a	  
piece	  of	  land	  until	  its	  nutrients	  are	  nearly	  exhausted.	  They	  then	  burn	  the	  vegetation	  on	  
the	   land	  and	   leave	   it	   fallow	  for	  a	  period	  of	  nearly	  15	  years	  until	   the	  soil	  can	  replenish	  
itself	  and	  regain	  its	  nutrients.	  Awas	  Tingni	  villages	  are	  constructed	  on	  the	  peripheries	  of	  
the	  plantations	  and	  during	  the	  period	  where	  the	  land	  is	  left	  fallow,	  they	  dismantle	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302	   Vuotto,	  Jonathan	  P.,	  “Awas	  Tingni	  v.	  Nicaragua:	  International	  Precedent	  for	  Indigenous	  Land	  Rights?”	  
Boston	  University	  International	  Law	  Journal,	  Vol.	  22,	  2004,	  pp.	  219-­‐243	  at	  226.	  
303	   ‘In	  most	  densely-­‐settled	  areas	  of	  the	  world,	  swidden	  agriculture	  long	  ago	  gave	  way	  to	  other	  systems.	  
As	  one	  might	  deduce,	  swidden	  agriculture	  is	  only	  sustainable	  so	  long	  as	  there	  are	  50	  hectares	  or	  more	  
of	  forest	  land	  per	  family,	  so	  that	  there	  can	  be	  at	  least	  50	  years	  of	  forest	  regrowth	  between	  cropping	  
cycles	  on	  any	  given	  parcel.	  Once	  population	  rises	  above	  that	  level,	  fallow	  periods	  become	  shorter,	  
allowing	  less	  forest	  regrowth,	  until	  eventually	  the	  ten	  years	  or	  less	  allowed	  between	  cropping	  cycles	  
produces	  only	  a	  grassy	  savanna	  instead	  of	  a	  full-­‐fledged	  forest.	  At	  that	  point	  the	  forest	  has	  effectively	  
been	  lost,	  and	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  change	  the	  cropping	  system	  to	  one	  more	  suited	  to	  a	  grassy	  savanna.	  
This	  process	  took	  place	  in	  Europe	  just	  before	  Classical	  Antiquity,	  leaving	  the	  dry	  scrublands	  of	  the	  
Mediterranean	  where	  oak	  forests	  had	  once	  flourished.	  But	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world,	  namely	  those	  
that	  remain	  covered	  in	  dense	  forest,	  the	  population	  has	  never	  risen	  above	  the	  density	  that	  can	  be	  
sustainably	  supported	  by	  swidden	  agriculture.	  In	  such	  places	  as	  the	  mountains	  of	  Southeast	  Asia	  and	  
the	  inner	  Amazon	  forest,	  over	  half	  a	  billion	  of	  the	  world’s	  people	  continue	  to	  earn	  their	  livelihood	  
satisfactorily	  and	  sustainably	  through	  swidden	  agriculture.’	  Vaughan,	  Greg,	  “Swidden	  Agriculture:	  
Sustainable	  Slash	  and	  Burn?”,	  Good	  Eater	  Collaborative,	  
http://www.goodeater.org/2010/07/02/swidden-­‐agriculture-­‐sustainable-­‐slash-­‐and-­‐burn/.	  Retrieved	  












villages	  and	  move	  them	  to	  another	  fertile	  area	  of	  their	  territory,	  where	  they	  begin	  again	  
to	  cultivate	  this	  area.304	  
	  
The	  Awas	  Tingni	  also	  hunt	  deer	  and	  wild	  fowl	  for	  subsistence	  and	  an	  important	  
aspect	  of	  their	  hunting	  tradition	  is	  the	  hunt	  for	  the	  pecari	   	   (a	  kind	  of	  a	  wild	  boar,	  which	  
is	  held	  in	  high	  spiritual	  esteem).	  Families	  go	  on	  pecari	  hunts	  that	  could	  last	  for	  days	  or	  
weeks,	  and	  the	  significance	  of	   the	  hunt	  goes	  beyond	  meat	  and	  skin	  to	   include	  rites	  of	  
passage	  and	  social	  bonding.	  In	  many	  ways	  the	  spiritual	  place	  occupied	  by	  the	  pecari	   in	  
the	  lives	  of	  the	  Awas	  Tingni	  affirms	  the	  link	  between	  the	  community	  and	  their	  territory.	  
In	  fact,	  the	  Awas	  Tingni	  lands	  affirm	  a	  link	  between	  the	  community	  and	  their	  ancestors	  
buried	   there	   and	   the	   spirits	   that	   dwell	   in	   the	  mountains.	   These	   spirits	   can	   affect	   the	  
success	  of	  a	  hunt,	  can	  heal	  the	  sick,	  protect	  the	  community,	  if	  appeased,	  or	  jeopardize	  
the	  community,	   if	  displeased.	  Awas	  Tingni	  ancestors	  are	  buried	  with	  their	  possessions,	  
and	  families	  pass	  on	  information	  of	  burial	  sites	  generation	  to	  generation.305	   	  
	  
In	   1993,	   the	   Nicaraguan	   Ministry	   of	   Environment	   and	   Natural	   Resources	  
(MARENA)	  gave	  a	  logging	  concession	  to	  a	  Dominican	  company	  Maderas	  y	  Derivados	  de	  
Nicaragua,	  S.A.	   (MADENSA).	  The	  concession	  covered	  around	  43,000	  hectares	  of	   forest	  
that	  fell	  within	  the	  Awas	  Tingni	  traditional	  lands.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  pressure	  from	  the	  World	  
Wildlife	   Fund	   (WWF)	   a	   trilateral	   agreement	   was	   signed	   in	   1994	   between	   the	   Awas	  
Tingni,	  MARENA	  and	  MADENSA.	  The	  Awas	  Tingni	  was	  assisted	  in	  its	  negotiations	  by	  the	  
College	  of	  Law	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Iowa	  (the	  IOWA	  project),	  which	  was	  supported	  by	  the	  
WWF.	   The	   agreement	   provided	   for	   sustainable	   timber	   harvesting	   in	   Awas	   Tingni	  
territory	  along	  with	  the	  sharing	  of	  economic	  benefits	  arising	  from	  the	  logging	  with	  the	  
Awas	   Tingni.	   The	   most	   important	   aspect	   of	   the	   agreement	   was	   that	   it	   committed	  
MARENA	  to	  a	  process	  of	  formal	   identification	  and	  titling	  of	  the	  Awas	  Tingni	   lands,	  and	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   Supra	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secured	   an	  undertaking	   from	   the	   government	   that	   it	  would	  not	   undertake	   any	   action	  
that	  would	  adversely	  affecting	  the	  community’s	  land	  claim.306	   	  
	  
Just	   as	   the	   ink	   was	   drying	   on	   the	   agreement,	   however,	   the	   government	   had	  
already	   entered	   into	   negotiations	  with	   a	   Korean	   logging	   company	   Sol	   del	   Caribe,	   S.A.	  
(SOLCARSA)	   seeking	   a	   logging	   concession	   on	   63,000	   hectares	   of	   land	   adjacent	   to	   the	  
MADENSA	   concession.	   A	   significant	   portion	   of	   this	   land	   fell	   within	   the	   Awas	   Tingni	  
territory	  and	  no	  efforts	  had	  been	  made	  by	  MARENA	   to	  begin	   to	   identify	   and	   title	   the	  
community’s	  lands	  as	  agreed.	  When	  the	  Awas	  Tingni	  learnt	  of	  this	  development	  in	  1995,	  
MARENA	  had	  already	  provided	  SOLCARSA	  with	  an	  exploration	  licence	  a d	  a	  preliminary	  
approval.307	   	  
	  
On	   receiving	   no	   response	   by	   MARENA	   to	   its	   protests,	   and	   when	   agents	   of	  
SOLCARSA	   began	   to	   undertake	   timber	   inventories	   on	   the	   lands,	   the	   Awas	   Tingni	  
concluded	  that	  MARENA	  was	  determined	  to	  grant	  the	  logging	  concession	  to	  SOLCARSA	  
on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  lands	  were	  state	  owned.	  The	  community	  filed	  for	  emergency	  relief	  
in	  the	  Nicaraguan	  courts	  relying	  on	  provisions	  of	  Nicaraguan	  law	  that	  provided	  for	  the	  
rights	  of	   indigenous	   communities	   to	   their	   communally	  owned	   traditional	   lands.	  When	  
the	  necessary	  relief	  was	  not	  fo thcoming,	  the	  community	  petitioned	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  
Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights	   claiming	   violations	  of	   the	   right	   to	  property	   (Article	   21),	  
cultural	   integrity	   (Article	  12)	  and	  other	   relevant	   rights	   in	   the	  American	  Convention	  on	  
Human	  Rights	  to	  which	  Nicaragua	  is	  a	  party.308	   	  
	  
Remarkably	   in	   1997	   as	   a	   result	   of	   a	   separate	   action	   by	   two	   members	   of	   the	  
Regional	  Council	  of	  the	  North	  Atlantic	  Autonomous	  Region	  claiming	  that	  the	  approval	  of	  
the	  Regional	  Council	  as	  required	  by	  law	  was	  not	  sought,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Nicaragua	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306	   Supra	  n.	  302	  at	  3.	  
307	   Supra	  n.	  302	  at	  3.	  













declared	  the	  SOLCARSA	  concession	  unconstitutional.	  MARENA	  sought	  to	  cure	  this	  defect	  
by	   securing	   a	   post	   hoc	   approval	   by	   a	  majority	   of	   the	   Regional	   Council.	   Another	   legal	  
action	   by	   the	   dissenting	   members	   of	   the	   Regional	   Council	   ensued	   and	   the	   Supreme	  
Court	  declared	  the	  concession	  null	  and	  void	  stating	  that	  a	  defect	  in	  due	  process	  cannot	  
be	  cured	  by	  a	  retrospective	  approval	  by	  the	  Regional	  Council.	  
	  
At	   this	   stage	   the	  Awas	  Tingni	  were	  convinced	   that	   the	  Nicaraguan	  government	  
was	  not	  willing	  to	  honour	  its	  agreement	  with	  the	  community	  to	  identify	  and	  title	  their	  
lands.	   Therefore,	   despite	   the	   revocation	   of	   the	   SOLCARSA	   concession	   due	   to	   the	  
decision	   by	   the	   Supreme	   Court,	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Commission	   o 	   Human	   Rights	  
submitted	  the	  Awas	  Tingni	  petition	  to	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  with	  
the	  hope	  of	  getting	  a	  remedy	  that	  would	  bind	  the	  Nicaraguan	  government	  to	  officially	  
demarcate	  and	  title	  lands	  of	  indigenous	  communities.	  
	  
In	  a	  ground-­‐breaking	  decision	  that	  found	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  Awas	  Tingni,	  the	  Inter-­‐
American	   Court	   affirmed	   the	   community’s	   right	   to	   property	   despite	   an	   absence	   of	  
official	   recognition	   of	   the	   title	   to	   its	   traditional	   lands	   by	   the	  Nicaraguan	   government.	  
The	  Court	   in	  a	  decision	  that	  stated	  that	  the	  government	  had	  violated	  Article	  21	  of	  the	  
American	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  noted:	  
	  
Given	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  instant	  case,	  some	  specifications	  are	  required	  on	  
the	  concept	  of	  property	  in	  indigenous	  communities.	  Among	  indigenous	  peoples	  
there	   is	   a	   communitarian	   tradition	   regarding	   a	   communal	   form	   of	   collective	  
property	  of	  the	  land,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  ownership	  of	  the	  land	  is	  not	  centered	  on	  
an	  individual	  but	  rather	  on	  the	  group	  and	  its	  community.	  Indigenous	  groups,	  by	  
the	  fact	  of	  their	  very	  existence,	  have	  the	  right	  to	  live	  freely	  in	  their	  own	  territory;	  
the	   close	   ties	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   with	   the	   land	   must	   be	   recognized	   and	  
understood	  as	   the	   fundamental	   basis	   of	   their	   cultures,	   their	   spiritual	   life,	   their	  
integrity,	  and	  their	  economic	  survival.	  For	   indigenous	  communities,	  relations	  to	  












and	   spiritual	   element,	   which	   they	   must	   fully	   enjoy,	   even	   to	   preserve	   their	  
cultural	  legacy	  and	  transmit	  it	  to	  future	  generations.309	  
	  
The	   above	  paragraph	   in	   the	   judgment	   shows	   the	   signs	  of	   emerging	  biocultural	  
jurisprudence	  through	  interpretation	  of	  the	  American	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights.	  The	  
Court	  could	  have	  stopped	  at	  stating	  that	  the	  Awas	  Tingni	  had	  a	  right	  to	  their	  communal	  
lands,	   but	   it	   continued	   to	   establish	   a	   link	   between	   land	   and	   peoplehood.	   The	   Court’s	  
emphasis	   on	   the	   ties	   between	   the	   community’s	   culture,	   spirituality	   and	   territory	  
highlights	  the	  principle	  of	  stewardship.	   	  
	  
This	   relationship	   between	   culture	   and	   property	   that	   the	   Court	   affirms	   is	   not	   a	  
value	   neutral	   relationship.	   As	   Radin	   noted,	   we	   can	   have	   personal	   and	   cultural	  
attachments	  to	  all	  kinds	  of	  property,	  but	  attachment	   in	   itself	  should	  not	  warrant	   legal	  
protection.	   The	   fetish	   for	   luxury	   goods	   in	   capitalist	   societies,	   for	   example,	   can	   be	  
understood	   as	   a	   relationship	   between	   some	   forms	   of	   contemporary	   culture	   and	  
property;	   but	   such	   an	   attachment	   can	   hardly	   be	   seen	   as	   something	   that	   needs	   to	   be	  
protected	   in	   law,	  where	  one’s	  right	  to	  expensive	  cars	  should	  be	  upheld.	  The	  nature	  of	  
attachment	   that	   the	   Court	   sought	   to	   uphold	   in	   the	   Awas	   Tingni	   case	   was	   one	   of	  
stewardship	  of	  land.	   	  
	  
It	  is	  unlikely	  that	  the	  Court	  would	  have	  upheld	  the	  Awas	  Tingni	  right	  to	  property	  
if	   the	   intent	   of	   the	   community	   was	   to	   profit	   financially	   from	   the	   land	   by	   providing	  
logging	  concessions	  to	  SOLCARSA	  or	  MADENSA.	  What	  the	  Court	  upheld	  was	  a	  particular	  
kind	   of	   relationship	   to	   the	   land,	   and	   this	   is	   a	   relationship	   of	   stewardship.	   From	   the	  
Court’s	  perspective	  attachment	  to	  land	  was	  an	  attachment	  to	  property	  for	  peoplehood	  
rather	  than	  to	  fungible	  property.	  Hence	  the	  Court	  emphasised	  on	  cultural	  and	  spiritual	  
connections	   to	   the	   land.	   The	   subtext	   of	   the	   Court’s	   decision	   in	   this	   case	   is	   that	   a	  
communal	  land	  title	  is	  established	  not	  merely	  through	  historical	  occupation	  but	  through	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












historical	  occupation	  coupled	  with	  a	  positive	  attachment	  of	  care	  manifested	  through	  the	  
bioculture	  of	  the	  community.	   	  
	  
The	  momentum	  towards	  biocultural	  rights	  set	  off	  by	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  in	  
the	   Awas	   Tingni	   judgment	   continued	   inexorably	   into	   its	   later	   decisions,	   where	   it	  
privileged	  a	  biocultural	  attachment	  to	  the	   land	  over	  the	  nature	  of	   the	  community	  and	  
the	  length	  of	  historical	  occupation	  of	  territory.	   	  
	  
(a)	  Saramaka	  People	  v.	  Suriname:	  Affirming	  Biocultural	  Relations	  
	  
Nevertheless,	  this	  Court	  has	  held	  that,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  indigenous	  communities	  who	  
have	  occupied	   their	  ancestral	   lands	   in	  accordance	  with	   customary	  practices	   –	   yet	  who	  
lack	   real	   title	   to	   the	   property	   –	   mere	   possession	   of	   the	   land	   should	   suffice	   to	   obtain	  
official	   recognition	   of	   their	   communal	   ownership.	   That	   conclusion	   was	   reached	   upon	  
considering	   the	   unique	   and	   enduring	   ties	   that	   bind	   indigenous	   communities	   to	   their	  
ancestral	  territory.	   	   The	  relationship	  of	  an	  indigenous	  community	  with	  its	  land	  must	  be	  
recognized	   and	   understood	   as	   the	   fundamental	   basis	   of	   its	   culture,	   spiritual	   life,	  
integrity,	   and	   economic	   survival.	   For	   such	   peoples,	   their	   communal	   nexus	   with	   the	  
ancestral	   territory	   is	   not	   merely	   a	   matter	   of	   possession	   and	   production,	   but	   rather	  
consists	  in	  material	  and	  spiritual	  elements	  that	  must	  be	  fully	  integrated	  and	  enjoyed	  by	  
the	   community,	   so	   that	   it	   may	   preserve	   its	   cultural	   legacy	   and	   pass	   it	   on	   to	   future	  
generations.	  
Case	  of	  Moiwana	  Village	  v.	  Suriname310	  
	  
The	  reasoning	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  in	  the	  Awas	  Tingni	  decision	  was	  extended	  to	  
create	   new	   criteria	   for	   determining	   a	   right	   to	   common	   property,	   the	   criteria	   of	  
stewardship	  or	  a	  biocultural	  relationship.	  In	  the	  2005	  judgment	  of	  the	  Court	  in	  the	  Case	  
of	   Moiwana	   Village	   v.	   Suriname, 311 	   one	   could	   already	   see	   the	   shift	   in	   property	  
jurisprudence	   from	   a	   focus	   on	   possession	   and	   production	   to	   a	   greater	   emphasis	   on	  
cultural	   and	   spiritual	   connections	   in	  order	   to	   establish	   communal	   land	   title.	   The	  main	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
310	   Inter-­‐Am.	  Ct.	  H.R.	  (ser.	  C)	  No.	  124	  (15	  June	  2005),	  at	  paragraph	  131.	  












thrust	   of	   the	   Moiwana	   Village	   case	   was	   less	   about	   land	   and	   more	   about	   the	   state	  
sponsored	  massacre	  of	  members	  of	  the	  N’djuka	  Maroon	  community	  and	  the	  continued	  
victimization	  of	  this	  community	  by	  the	  government	  of	  Suriname	  through	  denying	  them	  
effective	   protection	   and	   redress.	   Nevertheless	   the	   Court	   also	   pronounced	   on	   the	  
property	  rights	  of	   the	  N’djuka	  to	   their	  communal	   lands	  extending	  these	  rights	   to	  non-­‐
indigenous	   communities	   who	   were	   able	   to	   establish	   a	   biocultural	   bond	   with	   their	  
territories.	   	  
	  
While	  in	  the	  Awas	  Tingni	  decision,	  the	  establishment	  of	  land	  title	  stressed	  the	  fact	  
that	   the	  Awas	   Tingni	  were	   an	   indigenous	   people	  who	  were	   entitled	   to	   rights	   to	   their	  
ancestral	  territories,	  the	  Court	  in	  the	  Moiwana	  Village	  case	  emphasized	  as	  the	  deciding	  
factor,	   on	   the	   stewardship	   relation	   of	   the	   community	  with	   their	   land.	   The	   Court	   held	  
that:	  
	  
The	  Moiwana	  community	  members	  are	  not	  indigenous	  to	  the	  region;	  according	  to	  
the	   proven	   facts,	  Moiwana	  Village	  was	   settled	   by	  N’djuka	   clans	   late	   in	   the	   19th	  
Century…	   	   Nevertheless,	   from	   that	   time	   until	   the	   1986	   attack,	   the	   community	  
members	  lived	  in	  the	  area	  in	  strict	  adherence	  to	  N’djuka	  custom.	   	   Expert	  witness	  
Thomas	   Polimé	   described	   the	   nature	   of	   their	   relationship	   to	   the	   lands	   in	   and	  
around	  Moiwana	  Village:	   	  
	  
[The]	  N’djuka,	   like	  other	   indigenous	  and	  tribal	  peoples,	  have	  a	  profound	  and	  all-­‐	  
encompassing	  relationship	  to	  their	  ancestral	  lands.	   	   They	  are	  inextricably	  tied	  to	  
these	   lands	   and	   the	   sacred	   sites	   that	   are	   found	   there	   and	   their	   forced	  
displacement	   has	   severed	   these	   fundamental	   ties.	   	   Many	   of	   the	   survivors	   and	  
next	   of	   kin	   locate	   their	   point	   of	   origin	   in	   and	   around	   Moiwana	   Village.	   	   Their	  
inability	   to	  maintain	   their	   relationships	  with	   their	   ancestral	   lands	   and	   its	   sacred	  
sites	   has	   deprived	   them	   of	   a	   fundamental	   aspect	   of	   their	   identity	   and	   sense	   of	  
wellbeing.	  Without	  regular	  commune	  with	  these	  lands	  and	  sites,	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  
practice	   and	   enjoy	   their	   cultural	   and	   religious	   traditions,	   further	   detracting	   from	  
their	  personal	  and	  collective	  security	  and	  sense	  of	  wellbeing	  (my	  emphasis).	   	  
	  












an	  “all-­‐encompassing	  relationship”	  to	  their	  traditional	   lands,	  and	  their	  concept	  of	  
ownership	  regarding	  that	  territory	  is	  not	  centered	  on	  the	  individual,	  but	  rather	  on	  
the	  community	  as	  a	  whole	  (my	  emphasis).	  Thus,	  this	  Court’s	  holding	  with	  regard	  to	  
indigenous	  communities	  and	  their	  communal	  rights	  to	  property	  under	  Article	  21	  of	  
the	  Convention	  must	  also	  apply	  to	  the	  tribal	  Moiwana	  community	  members:	  their	  
traditional	   occupancy	   of	   Moiwana	   Village	   and	   its	   surrounding	   lands	   …	   should	  
suffice	  to	  obtain	  state	  recognition	  of	  their	  ownership.312	  
	  
	   The	  N’djuka	  are	  not	  an	  indigenous	  people	  in	  the	  strict	  sense	  of	  term.	  But,	  for	  the	  
Court,	   it	  was	  not	  merely	  being	  indigenous	  that	  entitled	  a	  community	  to	  the	  right	  to	  its	  
traditional	   lands.	   Rather	   it	   was	   through	   having	   a	   ‘profound	   and	   all	   encompassing	  
relationship’	   with	   their	   territories.	   Such	   a	   relationship	   is	   a	   one	  where	   a	   community’s	  
very	   identity	   or	   peoplehood	   is	   tied	   to	   the	   land.	   It	   is	   critical	   to	   note	   that	   the	   Court	   is	  
affirming	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  Moiwana	  to	  their	  ancestral	  lands	  on	  two	  grounds.	  The	  first	  is	  
the	   community’s	   historical	   occupation	   of	   the	   said	   lands,	   but	   the	   second	   ground	   (to	  
which	  the	  court	  devotes	  considerable	  attention)	   is	  the	  community’s	   ‘profound	  and	  all-­‐
encompassing	  relationship’	  with	  the	  land.	   	  
	  
	   Here	   the	   Court	   appears	   to	   use	   the	   same	   reasoning	   as	   Radin’s	   notion	   of	  
contextuality	   for	   human	   flourishing	   and	   Riley’s	   argument	   of	   ‘cultural	   property	   rights’.	  
Both	   Radin	   and	   Riley	   point	   out	   that	   there	   are	   deep	   relations	   that	   people	   have	   with	  
certain	  kinds	  of	  property	  that	  take	  it	  outside	  the	  realm	  of	  what	  is	  fungible,	  and	  place	  it	  
squarely	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  personal.	  Within	  the	  latter	  realm,	  the	  relationship	  between	  
a	  territory	  and	  a	  people	  is	  one	  of	  stewardship,	  where	  the	  flourishing	  of	  the	  people	  is	  tied	  
to	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  the	  property.	  It	   is	  submitted,	  that	  the	  people	  care	  for	  this	  land	  not	  
because	  they	  are	  conscious	  environmentalists	  but	  rather	  because	  their	  very	  selfhood	  is	  
tied	  to	  the	   land:	   they	   feel	   that	   the	   land	  belongs	  to	  them	  and	  they	  belong	  to	  the	   land.	  
The	  ethic	  of	  care	  for	  the	  land	  then	  is	  a	  natural	  by-­‐product	  of	  this	  deep	  relationship,	  just	  
as	  one	  would	  care	  for	  one’s	  family.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  













	   The	   maturing	   of	   the	   jurisprudence	   on	   biocultural	   rights	   appeared	   in	   the	   2007	  
decision	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Saramaka	   People	   v.	   Suriname.313	  
The	  Saramaka	  are	  one	  among	  the	  six	  Maroon	  tribes	  that	  live	  in	  the	  tropical	  rainforests	  
of	   Suriname.314	   The	   Surinamese	  Maroons	   numbering	   around	   1,20,000	   are	   the	   largest	  
Maroon	  population	  of	  the	  Americas.	  They	  were	  originally	  African	  slaves	  who	  in	  the	  17th	  
century,	  escaped	  from	  the	  Dutch	  settlers	  who	  brought	  them	  to	  Suriname	  to	  work	  their	  
sugar,	  timber	  and	  coffee	  plantations.	  The	  Maroons	  escaped	  into	  the	  dense	  Surinamese	  
forests	  and	  established	  self-­‐governing,	   linguistically	  and	  culturally	  distinct	  communities	  
between	  the	  late	  17th	  and	  the	  mid-­‐19th	  centuries.	  For	  over	  100	  years	  they	  fought	  a	  war	  
of	   liberation	   against	   their	   slave	  masters	   and	   in	   1762	  won	   their	   freedom	  and	   signed	   a	  
treaty	   with	   the	   Dutch	   crown.	   Until	   the	   mid-­‐20thcentury	   the	   Saramaka	   like	   the	   other	  
Maroon	  tribes	  lived	  autonomously	  within	  Suriname	  until	  the	  growing	  encroachments	  on	  
their	   lands	   in	   the	   name	   of	   development	   led	   to	   a	  war	   between	   the	  Maroons	   and	   the	  
Surinamese	  military	   government.	   The	   end	   of	   the	   civil	   war	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1990s	   led	   to	   a	  
national	  government	  that	  turned	  its	  back	  on	  the	  Saramaka	  and	  the	  other	  Maroons	  and	  
began	   to	   give	   large	   timber	   and	  mining	   concessions	   to	   foreign	   companies	   in	   Saramaka	  
territory	  without	  any	  consultation.315	  
	  
	   The	   Saramaka,	   who	   number	   about	   55,000	   and	   whose	   territory	   covers	   9,000	  
square-­‐kilometres	  of	  rainforest,	  had	  in	  1963	  lost	  50	  percent	  of	  their	  lands	  to	  a	  massive	  
hydroelectric	   dam	   built	   to	   provide	   electricity	   to	   the	   Alcoa	   bauxite	   factory.	   The	   dam	  
submerged	  some	  43	  Saramaka	  villages	  and	  nearly	  6000	  Saramaka	  were	  displaced.	  Some	  
were	  sent	  to	  resettlement	  camps	  where	  they	  still	  live.	  Others	  set	  up	  new	  villages	  on	  the	  
Upper	  Suriname	  River.	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  of	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  Vol.	  7,	  No.3,	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  699-­‐
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   In	   the	   late	   1990s,	   the	   Surinamese	   government	   permitted	   logging	   companies	   to	  
begin	  timber	  harvesting	  on	  Saramaka	  territory,	  against	  Saramaka	  wishes.316	   The	  expert	  
witness	   in	   the	   Sarmaka	   case	   -­‐	   a	   noted	   anthropologist	   Richard	   Price	   who	   has	   written	  
extensively	  on	  the	  Maroon	  populations	  of	  the	  Americas	  -­‐	  describes	  the	  situation:	  
	  
In	  1996,	  Saramaka	  women	  on	  their	  way	  to	  their	  gardens	  began	  to	  find	  their	  paths	  
blocked	  by	  Chinese	   labourers.	   They	  heard	  heavy	   earth-­‐moving	  machinery	   in	   the	  
distance.	  When	  village	  headmen	  went	  to	  have	  a	  look,	  they	  were	  told	  that	  the	  land	  
now	  belonged	  to	  the	  Chinese	  and	  that	  if	  they	  interfered	  with	  logging	  operations,	  
they	  would	  be	  arrested	  and	   imprisoned.	   Soon,	   soldiers	   from	   the	  Suriname	  army	  
were	   standing	   guard	   at	   the	   logging	   sites,	   refusing	   entry	   to	   Saramakas.	   The	  
Saramakas	   began	   to	   organize	   against	   this	   invasion	   of	   their	   lands,	   but	   the	  
depredations	  continued.	  Large	  swaths	  of	  the	  territory	  their	  ancestors	  had	  fought	  
for,	  and	  which	  had	  been	  granted	  to	  Saramakas	  by	  the	  Dutch	  in	  the	  treaty	  of	  1762,	  
were	   now	   occupied	   by	   Chinese	   loggers,	   who	   had	   by	   the	   mid-­‐1990s	   received	  
official	   concessions	   from	   the	   Suriname	   government	   to	   much	   of	   Saramaka	  
territory.317	   	  
	  
	   As	   the	   logging	   continued	   unabated	   over	   the	   years,	   leaders	   of	   the	   Saramaka	  
community	  began	  to	  mobilize	  their	  people	  across	  nearly	  70	  villages.	  They	  travelled	  from	  
village	  to	  village	  organizing	  the	  communities	  against	  the	  logging.	  They	  were	  assisted	  by	  
NGOs,	   who	   aided	   them	   with	   GPS	   mapping	   of	   their	   territories,	   and	   human	   rights	  
lawyers.318	   In	   2000	   they	   filed	   a	   petition	   before	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Commission	   on	  
Human	  Rights.	  The	  Commission	  in	  2002	  and	  in	  2004	  asked	  Suriname	  to	  cease	  all	  logging	  
concessions	   and	   mining	   exploration	   on	   Saramaka	   lands	   until	   a	   full	   and	   thorough	  
investigation	  of	   the	  Saramaka	  complaint.	  However	  when	  the	  government	  of	  Suriname	  
failed	   to	   comply	  with	   the	   remedial	  measures	   required	   by	   the	   Commission	   in	   its	   2006	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report,	   the	   Commission	   referred	   the	   case	   to	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	   for	   Human	  
Rights.319	   	  
	  
	   The	   Court	   in	   the	   Saramaka	   case	   elaborated	   on	   the	   biocultural	   relationship	  
between	   indigenous	   and	   tribal	   peoples	   and	   their	   territories	   that	   the	  Moiwana	  Village	  
case	   had	   referred	   to.	   In	   responding	   to	   the	   arguments	   of	   the	   Surinamese	   government	  
that	  the	  Saramaka	  (who	  were	  brought	  as	  slaves	  in	  the	  17th	  century)	  were	  not	  indigenous	  
people	  with	  rights	  to	  their	  ancestral	  lands-­‐	  the	  Court	  stated:	  
	  
Their	   (Saramaka’s)	   culture	   is	   also	   similar	   to	   that	   of	   tribal	   peoples	   insofar	   as	   the	  
members	  of	  the	  Saramaka	  people	  maintain	  a	  strong	  spiritual	  relationship	  with	  the	  
ancestral	   territory	   they	  have	   traditionally	  used	  and	  occupied.	   Land	   is	  more	   than	  
merely	   a	   source	   of	   subsistence	   for	   them;	   it	   is	   also	   a	   necessary	   source	   for	   the	  
continuation	   of	   the	   life	   and	   cultural	   identity	   of	   th 	   Saramaka	   people.	   The	   lands	  
and	   resources	   of	   the	   Saramaka	   people	   are	   part	   of	   their	   social,	   ancestral,	   and	  
spiritual	  essence.	   	   In	  this	  territory,	  the	  Saramaka	  people	  hunt,	  fish,	  and	  farm,	  and	  
they	  gather	  water,	  plants	  for	  medicinal	  purposes,	  oils,	  minerals,	  and	  wood.	  Their	  
sacred	   sites	   are	   scattered	   throughout	   the	   territory,	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   the	  
territory	   itself	   has	   a	   sacred	   value	   to	   them.	   In	   particular,	   the	   identity	   of	   the	  
members	   of	   the	   Saramaka	   people	   with	   the	   land	   is	   inextricably	   linked	   to	   their	  
historical	  fight	  for	  freedom	  from	  slavery,	  called	  the	  sacred	  “first	  time”.320	  
	  
	   In	   the	   Court’s	   statements,	   the	   emergence	   of	   biocultural	   jurisprudence	   with	   an	  
emphasis	   on	   the	   values	   of	   stewardship	   is	   clear.	   The	   Court	   in	   the	   Saramaka	   case	  
elaborated	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  community	  and	  the	  land	  that	  
qualifies	   it	   for	   a	   right	   to	   property	   under	  Article	   21	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Convention.	  
While	   the	   Awas	   Tingni,	   Moiwana	   Village	   and	   the	   Saramaka	   judgments	   are	   ordinarily	  
read	   as	   establishing	   the	   rights	   of	   indigenous	   and	   tribal	   peoples	   to	   their	   ancestral	  
territories,	  what	  is	  often	  missed	  is	  the	  principle	  that	  these	  judgments	  affirm.	  This	  is	  the	  
principle	   of	   a	   relationship	   of	   stewardship.	   The	   deep-­‐structure	   of	   the	   jurisprudence	   of	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the	  Court	  in	  these	  cases	  is	  not	  that	  a	  community	  being	  indigenous	  or	  tribal	  necessarily	  
vests	   it	   with	   a	   right	   to	   communal	   property,	   but	   rather	   that	   it	   is	   the	   stewarding	  
relationship	  of	  the	  community	  to	  its	  lands	  and	  waters	  that	  determines	  the	  authenticity	  
of	  the	  claim.	  In	  many	  ways,	  the	  sub-­‐text	  of	  these	  decisions	  reads	  that	  an	  indigenous	  or	  
tribal	  identity	  is	  established	  through	  proving	  a	  strong	  biocultural	  link	  to	  the	  land.	   	  
	  
	   The	   fact	   that	   the	  Court	  makes	   references	   to	   a	   ‘strong	   spiritual	   relationship	  with	  
their	  ancestral	  territory’	  or	   land	  as	  a	  part	  of	   ‘social,	  ancestral	  or	  spiritual	  essence’	  of	  a	  
community	  or	  the	  ‘territory	  having	  sacred	  value’	  gives	  us	  an	  insight	  into	  the	  nature	  and	  
the	  quality	  of	  the	  relationship	  a	  community	  must	  have	  with	  its	  land	  to	  for	  it	  to	  assert	  its	  
indigenous	  or	   tribal	   identity	  and	   the	  concomitant	   right	   to	  property.	  Such	  a	  biocultural	  
relationship	  with	   their	   territories	   is	   possible	   only	  when	   land	   is	   not	   seen	   as	   a	   fungible	  
property,	   whose	   importance	   lies	   in	   its	   exchange	   value,	   but	   rather	   when	   it	   is	   seen	   as	  
personal	   property,	  whose	  worth	   lies	   in	   it	   being	   at	   the	   core	  of	   peoplehood.	   The	  Court	  
made	  this	  clear	  when	  it	  extended	  the	  right	  to	  community	  property	  under	  Article	  21	  of	  
the	   Convention	   to	   the	   tribal	   communities	   on	   the	   condition	   of	   establishing	   a	   special	  
relationship	  with	  their	  territories.	  The	  Court	  stated	  that:	  
	  
[T]he	  Court	  considers	  that	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Saramaka	  people	  make	  up	  a	  tribal	  
community	  whose	  social,	  cultural	  and	  economic	  characteristics	  are	  different	  from	  
other	   sections	   of	   the	   national	   community,	   particularly	   because	   of	   their	   special	  
relationship	  with	  their	  ancestral	  territories,	  and	  because	  they	  regulate	  themselves,	  
at	  least	  partially,	  by	  their	  own	  norms,	  customs,	  and/or	  traditions.	  
	  
Hence,	  this	  Tribunal	  declares	  that	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Saramaka	  people	  are	  to	  be	  
considered	   a	   tribal	   community,	   and	   that	   the	   Court’s	   jurisprudence	   regarding	  
indigenous	  peoples’	  right	  to	  property	   is	  also	  applicable	  to	  tribal	  peoples	  because	  
both	   share	   distinct	   social,	   cultural,	   and	   economic	   characteristics,	   including	   a	  
special	   relationship	  with	  their	  ancestral	   territories,	   that	  require	  special	  measures	  
under	   international	   human	   rights	   law	   in	   order	   to	   guarantee	   their	   physical	   and	  













The	   Court’s	   decisions	   to	   this	   effect	   have	   all	   been	   based	   upon	   the	   special	  
relationship	   that	   members	   of	   indigenous	   and	   tribal	   peoples	   have	   with	   their	  
territory,	   and	   on	   the	   need	   to	   protect	   their	   right	   to	   that	   territory	   in	   order	   to	  
safeguard	  the	  physical	  and	  cultural	  survival	  of	  such	  peoples.321	   	  
	  
	   The	   Court	   in	   the	   Saramaka	   case	   does	   not	   stop	   at	   recognizing	   the	   rights	   of	  
indigenous	   and	   tribal	   peoples	   to	   their	   territories.	   It	   also	   secures	   the	   stewarding	  
relationship	  between	  the	  community	  and	  its	  land	  by	  establishing	  the	  community’s	  rights	  
over	   natural	   resources	   on	   and	   within	   the	   land.	   Developing	   a	   biocultural	   approach	   to	  
indigenous	  and	  tribal	  territories,	  the	  Court	  sought	  to	  uphold	  the	  principle	  of	  stewardship	  
by	  stating	  that	  a	  communal	  right	  to	  land	  includes	  a	  right	  to	  all	  resources	  on	  and	  within	  
the	  land	  necessary	  for	  the	  physical	  and	  cultural	  survival	  of	  the	  community.	   	  
	  
	   Such	  an	  approach	  could	  be	  narrowly	  understood	  as	  arguing	  that	  an	  indigenous	  or	  
tribal	   community	  has	   rights	  only	  over	   the	   resources	   it	  actually	  uses	  and	  not	  over	   sub-­‐
surface	  minerals,	   for	   example,	   since	   these	   are	   irrelevant	   for	   the	   cultural	   and	   physical	  
survival	   of	   the	   community.	   The	   Court	   in	   the	   Saramaka	   case	   however	   emphasized	   the	  
converse	  by	  indicating	  that	  the	  Saramaka	  would	  have	  the	  right	  to	  exclude	  any	  activities	  
on	  their	  lands	  that	  adversely	  affected	  the	  resources	  that	  the	  community	  relies	  upon.	  For	  
example,	  mining	   for	   gold	   could	   negatively	   affect	   fish	   populations	   in	   rivers	   where	   the	  
communities	   fish	   for	   subsistence.	   This	   means	   that	   the	   community	   in	   question	   could	  
restrict	   gold	  mining	   on	   their	   territories	   even	   though	   they	   did	   not	   need	   gold	   for	   their	  
cultural	  or	  physical	  survival.	   	  
	  
	   In	  effect	  the	  Court	  was	  making	  the	  point	  that	   indigenous	  and	  tribal	  communities	  
could	  restrict	  any	  activities	  that	  ran	  counter	  to	  their	  stewarding	  relationship	  with	  their	  
territories.	  Setting	  the	  stage	  for	  such	  an	  approach,	  the	  Court	  stated:	   	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












In	   accordance	   with	   this	   Court’s	   jurisprudence	   as	   stated	   in	   the	   Yakye	   Axa	   and	  
Sawhoyamaxa	   cases,	   members	   of	   tribal	   and	   indigenous	   communities	   have	   the	  
right	   to	   own	   the	   natural	   resources	   they	   have	   traditionally	   used	   within	   their	  
territory	   for	   the	  same	  reasons	   that	   they	  have	  a	   right	   to	  own	   the	   land	   they	  have	  
traditionally	  used	  and	  occupied	  for	  centuries.	  Without	  them,	  the	  very	  physical	  and	  
cultural	   survival	  of	   such	  peoples	   is	  at	   stake.	  Hence	   the	  need	   to	  protect	   the	   lands	  
and	  resources	  they	  have	  traditionally	  used	  to	  prevent	  their	  extinction	  as	  a	  people	  
(my	  emphasis).	  That	  is,	  the	  aim	  and	  purpose	  of	  the	  special	  measures	  required	  on	  
behalf	  of	  the	  members	  of	  indigenous	  and	  tribal	  communities	  is	  to	  guarantee	  that	  
they	  may	  continue	  living	  their	  traditional	  way	  of	  life,	  and	  that	  their	  distinct	  cultural	  
identity,	   social	   structure,	   economic	   system,	   customs,	   beliefs	   and	   traditions	   are	  
respected,	   guaranteed	   and	   protected	   by	   states.…,	   due	   to	   the	   inextricable	  
connection	  members	   of	   indigenous	   and	   tribal	   peoples	   have	  with	   their	   territory,	  
the	   protection	   of	   their	   right	   to	   property	   over	   such	   territory,	   in	   accordance	  with	  
Article	   21	   of	   the	   Convention,	   is	   necessary	   to	   guarantee	   their	   very	   survival.	  
Accordingly,	  the	  right	  to	  use	  and	  enjoy	  their	  territory	  would	  be	  meaningless	  in	  the	  
context	  of	   indigenous	  and	  tribal	  communities	   if	  said	  right	  were	  not	  connected	  to	  
the	   natural	   resources	   that	   lie	   on	   and	   within	   the	   land.	   That	   is,	   the	   demand	   for	  
collective	   land	   ownership	   by	   members	   of	   indigenous	   and	   tribal	   peoples	   derives	  
from	  the	  need	  to	  ensure	  the	  security	  and	  permanence	  of	  their	  control	  and	  use	  of	  
the	  natural	  resources,	  which	  in	  turn	  maintains	  their	  very	  way	  of	  life	  (my	  emphasis).	  
This	  connectedness	  between	  the	  territory	  and	  the	  natural	  resources	  necessary	  for	  
their	  physical	  and	  cultural	  survival	   is	  precisely	  what	  needs	  to	  be	  protected	  under	  
Article	  21	  of	  the	  Convention	  in	  order	  to	  guarantee	  the	  members	  of	  indigenous	  and	  
tribal	  communities’	  right	  to	  the	  use	  and	  enjoyment	  of	  their	  property.	   	   From	  this	  
analysis,	  it	  follows	  that	  the	  natural	  resources	  found	  on	  and	  within	  indigenous	  and	  
tribal	   people’s	   territories	   that	   are	   protected	   under	   Article	   21	   are	   those	   natural	  
resources	  traditionally	  used	  and	  necessary	  for	  the	  very	  survival,	  development	  and	  
continuation	  of	  such	  people’s	  way	  of	  life.322	   	  
	  
	   The	   implications	  of	   the	   judgment	   in	   this	   case	  are	   far	   reaching.	   The	  Court	  makes	  
the	  critical	  link	  between	  the	  communal	  right	  to	  land	  and	  the	  right	  to	  ensure	  the	  security	  
and	  permanence	  of	  the	  community’s	  control	  over	  its	  natural	  resources.	  The	  justification	  
that	  the	  Court	  provides	  is	  that	  such	  control	  is	  integral	  to	  a	  ‘way	  of	  life’,	  which	  denotes	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












biocultural	   relationship	   with	   land.	   The	   Court	   in	   the	   Saramaka	   case	   built	   on	   the	  
foundations	   laid	   by	   the	   Awas	   Tingni	   case	   and	   firmly	   established	   that	   the	   right	   to	  
communal	  property	  extends	  to	  tribal	  peoples	  and	  such	  a	  right	  includes	  the	  right	  to	  use	  
and	  maintain	  the	  resources	  on	  their	  territories	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  biocultural	  values	  
of	  the	  community.	   	  
	  
(b)	  Endorois	  Welfare	  Council	  v.	  Kenya:	  Globalizing	  Biocultural	  Rights	  
	  
The	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights	   established	   the	   judicial	   protection	   of	   the	  
relations	   of	   stewardship	   between	   indigenous	   and	   tribal	   peoples	   and	   their	   territories.	  
This	  heralded	  the	  birth	  of	  biocultural	  rights	  in	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  American	  Convention	  
on	   Human	   Rights	   and	   recently	   begun	   to	   inform	   the	   jurisprudence	   of	   the	   African	  
Commission	  on	  Human	  and	  Peoples	  Rights.323	   	  
	  
	   In	   its	   recent	  2010	   judgment	   in	   the	   case	  of	  Endorois	  Welfare	  Council	   v.	   Kenya,324	  
relied	  upon	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  to	  support	  its	  interpretation	  of	  the	  
African	  Charter	  on	  Human	  and	  Peoples	  Rights325	   and	  firmly	  roots	  the	  biocultural	  rights	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
323	   The	  African	  Commission	  on	  Human	  and	  Peoples	  Rights	  was	  established	  under	  Article	  30	  of	  the	  African	  
Charter	  to	  ‘promote	  human	  and	  peoples’	  rights	  and	  to	  ensure	  their	  protection	  in	  Africa’.	  It	  is	  
composed	  of	  11	  human	  rights	  experts	  of	  high	  moral	  standing	  who	  are	  chosen	  from	  lists	  of	  nominations	  
submitted	  by	  states.	  These	  experts	  act	  in	  their	  individual	  capacity	  and	  under	  Article	  45.2	  of	  the	  African	  
Charter	  ‘Ensure	  the	  protection	  of	  human	  and	  peoples	  rights	  under	  conditions	  laid	  down	  under	  the	  
African	  Charter’.	  This	  protective	  mandate	  of	  the	  Commission	  includes	  receiving	  complaints	  from	  
individuals,	  groups	  or	  NGOs	  of	  serious	  or	  massive	  violations	  of	  human	  rights	  by	  states.	  These	  
complaints	  are	  admissible	  if	  the	  complainant	  can	  establish	  that	  all	  domestic	  remedies	  have	  been	  
exhausted	  or	  that	  if	  these	  remedies	  do	  not	  or	  will	  not	  provide	  an	  effective	  redress.	  While	  the	  decisions	  
of	  the	  Commission	  are	  not	  legally	  binding,	  they	  are	  considered	  as	  authoritative	  interpretations	  of	  the	  
African	  Charter.	  The	  decisions	  of	  the	  Commission	  are	  sent	  to	  the	  Assembly	  of	  Heads	  of	  state	  and	  
Government	  of	  the	  AU	  who	  will	  decide	  if	  the	  course	  of	  action	  that	  would	  need	  to	  be	  taken.	  The	  
Commission	  can	  also	  refer	  its	  decision	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  complaint	  to	  the	  African	  Court	  on	  Human	  and	  
Peoples’	  Rights.	  The	  decision	  of	  the	  African	  Court	  is	  binding	  upon	  all	  state	  parties	  who	  have	  ratified	  
the	  Court	  Protocol.	  
324	   Communication	  276/2003,	  Decision	  of	  the	  African	  Commission	  on	  Human	  and	  Peoples	  Rights.	  
325	   The	  African	  Charter	  on	  Human	  and	  Peoples’	  Rights	  is	  an	  African	  regional	  human	  rights	  instrument.	  It	  
was	  adopted	  by	  the	  Organization	  of	  African	  Unity	  (OAU),	  now	  the	  African	  Union	  (AU).	  The	  Assembly	  of	  












of	  indigenous	  and	  tribal	  peoples	  in	  the	  African	  context.	   	  
	  
	   The	   Endorois	   are	   a	   community	   of	   around	   60,000	   people	   who	   have	   lived	  
sustainably	  for	  centuries	  as	  pastoralists	  around	  the	  Lake	  Bogoria	  in	  the	  Rift	  Valley	  area	  
of	  Kenya.	  The	  Government	  of	  Kenya	  dispossessed	  them	  of	  their	  territories	  through	  the	  
creation	  of	  the	  Lake	  Hannington	  game	  reserve	  in	  1973,	  and	  a	  subsequent	  re-­‐gazetting	  of	  
the	  Lake	  Bogoria	  Game	  Reserve	   in	  1978.	  Since	  that	  date	  the	  Endorois	  were	  effectively	  
denied	   access	   to	   their	   lands,	   which	   adversely	   affected	   their	   way	   of	   life,	   cultural	   and	  
spiritual	  traditions	  all	  of	  which	  were	  inextricably	  connected	  to	  their	  land.	   	  
	  
	   All	   the	   neighbouring	   communities	   had	   for	   hundreds	   of	   years	   accepted	   the	  
Endorois	  as	  the	  effective	  ‘owners’	  of	  their	  lands.	  Prior	  to	  Kenyan	  independence	  in	  1963,	  
however,	   although	   the	   British	   Crown	   claimed	   title	   over	   the	   Endorois	   lands,	   the	  
community	  was	  allowed	  peaceful	  and	  undisturbed	  possession	  and	  use	  of	  its	  territories.	  
When	  Kenya	  gained	  independence	  the	  Endorois	   land	  passed	  on	  to	  the	  respective	  local	  
county	  councils,	  which	  under	  Section	  115	  of	   the	  Kenyan	  Constitution,	  held	  the	   land	   in	  
trust	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Endorois	  community.	   	  
	  
	   The	  Endorois	  grazed	  thei 	  cattle	  along	  the	  fertile	  green	  pastures	  surrounding	  Lake	  
Bogoria	  and	  have	  historically	   relied	  upon	  the	  medicinal	  salt	   licks	   in	   the	  area	  to	  ensure	  
their	   animals’	   health.	   Lake	   Bogoria	   is	   central	   to	   the	   Endorois	   cultural	   and	   spiritual	  
traditions,	   including	   their	   historical	   prayer	   sites,	   places	   for	   circumcision	   and	   other	  
ceremonies.	  The	  people	  believe	  that	  the	  spirits	  of	  all	  Endorois	  live	  on	  Lake	  Bogoria	  and	  
that	  the	  Monchongoi	  forest	  is	  birthplace	  of	  their	  forbearers.	  
	  
	   Shortly	  after	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Lake	  Bogoria	  Game	  Reserve,	  the	  Kenyan	  Wildlife	  
Service	  (KWS)	  informed	  a	  few	  elders	  of	  the	  Endorois	  community	  that	  400	  famiies	  would	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
experts	  to	  draft	  an	  African	  Charter	  on	  Human	  and	  Peoples’	  Rights.	  The	  OAU	  adopted	  the	  Charter	  on	  7	  












be	  provided	  with	  compensation	  of	  fertile	  pieces	  of	  land	  and	  the	  community	  as	  a	  whole	  
would	   receive	   25%	   of	   the	   tourist	   revenue	   of	   the	   Game	   Reserve	   and	   85%	   of	   the	  
employment	  generated	   therein.	   The	  KWS	  also	  promised	   to	   construct	   for	   the	  Endorois	  
cattle	  dips	  and	  fresh	  water	  dams.	  None	  of	  these	  promises	  were	  kept	  and	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
repeated	   petitioning	   by	   the	   Endorois,	   the	   government	   finally	   agreed	   to	   provide	   3150	  
Kenya	   Shillings	   per	   family	   that	   had	   been	   dispossessed.	   It	   was	   only	   in	   1986	   however,	  
eight	   years	   after	   the	   Endorois	  were	  excluded	   from	   their	   lands,	   that	   some	  money	  was	  
given	  to	  170	  of	  the	  400	  families.	  The	  Endorois	  were	  also	  taken	  aback	  when	  they	  were	  
informed	  that	  the	  3150	  Kenya	  Shillings	  was	  full	  compensation	  for	  their	  loss	  of	  land.	  They	  
had	   understood	   that	   this	   money	   was	   for	   helping	   with	   relocation	   rather	   than	   for	  
compensation	  for	  their	  exclusion	  from	  their	  ancestral	  lands.	   	  
	  
	   The	  Endorois	  petitioned	  President	  Daniel	  Arap	  Moi	   to	   intervene	   to	  protect	   their	  
rights,	   and,	   despite	   the	   President’s	   directives	   to	   the	   local	   county	   councils	   in	   1994	   to	  
respect	   the	  1973	  agreement	  on	   compensation	   and	   to	  pay	   the	   community	   25%	  of	   the	  
annual	   tourist	   revenues,	   nothing	   was	   done.	   Due	   to	   the	   non-­‐implementation	   of	   the	  
presidential	  directives,	  the	  Endorois	  began	  legal	  action	  against	  the	  Baringo	  and	  Koibatek	  
County	   Councils.	   The	   High	   Court	   in	   its	   judgment	   in	   2002326	   dismissed	   the	   Endorois	  
application	  and	  stated	   in	   its	  decision	  that	  the	  community	  had	   lost	  any	   legal	  claim	  as	  a	  
result	  of	   the	  designation	  of	  their	   land	  as	  a	  game	  reserve.	  The	  Court	  also	  held	  that	  the	  
money	   given	   to	   the	   170	   Endorois	   families	   in	   1986	   fulfilled	   all	   duties	   owed	   by	   the	  
government	  to	  the	  community	  for	  the	  loss	  of	  their	  land.327	   	  
	  
	   The	  High	  Court	  refused	  to	  recognize	  the	  Endorois	  as	  a	  community	  and	  their	  right	  
to	   communal	   property	   as	   a	   result	   of	   historical	   occupation	   and	   cultural	   bonds	   to	   their	  
lands.	  After	  the	  decision,	  the	  Endorois	  became	  aware	  that	  part	  of	  their	  land	  was	  being	  
demarcated	  and	  sold	  off	  by	  the	  government	  to	  third	  parties,	  including	  concessions	  to	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326	   Referenced	  in	  supra	  n.	  325.	  












private	   company	   for	   mining	   rubies.	   The	  mining	   exacerbated	   the	   risk	   of	   polluting	   the	  
waterways	   used	   by	   the	   Endorois	   for	   their	   personal	   consumption	   and	   for	   their	   cattle.	  
Though	   as	   a	   result	   of	   their	   legal	   action	   the	   Endorois	   were	   permitted	   limited	   grazing	  
rights	  and	  access	  to	  Lake	  Bogoria	  for	  cultural	  purposes,	  the	  fact	  that	  their	  land	  was	  not	  
titled	  meant	  that	  access	  to	  their	  territories	  was	  subject	  entirely	  to	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  
Game	  Reserve	  officials.	   	  
	  
	   The	  Endorois	  community	  was	  breaking	  down	  due	  to	  the	  displacement	  from	  their	  
ancestral	   lands	   and	   they	   were	   being	   forced	   to	   live	   on	   the	   peripheries	   of	   the	   Game	  
Reserve.	  They	  no	  longer	  had	  access	  to	  their	  grasslands,	  salt	  licks,	  the	  Lake	  Bogoria	  and	  
medicinal	  plants,	  and	  instead	  had	  to	  survive	  in	  semi-­‐arid	  areas.	  The	  human	  rights	  lawyer	  
representing	   them	   was	   arrested	   in	   1996,	   was	   accused	   of	   ‘belonging	   to	   an	   unlawful	  
society’	  and	  received	  death	  threats.	   	  
	  
	   In	   2003,	   30	   years	   after	   they	   had	   been	   dispossessed,	   denied	   compensation	   and	  
access	  to	  justice,	  the	  Endorois	  decided	  to	  approach	  the	  African	  Commission	  on	  Human	  
and	  Peoples	  Rights	  for	  relief.	  They	  were	  supported	  by	  the	  Centre	  for	  Minority	  Rights	  and	  
Development	  (CEMIRIDE).	  After	  three	  years	  of	  no	  response	  by	  the	  government	  of	  Kenya	  
despite	  repeated	  requests	  and	  postponements	  of	  hearings	  by	  the	  African	  Commission,	  
the	  Commission	  decided	  to	  admit	  the	  Endorois	  complaint	  and	  consider	  the	  case	  on	   its	  
merits.	  The	  Endorois	  claimed	  the	  violation	  of	  Articles	  of	  the	  African	  Charter	  on	  Human	  
and	   Peoples	   Rights	   dealing	  with	   the	   right	   to	   property,	   the	   right	   to	   free	   disposition	   of	  
natural	   resources,	   the	   right	   to	   religion,	   the	   right	   to	   cultural	   life	   and	   the	   right	   to	  
development.328	   	  
	  
	   At	   the	  outset,	   the	  African	  Commission	   sought	   to	   clarify	   the	   status	  of	   indigenous	  
populations	  in	  Africa	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Articles	  20	  to	  24	  in	  the	  African	  Charter	  that	  refers	  
to	   ‘peoples.’	   It	   cited	   the	   African	   Commission’s	   work	   through	   its	   Working	   Group	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












Experts	   on	   Indigenous	   Populations/Communities,	   and	   referred	   to	   the	   four	   criteria	   for	  
identifying	   indigenous	   peoples:	   occupation	   and	   use	   of	   a	   specific	   territory;	   voluntary	  
perpetuation	   of	   peoples;	   self-­‐identification	   as	   a	   distinct	   collectivity,	   as	   well	   as	  
recognition	   by	   other	   groups;	   and	   experience	   of	   subjugation,	   marginalization,	  
dispossession,	  exclusion	  or	  discrimination.329	   What	   is	   interesting	   from	  the	  perspective	  
of	   an	   emerging	   discourse	   of	   stewardship	   is	   the	   African	   Commission’s	   emphasis	   on	  
another	  characteristic	  of	  African	  indigenous	  groups	  highlighted	  by	  its	  Working	  Group	  of	  
Experts	  on	  Indigenous	  Populations/Communities:	   	  
	  
A	  key	  characteristic	  for	  most	  of	  them	  is	  that	  the	  survival	  of	  their	  particular	  way	  of	  
life	   depends	   on	   access	   and	   rights	   to	   their	   traditional	   land	   and	   the	   natural	  
resources	  thereon.330	  
	  
	   The	   explicit	   linking	   of	   a	   way	   of	   life	   to	   traditional	   lands	   and	   resources	   therein	  
reveals	  an	  added	  dimension	  to	   the	  concept	  of	   indigenous	  and	  tribal	  communities	   that	  
has	  gained	  currency	  over	   the	   last	   two	  decades.	  This	  dimension	  emphasizes	   the	  strong	  
bond	   these	   communities	   have	   to	   their	   ancestral	   lands,	   a	   bond	   that	   defines	   the	   very	  
nature	  of	  their	  peoplehood.	  The	  African	  Commission	  stresses	  this	  point	  by	  adding:	  
	  
The	   African	   Commission	   is	   thus	   aware	   that	   there	   is	   an	   emerging	   consensus	   on	  
some	   objective	   features	   that	   a	   collective	   of	   individuals	   should	   manifest	   to	   be	  
considered	   as	   “peoples”,	   viz:	   a	   common	   historical	   tradition,	   racial	   or	   ethnic	  
identity,	  cultural	  homogeneity,	   linguistic	  unity,	  religious	  and	   ideological	  affinities,	  
territorial	  connection,	  and	  a	  common	  economic	  life	  or	  other	  bonds,	  identities	  and	  
affinities	   they	  collectively	  enjoy	  –	  especially	   rights	  enumerated	  under	  Articles	  19	  
to	  24	  of	   the	  African	  Charter	  –	  or	   suffer	  collectively	   from	  the	  deprivation	  of	   such	  
rights.	   What	   is	   clear	   is	   that	   all	   attempts	   to	   define	   the	   concept	   of	   indigenous	  
peoples	   recognize	   the	   linkages	   between	   peoples,	   their	   land,	   and	   culture	   (my	  
emphasis)	  and	  that	  such	  a	  group	  expresses	  its	  desire	  to	  be	  identified	  as	  a	  people	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329	   Report	  of	  the	  African	  Commission’s	  Working	  Group	  of	  Experts	  on	  Indigenous	  Populations/	  
Communities	  (adopted	  at	  the	  Twenty-­‐eighth	  Session,	  2003).	  












or	  have	  the	  consciousness	  that	  they	  are	  a	  people.331	  
	  
	   The	  Commission	  concluded	  that	  the	  Endorois	  culture,	  religion	  and	  traditional	  way	  
of	   life	   were	   integrally	   tied	   to	   their	   ancestral	   lands,	   Lake	   Bogoria	   and	   its	   surrounds	  
including	   the	  Monchongoi	   forest.	   In	   its	   conclusion,	   the	   Commission	  made	   clear	   that,	  
amongst	   the	   criteria	   for	   identifying	   indigenous	   and	   tribal	   groups,	   the	   relationship	  
between	  the	  community	  and	  its	  territory	  is	  a	  defining	  factor:	  
	  
The	  African	  Commission	   is	   also	   aware	   that	   though	   some	   indigenous	  populations	  
might	  be	  first	  inhabitants,	  validation	  of	  rights	  is	  not	  automatically	  afforded	  to	  such	  
pre-­‐invasion	  and	  pre-­‐colonial	  claims.	  In	  terms	  of	  ILO	  Convention	  169,	  even	  though	  
many	  African	  countries	  have	  not	  signed	  and	  ratified	  the	  said	  Convention,	  and	  like	  
the	  UN	  Working	  Groups’	   conceptualisation	  of	   the	   term,	   the	  African	  Commission	  
notes	  that	  there	  is	  a	  common	  thread	  that	  runs	  through	  all	  the	  various	  criteria	  that	  
attempts	   to	   describe	   indigenous	   peoples	   –	   that	   indigenous	   peoples	   have	   an	  
unambiguous	  relationship	  to	  a	  distinct	  territory	  and	  that	  all	  attempts	  to	  define	  the	  
concept	   recognise	   the	   linkages	   between	   people,	   their	   land,	   and	   culture	   (my	  
emphasis).332	  
	  
	   The	   decisions	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	   and	   the	   African	   Commission	   have	  
resulted	   in	   a	   paradigm	   shift	   in	   property	   jurisprudence	   where	   new	   criteria	   for	  
establishing	   common	   property	   rights	   of	   communities	   have	   emerged.	   These	   criteria	  
resonate	  with	  the	  arguments	  of	  Riley	  et	  al.	  to	  establish	  a	  new	  principle:	  that	  the	  sense	  of	  
peoplehood	  may	   arise	   through	   a	   mutually	   reinforcing	   relationship	   between	   land	   and	  
culture/religion.	  The	  property	  claims	  of	  the	  Awas	  Tingni,	  the	  Saramaka	  and	  the	  Endorois	  
are	   never	   presented	   purely	   as	   a	   right	   to	   property	   but	   as	   a	   right	   to	   the	   cultural	   and	  
therefore	   physical	   survival	   of	   a	   people.	   The	   bond	   between	   the	   community	   and	   its	  
territory	   is	   not	   just	   a	   bond	   established	   through	   historical	   occupation	   of	   land	   but	   a	  
biocultural	   bond	   whose	   content	   is	   defined	   by	   culture,	   religion	   and	   spirituality	   of	   the	  
community.	  This	  bond	   includes	  the	  duty	  of	  stewardship	  and	  thereby	  contains	  the	  very	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  151.	  












essence	  of	  what	  ‘flourishing’	  means	  to	  the	  community.	   	  
	  
	   This	  paradigm	  shift	   in	  property	   jurisprudence	   is	  exemplified	   in	   the	  Endorois	  case	  
where	  the	  community	  not	  only	  accused	  the	  Kenyan	  government	  of	  violating	  their	  right	  
to	  property	  but	  also	  coupled	   this	  violation	  with	  a	  denial	  of	   the	   right	   to	   freely	  practise	  
their	   religion	  and	  culture.	  The	  Endorois	  explicitly	   linked	   this	  denial	   to	   their	  dislocation	  
from	  Lake	  Bogoria	  and	  their	  sacred	  sites	  in	  the	  vicinity.	  They	  argued	  that	  many	  of	  their	  
rituals	  and	  ceremonies	  including	  circumcisions,	  initiations	  and	  marriages	  could	  only	  take	  
place	   on	   certain	   sacred	   sites	   around	   the	   Lake.	   Among	   the	   adverse	   impacts	   of	   the	  
dispossession	   of	   their	   lands	   was	   their	   inability	   to	   conduct	   their	   annual	   ceremony	   to	  
appease	  their	  ancestors,	  who	  had	  drowned	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Lake’s	  formation.	   	  
	  
	   The	   African	   Commission	   clearly	   used	   culture	   as	   a	   bridge	   between	   property	   and	  
peoplehood	   by	   noting	   that	   the	   denial	   of	   property	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Endorois	   is	  
tantamount	   to	   the	   denial	   of	   the	   right	   to	   freely	   practise	   religion	   and	   culture,	   and	  
therefore	  threatens	  the	  very	  survival	  of	  a	  people.	  The	  African	  Commission	  underscored	  
this	  by	  stating:	  
	  
This	  Commission	  also	  notes	  the	  views	  of	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Committee	  with	  regard	  
to	   the	   exercise	   of	   the	   cultural	   rights	   protected	   under	   Article	   27	   of	   the	   UN	  
Declaration	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Persons	  Belonging	  to	  National	  or	  Ethnic,	  Religious	  and	  
Linguistic	   Minorities.	   The	   Committee	   observes	   that	   “culture	   manifests	   itself	   in	  
many	   forms,	   including	   a	   particular	   way	   of	   life	   associated	   with	   the	   use	   of	   land	  
resources,	   especially	   in	   the	   case	   of	   indigenous	   peoples.	   That	   right	   may	   include	  
such	   traditional	   activities	   as	   fishing	   or	   hunting	   and	   the	   right	   to	   live	   in	   reserves	  
protected	   by	   law.	   The	   enjoyment	   of	   those	   rights	   may	   require	   positive	   legal	  
measures	   of	   protection	   and	   measures	   to	   ensure	   the	   effective	   participation	   of	  
members	   of	  minority	   communities	   in	   decisions	  which	   affect	   them.”	   The	   African	  
Commission	   notes	   that	   a	   common	   theme	   that	   usually	   runs	   through	   the	   debate	  
about	  culture	  and	  its	  violation	  is	  the	  association	  with	  one’s	  ancestral	  land.	  It	  notes	  
that	   its	   own	   Working	   Group	   on	   Indigenous	   Populations/Communities	   has	  
observed	   that	   dispossession	   of	   land	   and	   its	   resources	   is	   “a	  major	   human	   rights	  












Group	  has	  also	  emphasised	  that	  dispossession	  “threatens	  the	  economic,	  social	  and	  
cultural	  survival	  of	  indigenous	  pastoralist	  and	  hunter-­‐gatherer	  communities.”333	   	  
	  
	   Perhaps	  the	  most	  ground-­‐breaking	  aspect	  of	  the	  decision	  was	  an	  assertion,	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  property	  for	  peoplehood,	  that	  traditional	  possession	  is	  sufficient	  to	  establish	  
a	  right	  and	  this	  right	  overrides	  any	  other	  competing	  property	  claim.	  Any	  infringement	  of	  
the	   right	   of	   property	   for	   peoplehood	  would	   have	   to	   establish	   a	  most	   compelling	   and	  
urgent	   public	   interest.	   Regarding	   the	   establishment	   of	   a	   communal	   property	   right	  
through	   historical	   possession,	   the	   African	   Commission	   went	   so	   far	   as	   to	   say	   that	   in	  
situations	  of	  forced	  displacement	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  from	  their	  land,	  even	  the	  lack	  of	  
possession	   of	   these	   lands	   does	   not	   extinguish	   the	   original	   right.	   The	   Commission	  
elaborated	  its	  position	  by	  stating:	  
	  
In	  the	  view	  of	  the	  African	  Commission,	  the	  following	  conclusions	  could	  be	  drawn:	  
(1)	  traditional	  possession	  of	  land	  by	  indigenous	  people	  has	  the	  equivalent	  effect	  as	  
that	   of	   a	   state-­‐granted	   full	   property	   title;	   (2)	   traditional	   possession	   entitles	  
indigenous	  people	  to	  demand	  official	  recognition	  and	  registration	  of	  property	  title;	  
(3)	  the	  members	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  who	  have	  unwillingly	  left	  their	  traditional	  
lands,	   or	   lost	   possession	   thereof,	  maintain	   property	   rights	   thereto,	   even	   though	  
they	  lack	  legal	  title,	  unless	  the	  lands	  have	  been	  lawfully	  transferred	  to	  third	  parties	  
in	   good	   faith;	   and	   (4)	   the	  members	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	  who	  have	   unwillingly	  
lost	  possession	  of	  their	  lands,	  when	  those	  lands	  have	  been	  lawfully	  transferred	  to	  
innocent	  third	  parties,	  are	  entitled	  to	  restitution	  thereof	  or	  to	  obtain	  other	  lands	  
of	   equal	   extension	   and	   quality.	   Consequently,	   possession	   is	   not	   a	   requisite	  
condition	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  indigenous	  land	  restitution	  rights.334	   	  
	  
	   Regarding	   the	  encroachment	  on	   indigenous	   lands	   for	  public	   interest,	   the	  African	  
Commission	   strictly	   circumscribes	   this	   limitation	   on	   indigenous	   property	   rights	   by	  
pointing	  out	  that:	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The	   ‘public	   interest’	   test	   is	   met	   with	   a	   much	   higher	   threshold	   in	   the	   case	   of	  
encroachment	  of	   indigenous	   land	   rather	   than	   individual	  private	  property.	   In	   this	  
sense,	   the	   test	   is	  much	  more	   stringent	  when	   applied	   to	   ancestral	   land	   rights	   of	  
indigenous	  peoples.	  In	  2005,	  this	  point	  was	  stressed	  by	  the	  Special	  Rapporteur	  of	  
the	  United	  Nations	  Sub-­‐Commission	  for	  the	  Promotion	  and	  Protection	  of	  Human	  
Rights	  who	  published	  the	  following	  statement:	  Limitations,	   if	  any,	  on	  the	  right	  to	  
indigenous	  peoples	  to	  their	  natural	  resources	  must	  flow	  only	  from	  the	  most	  urgent	  
and	  compelling	  interest	  of	  the	  state.	  Few,	  if	  any,	  limitations	  on	  indigenous	  resource	  
rights	   are	   appropriate,	   because	   the	   indigenous	   ownership	   of	   the	   resources	   is	  
associated	  with	  the	  most	  important	  and	  fundamental	  human	  rights,	  including	  the	  
right	  to	  life,	  food,	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination,	  to	  shelter,	  and	  the	  right	  to	  exist	  
as	  a	  people.335	  
	  
	   Finally	   the	   Commission	   decided	   against	   the	   government	   of	   Kenya,	   rejecting	  
arguments	   of	   public	   interest	   to	   justify	   encroachment	   on	   the	   Endorois	   territory.	   The	  
Commission	   found	   the	   state	   arguments	   that	   the	   land	   was	   being	   demarcated	   as	   a	  
conservation	   area	   in	   public	   interest	   as	   particularly	   disingenuous.	   Highlighting	   the	  
stewardship	   role	   of	   the	   Endorois	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   their	   territories,	   the	   Commission	  
unequivocally	   supported	   the	   Endorois’	   biocultural	   rights	   to	   their	   traditional	   lands	   and	  
waters.	  The	  Commission	  noted:	   	  
	  
The	   reasons	   of	   the	  Government	   in	   the	   instant	   Communication	   are	   questionable	  
for	  several	   reasons	   including:	   (a)	   the	  contested	   land	   is	   the	  site	  of	  a	  conservation	  
area,	   and	   the	   Endorois	   –	   as	   the	   ancestral	   guardians	   of	   that	   land	   -­‐	   are	   best	  
equipped	  to	  maintain	  its	  delicate	  ecosystems	   (my	  emphasis);	  (b)	  the	  Endorois	  are	  
prepared	   to	   continue	   the	   conservation	   work	   begun	   by	   the	   Government;	   (c)	   no	  
other	  community	  have	  settled	  on	  the	  land	  in	  question,	  and	  even	  if	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  
the	  Respondent	  state	  is	  obliged	  to	  rectify	  that	  situation,	  (d)	  the	  land	  has	  not	  been	  
spoliated	  and	  is	  thus	  inhabitable;	  (e)	  continued	  dispossession	  and	  alienation	  from	  
their	   ancestral	   land	   continues	   to	   threaten	   the	   cultural	   survival	   of	   the	   Endorois’	  
way	  of	  life,	  a	  consequence	  which	  clearly	  tips	  the	  proportionality	  argument	  on	  the	  
side	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  under	  international	  law.336	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(c)	  Biocultural	  Rights	  and	  Legal	  Recognition	  of	  Stewardship	  Claims	   	  
	  
It	  could	  well	  be	  argued	  that	  all	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  regional	  tribunals	  and	  commissions	  
are	  merely	   recognizing	   group	   rights	   to	   indigenous	   or	   tribal	   land	   title	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  
historical	   occupation	   and	   not	   biocultural	   or	   stewardship	   rights.	   However	   such	   an	  
argument	  does	  not	  answer	  for	  the	  extensive	  treatment	  by	  the	  judges	  in	  these	  cases	  of	  
the	   cultural,	   spiritual	   and,	   in	   effect,	   ‘all-­‐encompassing	   relationship’	   between	   a	   people	  
and	  their	  territories.	  In	  fact	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  courts	  turned	  on	  the	  important	  pivot	  of	  
the	   relationship	   between	   property	   and	   peoplehood.	   This	   relationship	   is	   one	   where	  
property	   is,	   in	  Radin’s	   terms,	   personal	   not	   fungible	   and	   critical	   for	   human	   flourishing.	  
The	  fact	  that	  the	  lands	  in	  question	  were	  materially,	  culturally	  and	  spiritually	  integral	  to	  
peoplehood	  implied	  a	  relationship	  with	  a	  land	  that	  embodied	  an	  ethic	  of	  care.	  Such	  an	  
ethic	  of	  care	  though	  culturally	  and	  spiritually	  expressed	  has	  its	  material	  basis	  in	  the	  cold	  
fact	  that	  a	  destruction	  of	  the	  land	  would	  imperil	  the	  entire	  existence	  of	  a	  people,	  every	  
aspect	   of	   whose	   lives	   depended	   on	   the	   land.	   The	  main	   issue	   in	   the	   decisions	   of	   the	  
regional	  tribunals	  was	  less	  about	  the	  land	  belonging	  to	  the	  people	  and	  more	  about	  the	  
people	  belonging	  to	  the	  land,	  without	  which	  they	  would	  cease	  to	  exist	  as	  a	  people.	  
	  
	   In	  each	  of	  these	  cases	  the	  communities	  asserted	  their	  claims	  to	  the	  land	  not	  just	  
by	  proving	  occupation	  but	  also	  by	  establishing	   strong	  cultural	  and	   spiritual	   ties	   to	   the	  
land	   through	   showing	   a	   strong	   ethic	   of	   stewardship.	   If	   the	   communities	  were	   able	   to	  
prove	  only	  historic	  occupation	  but	  unable	  to	  establish	  stewardship,	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  
courts	   may	   not	   have	   gone	   in	   their	   favour.	   For	   example,	   if	   there	   was	   widespread	  
evidence	  of	  the	  afore	  mentioned	  communities	  selling	  or	  leasing	  parts	  of	  their	  lands	  for	  
strip	  mining	  and	  themselves	  engaged	   in	  ecologically	  destructive	  practices,	   then	  clearly	  
they	  would	  not	  have	  been	  able	  to	  establish	  an	  ‘all-­‐encompassing	  relationship’	  with	  the	  
land.	  The	  land	  would	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  fungible	  asset	  and	  at	  best	  the	  courts	  would	  have	  












required	   the	   governments	   to	   recognize	   community	   rights,	   not	   just	   to	   any	   lands,	   but	  
specifically	   to	   ancestral	   lands	   evidences	   the	   emergence	   biocultural	   rights	   in	   the	  
jurisprudence	  of	  regional	  tribunals	  and	  commissions.	  At	  this	  juncture,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  
include	   a	   caveat	   that	   the	   submissions	   here	   should	   not	   be	   interpreted	   as	   an	   assertion	  
that	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	   traditional	   communities	   are	   invariably	   stewards	   of	   the	  
land.	  On	   the	   contrary,	   the	  effort	  here	   is	   to	  merely	   to	  marshal	   evidence	   to	  establish	   a	  
discursive	   shift	   in	   law	   and	   policy	   towards	   the	   recognition	   of	   biocultural	   rights	   of	  
communities	  where	  they	  are	  able	  to	  establish	  practices	  of	  stewardship.	  
	  
	   The	  growing	   traction	  of	  biocultural	   rights	   in	   the	  afore-­‐discussed	  decisions	  marks	  
the	  establishment	  of	  a	   stewardship	  discourse	   in	  property	   jurisprudence.	   If	  a	  discourse	  
on	  stewardship	  brings	  with	  it	  a	  set	  of	  values	  that	  are	  markedly	  different	  from	  those	  of	  
conventional	   property	   jurisprudence,	   then	   such	   a	   discourse	   necessarily	   requires	   the	  
acceptance	   of	   a	   legal	   pluralism.	   The	   break	   that	   biocultural	   rights	   make	   from	   the	  
dominant	   state-­‐centred	   approach	   to	   land	   as	   fungible	   and	   alienable	   requires	   an	  
engagement	  with	  a	  different	  worldview.	   	  
	  
	   Stewardship	  of	   lands	  and	  waters	   is	  not	  an	  abstract	  concept	  but	   is	  embodied	   in	  a	  
way	  of	  life	  that	  can	  only	  flourish	  if	  its	  cultural	  and	  material	  autonomy	  can	  be	  protected.	  
The	  ethic	  of	  stewardship	   is	   rooted	  within	  a	  moral	  universe	  that	  will	  be	  crowded	  out	   if	  
forced	  to	  fit	  within	  the	  dominant	  legal	  and	  material	  systems	  of	  the	  homo	  economicus.	  It	  
is	   precisely	   for	   this	   reason	   that	   the	   jurisprudence	   of	   Inter-­‐American	   Court	   and	   the	  
African	   Commission	   have	   begun	   to	   strongly	   affirm	   the	   rights	   of	   indigenous	   and	   tribal	  
communities	  to	  cultural	  autonomy	  and	  the	  to	  control	  and	  manage	  their	  territories.	   	  
	  
	   In	   many	   ways	   the	   deep	   structure	   of	   the	   right	   of	   control	   over	   territories	   and	  
cultural	  autonomy	  is	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐determination,	  albeit	  in	  a	  form	  that	  does	  not	  seek	  
separate	   statehood	   but	   rather	   insists	   on	   respect	   for	   customary	   laws	   and	   local	  












builds	   on	   firm	   foundations	   laid	   down	   in	   Anglo-­‐American	   jurisprudence.	   It	   is	   these	  












CHAPTER	  VIII	  –	  BIOCULTURAL	  RIGHTS	  IN	  ANGLO-­‐AMERICAN	  
JURISPRUDENCE	  
	  
There	   is	   a	   tendency,	   operating	   at	   times	   unconsciously,	   to	   render	   that	   (native)	   title	  
conceptually	   in	   terms,	   which	   are	   appropriate	   only	   to	   systems,	   which	   have	   grown	   up	  
under	   English	   law.	   But	   this	   tendency	   has	   to	   be	   held	   in	   check	   closely.	   As	   a	   rule,	   in	   the	  
various	   systems	   of	   native	   jurisprudence	   throughout	   the	   Empire,	   there	   is	   no	   such	   full	  
division	   between	   property	   and	   possession	   as	   English	   lawyers	   are	   familiar	  with.	   A	   very	  
usual	  form	  of	  native	  title	  is	  that	  of	  a	  usufructuary	  right,	  which	  is	  a	  mere	  qualification	  of	  
or	  burden	  on	  the	  radical	  or	  final	  title	  of	  the	  Sovereign	  where	  that	  exists.	  In	  such	  cases	  the	  
title	  of	  the	  Sovereign	  is	  a	  pure	  legal	  estate,	  to	  which	  beneficial	  rights	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  
attached.	  But	  this	  estate	  is	  qualified	  by	  a	  right	  of	  beneficial	  user	  which	  may	  not	  assume	  
definite	  forms	  analogous	  to	  estates,	  or	  may,	  where	  it	  has	  assumed	  these,	  have	  derived	  
them	  from	  the	  intrusion	  of	  the	  mere	  analogy	  of	  English	  jurisprudence….The	  title,	  such	  as	  
it	  is,	  may	  not	  be	  that	  of	  the	  individual,	  as	  in	  this	  country	  it	  nearly	  always	  is	  in	  some	  form,	  
but	  may	  be	  that	  of	  a	  community.	  Such	  a	  community	  may	  have	  the	  possessory	  title	  to	  the	  
common	  enjoyment	  of	  a	  usufruct,	  with	  customs	  under	  which	  its	  individual	  members	  are	  
admitted	  to	  enjoyment,	  and	  even	  to	  a	  right	  of	  transmitting	  the	  individual	  enjoyment	  as	  
members	   by	   assignment	   inter	   vivos	   or	   by	   succession.	   To	   ascertain	   how	   far	   this	   latter	  
development	  of	   right	  has	  progressed	   involves	   the	  study	  of	   the	  history	  of	   the	  particular	  
community	  and	  its	  usages	  in	  each	  case.	  Abstract	  principles	  fashioned	  a	  priori	  are	  of	  but	  
little	  assistance,	  and	  are	  as	  often	  as	  not	  misleading.	  
The	  judgment	  of	  their	  Lordships	  delivered	  by	  Viscount	  Haldane	  in	  Amodu	  Tijani	  v.	  The	  
Secretary,	  Southern	  Nigeria,	  Privy	  Council,	  11th	  July	  1921337	  
	  
The	   last	   two	   decades	   have	   resulted	   in	   landmark	   decisions	   on	   ‘aboriginal	   title’338	   in	  
Anglo-­‐American	   jurisprudence.	  These	  decisions	  of	   the	  highest	  courts	  have	  conclusively	  
established	   for	   domestic	   law	   the	   rights	   of	   indigenous	   and	   tribal	   communities	   to	   their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337	   (1921)	  2	  A.C.	  399.	  
338	   “Aboriginal	  title	  (or	  native	  title	  as	  it	  is	  so	  called)	  is	  a	  right	  to	  land,	  one	  vesting	  in	  a	  community	  that	  
occupied	  the	  land	  at	  the	  time	  of	  colonization.	  Once	  such	  a	  title	  is	  established,	  the	  claimants	  may	  
vindicate	  their	  land	  or,	  if	  it	  had	  been	  expropriated	  without	  adequate	  reimbursement,	  claim	  
compensation.”	  in	  Bennett,	  Thomas	  W.	  et.al,	  “Aboriginal	  Title	  in	  South	  Africa	  Revisited,”(1999)	  15	  













traditional	  lands.	  While	  our	  focus	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  on	  Anglo-­‐American	  jurisprudence,	  it	  
is	  pertinent	  to	  note	  that	  the	  doctrine	  of	  aboriginal	  title	  is	  sui	  generis	  rather	  than	  typical	  
of	   common	   law	   notions	   of	   property.339	   It	   is	   recognised	   in	   legal	   systems	   other	   than	  
Anglo-­‐American340	   and	  is	  arguably	  a	  right	  recognized	  in	  international	  law.341	   Hence	  the	  
current	   chapter	   should	  be	  viewed	  as	   less	  about	  Anglo-­‐	  American	   jurisprudence	  per	   se	  
and	  more	  about	  the	  judicial	  recognition	  of	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  aboriginal	  title	  that	  lies	  outside	  
the	  common	   law	  system.342	   Where	  South	  African	  case	   law	  has	  been	  analysed,	   it	  does	  
not	  in	  any	  way	  deny	  its	  Roman-­‐Dutch	  elements	  but	  rather	  seeks	  to	  explore	  its	  common	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339	   On	  18th	  October	  2007,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Belize	  in	  Cal	  v.	  Attorney	  General	  (Claims	  Nos.	  171	  and	  
172	  (2007)	  ruled	  that	  the	  national	  government	  must	  recognize	  indigenous	  Mayans’	  customary	  tenure	  
to	  land	  and	  refrain	  from	  any	  act	  that	  might	  prejudice	  their	  use	  or	  enjoyment	  of	  their	  ancestral	  domain.	  
The	  Court	  also	  held	  that	  the	  Mayan	  tenure	  pre-­‐dates	  European	  colonization	  and	  survives	  today.	  The	  
decision	  noted	  ‘A	  mere	  change	  in	  sovereignty	  does	  not	  extinguish	  native	  title	  to	  land.…	  Extin-­‐
guishment	  or	  rights	  to	  or	  interests	  in	  land	  is	  not	  to	  be	  lightly	  inferred.’	  Referring	  to	  Delgamuukw	  v.	  
British	  Columbia	  (see	  below),	  the	  High	  Court	  observed	  that	  ‘Indigenous	  title	  is	  now	  correctly	  regarded	  
as	  sui	  generis.’	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  very	  fact	  of	  ‘Original	  Peoples’	  having	  inhabited	  a	  land	  over	  time	  
confers	  land	  title	  rights	  to	  them.	  It	  cited	  the	  Belizean	  Constitution	  and	  several	  international	  legal	  
precedents	  that	  affirmed	  the	  existence	  of	  indigenous	  peoples’	  collective	  rights	  to	  their	  land	  and	  other	  
natural	  resources.	  While	  stating	  that	  the	  UNDRIP	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  non-­‐binding,	  the	  Court	  averred	  
that	  principles	  of	  general	  international	  law	  contained	  in	  the	  declaration	  should	  be	  respected.	  
Moreover,	  it	  noted	  that	  the	  UNDRIP	  was	  adopted	  by	  an	  ‘overwhelming	  number’	  of	  states	  thus	  
reflecting	  ‘the	  growing	  consensus	  and	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  international	  law	  on	  indigenous	  
peoples	  and	  their	  lands	  and	  resources.	  See	  Lynch,	  Owen	  J.,	  Mandating	  Recognition:	  International	  Law	  
and	  Native/Aboriginal	  Title,	  Washington	  DC:	  Rights	  and	  Resources	  Initiative,	  2011,	  p.	  15.	  
340	   The	  1988	  Brazilian	  Constitution	  for	  the	  first	  time	  recognized	  the	  existence	  of	  collective	  rights	  of	  
Brazilian	  Indians	  and	  acknowledged	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  community-­‐based	  indigenous	  autonomy	  and	  
social	  structures.	  The	  Brazilian	  Constitution	  states	  that	  ‘Land	  traditionally	  occupied	  by	  Brazilian	  Indians	  
are	  those	  that	  they	  have	  occupied	  and	  permanently	  possessed	  and	  they	  shall	  have	  the	  exclusive	  
usufruct	  of	  the	  riches	  of	  the	  soil,	  the	  rivers	  and	  the	  lakes	  existing	  therein.’	  In	  2009	  Brazil’s	  Supreme	  
Court	  handed	  down	  a	  decision	  giving	  indigenous	  Amazonians	  legal	  control	  over	  1.7	  million	  hectares	  
Raposa	  Serra	  do	  Sol	  Indigenous	  Reserve.	  See	  ibid	  at	  16.	  
341	   The	  UNDRIP	  in	  Article	  26	  states	  that	  ‘Indigenous	  peoples	  have	  the	  right	  to	  the	  lands,	  territories	  and	  
resources	  which	  they	  have	  traditionally	  owned.’	  In	  Article	  10	  the	  Declaration	  goes	  further	  by	  providing	  
that	  ‘Indigenous	  peoples	  shall	  not	  be	  forcibly	  removed	  from	  their	  lands	  or	  territories.	  No	  relocation	  
shall	  take	  place	  without	  the	  free,	  prior	  and	  informed	  consent	  of	  the	  indigenous	  peoples	  concerned	  and	  
after	  agreement	  on	  just	  and	  fair	  compensation	  and,	  where	  possible,	  with	  the	  option	  of	  return.’	  The	  
International	  Labour	  Organization	  (ILO)	  Conventions	  No.	  107	  and	  169	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Indigenous	  and	  
Tribal	  Peoples	  in	  Developing	  Countries	  came	  into	  force	  in	  1957	  and	  1989	  respectively.	  Prior	  to	  the	  
UNDRIP,	  the	  ILO	  Conventions	  were	  seen	  as	  the	  most	  explicit	  statements	  in	  international	  law	  on	  
aboriginal	  title.	  While	  ILO	  Convention	  No.	  107	  has	  been	  ratified	  by	  27	  countries	  and	  Convention	  No.	  
169	  by	  20	  countries.	  
342	   Supra	  n.	  339	  at	  462;	  Bennett,	  Thomas	  W.	  et.al	  also	  note	  in	  this	  article	  that	  the	  courts	  in	  Canada	  and	  
Australia	  have	  declared	  that	  aboriginal	  title	  is	  not	  a	  part	  of	  English	  common	  law	  but	  is	  in	  fact	  an	  
equitable	  principle	  of	  constitutional	  common	  law	  and	  that	  its	  doctrine	  is	  applicable	  even	  in	  colonies,	  












law	  and	  sui	  generis	  influences.	  
	  
	   Aboriginal	  title	  differs	  from	  common-­‐law	  property	  rights	  because	  it	  is	  a	  communal	  
right	   vesting	   in	   an	   aboriginal	   people	   and	   originated	   in	   a	   pre-­‐colonial	   system	   of	  
indigenous	  law.	  It	  therefore	  lies	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  indigenous	  laws	  and	  the	  received	  
systems	  of	  colonial	  law.343	   	  
	  
	   Many	  of	   the	  decisions	  dealing	  with	  aboriginal	   title	   rest	  on	   the	   clear	   foundations	  
laid	   by	   the	   Privy	   Council	   in	   1921	   in	   its	   decision	   in	   Amodu	   Tijani	   v.	   The	   Secretary,	  
Southern	  Nigeria.344	   Nevertheless	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   the	   American	   Supreme	  
Court	   in	   Johnson	   v.	  M’Intosh	  nearly	  a	  hundred	  years	  before	  Amodu	  Tijani	  had	  already	  
begun	   to	   recognize	   the	   rights	   of	   the	   conquered	   American	   Indian	   tribes	   to	   property.	  
Chief	  Justice	  Marshall	  in	  his	  judgement	  stated	  that:	  
	  
The	   rights	   of	   the	   conquered	   to	   property	   should	   remain	   unimpaired….the	   new	  
subjects	   should	   be	   governed	   as	   equitably	   as	   the	   old,	   and	   ….confidence	   in	   their	  
security	   should	  gradually	  banish	   the	  painful	   sense	  of	  being	   separated	   from	   their	  
ancient	  connections.345	   	   	  
	  
	   Before	  discussing	  the	  reasoning	  of	  the	  Privy	  Council	  in	  Amodu	  Tijani	  it	  is	  important	  
to	   provide	   some	   context	   to	   the	   common	   law	   history	   that	   underlies	   these	   significant	  
advances	  in	  Anglo	  American	  case	  law.	  Courts	  in	  countries	  that	  were	  former	  colonies	  of	  
the	  British	  Crown	  (or	  what	  are	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  common	  law	  jurisdictions)	  have	  on	  
occasion	   had	   to	   clarify	   the	   status	   of	   the	   rights	   of	   indigenous,	   native	   or	   aboriginal	  
communities	   to	   their	   traditional	   lands	   after	   annexation	   by	   the	   British	   Empire.	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343	   In	  fact	  some	  commentators	  have	  gone	  as	  far	  as	  to	  say	  that	  aboriginal	  title	  is	  already	  recognized	  under	  
aboriginal	  law	  and	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  common	  law.	  However	  the	  recognition	  by	  common	  law	  of	  
aboriginal	  title	  is	  what	  is	  termed	  as	  ‘native	  title’.	  While	  the	  lack	  of	  recognition	  by	  common	  law	  of	  
aboriginal	  title	  extinguishes	  native	  title,	  aboriginal	  title	  continues	  to	  exist	  due	  to	  its	  recognition	  by	  
aboriginal	  law.	  See	  Pearson,	  Noel,	  “The	  Concept	  of	  Native	  Title	  at	  Common	  Law”,	  Australian	  
Humanities	  Law	  Review,	  March	  1997,	  http://www.australianhumanitiesreview.org/archive/Issue-­‐
March-­‐1997/pearson.html.	  Retrieved	  13th	  September	  2011.	  
344	   (1921)	  2	  A.C.	  399.	  












reason	  behind	  such	  clarification	  was	  the	  need	  to	  establish	  whether	  these	  rights	  survived	  
the	  hand-­‐over	  of	  power	  by	  the	  Crown	  to	  the	  respective	  national	  governments	  when	  the	  
colonies	  gained	  independence.	  Simply	  put,	  if	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  these	  former	  colonies	  
traced	   its	   lineage	   to	  common	   law,	   then	   the	  operative	  question	  was	  whether	   common	  
law	  recognized	  the	  customary	  land	  rights	  and	  the	  relevant	  customary	  laws	  of	  the	  native	  
populations	  when	  these	  colonies	  were	  under	  the	  rule	  of	  the	  British	  Empire.	  If	  common	  
law	  did	  recognize	  such	  rights,	  then	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  they	  would	  have	  survived	  the	  
transfer	  of	  power	   to	   the	  new	  governments,	  who	   in	   turn	  would	  also	  have	   to	   recognize	  
such	  rights	  since	  their	  jurisprudence	  was	  based	  on	  common	  law.346	   	  
	  
	   In	  the	  above	  excerpt	   from	  Amodu	  Tijani,	  Viscount	  Haldane	  reasoned	  that	   ‘native	  
title’	   is	   a	   burden	   on	   the	   ‘radical	   title’	   of	   the	   Crown.	   The	   presumption	   of	   the	   Crown’s	  
‘radical	  title’	  over	  all	  lands	  in	  its	  colonies	  implied	  that	  the	  Crown,	  like	  any	  government,	  
asserted	   its	   sovereignty	  over	   the	  area	  within	   its	   jurisdiction.	  Such	   title	  means	   that	   the	  
land	  in	  question	  is	  within	  the	  administrative	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Crown.	  However	  the	  fact	  
that	  land	  is	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Crown	  or	  any	  government	  for	  that	  matter	  does	  
not	  mean	  that	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  rights	  of	   individuals	  or	  communities	  over	  such	  land	  can	  
be	  denied.	  Rather,	  such	  rights	  (in	  this	  case	  ‘native	  title’)	  become	  a	  burden	  on	  the	  ‘radical	  
title’,	  which	  means	   that	   the	  C own	  or	   the	  government	  would	  have	   to	   recognize	   these	  
rights	   and	   in	   cases	  where	   such	   rights	   are	   to	   be	   extinguished,	   due	   process	   of	   the	   law	  
would	   need	   to	   be	   followed	   and	   compensation	   should	   be	   provided.	   In	   a	   nutshell,	   in	  
common	  law,	  the	  rights	  of	  communities	  and	  individuals	  over	  land	  are	  protected	  against	  
any	  wholesale	  expropriation	  by	  governments	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  such	  land	  is	  under	  
state	  jurisdiction.347	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
346	   Lord	  Hailey,	  An	  African	  Survey:	  A	  Study	  of	  Problems	  Africa	  South	  of	  the	  Sahara,	  Revised	  to	  1956,	  
Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1968.	  No	  reserves	  were	  created	  in	  West	  Africa,	  because	  in	  this	  region	  
only	  a	  small	  amount	  of	  land	  had	  been	  appropriated	  by	  settlers	  or	  declared	  Crown	  property.	  Indigenous	  
landholdings	  were,	  by	  and	  large,	  undisturbed	  by	  colonization.	  
347	   ‘Radical	  title,	  which	  is	  an	  assertion	  the	  right	  of	  the	  Crown	  over	  all	  land	  in	  its	  jurisdiction,	  should	  be	  
distinguished	  from	  eminent	  domain,	  the	  power	  to	  take	  land.	  Radical	  title	  enables	  the	  Crown	  to	  













	   While	   this	   state	   of	   affairs	   is	   generally	   accepted	   in	   common	   law	   countries,	   the	  
pertinence	  of	  Amodu	  Tijani	   is	   its	  clarification	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  common	  law	  
and	   customary	   law.	   The	  property	   rights	  of	  British	   citizens	  under	   common	   law	  being	  a	  
burden	  on	  the	  Crown	  is	  one	  thing,	  since	  both	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  citizens	  and	  the	  radical	  
title	   of	   the	   Crown	   are	   derived	   from	   within	   the	   same	   legal	   system.	   However	   the	  
recognition	   in	   common	   law	   of	   land	   rights	   of	   individuals	   and	   communities	   that	   are	  
derived	  from	  indigenous	  systems	  of	  customary	  law	  is	  another	  thing	  altogether,	  and	  it	  is	  
here	  that	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Privy	  Council’s	  judgment	  in	  Amodu	  Tijani	  lies.	  
	  
	   As	  Viscount	  Haldane	  noted	  in	  his	  oft	  quoted	  dictum:	   	  
	  
There	  is	  a	  tendency,	  operating	  at	  times	  unconsciously,	  to	  render	  that	  (native)	  title	  
conceptually	   in	   terms,	  which	  are	  appropriate	  only	   to	   systems	  which	  have	  grown	  
up	  under	  English	  law.	  But	  this	  tendency	  has	  to	  be	  held	  in	  check	  closely.348	   	  
	   	  
	   What	   needs	   to	   be	   held	   in	   check	   is	   the	   tendency	   in	   common	   law	   to	   recognize	  
customary	  law	  only	  where	  it	  fits	  within	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  categories	  of	  common	  law.	  The	  
potential	   injustice	   caused	   to	   traditional	   occupants	   or	   users	   of	   land	  due	   to	   the	   lack	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
particular	  land	  to	  a	  subject,	  by	  definition,	  the	  Crown	  no	  longer	  has	  radical	  title	  to	  that	  land;	  that	  is,	  the	  
sovereign	  loses	  its	  radical	  title	  to	  the	  land	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  grant.	  Thus,	  radical	  title	  is	  only	  
relevant	  in	  respect	  of	  land,	  which	  is	  not	  subject	  to	  a	  Crown	  grant,	  that	  is,	  unalienated	  land.	  It	  is	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  alienated	  land,	  therefore,	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  eminent	  domain	  is	  relevant.	  Although	  the	  
Crown	  does	  not	  have	  a	  radical	  title	  to	  land,	  which	  has	  been	  granted	  to	  a	  subject	  (the	  land	  is	  no	  longer	  
Crown	  land),	  it	  has	  a	  power	  of	  eminent	  domain	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  land.	  Thus	  the	  concept	  of	  eminent	  
domain	  compliments	  the	  concept	  of	  radical	  title.	  Until	  the	  Crown	  has	  exercised	  its	  sovereign	  power	  to	  
grant	  an	  interest	  in	  unalienated	  land,	  bringing	  it	  within	  the	  doctrine	  of	  tenure,	  the	  Crown	  cannot	  
exercise	  its	  powers	  of	  eminent	  domain	  to	  effect	  acquisition	  of	  property.	  Because	  unalienated	  land	  
comes	  within	  the	  definition	  of	  Crown	  land,	  that	  is	  land	  in	  respect	  of	  which	  the	  Crown	  has	  a	  radical	  
title,	  the	  Crown	  can	  simply	  exercise	  its	  sovereign	  power	  to	  appropriate	  to	  itself	  ownership	  of	  the	  land.	  
By	  formally	  entitling	  itself	  to	  the	  land,	  the	  land	  loses	  its	  character	  as	  Crown	  land	  and	  becomes	  Crown	  
property.’	  In	  Secher,	  Ulla,	  “Implications	  of	  the	  Crown’s	  Radical	  Title	  for	  Statutory	  Regimes	  Regulating	  
the	  Alienation	  of	  Land:	  ‘Crown	  Land’	  v	  ‘Property	  of	  the	  Crown’	  Post-­‐	  Mabo”,	  Monash	  University	  Law	  
Review,	  Vol.	  34,	  No.	  1,	  2008,	  pp.9-­‐52	  at	  p.	  50.	   	  
348	   Supra	  n.	  345	  at	  3.	  Viscount	  Haldane’s	  views	  were	  in	  marked	  contrast	  to	  the	  Privy	  Council	  decision	  in	  Re	  
Southern	  Rhodesia	  (1919)	  AC	  211	  (PC)	  which	  held	  that	  customary	  tenure	  was	  too	  primitive	  to	  warrant	  












recognition	  of	  customary	  law	  title	  to	  land	  extends	  even	  to	  this	  day.349	   In	  many	  ways	  this	  
situation	  is	  as	  much	  political	  as	  it	   is	   legal,	  since	  the	  non-­‐	  recognition	  of	  communal	  title	  
paves	  the	  way	  for	  the	  dominant	  understanding	  land	  as	  a	  marketable	  commodity	  that	  is	  
fungible,	  alienable	  and	  tradable	  (with	  no	  biocultural	  links	  to	  peoplehood).	   	  
	  
	   Amodu	  Tijani	  was	  a	  case	   that	  came	  before	   the	  Privy	  Council	  on	  appeal	   from	  the	  
Supreme	  Court	  of	  Nigeria	   in	  1921.	  Amodu	  Tijani,	   the	  appellant,	  was	  one	  of	   the	  native	  
chiefs,	  the	  land	  under	  whose	  control	  was	  acquired	  by	  the	  government	  of	  the	  colony	  for	  
public	  purposes	  under	  the	  Public	  Lands	  Ordinance.	  The	  Public	  Lands	  Ordinance	  entitled	  
Amodu	   Tijani	   to	   compensation	   for	   the	   state’s	   acquisition	   of	   his	   lands.	   What	   was	   in	  
dispute,	   however,	  was	   the	   basis	   on	  which	   the	   compensation	   that	  was	   due	  was	   to	   be	  
calculated.	   The	   government	   of	   the	   colony	   decided	   to	   compensate	   Tijani	   only	   to	   the	  
extent	   of	   the	   revenues	   and	   tributes	   that	   he	   would	   receive	   from	   the	   communities	  
occupying	  the	  land.	  Tijani	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  argued	  that	  the	  land	  was	  held	  in	  communal	  
title	   and	   the	   transfer	   of	   ownership	   of	   the	   land	   to	   the	   government	   necessitated	  
compensation	  for	  the	  full	  value	  of	  the	  land.	  The	  case	  went	  on	  appeal	  all	  the	  way	  to	  the	  
Supreme	   Court	   of	   Nigeria,	  which	   upheld	   the	   government’s	   decision	   on	   the	   basis	   that	  
native	   chiefs	   in	   Lagos	   do	   not	   have	   absolute	   ownership	   of	   the	   lands	   but	  were	  merely	  
entitled	  to	  receive	  tributes	  and	  rents	  from	  occupiers	  to	  these	  lands.	  Tijani	  appealed	  the	  
decision	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  before	  the	  Privy	  Council	  pressing	  the	  point	  that	  the	  land	  
was	  held	  in	  communal	  title	  and	  the	  community	  had	  usufructuary	  rights	  over	  the	  land.	   	  
	  
	   After	  analysing	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  case,	  their	  Lordships	  overruled	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  
Supreme	  Court	  of	  Nigeria	  noting	  that:	  
	  
Their	  Lordships	  think	  that	  the	  learned	  Chief	  Justice	  (of	  the	  Supreme	  Court)	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349	   Examples	  of	  this	  includes	  the	  recent	  appeal	  by	  the	  Hai//om	  people	  of	  Etosha	  in	  Namibia	  to	  the	  
Minister	  of	  Environment	  and	  Tourism	  Netumbo	  Nandi-­‐Ndaitwah	  to	  recognize	  their	  customary	  law	  title	  
to	  their	  traditional	  lands	  in	  the	  Etosha	  National	  Park.	  Letter	  from	  the	  Etosha	  Hai||om	  Association	  












judgment	   thus	   summarised,	   which	   virtually	   excludes	   the	   legal	   reality	   of	   the	  
community	  usufruct,	  has	  failed	  to	  recognize	  the	  real	  character	  of	  the	  title	  to	  land	  
occupied	  by	  a	  native	  community.	  That	   title,	  as	   they	  have	  pointed	  out,	   is	  prima	  
facie	  based,	  not	  on	  such	  individual	  ownership	  as	  English	  law	  has	  made	  familiar,	  
but	   on	   a	   communal	   usufructuary	   occupation,	  which	  may	   be	   so	   complete	   as	   to	  
reduce	   any	   radical	   right	   in	   the	   Sovereign	   to	   one	   which	   only	   extends	   to	  
comparatively	   limited	   rights	   of	   administrative	   interference	   (my	   emphasis).	   In	  
their	   opinion	   there	   is	   no	   evidence	   that	   this	   kind	   of	   usufructuary	   title	   of	   the	  
community	  was	  disturbed	  in	  law,	  either	  when	  the	  Benin	  Kings	  conquered	  Lagos	  
or	  when	  the	  cession	  to	  the	  British	  Crown	  took	  place	  in	  1861.	  The	  general	  words	  
used	   in	   the	   treaty	   of	   cession	   are	   not	   in	   themselves	   to	   be	   construed	   as	  
extinguishing	  subject	  rights.	  The	  original	  native	  right	  was	  a	  communal	  right,	  and	  
it	  must	  be	  presumed	  to	  have	  continued	  to	  exist	  unless	  the	  contrary	  is	  established	  
by	   the	   context	   or	   circumstances.	   There	   is,	   in	   their	   Lordships'	   opinion,	   no	  
evidence	  which	  points	  to	  its	  having	  been	  at	  any	  time	  seriously	  disturbed	  or	  even	  
questioned.	  Under	  these	  conditions	  they	  are	  unable	  to	  take	  the	  view	  adopted	  by	  
the	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  the	  full	  Court.350	  
	  
	   What	  makes	  Amodu	  Tijani	  a	  foundational	  decision	  in	  common	  law	  jurisprudence	  is	  
the	  resolution	  by	  the	  Privy	  Council	  (the	  highest	  appellate	  body	  in	  the	  British	  Empire)	  of	  
two	  key	  issues	  regarding	  native	  title:	   	  
	  
(i) There	  is	  always	  a	  presumption	  in	  common	  law	  that	  the	  Crown	  recognizes	  the	  
customary	   rights	   of	   native	   populations	   when	   it	   asserts	   its	   radical	   title	   and	  
that	  these	  rights	  become	  a	  burden	  on	  the	  radical	  title	  of	  the	  Crown;	  and	  
(ii) An	   attempt	   should	   be	   made	   to	   understand	   native	   title	   i.e.	   customary	   law	  
relating	  to	   land	  use,	  on	   its	  own	  terms	  and	  not	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  categories	   in	  
English	  law.	   	   	  
	  
	   The	   Privy	   Council	   in	   Amodu	   Tijani	   in	   effect	   accepted	   that	   common	   law	   can	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
350	   Supra	  n.	  345	  at	  4.	  This	  conception	  followed	  St.	  Catherine’s	  Milling	  &	  Lumber	  Co.	  v.	  The	  Queen	  (1889)	  
14	  App	  Cas	  46	  (PC),	  where	  the	  Privy	  Council	  also	  held	  that	  radical	  title	  remained	  vested	  in	  the	  Crown,	  













recognize	   and	   co-­‐exist	   with	   an	   indigenous	   system	   of	   customary	   law. 351 	   More	  
importantly	   the	  Privy	  Council	  opened	  the	   jurisprudential	  doors	   to	   recognition	  of	  other	  
ways	   of	   understanding	   property,	   and	   by	   implication	   peoplehood,	   that	   could	  
substantially	  differ	  from	  the	  approaches	  of	  English	  law.352	  
	   	  
(a)	  Establishing	  Native	  Title	  in	  the	  Nineties:	  Mabo	  v.	  Queensland	  (No.2)	  
	  
	   Whatever	   the	   justification	   advanced	   in	   earlier	   days	   for	   refusing	   the	   rights	   and	  
interests	   in	   land	   of	   the	   indigenous	   inhabitants	   of	   settled	   colonies,	   an	   unjust	   and	  
discriminatory	  doctrine	  of	  that	  kind	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  accepted.	  The	  expectations	  of	  the	  
international	   community	   accord	   in	   this	   respect	   with	   the	   contemporary	   values	   of	   the	  
Australian	  people.	  The	  opening	  up	  of	   international	   remedies	   to	   individuals	  pursuant	   to	  
Australia’s	  accession	  to	  the	  Optional	  Protocol	  to	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  
Political	   Rights…brings	   to	   bear	   on	   the	   common	   law	   the	   powerful	   influence	   of	   the	  
Covenant	   and	   the	   international	   standards	   it	   imports.	   The	   common	   law	   does	   not	  
necessarily	   conform	   with	   international	   law,	   but	   international	   law	   is	   a	   legitimate	   and	  
important	   influence	  on	   the	  development	  of	   common	   law	  especially	  when	   international	  
law	  declares	   the	  existence	  of	  universal	  human	  rights.	  A	  common	   law	  doctrine	   founded	  
on	   unjust	   discrimination	   in	   the	   enjoyment	   of	   civil	   and	   political	   rights	   demands	  
reconsideration.	   It	   is	   contrary	  both	   to	   international	   standards	  and	   to	   the	   fundamental	  
values	   of	   our	   common	   law	   to	   entrench	   a	   discriminatory	   rule	   which,	   because	   of	   the	  
supposed	  position	  on	  the	  scale	  of	  social	  organization	  of	  the	  indigenous	  inhabitants	  of	  a	  
settled	  colony,	  denies	  them	  a	  right	  to	  occupy	  their	  traditional	  lands.	  
Justice	  Brennan	  in	  Mabo	  v.	  Queensland	  (No.2)353	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351	   See	  also,	  Sobhuza	  II	  v.	  Miller	  (1926)	  AC	  518	  (PC)	  at	  525	  where	  the	  Privy	  Council	  held	  that	  ‘the	  title	  of	  
the	  native	  community	  generally	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  usufructuary	  right,	  a	  mere	  qualification	  of	  a	  
burden	  on	  the	  radical	  or	  final	  title	  of	  whoever	  is	  sovereign.	  Obviously	  such	  a	  usufructuary	  right,	  
however	  difficult	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  by	  ordinary	  methods	  of	  conveyancing,	  may	  be	  extinguished	  by	  the	  
action	  of	  a	  paramount	  power	  which	  assumes	  possession	  or	  the	  entire	  control	  of	  the	  land.’	  
352	   The	  recognition	  of	  aboriginal	  title	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  New	  Zealand	  through	  treaties	  predates	  
Amodu	  Tijani.	  The	  expansion	  of	  the	  United	  States	  after	  independence	  from	  Britain	  was	  achieved	  by	  
treaties	  between	  the	  federal	  government	  and	  American	  Indians.	  These	  treaties	  usually	  provided	  that	  
the	  latter,	  as	  sovereign	  nations,	  were	  entitled	  to	  retain	  their	  lands	  and	  a	  degree	  of	  internal	  autonomy.	  
See	  Worcester	  v.	  Georgia	  31	  US	  (6	  Peters)	  515,	  559-­‐60	  (1832).	  In	  New	  Zealand	  the	  recognition	  of	  
aboriginal	  title	  was	  based,	  in	  the	  first	  instance,	  on	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Waitangi	  of	  1840.	  












The	  Mabo	  case	  (No.2)	  involved	  a	  declaration	  sought	  by	  the	  Meriam	  people,	  a	  sea-­‐faring	  
and	  gardening	  community	  of	   the	  eastern	  Torres	  Strait	   Islands,	   for	   their	  entitlement	  as	  
traditional	  owners	  and	  occupiers	  over	  three	  Torres	  Strait	  Islands,	  collectively	  known	  as	  
the	  Murray	   Islands.	  The	  Meriam	  people	  argued	  that	  they	  had	   lived	  on	  these	   islands	   in	  
accordance	   with	   their	   customary	   laws	   for	   a	   number	   of	   generations	   even	   prior	   to	  
annexation	   by	   the	   British	   Crown.	   They	   asserted	   that	   their	   native	   title	   was	   not	  
extinguished	  after	   the	  annexation	  and	  establishment	  of	  a	  British	  Colony	  of	  New	  South	  
Wales	  in	  1788,	  and	  that	  the	  title	  continued	  to	  exist	  to	  the	  present.	   	   	  
	  
	   In	  1982	  members	  of	  the	  Meriam	  community,	  Eddie	  Koiki	  Mabo,	  Sam	  Passi,	  David	  
Passi,	  Celuia	  Mapo	  Salee	  and	  James	  Rice	  claimed	  legal	  ownership	  of	  their	   lands	  on	  the	  
Murray	  Islands.	  While	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Queensland	  was	  considering	  the	  case,	  the	  
state	   Parliament	   enacted	   the	   Torres	   Strait	   Islands	   Coastal	   Islands	   Act,	   which	   formally	  
extinguished,	  without	  compensation,	  all	   rights	   that	  Torres	  Strait	   Islanders	  had	   to	   their	  
land	  after	   its	  annexation	  by	   the	  British	  Crown	   in	  1879.	  This	  Act	  was	  challenged	   in	   the	  
High	   Court	   of	   Australia,	   which	   decided	   in	  Mabo	   No.1	   that	   the	   Act	   was	   invalid	   as	   it	  
conflicted	  with	  the	  Commonwealth	  Racial	  Discrimination	  Act	  of	  1975.354	   	  
	  
	   However	  Mabo	  No.1	   still	   did	  not	   resolve	   the	  question	  of	   legal	   ownership	  of	   the	  
Meriam	  people	  over	   their	   lands.	  On	   the	  3rd	   of	   June	  1992,	   the	  High	  Court	   of	  Australia	  
handed	  down	  a	  landmark	  decision	  (Mabo	  No.2)	  that	  affirmed	  native	  title	  and	  therefore	  
the	   customary	   land	   rights	   of	   the	  Meriam	  people.	   Eddie	  Mabo	   and	  Celuia	  Mapo	   Salee	  
had	  died	  in	  the	  ten	  years	  it	  took	  from	  the	  initiation	  of	  the	  land	  title	  claim	  to	  the	  decision	  
of	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  Australia.	  Nevertheless	  the	  process	  they	  began	  transformed	  Anglo-­‐
American	  jurisprudence	  relating	  to	   land	  rights	  of	   indigenous	  peoples	   in	  ways	  that	  they	  
probably	  never	  conceived.	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
354	   See	  Documenting	  Democracy,	  Mabo	  (No.2)	  http://foundingdocs.gov.au/item-­‐did-­‐33.html.	  Retrieved	  












	   Mabo	   No.2	   traced	   a	   line	   of	   precedents	   in	   common	   law	   beginning	   with	   Amodu	  
Tijani	   that	   upheld	   ‘native	   title’	   and	   therefore	   customary	   systems	   of	   land	   holding.	   In	  
doing	  so	  the	  case	  overruled	  Australian	  decisions	  in	  common	  law	  that	  did	  not	  recognize	  
traditional	  land	  rights.355	   The	  fact	  that	  Justice	  Brennan	  in	  the	  above	  excerpt	  went	  as	  far	  
as	   saying	   that	   international	   law	  was	  a	   legitimate	  and	   important	   influence	  on	  common	  
law	   and	   common	   law	   could	   not	   violate	   human	   rights	   is	   an	   indication	   of	   the	   delicate	  
balance	   he	   sought	   to	   maintain,	   a	   balance	   between	   holding	   fast	   to	   the	   centuries	   of	  
common	   law	   tradition	   and	   keeping	   step	   with	   the	   growing	   human	   rights	   discourse	   in	  
international	  law.	   	  
	  
	   Justice	   Brennan,	   speaking	   on	   behalf	   of	   himself,	   Chief	   Justice	  Mason	   and	   Justice	  
McHugh,	   was	   confronted	   with	   a	   political	   dilemma.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   he	   could	   not	  
embrace	  the	  advances	  in	  international	  law	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  would	  undercut	  the	  very	  
foundations	  of	  Australian	   legal	  system	  i.e.	  disrupt	  the	  existing	   land	  rights	  of	  Australian	  
citizens	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   some	   of	   this	   land	   was	   acquired	   as	   a	   result	   of	   great	  
injustices	   against	   the	   aboriginal	   populations.	  On	   the	  other	   hand,	   he	   could	  not	   uphold	  
aspects	  of	  common	  law	  that	  were	  clearly	  contrary	  to	  generally	  accepted	  human	  rights	  
standards.	  The	  way	  out	  of	  this	  dilemma	  was	  for	  Justice	  Brennan	  to	  propound	  the	  rule	  of	  
the	  ‘skeleton	  principle’:	  
	  
In	  discharging	   its	  duty	   to	  declare	   the	   common	   law	  of	  Australia,	   this	  Court	   is	  not	  
free	  to	  adopt	  rules	  that	  accord	  with	  contemporary	  notions	  of	   justice	  and	  human	  
rights	   if	   their	   adoption	   would	   fracture	   the	   skeleton	   of	   principle	   (my	   emphasis)	  
which	  gives	  the	  body	  of	  our	  law	  its	  shape	  and	  internal	  consistency.	  Australian	  law	  
is	  not	  only	  the	  historical	  successor	  of,	  but	  is	  an	  organic	  development	  from,	  the	  law	  
of	  England.	  Although	  our	  law	  is	  the	  prisoner	  of	  its	  history,	  it	  is	  not	  now	  bound	  by	  
decisions	   of	   courts	   in	   the	   hierarchy	   of	   an	   Empire	   then	   concerned	   with	   the	  
development	  of	  its	  colonies.356	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
355	   See,	  Cooper	  v.	  Stuart	  (1889)	  14	  App	  Cas	  286	  and	  Milirrpum	  v.	  Nabalco	  Pty	  Ltd.	  (1971)	  17	  FLR	  141.	   	  












	   The	  challenge	  for	  Justice	  Brennan,	  however,	  was	  to	  clarify	  what	  was	  meant	  by	  this	  
skeletal	  principle	  of	  Australian	   law	  that	  could	  override	   international	  human	  rights	   law.	  
He	  sidestepped	  this	  difficulty	  by	  stating	  that:	  
	  
The	  peace	  and	  order	  of	  Australian	   society	   is	   built	   on	   the	   legal	   system.	   It	   can	  be	  
modified	   to	   bring	   it	   into	   conformity	   with	   contemporary	   notions	   of	   justice	   and	  
human	  rights,	  but	  it	  cannot	  be	  destroyed.	  It	   is	  not	  possible	  a	  priori	  to	  distinguish	  
between	  cases	   that	  express	  a	   skeletal	  principle	  and	   those,	  which	  do	  not,	  but	  no	  
case	   can	   command	   unquestioning	   adherence	   if	   the	   rule	   it	   expresses	   seriously	  
offends	  the	  values	  of	  justice	  and	  human	  rights	  (especially	  equality	  before	  the	  law)	  
which	  are	  aspirations	  of	  the	  contemporary	  Australian	  legal	  system.	  If	  a	  postulated	  
rule	   of	   common	   law	   expressed	   in	   earlier	   cases	   seriously	   offends	   those	  
contemporary	  values,	  the	  question	  arises	  whether	  the	  rule	  should	  be	  maintained	  
and	  applied.	  Whenever	   such	  a	  question	  arises,	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	  assess	  whether	  
the	  particular	  rule	  is	  an	  essential	  doctrine	  of	  our	  legal	  system	  and	  whether,	  if	  the	  
rule	   were	   to	   be	   overturned,	   the	   disturbance	   to	   be	   apprehended	   would	   be	  
disproportionate	  to	  the	  benefit	  flowing	  from	  the	  overturning.357	  
	  
	   At	   this	   stage	   it	   would	   help	   to	   clarify	   the	   common	   law	   principle	   that	   was	   being	  
argued	  by	  the	  government	  of	  Queensland,	  which	  was	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  rule	  propounded	  
by	  Amodu	  Tijani.	  In	  fact	  the	  government	  of	  Queensland	  was	  making	  the	  case	  that,	  while	  
Amodu	  Tijani	  held	  that	  common	  law	  should	  recognize	  native	  title,	  this	  recognition	  was	  
subject	  to	  two	  caveats:	  the	  international	  law	  rule	  of	  terra	  nullius	  (uninhabited	  land)	  and	   	  
the	  Privy	  Council	   ruling	   in	   the	  1919	   the	   case	  of	   In	   re	   Southern	  Rhodesia358	   which	  had	  
held	   that	   certain	   forms	   of	   aboriginal	   social	   organization	   in	   relation	   to	   land	   were	   so	  
‘backward’	   that	   it	   was	   as	   good	   as	   the	   land	   was	   unoccupied.359	   Lord	   Sumner	   in	   In	   re	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
357	   Supra	  n.	  354,	  at	  paragraph	  29,	  judgment	  of	  Brennan	  J.	  
358	   (1919)	  AC211.	  
359	   Justice	  Brennan	  articulated	  his	  reasoning	  by	  stating	  that:	  ‘The	  theory	  that	  the	  indigenous	  inhabitants	  
of	  a	  "settled"	  colony	  had	  no	  proprietary	  interest	  in	  the	  land	  thus	  depended	  on	  a	  discriminatory	  
denigration	  of	  indigenous	  inhabitants,	  their	  social	  organization	  and	  customs.	  As	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  theory	  
is	  false	  in	  fact	  and	  unacceptable	  in	  our	  society,	  there	  is	  a	  choice	  of	  legal	  principle	  to	  be	  made	  in	  the	  
present	  case.	  This	  Court	  can	  either	  apply	  the	  existing	  authorities	  and	  proceed	  to	  inquire	  whether	  the	  
Meriam	  people	  are	  higher	  "in	  the	  scale	  of	  social	  organization"	  than	  the	  Australian	  Aborigines	  whose	  












Southern	  Rhodesia	  expressed	  this	  view	  by	  stating:	  
	  
The	  estimation	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  aboriginal	  tribes	  is	  always	  inherently	  difficult.	  Some	  
tribes	   are	   so	   low	   in	   the	   scale	   of	   social	   organization	   that	   their	   usages	   and	  
conceptions	  of	  rights	  and	  duties	  are	  not	  to	  be	  reconciled	  with	  the	   institutions	  or	  
the	  legal	  ideas	  of	  civilized	  society.	  Such	  a	  gulf	  cannot	  be	  bridged,	  it	  would	  be	  idle	  
to	  impute	  to	  such	  people	  some	  shadow	  of	  the	  rights	  known	  to	  our	  law	  and	  then	  to	  
transmute	   it	   into	   the	   substance	   of	   transferable	   rights	   of	   property	   as	   we	   know	  
them.360	  
	  
	   The	  logical	  conclusion	  of	  such	  a	  view	  propounded	  by	  the	  Privy	  Council	  was	  that	  the	  
moment	   the	  colonial	   government	   classified	  certain	   tribes	   in	   the	  colonies	  as	   ‘so	   low	   in	  
the	  scale	  of	  social	  organization’	  that	  their	  way	  of	  life	  cannot	  be	  reconciled	  with	  ‘civilized	  
society’,	   then	   the	   Crown	   no	   longer	   had	   to	   recognize	   their	   customary	   laws	   relating	   to	  
land.	   These	   lands	   could	   be	   deemed	   ownerless.	   The	   declaration	   that	   a	   land	   was	  
ownerless	   implied	   that	   the	   ‘radical	   title’	   of	   the	   Crown	   would	   expand	   to	   include	  
beneficial	  ownership	  of	  the	  land.	  This	  would	  imply	  that	  the	  land	  was	  not	  only	  within	  the	  
jurisdiction	   of	   the	   Crown	  but	   also	   that	   the	   Crown	   in	   effect	   became	   the	   owner	   of	   the	  
land.	  
	  
	   At	   this	   stage	   the	   High	   Court	   of	   Australia	   had	   a	   choice	   of	   critically	   analysing	   the	  
doctrine	  of	  terra	  nullius	  or	  engaging	  in	  the	  unsavoury	  task	  of	  examining	  the	  customs	  and	  
traditions	  of	  the	  Meriam	  people	  to	  determine	  whether	  they	  can	  be	  reconciled	  with	  Lord	  
Sumner’s	   views	   of	   ‘civilized	   society’.	   Justice	   Brennan	   and	   his	   fellow	   judges	   chose	   the	  
former	   course	   of	   action	   and	   thereby	   overruled	   In	   re	   Southern	   Rhodesia	   and	   all	   the	  
decisions	  thereafter	  that	  had	  relied	  on	  that	  case	  to	  deny	  native	  title.	   Importantly	  they	  
disagreed	   with	   Milirrpum	   v.	   Nabalco	   Pty.	   Ltd.,361	   the	   only	   reported	   decision	   of	   an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
authorities,	  discarding	  the	  distinction	  between	  inhabited	  colonies	  that	  were	  terra	  nullius	  and	  those	  
which	  were	  not.’	  Supra	  n.	  354,	  at	  paragraph	  39,	  judgment	  of	  Brennan	  J.	  
360	   Supra	  n.	  354,	  at	  paragraph	  38,	  judgment	  of	  Brennan	  J.	  
361	   (1970)	  17	  FLR	  141.	  Deane	  and	  Gaudron	  JJ	  stated	  that	  in	  Milirrpum:	  ‘…a	  group	  of	  Aborigines	  












Australian	   court	   directly	   dealing	   with	   the	   merits	   of	   an	   Aboriginal	   claim	   to	   particular	  
traditional	   tribal	  or	   communal	   lands.	   In	   interrogating	   the	  doctrine	  of	   terra	  nullius,	   the	  
High	  Court	  of	  Australia	  had	  at	  its	  disposal	  the	  advisory	  opinion	  of	  the	  International	  Court	  
of	  Justice	  (ICJ)	  on	  the	  status	  of	  the	  Western	  Sahara,	  where	  the	  ICJ	  unequivocally	  clarified	  
what	   terra	   nullius	   meant	   in	   law.	   The	   majority	   judgment	   in	   the	   Advisory	   Opinion	   on	  
Western	  Sahara362	   noted	  that:	  
	  
The	  expression	  "terra	  nullius"	  was	  a	  legal	  term	  of	  art	  employed	  in	  connection	  with	  
"occupation"	  as	  one	  of	  the	  accepted	  legal	  methods	  of	  acquiring	  sovereignty	  over	  
territory.	   "Occupation"	   being	   legally	   an	   original	   means	   of	   peaceably	   acquiring	  
sovereignty	   over	   territory	   otherwise	   than	   by	   cession	   or	   succession,	   it	   was	   a	  
cardinal	  condition	  of	  a	  valid	  "occupation"	  that	  the	  territory	  should	  be	  terra	  nullius-­‐	  
a	   territory	  belonging	   to	  no-­‐one	   -­‐	  at	   the	   time	  of	   the	  act	  alleged	  to	  constitute	   the	  
"occupation"….Whatever	   differences	   of	   opinion	   there	   may	   have	   been	   among	  
jurists,	  the	  state	  practice	  of	  the	  relevant	  period	  indicates	  that	  territories	  inhabited	  
by	  tribes	  or	  peoples	  having	  a	  social	  and	  political	  organization	  were	  not	  regarded	  as	  
terra	  nullius.363	  
	  
	   The	  Vice-­‐President	   of	   the	   ICJ,	   Justice	  Ammoun,	   in	   a	   separate	   opinion	   supported	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the	  Northern	  Territory	  claiming	  relief	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  possession	  and	  enjoyment	  of	  areas	  of	  land	  
which	  had	  initially	  been	  part	  of	  the	  Colony	  of	  New	  South	  Wales.	  The	  learned	  trial	  judge	  (Blackburn	  J.)	  
rejected	  the	  plaintiffs'	  claim	  of	  common	  law	  communal	  native	  title.	  The	  primary	  reason	  for	  that	  
rejection	  was	  that	  his	  Honour	  found	  that	  the	  plaintiffs	  had	  not	  established,	  on	  the	  balance	  of	  
probabilities,	  that	  their	  predecessors	  had	  had	  the	  same	  links	  as	  themselves	  to	  the	  relevant	  areas	  of	  
land	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	  New	  South	  Wales.	  It	  is	  not	  necessary,	  for	  present	  purposes,	  to	  
examine	  the	  correctness	  or	  the	  relevance	  of	  that	  particular	  finding	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  evidence	  in	  
Milirrpum.	  The	  importance	  of	  the	  case	  for	  present	  purposes	  lies	  in	  Blackburn	  J.'s	  conclusion	  that,	  quite	  
apart	  from	  that	  finding,	  there	  were	  general	  reasons	  of	  principle	  which	  precluded	  the	  plaintiffs'	  
success.	  One	  was	  that	  a	  doctrine	  of	  common	  law	  native	  title	  had	  no	  place	  in	  a	  settled	  Colony	  except	  
under	  express	  statutory	  provisions.	  Another	  was	  that,	  under	  any	  such	  doctrine,	  the	  narrow	  and	  
somewhat	  rigid	  approach	  referred	  to	  in	  In	  re	  Southern	  Rhodesia	  would	  be	  appropriate	  and	  that	  the	  
plaintiffs	  had	  failed	  to	  establish	  any	  pre-­‐existing	  interest	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  land	  which	  satisfied	  the	  
requirement	  that	  it	  be	  of	  the	  category	  of	  "rights	  of	  property".	  It	  should	  be	  apparent	  from	  what	  has	  
been	  written	  above	  that	  we	  disagree	  with	  each	  of	  the	  above	  conclusions	  of	  general	  principle	  reached	  
by	  Blackburn	  J.	  in	  Milirrpum.	  As	  has	  been	  seen,	  the	  doctrine	  of	  presumptive	  common	  law	  native	  title,	  
which	  has	  long	  been	  recognized	  by	  the	  common	  law,	  is	  applicable	  to	  a	  settled	  British	  Colony.’	  Supra	  n.	  
354,	  at	  paragraphs	  41	  and	  42,	  judgment	  of	  Deane	  and	  Gaudron	  JJ.	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   Western	  Sahara,	  Advisory	  Opinion,	  I.C.J.	  Reports,	  1975,	  p.12.	  












the	  views	  of	  Mr.	  Bayona-­‐Ba-­‐Meya,	  Senior	  President	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Zaire,	  and	  
Mr.	  Mohammed	  Bedjaoui,	  Algerian	  Ambassador	  in	  Paris,	  representatives	  respectively	  of	  
the	  Republic	  of	  Zaire	  and	  the	  Democratic	  and	  Popular	  Republic	  of	  Algeria	  regarding	  the	  
concept	   of	   terra	   nullius.	   Justice	   Ammoun’s	   views	   on	   terra	   nullius	   in	   his	   separate	  
judgment	   deserve	   to	   be	   presented	   in	   full	   considering	   its	   explicit	   recognition	   of	   a	  
biocultural	   relationship	   with	   the	   land.	   The	  majority	   in	  Mabo	   No.2	   concurred	   in	   their	  
judgment	  with	  the	  views	  of	  Justice	  Ammoun	  where	  he	  noted:	  
	  
Mr.	  Bayona-­‐Ba-­‐Meya	  goes	  on	  to	  dismiss	  the	  materialistic	  concept	  of	  terra	  nullius,	  
which	   led	   to	   this	   dismemberment	   of	   Africa	   following	   the	   Berlin	   Conference	   of	  
1885.	  Mr.	  Bayona-­‐Ba-­‐Meya	  substitutes	  for	  this	  a	  spiritual	  notion:	  the	  ancestral	  tie	  
between	   the	   land,	   or	   "mother	   nature",	   and	   the	  man	  who	  was	   born	   therefrom,	  
remains	  attached	  thereto,	  and	  must	  one	  day	  return	  thither	  to	  be	  united	  with	  his	  
ancestors.	   This	   link	   is	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   ownership	   of	   the	   soil,	   or	   better,	   of	  
sovereignty.	   This	   amounts	   to	   a	  denial	   of	   the	   very	   concept	  of	   terra	  nullius	   in	   the	  
sense	   of	   a	   land	  which	   is	   capable	   of	   being	   appropriated	   by	   someone	  who	   is	   not	  
born	   therefrom.	   It	   is	   a	   condemnation	   of	   the	   modern	   concept,	   as	   defined	   by	  
Pasquale	  Fiore,	  which	  regards	  as	  terra	  nullius	  territories	  inhabited	  by	  populations	  
whose	   civilization,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   the	   public	   law	   of	   Europe,	   is	   backward,	   and	  
whose	   political	   organization	   is	   not	   conceived	   according	   to	  Western	   norms.	   One	  
might	  go	  still	  further	  in	  analysing	  the	  statement	  of	  the	  representative	  of	  Zaire	  so	  
as	   to	   say	   that	  he	  would	  exclude	   from	   the	   concept	  of	   terra	  nullius	  any	   inhabited	  
territory.	  His	  view	  thus	  agrees	  with	  that	  of	  Vattel,	  who	  defined	  terra	  nullius	  as	  a	  
land	  empty	  of	  inhabitants.	  This	  is	  the	  reply	  which	  may	  be	  given	  to	  the	  participants	  
in	   the	   Berlin	   Conference	   of	   1885,	   who,	   during	   the	   fierce	   blaze	   of	   nineteenth-­‐
century	   colonialism,	   the	   success	   of	   which	   they	   sought	   to	   ensure	   by	   eliminating	  
competition,	  regarded	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  as	  an	  immense	  terra	  nullius	  available	  for	  
the	   first	   occupier,	   whereas	   that	   continent	   had	   been	   inhabited	   since	   prehistoric	  
times,	  and	  flourishing	  kingdoms	  had	  there	  been	  established	  -­‐	  Ghana,	  Mali,	  Bornu	  -­‐	  
whose	   civilization	   survived	  until	   the	   colonial	   period,	   and	  only	   succumbed	   to	   the	  
wounds	  inflicted	  by	  colonization	  and	  the	  slave	  trade…..	  It	  was	  in	  the	  southern	  part	  
of	  this	  continent	  and	  in	  Kenya	  that	  the	  ethnologists	  discovered	  the	  remains	  of	  the	  
first	  hominoids.364	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












	   Justice	   Brennan	   and	   his	   fellow	   judges	   in	  Mabo	   No.	   2	   relied	   upon	   the	   advisory	  
opinion	   of	   the	   ICJ	   in	  Western	   Sahara	   to	   overrule	   the	   views	   of	   Lord	   Sumner	   in	   In	   re	  
Southern	   Rhodesia	   and	   clarified	   that	   native	   title	   in	   common	   law	   is	   not	   extinguished	  
simply	   because	   the	   administrators	   of	   the	   colonies	   did	   not	   think	   that	   the	   social	  
organization	  of	  the	  natives	  met	  the	  standards	  of	  ‘civilized	  society’.	  In	  situations	  of	  such	  a	  
nature,	  one	  would	  do	  well	  to	  cleave	  to	  the	  dictum	  of	  Viscount	  Haldane	  in	  Amodu	  Tijani	  
that	  native	  title	  should	  not	  be	  conceived	  of	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  English	  law	  but	  on	  its	  own	  
terms.	   	  
	  
	   Once	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  Australia	  had	  done	  away	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  terra	  nullius	  in	  
the	  Australian	  context,	  it	  cleared	  the	  way	  for	  the	  recognition	  of	  native	  title	  in	  common	  
law.	   Justice	   Brennan	   noted	   that	   the	   assertion	   of	   radical	   title	   by	   the	   Crown	   does	   not	  
imply	  that	  the	  Crown	  acquires	  beneficial	  ownership	  of	   the	   land	   in	  question.	  He	  makes	  
this	  point	  explicitly	  by	  the	  notion	  that	  ‘it	  is	  only	  the	  fallacy	  of	  equating	  sovereignty	  and	  
beneficial	  ownership	  of	  land	  that	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  notion	  that	  native	  title	  is	  extinguished	  
by	  the	  acquisition	  of	  sovereignty.’365	  
	  
	   Going	   further	   to	   clarify	   the	   different	   ways	   in	   which	   land	   is	   held	   by	   indigenous	  
peoples	  and	  the	  need	  for	  legal	   ecognition	  of	  the	  same,	  Justice	  Brennan	  notes:	  
	  
The	   fact	   that	   individual	   members	   of	   the	   community….enjoy	   only	   usufructuary	  
rights	  that	  are	  not	  proprietary	  in	  nature	  is	  no	  impediment	  to	  the	  recognition	  of	  a	  
proprietary	   community	   title.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   not	   possible	   to	   admit	   traditional	  
usufructuary	   rights	   without	   admitting	   a	   traditional	   proprietary	   community	   title.	  
There	   may	   be	   difficulties	   of	   proof	   of	   boundaries	   or	   of	   membership	   of	   the	  
community	   or	   of	   representatives	   of	   the	   community	   which	   was	   in	   exclusive	  
possession,	  but	   those	  difficulties	  afford	  no	  reason	  for	  denying	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  
proprietary	  community	  title	  capable	  of	  recognition	  by	  common	  law.366	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   While	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  Australia	  were	  in	  agreement	  thus	  far,	  they	  
still	  left	  open	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  and	  how	  native	  title	  could	  be	  extinguished	  by	  the	  
state,	   and,	   if	   native	   title	   was	   extinguished,	   whether	   the	   communities	   who	   lost	   their	  
lands	  were	   entitled	   to	   compensation.	   It	  was	   on	   this	   issue	   that	   the	  majority	  was	   spilt.	  
Justices	   Brennan,	   Mason	   and	   McHugh	   held	   that	   native	   title	   is	   a	   form	   of	   permissive	  
occupancy	  at	  the	  will	  of	  the	  Crown,	  and	  Justices	  Toohey,	  Deane	  and	  Gaudron	  held	  that,	  
in	   the	   absence	   of	   clear	   and	   unambiguous	   statutory	   provisions	   to	   the	   contrary,	  
extinguishment	  of	  native	  title	  by	  the	  Crown	  by	  inconsistent	  grant	  is	  wrongful	  and	  gives	  
rise	  to	  a	  claim	  for	  compensatory	  damages.367	   	  
	  
	   Justice	  Brennan	  on	  behalf	  of	  himself	   and	   Justices	  Mason	  and	  McHugh	  explained	  
native	  title	  as	  a	  term	  that	  ‘conveniently	  describes	  the	  rights	  and	  interests	  of	  indigenous	  
inhabitants	   in	   land,	   whether	   communal,	   group	   or	   individual	   possessed	   under	   the	  
traditional	   laws	   acknowledged	   by	   and	   the	   traditional	   customs	   observed	   by	   the	  
indigenous	   inhabitants’	   368	   and	   that	   the	   dispossession	   of	   the	   indigenous	   peoples	   of	  
Australia	  was	  not	  a	  result	  of	  the	  application	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  common	  law	  or	  the	  fact	  
that	  native	  title	  did	  not	  survive	  the	  acquisition	  of	  sovereignty	  by	  the	  Crown	  but	  by	  the	  
recurrent	   exercise	   of	   paramount	   power.369	   The	   real	   question	   then	   was	   whether	   the	  
exercise	  of	  paramount	  or	  executive	  power	  could	  validly	  extinguish	  native	   title,	  and	  on	  
this	  issue	  the	  majority	  in	  Mabo	  No.2	  split.	   	  
	  
	   Justice	  Brennan	  noted	  that	  native	  title	  is	  different	  from	  an	  interest	  in	  land	  granted	  
by	   the	   Crown.	   He	   thereby	   distinguished	   between	   the	   rights	   of	   indigenous	   peoples	   to	  
their	  lands	  in	  Australia	  and	  other	  Australians	  whose	  land	  was	  granted	  by	  the	  Crown	  or	  
who	  purchased	  their	  lands	  according	  to	  statute.	  Outlining	  a	  rationale	  that	  posed	  a	  grave	  
risk	  to	  native	  title,	  Justice	  Brennan	  noted:	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   Supra	  n.	  354,	  at	  paragraph	  2.	  
368	   Supra	  n.	  354,	  at	  paragraph	  61,	  judgment	  of	  Brennan	  J.	  













(A)n	  interest	  validly	  granted	  by	  the	  Crown	  or	  a	  right	  or	  interest	  dependent	  on	  an	  
interest	   validly	   granted	   by	   the	   Crown	   cannot	   be	   extinguished	   by	   the	   Crown	  
without	   statutory	   authority.	   As	   the	  Crown	   is	   not	   competent	   to	   derogate	   from	  a	  
grant	  once	  made,	  a	  statute	  which	  confers	  a	  power	  on	  the	  Crown	  will	  be	  presumed	  
(so	   far	  as	  consistent	  with	   the	  purpose	   for	  which	   the	  power	   is	  conferred)	   to	  stop	  
short	  of	  authorizing	  any	  impairment	  of	  an	  interest	  in	  land	  granted	  by	  the	  Crown	  or	  
dependent	   on	   a	   Crown	   grant.	   But,	   as	   native	   title	   is	   not	   granted	   by	   the	   Crown,	  
there	   is	   no	   comparable	   presumption	   affecting	   the	   conferring	   of	   any	   executive	  
power	  on	  the	  Crown	  the	  exercise	  of	  which	  is	  apt	  to	  extinguish	  native	  title.370	  
	  
	   The	  implications	  of	  this	  view	  are	  grave	  for	  the	  security	  of	  native	  title.	  In	  effect,	  the	  
executive,	   with	   no	   statutory	   authority,	   can	   decide	   to	   extinguish	   native	   title	   without	  
necessarily	  getting	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  communities	  holding	  the	  native	  title.371	   What	   is	  
worse	   is	   that	  an	  action	  by	   the	  executive	   that	   is	   inconsistent	  with	  native	   title	   could	  be	  
tantamount	   to	   extinguishing	   that	   title.	   For	   example,	   a	   decision	   by	   the	   Crown	   to	  
reallocate	   some	   of	   the	   land	   under	   native	   title	   for	   a	   public	   purpose	   could	   extinguish	  
native	   title	   if	   it	   conflicted	   with	   such	   a	   purpose,	   irrespective	   of	   whether	   the	   Crown	  
intended	   to	   extinguish	   it	   or	   not.	   This	  means	  public	   purpose	   as	  deemed	  by	   the	  Crown	  
would	  always	  trump	  native	  title	  thus	  making	  native	  title	  particularly	  vulnerable.	  Justice	  
Brennan	  notes	  that:	  ‘A	  Crown	  grant	  which	  vests	  in	  the	  grantee	  an	  interest	  in	  land	  which	  
is	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  continued	  right	  to	  enjoy	  a	  native	  title	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  same	  land	  
necessarily	  extinguishes	  the	  native	  title.’372	  
	  
	   Justices	  Brennan,	  Mason	  and	  McHugh	  emphasized	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  native	  title	  
by	   concluding	   that	   while	   such	   title	   remains	   unaffected	   by	   the	   Crown’s	   acquisition	   of	  
radical	  title,	  such	  an	  acquisition	  nevertheless	  exposes	  native	  title	  to	  extinguishment	  by	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370	   Supra	  n.	  354,	  at	  paragraph	  74,	  judgment	  of	  Brennan	  J.	  
371	   The	  judges	  here	  refused	  to	  make	  the	  concession	  of	  eminent	  domain	  for	  native	  title	  wherein	  full	  
compensation	  would	  have	  to	  be	  paid	  when	  the	  executive	  expropriated	  private	  property	  for	  public	  
good.	  See	  supra	  n.	  348.	  












valid	  exercise	  of	  sovereign	  power	   inconsistent	  with	  the	  continued	  enjoyment	  of	  native	  
title.	   Their	   brother	   judges,	   Justices	   Toohey,	   Dean	   and	   Gaudron	   however	   strongly	  
disagreed	   with	   this	   conclusion,	   arguing	   that	   it	   would	   exacerbate	   the	   vulnerability	   of	  
native	  title	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  would	  render	  it	  hollow.	   	  
	  
	   Justices	  Dean	  and	  Gaudron	  in	  their	  joint	  judgment	  added	  significant	  limitations	  to	  
the	  executive’s	  power	  to	  extinguish	  native	  title.	  They	  reasoned	  that	  even	  though	  native	  
title,	  like	  other	  forms	  of	  property,	  can	  be	  extinguished	  by	  the	  state,	  it	  can	  only	  be	  done	  
through	   legislation	  where	   it	   is	   stated	   in	  clear	  and	  unambiguous	   terms	  that	   there	   is	  an	  
intent	  to	  expropriate	  native	  lands.	  The	  judges	  asserted	  in	  no	  uncertain	  terms	  that	  acts	  of	  
the	   executive	   inconsistent	   with	   native	   title	   or	   general	   waste	   lands	   (or	   Crown	   lands)	  
legislation	   cannot	   be	   construed,	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   clear	   words	   to	   this	   effect,	   as	  
extinguishing	  or	  diminishing	  native	  title.	  The	  judges	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  say:	  
	  
If	  lands	  in	  relation	  to	  which	  such	  (native)	  title	  exists	  are	  clearly	  included	  within	  the	  
ambit	   of	   such	   legislation,	   the	   legislative	   provisions	   conferring	   executive	   powers	  
will,	   in	   the	  absence	  of	   clear	  and	  unambiguous	  words,	  be	   construed	   so	  as	  not	   to	  
increase	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  Crown	  to	  extinguish	  or	  diminish	  native	  title.	  That	  is	  to	  
say,	   the	   power	   of	   the	   Crown	   wrongfully	   to	   extinguish	   the	   native	   title	   by	  
inconsistent	  grant	  will	  remain	  but	  any	  liability	  of	  the	  Crown	  to	  pay	  compensatory	  
damages	  for	  such	  wrongful	  extinguishment	  will	  be	  unaffected.	  The	  executive	  acts	  
of	  the	  Crown	  under	  Crown	  or	  waste	  lands	  legislation	  will	  likewise	  be	  presumed	  not	  
to	  have	  been	  intended	  to	  derogate	  from	  native	  title.373	  
	  
	   Justice	  Toohey	  in	  a	  separate	  judgment	  went	  a	  step	  further	  to	  question	  the	  limits	  of	  
the	  Crown’s	  power	  to	  extinguish	  native	  title.	  Should	  the	  power	  be	  exercised	  only	  with	  
the	   consent	   of	   the	   titleholders	   or	   can	   it	   be	   exercised	   unilaterally?	   Is	   there	   a	   right	   to	  
compensation	  by	  the	  titleholders	  whose	  rights	  have	  been	  extinguished	  or	  diminished?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
373	   Supra	  n.	  354,	  at	  paragraph	  61,	  judgment	  of	  Dean	  and	  Gaudron	  JJ;	  see	  also,	  The	  Commonwealth	  v.	  
Hazeldell	  Ltd.	  [1918]	  HCA	  75;	  (1918)	  25	  CLR	  552,	  at	  563;	  Central	  Control	  Board	  (Liquor	  Traffic)	  v.	  
Cannon	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  Company	  Ltd.	  (1919)	  AC	  744,	  at	  752;	  Clissold	  v.	  Perry	  [1904]	  HCA	  12;	  (1904)	  1	  CLR	  












For	  Justice	  Toohey	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  native	  title,	  or	  what	  he	  refers	  to,	  as	  ‘traditional	  
title’,	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  aboriginal	  society	  occupying	  the	  lands	  in	  question	  at	  the	  time	  
of	  annexation	  has	  to	  be	  proved.	  However	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  society	  has	  transformed	  does	  
not	  extinguish	  native	  title.	  He	  says	  that:	  
	  
Traditional	   title	   arises	   from	   the	   fact	   of	   occupation,	   not	   the	   occupation	   of	   a	  
particular	   kind	   of	   society	   or	   way	   of	   life.	   So	   long	   as	   occupation	   by	   a	   traditional	  
society	   is	  established	  now	  and	  at	   the	  time	  of	  annexation,	   traditional	   rights	  exist.	  
An	  indigenous	  society	  cannot,	  as	  it	  were,	  surrender	  its	  rights	  by	  modifying	  its	  way	  
of	  life.374	   	  
	  
	   The	   judges	   in	  Mabo	   No.2	   however	   did	   not	   dwell	   on	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	  
lifestyle	  of	  an	  aboriginal	  community	  should	  change	  for	  it	  to	  lose	  its	  native	  title.	  Decisions	  
thereafter,	   as	   we	   shall	   see,	   have	   further	   elaborated	   on	   the	   content	   of	   aboriginal	   or	  
native	  title.	  But	  for	  now,	  the	  most	  significant	  aspect	  of	  Justice	  Toohey’s	   judgment	  was	  
his	   tracing	  of	  a	  clear	   line	  of	  authority	   in	  common	   law	  that	  restricted	  the	  power	  of	   the	  
state	  or	  the	  Crown	  from	  unilaterally	  extinguishing	  native	  title.	  While	  agreeing	  that	  there	  
is	   precedent	   supporting	   the	   power	   of	   the	   Crown	   to	   extinguish	   native	   title	   through	  
legislating	  in	  clear	  and	  simple	  language,	  Justice	  Toohey	  stressed	  that	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  
to	  treat	  native	  title	  as	  more	  vulnerable	  than	  other	  kinds	  of	  rights	  in	  land	  and	  stated	  that:	  
	  
[T]o	   say	   that,	   with	   the	   acquisition	   of	   sovereignty,	   the	   Crown	   has	   the	   power	   to	  
extinguish	   traditional	   title	   does	   not	   necessarily	   mean	   that	   such	   a	   power	   is	   any	  
different	   from	   that	   with	   respect	   to	   other	   interests	   in	   land.	   The	   Crown	   has	   the	  
power,	   subject	   to	   constitutional,	   statutory	   or	   common	   law	   restrictions,	   to	  
terminate	  any	  subject’s	  title	  to	  property	  by	  compulsorily	  acquiring	  it.375	  
	  
	   Justice	   Toohey	   noted	   that	   the	   tendency	   to	   think	   that	   native	   title	   is	   more	  
vulnerable	  to	  extinguishment	  by	  the	  Crown	  than	  other	  kinds	  of	  title	  arises	  from	  the	  view	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
374	   Supra	  n.	  354,	  at	  paragraph	  51,	  judgment	  of	  Toohey	  J.	  












that	  it	  is	  a	  ‘personal	  or	  usufructuary	  right’	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  ‘proprietary	  right’.	  Here	  the	  
judge	   underscored	   the	   principle	   of	   Amodu	   Tijani,	  where	   Viscount	   Haldane	   cautioned	  
against	  understanding	  traditional	  title	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  English	  law	  rather	  than	  by	  
reference	  to	  the	  indigenous	  system.	  Justice	  Toohey	  concluded	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  native	  
title	   could	   be	   personal	   or	   usufructuary	   should	   not	   make	   it	   any	   more	   vulnerable	   to	  
extinguishment	  than	  other	  kinds	  of	  proprietary	  rights.	  
	  
	   At	   this	   stage	   Justice	   Toohey	   was	   confronted	   with	   the	   same	   dilemma	   that	  
confronted	  Justice	  Brennan:	  To	   limit	   the	  power	  of	   the	  Crown	  to	  extinguish	  native	  title	  
would	   necessarily	   be	   to	   render	   a	   number	   of	   previous	   actions	   of	   the	   Crown	   acquiring	  
aboriginal	   lands	  illegal	  thereby	  destabilizing	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  current	  occupants.	  At	  the	  
same	   time	  not	   to	   subject	   the	  Crown’s	  power	   to	  due	  process	  would	  be	   to	   continue	   to	  
expose	  aboriginal	   peoples	   to	   the	   same	  kind	  of	   injustices	  of	   the	  past,	   in	   effect	  making	  
their	   rights	   purely	   academic.	   Justice	   Brennan	   chose	   the	   more	   conservative	   route	   to	  
resolve	   this	   dilemma.	   He	   stated	   that,	   as	   long	   as	   the	   extinguishment	  was	   for	   a	   public	  
purpose,	   it	  was	   valid.	   Justice	   Toohey,	   on	   the	  other	  hand,	   chose	   the	  more	  progressive	  
route,	  which	  he	  embarked	  upon	  only	  after	   firmly	  closing	  behind	  him	  any	  opening	  that	  
could	  expose	  previous	  actions	  of	   the	  Crown	  to	   legal	  challenge.	  He	  did	  so	  by	  observing	  
that:	  
	  
Where	   there	   has	   been	   an	   alienation	   of	   land	   by	   the	   Crown	   inimical	   to	   the	  
continuance	  of	  traditional	  title,	  any	  remedy	  against	  the	  Crown	  may	  have	  been	  lost	  
by	   the	   operation	   of	   limitation	   statutes.	   And	   nothing	   in	   this	   judgment	   should	   be	  
taken	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  titles	  of	  those	  to	  whom	  land	  has	  been	  alienated	  by	  the	  
Crown	  may	  now	  be	  disturbed.376	   	  
	  
	   Having	   thus	   secured	   the	   ‘skeletal	   principle’	   of	   Australian	   law,	   Justice	   Toohey	  
developed	  on	  a	  line	  of	  reasoning	  initiated	  by	  the	  American	  courts	  on	  the	  ‘fiduciary	  duty’	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












of	   the	  Crown	  with	   respect	   to	  native	   title.377	   In	   responding	   to	   the	  plaintiffs’	   claim	   that	  
the	  Crown	  was	  under	  a	  fiduciary	  duty	  to	  recognize	  and	  protect	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  Meriam	  
people	   to	   the	   Murray	   islands,	   Justice	   Toohey	   began	   with	   analysing	   the	   existence	   of	  
fiduciary	  obligations	  of	  the	  Crown.	  The	  government	  of	  Queensland	  argued	  that	  because	  
they	  had	  the	  power	  extinguish	  native	  title,	  they	  had	  no	  fiduciary	  obligations	  towards	  the	  
holders	  of	  such	  title.	  However	  Justice	  Toohey’s	  response	  to	  this	  argument	  was	  counter-­‐
intuitive	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   he	   noted	   that	   the	   Crown’s	   fiduciary	   obligations	   towards	  
native	   titleholders	   arose	  precisely	   because	   the	  Crown	  had	   the	  power	   to	   extinguish	  or	  
diminish	   native	   title.378	   Justice	   Toohey	   further	   noted	   that	   the	   fact	   that	   native	   title	   in	  
common	   law	   jurisprudence	   is	   inalienable	   except	   to	   the	   Crown	   further	   affirmed	   the	  
Crown’s	  fiduciary	  duty	  to	  indigenous	  peoples.	  He	  elaborated:	  
	  
[I]f	   the	   Crown	   in	   the	   right	   of	   Queensland	   has	   the	   power	   to	   alienate	   land	   the	  
subject	   of	   the	  Meriam	  people’s	   traditional	   rights	   and	   interests	   and	   the	   result	   of	  
that	  alienation	  is	  the	  loss	  of	  traditional	  title,	  and	  if	  the	  Meriam	  people’s	  power	  to	  
deal	  with	  their	  title	  is	  restricted	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  is	  inalienable,	  except	  to	  the	  Crown,	  
then	  this	  power	  and	  corresponding	  vulnerability	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  fiduciary	  obligation	  
on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Crown.	  The	  power	  to	  destroy	  or	  impair	  people’s	  interests	  in	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377	   One	  of	  the	  earliest	  cases	  in	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning	  was	  the	  Cherokee	  Nation	  v.	  Georgia,	  5	  Peters	  1	  
(1831)	  where	  Chief	  Justice	  Marshall	  held	  that	  the	  Indian	  tribes	  were	  akin	  to	  constitutional	  ‘wards'	  
under	  the	  ‘guardianship'	  of	  the	  United	  States	  federal	  government.	  In	  Seminole	  Nation	  v.	  US,	  316	  US	  
286	  (1942)	  at	  296-­‐7,	  the	  US	  Supreme	  Court	  decided	  that	  the	  state's	  assumption	  of	  a	  trust	  implied	  a	  
binding	  obligation.	   	   The	  trust,	  in	  other	  words,	  was	  to	  be	  interpreted	  in	  a	  strict	  or	  ‘lower	  sense’.	  
Pyramid	  Lake	  Paiute	  Tribe	  v.	  Morton,	  354	  F	  Supp	  252	  (1972)	  at	  256-­‐7	  established	  the	  principle	  that	  the	  
government's	  responsibility	  as	  a	  trustee	  overrode	  whatever	  administrative	  powers	  it	  might	  enjoy.	   	  
Soon	  afterwards,	  Navajo	  Tribe	  v.	  US,	  624	  F2d	  981	  (1980)	  held	  that,	  when	  administering	  Indian	  
property,	  the	  government	  was	  under	  a	  special	  duty	  of	  care	  and	  that,	  whenever	  the	  government	  had	  
control	  of	  tribal	  moneys	  or	  property,	  it	  was	  subject	  to	  an	  actionable	  fiduciary	  duty,	  even	  though	  the	  
statute	  or	  other	  foundation	  document	  specifying	  government	  powers	  had	  not	  mentioned	  a	  trust	  fund.	  
The	  latter	  point	  was	  endorsed	  in	  US	  v.	  Mitchell	  II	  463	  US	  206	  (1983)	  where	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  held	  
that	  a	  fiduciary	  obligation	  necessarily	  arose	  whenever	  the	  elements	  of	  a	  common-­‐law	  trust	  were	  
present	  -­‐	  ‘a	  trustee	  (the	  United	  States),	  a	  beneficiary	  (the	  Indian	  allottees),	  and	  a	  trust	  corpus	  (Indian	  
timber,	  lands,	  and	  funds)'	  -­‐	  even	  though	  nothing	  was	  expressly	  said	  in	  the	  foundation	  document	  about	  
a	  trust	  or	  fiduciary	  relationship.	  See	  Bennett,	  Thomas	  W.	  et.al,	  “The	  State	  as	  Trustee	  of	  Land”,	  (2000)	  
16	  SAJHR,	  pp.	  601-­‐622.	   	  
378	   See	  also,	  Seminole	  Nation	  v.	  United	  States,	  316	  U.S.	  286,	  296-­‐97	  (1942)	  where	  the	  Court	  maintained	  
that	  the	  government	  by	  entering	  into	  a	  treaty	  with	  the	  Indians	  has	  taken	  upon	  itself	  the	  ‘moral	  
obligations	  of	  the	  highest	  responsibility	  and	  trust,’	  and	  that	  its	  conduct	  will	  be	  scrutinized	  by	  “the	  most	  












way	  is	  extraordinary	  and	  is	  sufficient	  to	  attract	  regulation	  by	  Equity	  to	  ensure	  that	  
the	  position	   is	  not	  abused.	  The	   fiduciary	   relationship	  arises,	   therefore,	  out	  of	   the	  
power	   of	   the	   Crown	   to	   extinguish	   traditional	   title	   by	   alienating	   the	   land	   or	  
otherwise;	  it	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  an	  exercise	  of	  that	  power	  (my	  emphasis).379	  
	  
	   Justice	  Toohey	  went	  on	  to	  explain	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  fiduciary	  obligation	  of	  the	  
Crown	   was	   similar	   to	   that	   of	   a	   constructive	   trustee,	   since	   the	   legal	   interest	   in	   the	  
traditional	   rights	   is	   in	   the	  Crown	  whereas	   the	  beneficial	   interest	   in	   the	   rights	   is	   in	   the	  
indigenous	  owners.	  The	  content	  of	  this	  fiduciary	  obligation	  prima	  facie	  was	  a	  duty	  to	  act	  
in	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  beneficiaries.	   	  
	  
	   The	  cutting	  edge	  of	  Justice	  Toohey’s	  judgment	  however	  lies	  in	  his	  reasoning	  that	  a	  
fiduciary	  obligation	  puts	  a	  special	  burden	  on	  the	  Crown	  not	  to	  act	  in	  a	  way	  that	  unduly	  
impairs	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  indigenous	  peoples.	  Interestingly	  these	  views	  undercut	  the	  
position	   of	   Justice	   Brennan,	   by	   implying	   that	   the	   Crown	   cannot	   discharge	   its	   duty	   by	  
merely	   claiming	   that	   the	   extinguishing	   or	   diminishing	   of	   native	   title	   is	   for	   a	   public	  
purpose.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  Crown’s	  primary	  duty	  in	  the	  case	  of	  native	  title	  is	  towards	  
the	  indigenous	  holders	  of	  this	  title	  which	  this	  overrides	  any	  larger	  public	  purpose	  intent	  
of	  the	  Crown.	   	  
	  
	   This	  means	   that	   consultation	  with	   and	   the	   consent	   of	   the	   native	   title	   holders	   is	  
imperative	   to	   fulfil	   the	   Crown’s	   fiduciary	   duty	   before	   it	   takes	   any	   decision	   to	   impair	  
native	  title.	  By	  reasoning	  thus,	  Justice	  Toohey	  conclusively	  restricted	  the	  Crown’s	  power	  
to	   extinguish	   native	   title	   thereby	   providing	   native	   title	   the	   security	   it	   had	   been	  
historically	  denied.	   	  
	  
	   The	  majority	   in	  Mabo	  No.2	   agreed	   that	  native	   title	   in	   common	   law	   survived	   the	  
assertion	  of	  sovereignty	  by	  the	  Crown,	  thereby	  entitling	  indigenous	  people	  to	  beneficial	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












ownership	  of	  their	  traditional	   lands.	  The	  precedent	  value	  of	  Mabo	  No.2	   for	  indigenous	  
peoples	  rights	  in	  common	  law	  jurisprudence	  is	  significant	  since	  it	  recognized	  customary	  
land	  rights	  in	  the	  common	  law.	  In	  many	  ways	  Mabo	  No.2	  opened	  the	  door	  to	  protecting	  
other	  forms	  of	  property	  in	  Anglo-­‐American	  jurisprudence,	  forms	  of	  property	  that	  went	  
beyond	  absolute	  ownership	  of	  fungible	  assets	  to	  personal,	  usufructuary	  and	  communal	  
biocultural	   relations	   to	   traditional	   lands.	   However	   the	   critical	   question	   that	   split	   the	  
majority	  still	  remained:	  what	  are	  the	  limits	  to	  state	  power	  in	  the	  context	  of	  land	  rights	  of	  
indigenous	  peoples	  and	  traditional	  communities?	   Is	  this	  power	  unmitigated	  as	  Justices	  
Brennan,	  McHugh	  and	  Mason	  held	  or	  is	  it	  strictly	  restricted,	  as	  Justices	  Toohey,	  Gaudron	  
and	  Dean	  believed?	   	  
	  
(b)	  Beyond	  Mabo:	  Clarifying	  Aboriginal	  Title	  in	  Delgamuukw	  v.	  British	  
Columbia380	  
	  
A	  total	  of	  61	  witnesses	  gave	  evidence	  at	  trial,	  many	  using	  translators	  from	  their	  native	  
Gitksan	  or	  Wet’suwet’en	   language;	  “word	  spellers”	  to	  assist	   the	  official	   reporters	  were	  
required	  for	  many	  witnesses;	  a	  further	  15	  witnesses	  gave	  their	  evidence	  on	  commission;	  
53	  territorial	  affidavits	  were	  filed;	  30	  deponents	  were	  cross-­‐examined	  out	  of	  court;	  there	  
are	  23,503	  pages	  of	  transcript	  evidence	  at	  trial;	  5898	  pages	  of	  transcript	  of	  argument;	  
3,039	  pages	  of	  commission	  evidence	  and	  2,553	  pages	  of	  cross-­‐examination	  on	  affidavits	  
(all	   evidence	   and	   oral	   arguments	   are	   conveniently	   preserved	   in	   hard	   copy	   and	   on	  
diskettes);	   about	   9,200	   exhibits	   were	   filed	   at	   trial	   comprising,	   I	   estimate,	   well	   over	  
50,000	   pages;	   the	   plaintiffs’	   draft	   outline	   of	   argument	   comprises	   3,250	   pages,	   the	  
province’s	   1,975	   pages,	   and	   Canada’s	   over	   1,000	   pages;	   there	   are	   5,977	   pages	   of	  
transcript	  of	  argument	   in	  hard	   copy	  and	  on	  diskettes.	   	   All	   parties	   filed	   some	  excerpts	  
from	  the	  exhibits	  they	  referred	  to	  in	  argument.	   	   The	  province	  alone	  submitted	  28	  huge	  
binders	  of	   such	  documents.	   	   At	   least	   15	  binders	  of	   reply	  argument	  were	   left	  with	  me	  
during	  that	  stage	  of	  the	  trial.	   	  
Chief	  Justice	  McEachern’s	  description	  of	  the	  trial	  at	  the	  British	  Columbia	  Supreme	  
Court381	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   (1997)	  3	  S.C.R.	  1010.	  













The	   trial	   of	   Delgamuukw	   v.	   British	   Columbia	   at	   the	   British	   Columbia	   Supreme	   Court	  
heard	  318	  days	  of	  testimony	  and	  resulted	  in	  a	  400-­‐page	  judgment	  by	  the	  trial	  judge	  with	  
another	  100	  pages	  of	   schedules.382	   The	  proceedings	  began	   in	  1984	  with	  a	   claim	   from	  
the	   hereditary	   chiefs	   of	   the	   Gitksan	   and	   Wet’suwet’en	   First	   Nations,	   who,	   both	  
individually	   and	   on	   behalf	   of	   their	   ‘Houses’,	   claimed	   ‘ownership’	   of	   territory	   and	  
‘jurisdiction’	   over	   separate	   portions	   of	   58,000	   square	   kilometers	   in	   British	   Columbia.	   	  
The	   claim	   for	   jurisdiction	  meant	   that,	   where	   there	  was	   a	   conflict	   between	   tribal	   and	  
provincial	  law,	  the	  tribal	  law	  would	  prevail.	   	  
	  
	   For	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  claim,	  the	  area	  was	  divided	  into	  133	  individual	  territories,	  
claimed	  by	   the	   71	  Houses.	   	   This	   represented	   all	   of	   the	  Wet’suwet’en	  people,	   and	   all	  
but	   12	   of	   the	  Gitksan	  Houses.	   The	   province	   of	   British	   Columbia	   counterclaimed	   for	   a	  
declaration	   that	   the	   Gitksan	   and	   Wet’suwet’en	   had	   no	   right	   to	   or	   interest	   in	   the	  
territory	  or	  alternatively,	  that	  their	  cause	  of	  action	  ought	  to	  be	  for	  compensation	  from	  
the	  Government	  of	  Canada.	   	  
	  
	   In	  1991	  the	  British	  Columbia	  Supreme	  Court	  held	  that	  aboriginal	  title	  was	  limited	  
to	  aboriginal	  rights	  and	  did	  not	  extend	  beyond	  occupation	  or	  use	  of	   land	  to	  hunt,	  fish,	  
collect	  wood,	  berries	  and	  other	  foods	  for	  sustenance	  in	  a	  traditional	  manner.	  This	  meant	  
that,	  while	  Canadian	  law	  recognized	  the	  rights	  of	  aboriginal	  people	  to	  carry	  on	  some	  of	  
their	  traditional	  practices,	  it	  did	  not	  recognize	  customary	  law	  relating	  to	  land	  title.	  
	   	  
	   The	  Supreme	  Court	  also	  held	  that	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  Gitksan	  and	  Wet’suwet’en	  were	  
extinguished	  through	  pre-­‐Confederation	  enactments	  providing	  unencumbered	  titles	   to	  
settlers,	   and	   that	   the	   land	   of	   the	   Gitksan	   and	   Wet’suwet’en	   became	   vested	   in	   the	  
Imperial	   Crown	   upon	   its	   assertion	   of	   sovereignty	   over	   the	  mainland	   colony	   of	   British	  
Columbia	   in	   the	  early	  or	  mid-­‐19th	  Century.	   Finally	   the	  Court	   ruled	   that	   since	   its	  entry	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












into	  Confederation	  in	  1871,	  the	  Province	  of	  British	  Columbia	  had	  the	  right	  to	  dispose	  of	  
Crown	  lands	  unburdened	  by	  aboriginal	  title,	  and	  the	  right	  to	  govern	  the	  province	  within	  
the	  terms	  of	  Section	  92	  of	  the	  Constitution	  Act,	  1867.383	   This	  meant	  that	  the	  aboriginal	  
title	  claimed	  by	   the	   tribes	  no	   longer	  existed	  and	  the	  Gitksan	  and	  Wet’suwet’en	  would	  
not	  qualify	  to	  claim	  their	  rights	  under	  Section	  35(1)	  of	  the	  Constitution	  Act	  of	  1982	  that	  
sought	  to	  recognize	  existing	  rights	  of	  aboriginal	  peoples	  in	  Canada.	  
	  
	   The	  Gitksan	  and	  Wet’suwet’en	  appealed	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  to	  the	  
British	  Columbia	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	  which	  heard	  374	  days	  of	  evidence	  and	  arguments.	  In	  
1993	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  overturned	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  stating	  that	  the	  
rights	  of	  the	  Gitksan	  and	  Wet’suwet’en’s	  had	  not	  been	  extinguished	  and	  were	  protected	  
by	   common	   law,	  and,	   since	  1982	  by	  Section	  35	   (1)	  of	   the	  Constitution	  Act.	   The	   scope	  
and	  content	  of	  these	  rights	  was	  not	  addressed	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	  which	  referred	  
these	  issues	  back	  to	  the	  trial	  judge.	  Nevertheless	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  asked	  the	  parties	  
to	  resolve	  their	  differences	  through	  consultation	  and	  negotiation.	   	  
	  
	   In	   March	   1994	   the	   parties	   were	   granted	   leave	   to	   appeal	   and	   cross-­‐appeal	   the	  
decision	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada.	  In	  the	  meantime	  the	  
parties	   requested	   an	   adjournment	   of	   proceedings	   to	   try	   to	   work	   out	   a	   negotiated	  
settlement.	   By	   February	   1996	   the	   negotiations	   between	   the	   Gitksan	   and	   the	   British	  
Columbia’s	  Ministry	  of	  Aboriginal	  Affairs	  was	  deadlocked.	  The	  parties	   then	  decided	   to	  
continue	  with	  the	  proceedings	  before	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada.384	   	  
	  
	   The	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  did	  not	  enter	  into	  the	  merits	  of	  the	  case	  to	  decide	  
whether	  or	  not	  the	  Gitksan	  and	  Wet’suwet’en	  had	  aboriginal	  title	  to	  the	  lands	  that	  they	  
claimed.	  Instead	  it	  ordered	  a	  new	  trial	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  trial	  judge	  had	  not	  given	  due	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weight	   to	   the	  oral	  histories	  of	   the	  tribes.	   In	  addition	  the	  Court	  gave	  a	  groundbreaking	  
decision	   clarifying	   the	   content	  of	   aboriginal	   title	   in	  Canada,	   the	  power	  of	   the	   state	   to	  
extinguish	   or	   diminish	   aboriginal	   title	   and	   the	   evidentiary	   value	   of	   oral	   histories	   in	  
establishing	  aboriginal	  title.	   	  
	  
	   Chief	   Justice	   Lamer,	   who	   handed	   down	   the	   judgment	   on	   behalf	   of	   his	   fellow	  
justices,	   began	   by	   examining	   the	   status	   of	   oral	   histories	   as	   evidence	   in	   establishing	  
aboriginal	  title.	  The	  contention	  of	  the	  Gitksan	  and	  Wet’suwet’en	  was	  that	  the	  trial	  judge	  
did	   not	   give	   due	   weight	   to	   the	   adaawk	   of	   the	   Gitksan	   and	   the	   kungax	   of	   the	  
Wet’suwet’en.	  The	  adaawk	  and	  the	  kungax	  are:	  
	  
(S)acred	  official	   litany,	   or	   history,	   or	   recital	   of	   the	  most	   important	   laws,	   history,	  
traditions	   and	   traditional	   territory	   of	   a	  House.	   The	   content	   of	   these	   special	   oral	  
histories	   includes	   a	   physical	   representation	   in	   totem	   poles,	   crests	   and	   blankets.	  
Their	  importance	  is	  underlined	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  repeated	  and	  performed	  
and	  authenticated	  at	  important	  feasts.385	  
	  
	   At	  the	  trial	  the	  adaawk	  was	  relied	  upon	  as	  an	  aspect	  of	  and	  proof	  of	  land	  tenure	  
law	  of	   the	  Gitskan	  and	  evidence	  of	   their	  historical	  use	  and	  occupation	  of	   the	   lands	   to	  
which	  they	  claimed	  title.	  The	  kungax	  was	  relied	  upon	  by	  the	  Wet’suwet’en	  as	  the	  main	  
proof	   of	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   lands	   to	   the	   culture	   of	   the	   tribe.	   The	   trial	   judge	   had	  
refused	  to	  give	  any	  independent	  weight	  to	  these	  histories	  to	  establish	  aboriginal	  title	  of	  
the	  Gitksan	  and	  Wet’suwet’en.	  Instead	  he	  held	  that	  oral	  traditions	  at	  best	  can	  be	  used	  
to	  confirm	  the	  facts	  established	  by	  other	  forms	  of	  evidence.	  The	  judge	  noted	  that	  it	  was	  
not	  easy	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  mythological	  and	  real	  aspects	  of	  oral	  history;	  oral	  
history	   tended	   to	   confound	   facts	   and	   beliefs	   and	   projected	   a	   romantic	   view	   of	   the	  
history	  of	  the	  tribes.	  Most	  importantly,	  the	  trial	  judge	  felt	  that	  the	  adaawk	  and	  kungax	  
lacked	  the	  necessary	  detail	  regarding	  the	  specific	  lands	  that	  were	  being	  claimed.386	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   The	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  overruled	  the	  trial	  judge’s	  reasoning	  and	  ordered	  a	  
new	   trial,	   thereby	   breaking	   new	   ground	   on	   recognition	   of	   non-­‐codified	   and	   oral	  
customary	  laws	  and	  traditions	  relating	  to	  community	  land	  rights.	  This	  Court	  noted	  that,	  
if	   the	  oral	  traditions	  of	  the	  Gitksan	  and	  Wet’suwet’en	  had	  been	  given	  due	  weight,	  the	  
conclusions	  of	  the	  trial	  judge	  on	  fact	  may	  have	  been	  different.	  It	  stressed	  that,	  if	  the	  trial	  
judge’s	  understanding	  of	  oral	  evidence	  were	  upheld,	  then	  the	  oral	  histories	  of	  aboriginal	  
peoples	  would	   be	   ‘consistently	   and	   systematically	   undervalued	   by	   the	   Canadian	   legal	  
system’.387	   Chief	   Justice	   Lamer	   quoted	   with	   approval	   the	   1996	   Report	   of	   the	   Royal	  
Commission	  on	  Aboriginal	  Peoples	  as	  a	  useful	  approach	  to	  understanding	  oral	  history:	  
	  
The	  Aboriginal	  tradition	  in	  the	  recording	  of	  history	  is	  neither	  linear	  nor	  steeped	  in	  
the	   same	   notions	   of	   social	   progress	   and	   evolution	   [as	   in	   the	   non-­‐	   Aboriginal	  
tradition].	   Nor	   is	   it	   usually	   human-­‐centred	   in	   the	   same	   way	   as	   the	   western	  
scientific	   tradition,	   for	   it	  does	  not	  assume	  that	  human	  beings	  are	  anything	  more	  
than	  one	  -­‐-­‐	  and	  not	  necessarily	  the	  most	  important	  -­‐-­‐	  element	  of	  the	  natural	  order	  
of	   the	   universe.	   Moreover,	   the	   Aboriginal	   historical	   tradition	   is	   an	   oral	   one,	  
involving	   legends,	  stories	  and	  accounts	  handed	  down	  through	  the	  generations	   in	  
oral	  form.	   	   It	  is	  less	  focused	  on	  establishing	  objective	  truth	  and	  assumes	  that	  the	  
teller	  of	  the	  story	  is	  so	  much	  a	  part	  of	  the	  event	  being	  described	  that	  it	  would	  be	  
arrogant	  to	  presume	  to	  classify	  or	  categorize	  the	  event	  exactly	  or	   for	  all	   time.	   In	  
the	  Aboriginal	   tradition	   the	   purpose	  of	   repeating	   oral	   accounts	   from	   the	  past	   is	  
broader	   than	   the	   role	   of	   written	   history	   in	   western	   societies.	   	   It	   may	   be	   to	  
educate	  the	  listener,	  to	  communicate	  aspects	  of	  culture,	  to	  socialize	  people	  into	  a	  
cultural	  tradition,	  or	  to	  validate	  the	  claims	  of	  a	  particular	  family	  to	  authority	  and	  
prestige.	  .	  .	  .Oral	  accounts	  of	  the	  past	  include	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  subjective	  experience.	  
They	  are	  not	  simply	  a	  detached	  recounting	  of	  factual	  events	  but,	  rather,	  are	  “facts	  
enmeshed	   in	   the	   stories	   of	   a	   lifetime”.	   	   They	   are	   also	   likely	   to	   be	   rooted	   in	  
particular	  locations,	  making	  reference	  to	  particular	  families	  and	  communities.	  This	  
contributes	  to	  a	  sense	  that	  there	  are	  many	  histories,	  each	  characterized	  in	  part	  by	  
how	  a	  people	   see	   themselves,	  how	   they	  define	   their	   identity	   in	   relation	   to	   their	  
environment,	  and	  how	  they	  express	  their	  uniqueness	  as	  a	  people.388	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   Giving	  of	   independent	  weight	   to	   the	  oral	   traditions	  of	  aboriginal	   customary	   laws	  
was	   a	   jurisprudential	   landmark.	   It	   paved	   the	   way	   for	   courts	   to	   appreciate	   aboriginal	  
worldviews	   wherein	   traditional	   lands	   are	   not	   identified	   with	   title	   deeds	   or	   even	  
occupation,	   but	   through	   relationships	   that	   include	   stories,	   songs,	  myths	   and	   legends.	  
Having	  ordered	  a	  retrial	  with	  an	  instruction	  to	  the	  trial	  court	  to	  give	  the	  oral	  traditions	  
of	   the	  Gitksan	  and	  Wet’suwet’en	   independent	  and	  not	  merely	   confirmatory	  weight	   in	  
establishing	  aboriginal	   title,	  Chief	   Justice	  Lamer	   turned	  his	  attention	   to	   the	  content	  of	  
the	  title.	  
	  
	   In	   the	   first	  place,	  he	  needed	   to	  make	  a	  clear	  distinction	  between	  aboriginal	   title	  
and	  aboriginal	  rights.	  The	  trial	  court	  had	  held	  that	  aboriginal	  title	  is	  essentially	  a	  bundle	  
of	  aboriginal	  rights	  and	  did	  not	  extend	  beyond	  occupation	  or	  use	  of	   land	  to	  hunt,	  fish,	  
collect	   wood,	   berries	   and	   other	   foods	   for	   sustenance	   in	   a	   traditional	   manner.	   Chief	  
Justice	  Lamer	  noted	  that:	  
	  
Aboriginal	  title	  is	  a	  right	  in	  land	  and,	  as	  such,	  is	  more	  than	  the	  right	  to	  engage	  in	  
specific	   activities	  which	  may	  be	   themselves	  aboriginal	   rights.	   	   Rather,	   it	   confers	  
the	  right	  to	  use	  land	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  activities,	  not	  all	  of	  which	  need	  be	  aspects	  of	  
practices,	  customs	  and	  traditions	  which	  are	   integral	   to	  the	  distinctive	  cultures	  of	  
aboriginal	   societies.	   	   Those	   activities	   do	   not	   constitute	   the	   right	  per	   se;	   rather,	  
they	  are	  parasitic	  on	  the	  underlying	  title.	   	   However,	  that	  range	  of	  uses	  is	  subject	  
to	   the	   limitation	   that	   they	   must	   not	   be	   irreconcilable	   with	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  
attachment	  to	  the	  land	  which	  forms	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  particular	  group’s	  aboriginal	  
title	  (my	  emphasis).389	  
	  
	   With	   this	   understanding	   of	   aboriginal	   title,	   Chief	   Justice	   Lamer	   does	   two	   things.	  
First,	  he	  extends	  aboriginal	   title	  beyond	  the	  right	  to	  no	  more	  than	  carry	  on	  traditional	  
activities	  on	  aboriginal	  lands.	  Secondly,	  he	  limits	  the	  title	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  such	  activities	  
should	  not	  be	   in	  direct	  conflict	  with	   the	  biocultural	   relations	  with	   the	   land	   that	   forms	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












the	   basis	   of	   the	   title.	   While	   noting	   that	   aboriginal	   title	   is	   sui	   generis	   and	   that	   its	  
elements	   include	   its	   inalienability,	   occupation	   by	   the	   tribes	   prior	   to	   annexation	   and	  
communal	  control,	   Justice	  Lamer	  stressed	   its	   inherent	   limits:	   that	   ‘lands	  held	  pursuant	  
to	  aboriginal	   title	  cannot	  be	  used	   in	  a	  manner	   that	   is	   irreconcilable	  with	   the	  nature	  of	  
attachment	   to	   the	   land	   which	   forms	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   group’s	   claim	   to	   the	   aboriginal	  
title’.390	  
	  
	   The	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada,	  by	  establishing	  this	  limit,	  clearly	  located	  aboriginal	  
title	  in	  a	  category	  that	  was	  different	  from	  other	  kinds	  of	  land	  title.	  The	  Court	  seemed	  to	  
emphasize	  that	  aboriginal	  title	  was	  based	  on	  a	  special	  relationship	  with	  the	  land,	  which	  
could	  well	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  biocultural	  relationship	  and	  that	  any	  activities	  undertaken	  
by	   the	   tribe	   which	   would	   threaten	   such	   a	   relationship	   would	   weaken	   the	   title.	   It	   is	  
submitted	  that	  by	  approaching	  aboriginal	  title	  in	  this	  fashion,	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  Court	  
stressed	   the	   tribe’s	  duty	  of	   stewardship.	  While	   such	  an	  approach	  has	  been	  viewed	  by	  
some	   commentators	   as	   a	   patronizing	   limit	   on	   aboriginal	   self-­‐government,391	   it	   would	  
help	  to	  dwell	  rather	  on	  the	  rationale	  provided	  by	  Chief	  Justice	  Lamer	  for	  taking	  such	  an	  
approach.	   	  
	  
	   The	  Chief	  Justice	  explained:	  
	  
Accordingly,	   in	  my	   view,	   lands	   subject	   to	   aboriginal	   title	   cannot	   be	   put	   to	   such	  
uses	  as	  may	  be	  irreconcilable	  with	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  occupation	  of	  that	   land	  and	  
the	   relationship	   that	   the	   particular	   group	  has	   had	  with	   the	   land	  which	   together	  
have	  given	  rise	  to	  aboriginal	  title	  in	  the	  first	  place...one	  of	  the	  critical	  elements	  in	  
the	  determination	  of	  whether	  a	  particular	  aboriginal	  group	  has	  aboriginal	  title	  to	  
certain	   lands	   is	   the	   matter	   of	   the	   occupancy	   of	   those	   lands.	   	   Occupancy	   is	  
determined	  by	   reference	   to	   the	  activities	   that	  have	   taken	  place	  on	   the	   land	  and	  
the	  uses	  to	  which	  the	  land	  has	  been	  put	  by	  the	  particular	  group.	   	   If	  lands	  are	  so	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occupied,	   there	   will	   exist	   a	   special	   bond	   between	   the	   group	   and	   the	   land	   in	  
question	  such	  that	  the	  land	  will	  be	  part	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  group’s	  distinctive	  
culture.	  It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  these	  elements	  of	  aboriginal	  title	  create	  an	  inherent	  
limitation	  on	  the	  uses	  to	  which	  the	  land,	  over	  which	  such	  title	  exists,	  may	  be	  put.	   	  
For	  example,	  if	  occupation	  is	  established	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  use	  of	  the	  land	  as	  a	  
hunting	  ground,	  then	  the	  group	  that	  successfully	  claims	  aboriginal	  title	  to	  that	  land	  
may	  not	  use	  it	  in	  such	  a	  fashion	  as	  to	  destroy	  its	  value	  for	  such	  a	  use	  (e.g.,	  by	  strip	  
mining	  it).	   	   Similarly,	  if	  a	  group	  claims	  a	  special	  bond	  with	  the	  land	  because	  of	  its	  
ceremonial	   or	   cultural	   significance,	   it	  may	   not	   use	   the	   land	   in	   such	   a	  way	   as	   to	  
destroy	   that	   relationship	   (e.g.,	   by	   developing	   it	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   the	   bond	   is	  
destroyed,	  perhaps	  by	  turning	  it	  into	  a	  parking	  lot).392	   	  
	  
	   By	   reasoning	   thus,	   it	   could	   be	   argued	   that	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   of	   Canada	   based	  
aboriginal	  title	  not	  purely	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  tribes	  occupied	  the	   lands	  at	  the	  time	  of	  
annexation	  by	  the	  Crown,	  but	  also	  on	  a	  special	  biocultural	  relationship	  with	  the	  land.	  In	  
a	  sense,	  this	  line	  of	  reasoning	  is	  linked	  to	  Chief	  Justice	  Lamer’s	  views	  on	  the	  admissibility	  
of	  and	  weight	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  given	  to	  oral	  histories	  in	  establishing	  aboriginal	  title.	  Oral	  
histories	   in	  many	  ways	  establish	  occupation	   through	  emphasizing	   specific	   cultural	  and	  
spiritual	   ties	   to	   the	   land	  which	  are	   ritualized	   through	   stories,	   songs	   and	  myths.	   These	  
cultural	  and	  spiritual	  ties	  assert	  that	  the	  aboriginal	  community	  in	  question	  does	  not	  just	  
refer	  to	  any	  land	  (or	  land	  as	  a	  fungible	  asset),	  but	  to	  specific	  traditional	  land	  that	  defines	  
them	   as	   a	   people.	   Such	   an	   approach	   to	   land,	   according	   to	   the	   Supreme	   Court,	  
necessarily	  makes	  aboriginal	  title	  inalienable.	   	  
	  
	   Elaborating	  on	  this	  view	  Chief	  Justice	  Lamer	  notes:	  
	  
It	   is	   for	   this	   reason	   also	   that	   lands	   held	   by	   virtue	   of	   aboriginal	   title	  may	   not	   be	  
alienated.	   Alienation	   would	   bring	   to	   an	   end	   the	   entitlement	   of	   the	   aboriginal	  
people	  to	  occupy	  the	   land	  and	  would	  terminate	  their	   relationship	  with	   it….What	  
the	   inalienability	  of	   lands	  held	  pursuant	   to	  aboriginal	   title	   suggests	   is	   that	   those	  
lands	   are	   more	   than	   just	   a	   fungible	   commodity.	   	   The	   relationship	   between	   an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












aboriginal	   community	   and	   the	   lands	   over	   which	   it	   has	   aboriginal	   title	   has	   an	  
important	  non-­‐economic	  component.	   	   The	  land	  has	  an	  inherent	  and	  unique	  value	  
in	   itself,	   which	   is	   enjoyed	   by	   the	   community	   with	   aboriginal	   title	   to	   it	   (my	  
emphasis).	   	   The	   community	   cannot	   put	   the	   land	   to	   uses	   which	   would	   destroy	  
that	  value.393	   	  
	  
	   Having	  said	  this	  Justice	  Lamer,	  expanded	  further	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  aboriginal	  title,	  
thereby	   distinguishing	   it	   from	   aboriginal	   rights.	   He	   emphasized	   that	   a	   variety	   of	  
aboriginal	   rights	   can	  be	  contained	  within	  aboriginal	   title,	  but	   that	   the	  main	  difference	  
between	  them	  is	   the	  proof	  needed	  to	  establish	  them.	   In	  order	  to	  assert	   title	   the	  tribe	  
must	  prove	  occupancy	  of	  the	  lands	  at	  the	  time	  the	  Crown	  asserted	  sovereignty.	  So,	  the	  
fact	  that	  a	  group	  is	  able	  to	  make	  out	  a	  claim	  for	  aboriginal	  rights	  would	  not	  necessarily	  
imply	  an	  aboriginal	  title.	  Chief	  Justice	  Lamer	  elucidated	  this	  as:	  
	  
Constitutionally	  recognized	  aboriginal	  rights	  fall	  along	  a	  spectrum	  with	  respect	  to	  
their	   degree	   of	   connection	  with	   the	   land.	   	   At	   the	   one	   end	   are	   those	   aboriginal	  
rights	   which	   are	   practices,	   customs	   and	   traditions	   integral	   to	   the	   distinctive	  
aboriginal	   culture	   of	   the	   group	   claiming	   the	   right	   but	   where	   the	   use	   and	  
occupation	  of	  the	  land	  where	  the	  activity	  is	  taking	  place	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  support	  
a	  claim	  of	  title	  to	  the	  land.	  In	  the	  middle	  are	  activities	  which,	  out	  of	  necessity,	  take	  
place	  on	  land	  and	  indeed,	  might	  be	  intimately	  related	  to	  a	  particular	  piece	  of	  land.	   	  
Although	  an	  aboriginal	  group	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  title	  to	  the	  land,	  it	  
may	  nevertheless	  have	  a	  site-­‐specific	   right	   to	  engage	   in	  a	  particular	  activity.	   	   At	  
the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  is	  aboriginal	  title	  itself	  which	  confers	  more	  than	  the	  
right	   to	   engage	   in	   site-­‐specific	   activities	   which	   are	   aspects	   of	   the	   practices,	  
customs	  and	  traditions	  of	  distinctive	  aboriginal	  cultures.394	   	   	  
	  
	   The	  next	  significant	  question	  addressed	  by	  the	  Court	  was	  the	  power	  of	  the	  federal	  
and	   provincial	   governments	   to	   diminish	   or	   extinguish	   aboriginal	   rights	   and	   title.	   Here	  
Chief	   Justice	   Lamer	   and	  his	   brother	   judges	   did	   agree	   that,	   in	   common	   law,	   aboriginal	  
rights	   or	   title	   are	   not	   absolute	   and	   can	   be	   infringed.	   The	   Canadian	   Supreme	   Court	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however	  differed	  from	  the	  views	  of	  Justice	  Brennan	  in	  Mabo	  No.2	  by	  requiring	  a	  much	  
heavier	  burden	  on	  the	  government	  when	   it	   sought	   to	  do	  so.	  The	  Court	   in	  Canada	   laid	  
down	   two	   conditions:	   an	   infringement	   must	   further	   a	   compelling	   and	   substantial	  
legislative	  objective;	  it	  must	  be	  consistent	  with	  the	  fiduciary	  duties	  of	  the	  Crown	  to	  the	  
aboriginal	  peoples.395	  
	  
	   At	   this	   stage	   the	   Canadian	   Supreme	   Court	   seemed	   to	   give	   the	   Crown	   a	   fairly	  
generous	   power	   to	   infringe	   aboriginal	   title	   and	   rights	   by	   stating	   that	   a	   general	   public	  
purpose	  like	  the	  development	  of	  agriculture,	  forestry,	  mining	  and	  hydroelectric	  power,	  
the	  general	  economic	  development	  of	  the	  interior	  of	  British	  Columbia,	  protection	  of	  the	  
environment	   or	   endangered	   species,	   and	   the	   building	   of	   infrastructure	   and	   the	  
settlement	   of	   foreign	   populations	   to	   support	   those	   aims,	   can	   be	   sufficient	   reason	   for	  
infringement.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  the	  Court	  limited	  this	  power	  by	  stressing	  the	  
Crown’s	  fiduciary	  duty	  to	  act	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  aboriginal	  peoples.	   	  
	  
	   Chief	  Justice	  Lamer	  listed	  three	  aspects	  of	  this	  duty:	  
	  
First,	  the	  right	  to	  exclusive	  use	  and	  occupation	  of	  land	  is	  relevant	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  
scrutiny	  of	  the	  infringing	  measure	  or	  action.	   	   Second,	  the	  right	  to	  choose	  to	  what	  
uses	  land	  can	  be	  put,	  subject	  to	  the	  ultimate	  limit	  that	  those	  uses	  cannot	  destroy	  
the	  ability	  of	  the	  land	  to	  sustain	  future	  generations	  of	  aboriginal	  peoples,	  suggests	  
that	  the	  fiduciary	  relationship	  between	  the	  Crown	  and	  aboriginal	  peoples	  may	  be	  
satisfied	  by	  the	  involvement	  of	  aboriginal	  peoples	  in	  decisions	  taken	  with	  respect	  
to	  their	  lands.	  There	  is	  always	  a	  duty	  of	  consultation	  and,	  in	  most	  cases,	  the	  duty	  
will	  be	  significantly	  deeper	  than	  mere	  consultation.	  And	  third,	  lands	  held	  pursuant	  
to	  aboriginal	  title	  have	  an	   inescapable	  economic	  component	  which	  suggests	  that	  
compensation	   is	   relevant	   to	   the	   question	   of	   justification	   as	   well.	   Fair	  
compensation	  will	  ordinarily	  be	  required	  when	  aboriginal	  title	  is	  infringed.396	   	  
	  
	   Compared	  with	  decision	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  Australia	  in	  Mabo	  No.2,	  the	  Supreme	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Court	   of	   Canada	   in	   Delgamuukw	   restricted	   the	   power	   of	   the	   Crown	   to	   infringe	   or	  
extinguish	  aboriginal	  rights	  and	  title	  to	  a	  much	  greater	  extent.	  In	  Delgamuukw	  the	  Court	  
held	   that	   depending	   on	   the	   strength	   of	   the	   right	   or	   the	   title,	   it	   could	   be	   argued	   that	  
consultation	  with	  and	  sometimes	  consent	  of	  the	  aboriginal	  tribes	  in	  question	  would	  be	  
required	  prior	  to	  any	  state	  action.	  Nevertheless,	  in	  cases	  where	  there	  is	  an	  infringement	  
by	   the	   Crown	   of	   aboriginal	   title,	   compensation	   would	   have	   to	   be	   provided	   to	   the	  
aboriginal	  tribes	  concerned.	  
	  
(c)	  Indigenous	  Title	  in	  Africa:	  Alexkor	  Limited	  v.	  The	  Richtersveld	  Community397	  
	  
While	  in	  the	  past	  indigenous	  law	  was	  seen	  through	  the	  common	  law	  lens,	  it	  must	  now	  be	  
seen	  as	  an	   integral	  part	  of	  our	   law.	   	   Like	  all	   law	   it	  depends	   for	   its	  ultimate	   force	  and	  
validity	   on	   the	   Constitution.	   Its	   validity	   must	   now	   be	   determined	   by	   reference	   not	   to	  
common	   law,	   but	   to	   the	   Constitution.…It	   is	   clear,	   therefore	   that	   the	   Constitution	  
acknowledges	   the	   originality	   and	   distinctiveness	   of	   indigenous	   law	   as	   an	   independent	  
source	   of	   norms	   within	   the	   legal	   system.	   	   At	   the	   same	   time	   the	   Constitution,	   while	  
giving	  force	  to	  indigenous	  law,	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  such	  law	  is	  subject	  to	  the	  Constitution	  
and	  has	  to	  be	  interpreted	  in	  the	  light	  of	  its	  values.	   	   Furthermore,	  like	  the	  common	  law,	  
indigenous	   law	   is	   subject	   to	   any	   legislation,	   consistent	   with	   the	   Constitution	   that	  
specifically	  deals	  with	   it.	   In	   the	   result,	   indigenous	   law	   feeds	   into,	  nourishes,	   fuses	  with	  
and	  becomes	  part	  of	  the	  amalgam	  of	  South	  African	  law.	   	  
Judgment	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  of	  South	  Africa	  in	  Alexkor	  v.	  The	  Richtersveld	  
Community398	  
	  
The	  decisions	  of	   the	  High	  Court	   of	  Australia	   in	  Mabo	  No.2	   and	   the	   Supreme	  Court	   of	  
Canada	   in	   Delgamuukw	   were	   not	   alone	   in	   recognizing	   native	   or	   aboriginal	   title.	   The	  
Constitutional	   Court	   in	   South	   Africa	   in	   2003	   handed	   down	   a	   significant	   judgement	  
recognizing	  the	  indigenous	  title	  of	  the	  Richtersveld	  community	  to	  their	  traditional	  lands.	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In	  doing	  so	  the	  Court	  clarified	  the	  status	  of	  indigenous	  land	  rights	  in	  South	  Africa	  vis-­‐à-­‐
vis	  both	  common	  law	  and	  the	  South	  African	  Constitution.	  
	  
The	  Richtersveld	  is	  an	  area	  of	  land	  in	  the	  Northern	  Cape	  Province	  of	  South	  Africa	  
that	   had	   for	   centuries	   been	   inhabited	   by	   the	   Richtersveld	   community.	   In	   the	   1920s,	  
when	  diamonds	  were	  discovered,	  the	  state	  dispossessed	  the	  community	  of	  its	  lands.	  In	  
1994	   after	   the	   end	   of	   apartheid	   and	   the	   first	   democratic	   elections,	   the	   new	   South	  
African	  government	  passed	  the	  Restitution	  of	  Land	  Rights	  Act	  of	  1994399	   which	  entitled	  
communities	  dispossessed	  of	  their	  lands	  after	  the	  19th	  of	  June	  1913	  resulting	  from	  past	  
racially	   discriminatory	   laws	   to	   claim	   restitution	   of	   such	   lands.	   The	   Richtersveld	  
community	  then	  lodged	  a	  claim	  for	  their	  traditional	  lands	  with	  the	  Land	  Claims	  Court.	  In	  
2001	  the	  Land	  Court	  dismissed	  the	  claim.	  The	  community	  appealed	  the	  decision	  to	  the	  
Supreme	   Court	   of	   Appeal,	   which	   set	   aside	   the	   order	   and	   granted	   relief	   to	   the	  
community.	  Both	  Alexkor	   (which	   is	  a	  South	  African	  state	  owned	  mining	  company	  with	  
interests	   in	   the	   Richtersveld)	   and	   the	   South	   African	   government	   then	   appealed	   the	  
decision	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  to	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  of	  South	  Africa.	  The	  
latter	   decided	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   Richtersveld	   community	   holding	   that	   it	   had	   a	   right	   to	  
ownership	   of	   traditional	   lands	   (including	   its	  minerals	   and	   precious	   stones)	   and	   to	   the	  
exclusive	  beneficial	  use	  and	  occupation	  of	  the	  land.400	  
	  
The	  Constitutional	   Court	   relied	  on	   the	   same	   common	   law	  precedents	   as	   those	  
used	   by	   the	  High	   Court	   of	   Australia	   and	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   of	   Canada	   to	   affirm	   that	  
indigenous	  title	  survived	  the	  British	  Crown’s	  assertion	  of	   radical	   title	  over	  the	   lands	  of	  
the	   Richtersveld	   community	   through	   annexation	   in	   1847.	   The	   difference	   in	   the	   South	  
African	  situation	  however	  was	  the	  Richtersveld	  community’s	  dispossession	  of	  their	  lands	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under	  the	  Precious	  Stones	  Act	  of	  1927.	  This	  enactment	  allowed	  the	  community’s	  land	  to	  
be	  proclaimed	  as	  unalienated	  Crown	  land.	   	  
	  
Although	   the	   community’s	   title	   to	   land	   was	   recognized	   in	   indigenous	   or	  
customary	   law,	   this	   title	   was	   not	   registered	   by	   the	   state	   thereby	   allowing	   for	   the	  
community’s	   dispossession	   of	   the	   community	   of	   its	   lands.	   The	   Richtersveld	   people	  
sought	   to	  make	   its	   claim	   for	   land	   restitution	  on	   the	  basis	   of	   the	   limited	   retrospective	  
provision	  of	   the	  Restitution	  of	  Land	  Rights	  Act	  arguing	  that	   they	  were	  dispossessed	  of	  
their	   lands	   after	   the	   19th	   of	   June	   1913,	   and	   that	   this	   was	   a	   result	   of	   a	   racially	  
discriminatory	  practice	  of	  the	  state	  not	  recognizing	  indigenous	  title	  to	  la d.	   	  
	  
The	  unique	  contribution	  of	  the	  Richtersveld	  case	  and	  in	  this	  sense	  the	  Restitution	  
of	  Land	  Rights	  Act	  was	  that	  it	  established	  that,	  even	  if	  indigenous	  title	  was	  extinguished	  
by	  an	  act	  of	   state,	   it	   could	  be	   restored	   if	   the	   title	  were	  extinguished	  after	   the	  19th	  of	  
June	   1913	  which	  was	  when	   the	  Natives	   Land	  Act	   27	   of	   1913401	   came	   into	   operation.	  
(The	  latter	  Act	  that	  deprived	  black	  South	  Africans	  of	  the	  right	  to	  own	  land	  and	  rights	  in	  
land	  in	  large	  parts	  of	  South	  Africa.)	  The	  Constitutional	  Court	  in	  the	  Richtersveld	  case	  also	  
established	   the	   precedent	   that	   a	   claim	   of	   sovereignty	   by	   the	   Crown	   in	   1847	   did	   not	  
extinguish	  indigenous	  title.	   	  
	  
Perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  assertions	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Court	  was	  that	  
indigenous	   or	   customary	   law	   title	   is	   sufficient	   to	   establish	   beneficial	   ownership	   and	  
rights	  over	  land	  and	  that	  indigenous	  title	  must	  be	  understood	  on	  its	  own	  terms	  and	  not	  
in	   accordance	   with	   common	   law.	   The	   Court	   citing	   the	   views	   of	   Viscount	   Haldane	   in	  
Amodu	  Tijani	  concluded	  that:	   	  
	  
[W]e	   are	   of	   the	   view	   that	   the	   real	   character	   of	   the	   title	   that	   the	   Richtersveld	  
Community	   possessed	   in	   the	   subject	   land	   was	   a	   right	   of	   communal	   ownership	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












under	   indigenous	   law.	   	   The	  content	  of	   that	   right	   included	   the	   right	   to	  exclusive	  
occupation	   and	   use	   of	   the	   subject	   land	   by	   members	   of	   the	   Community.	   	   The	  
Community	  had	  the	  right	  to	  use	  its	  water,	  to	  use	  its	  land	  for	  grazing	  and	  hunting	  
and	   to	   exploit	   its	   natural	   resources,	   above	   and	  beneath	   the	   surface.	   	   It	   follows	  
therefore	   that	   prior	   to	   annexation	   the	   Richtersveld	   Community	   had	   a	   right	   of	  
ownership	  in	  the	  subject	  land	  under	  indigenous	  law.402	  
	  
	   In	  a	  radical	  pronouncement	  that	  went	  further	  than	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  courts	  of	  
Australia	  and	  Canada,	  the	  South	  African	  Court	  stated	  that	  actions	  of	  the	  state	  that	  did	  
not	   recognize	   customary	   or	   indigenous	   land	   title	   would	   be	   tantamount	   to	   racially	  
discriminatory	   practices	   if	   these	   actions	   tended	   to	   affect	   particular	   communities	  
disproportionately.	  The	  Constitutional	  Court	  noted	  that:	  
	  
Accordingly,	   the	   Precious	   Stones	   Act	   and	   its	   Proclamations	   failed	   to	   recognise	  
indigenous	   law	   ownership	   and	   treated	   the	   subject	   land	   as	   state	   land.	   	   On	   the	  
other	  hand,	  registered	  ownership	  was	  recognised,	  respected	  and	  protected.	   	   For	  
the	  most	  part,	  whites	  held	   their	   land	  under	   the	  system	  of	   registered	  ownership,	  
though	  there	  were	  some	  black	  people	  and	  black	  communities	  who	  did	  acquire	  title	  
of	   this	   sort.	   However,	   given	   that	   indigenous	   law	   ownership	   is	   the	  way	   in	  which	  
black	   communities	   have	   held	   land	   in	   South	   Africa	   since	   time	   immemorial,	   the	  
inevitable	  impact	  of	  the	  Prec ous	  Stones	  Act’s	  failure	  to	  recognise	  indigenous	  law	  
ownership	  was	   racially	  discriminatory	  against	  black	  people	  who	  were	   indigenous	  
law	   owners.	   The	   laws	   and	   practices	   by	   which	   the	   Richtersveld	   Community	   was	  
dispossessed	  of	  the	  subject	  land	  accordingly	  discriminated	  against	  the	  Community	  
and	  its	  members	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  race.403	  
	  
	   The	  Court	  continued:	  
	  
In	   this	   case,	   the	   racial	   discrimination	   lay	   in	   the	   failure	   to	   recognise	   and	   accord	  
protection	   to	   indigenous	   law	   ownership	   while,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   according	  
protection	  to	  registered	  title.	  The	   inevitable	   impact	  of	   this	  differential	   treatment	  
was	  racial	  discrimination	  against	  the	  Richtersveld	  Community,	  which	  caused	   it	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
402	   Supra	  n.	  398,	  at	  paragraph	  64.	  












be	  dispossessed	  of	  its	  land	  rights.	   	   Although	  it	  is	  correct	  that	  the	  Precious	  Stones	  
Act	   did	   not	   form	   part	   of	   the	   panoply	   of	   legislation	   giving	   effect	   to	   “spatial	  
apartheid”,	  its	  inevitable	  impact	  was	  to	  deprive	  the	  Richtersveld	  Community	  of	  its	  
indigenous	  law	  rights	  in	  land	  while	  recognising,	  to	  a	  significant	  extent,	  the	  rights	  of	  
registered	  owners.	   	   In	  our	  view,	  this	  is	  racially	  discriminatory….404	   	  
	  
	   While	   the	   decision	   of	   the	   Constitutional	   Court	   of	   South	   Africa	   is	   informed	   by	  
common	  law,	  Roman-­‐Dutch	  law	  and	  the	  South	  African	  Constitution,	  its	  judgment	  can	  be	  
placed	   within	   the	   tradition	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   jurisprudence	   dealing	   with	   indigenous	  
title	  beginning	  with	  Mabo	  No.2	   and	   later	   continuing	   through	   to	  Delgamuukw.	   Each	  of	  
these	  decisions	  symbolizes	  the	  steps	  towards	  recognition	  of	  the	  customary	  land	  title	  and	  
therefore	  customary	  law	  itself.	   	  
	  
(d)	  Biocultural	  Rights	  and	  Customary	  Land	  Title	  	  
While	  the	  recognition	  of	  customary	  land	  title	  in	  Anglo-­‐American	  jurisprudence	  is	  for	  the	  
most	   part	   a	   result	   of	   challenges	   by	   indigenous	   or	   aboriginal	   peoples,	   these	  
jurisprudential	  victories	  have	  added	  a	  significant	  momentum	  to	  biocultural	   rights.	   In	  a	  
number	  of	  common	  law	  countries,	  the	  call	  for	  recognition	  of	  customary	  land	  titles	  is	  led	  
by	  communities	  whose	  claims	  are	  not	  necessarily	   rooted	   in	   their	  aboriginal	   status	  but	  
rather	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  have	  been	  stewards	  of	  these	  lands	  for	  generations.	  
	  
	   The	   recognition	   of	   customary	   land	   title	   in	   the	   form	   of	   native,	   aboriginal	   or	  
indigenous	   title	   is	   a	   significant	   advance	   in	   Anglo-­‐American	   jurisprudence.	   As	   the	  
Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	   in	  Delgamuukw	  pointed	  out,	   in	  many	  cases	  aboriginal	  rights	  
are	   dependent	   on	   aboriginal	   title.	   Aboriginal	   title	   itself,	   while	   a	   beneficial	   form	   of	  
interest	  in	  traditional	  lands	  is	  limited	  by	  a	  stewardship	  duty	  imposed	  on	  the	  tribes	  not	  to	  
use	  the	  lands	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  is	  irreconcilable	  with	  those	  aspects	  of	  aboriginal	  culture	  
that	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  community’s	  connection	  with	  the	  land.	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  













`	   Both	  the	  Australian	  High	  Court	  and	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Canada	  emphasized	  that	  
the	  state	  is	  not	  free	  to	  expropriate	  title	  or	  diminish	  at	  will	  in	  accordance	  with	  its	  general	  
power	  of	  eminent	  domain.	  Instead	  it	  has	  a	  fiduciary	  obligation	  to	  protect	  customary	  title	  
realised	   in	   a	   requirement	   to	   consult	   and	   where	   necessary	   seek	   the	   consent	   or	  
compensate	   aboriginal	   communities	   where	   their	   title	   is	   to	   be	   diminished	   or	  
extinguished.	  In	  addition	  of	  course,	  the	  state	  will	  be	  expected	  to	  pay	  compensation	  for	  
the	  loss	  of	  rights.	  The	  Constitutional	  Court	  of	  South	  Africa	  went	  as	  far	  as	  to	  say	  that	  non-­‐
recognition	  of	  customary	  title	  when	  it	  disproportionately	  affects	  particular	  communities	  
can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  racially	  discriminatory.	   	  
	  
	   The	   line	  between	   recognition	  of	   biocultural	   rights	   and	   customary	   title	   to	   land	   is	  
implicit	   although	   there	   is	   an	   overlap	   between	   the	   two.	   While	   the	   recognition	   of	  
customary	  title	  to	  land	  usually	  involves	  remedying	  historical	  injustices,	  biocultural	  rights	  
rely	   on	   stewardship	   of	   ecosystems	   for	   their	   justification.	   The	   point	   of	   overlap	   exists	  
where	  both	  customary	  title	  and	  biocultural	  rights	  assert	  strong	  communal	  cultural	  and	  
spiritual	   bonds	   to	   certain	   lands	   bonds	   that	   render	   these	   lands	   as	   non-­‐fungible,	  
inalienable	  and	  lie	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  peoplehood.	   	  
	  
	   The	   Richtersveld	   community	   though	   belonging	   to	   the	   indigenous	   Nama	  
community,	   grounded	   their	   claim	   not	   only	   on	   their	   indigeniety	   but	   also	   on	   historical	  
occupation	  of	  their	   lands.	   In	  other	  common	  law	  countries	  such	  as	  India,	   it	   is	  clear	  that	  
community	   rights	   to	   their	   traditional	   lands	   are	   no	   longer	   rooted	   in	   establishing	  
indigeniety	  but	  in	  stewardship.	  The	  recent	  Indian	  Scheduled	  Tribes	  and	  Other	  Traditional	  
Forest	  Dwellers	  (Recognition	  of	  Forest	  Rights)	  Act	  of	  2006	  is	  an	  important	  case	  in	  point.	  
The	  Act	  recognizes	  the	  customary	  use	  rights	  of	  all	  forest	  dwelling	  communities	  and	  in	  its	  
preamble	   seeks	   to	   remedy	   the	   injustices	   caused	   to	   these	   communities	   during	  
colonialism	   and	   post-­‐independence.	   The	   biocultural	   dimension	   of	   this	   Act	   lies	   in	   the	  












communities	  to	  conserve	  biodiversity	  and	  maintain	  an	  ecological	  balance.	  Furthermore	  
the	   Act	   conclusively	   underscores	   stewardship	   duties	   of	   communities	   by	   including	   a	  
section	   on	   ‘Duties	   of	   Forest	   Rights	   Holders’,	   which	   is	   unprecedented	   in	   any	   previous	  
Indian	  law	  relating	  to	  forests.405	   	  
	  
	   The	  most	   explicit	   in	   recognition	   of	   biocultural	   rights	   in	   the	   form	   of	   stewardship	  
duties	  is	  the	  2010	  Bolivian	  ‘Law	  on	  the	  Rights	  of	  Mother	  Earth’,	  an	  unprecedented	  law	  to	  
grant	  a	  personified	  Nature	  equal	   rights	   to	  humans.406	   The	   law	  establishes	  eleven	  new	  
rights	  for	  Nature.	  These	  include:	  the	  right	  to	  life	  and	  to	  exist;	  the	  right	  to	  continue	  vital	  
cycles	  and	  processes	  free	  from	  human	  alteration;	  the	  right	  to	  pure	  water	  and	  clean	  air;	  
the	  right	  to	  balance;	  the	  right	  not	  to	  be	  polluted;	  the	  right	  to	  not	  have	  cellular	  structures	  
modified	  or	  genetically	  altered;	  and	  the	  right	  not	  to	  be	  affected	  by	  mega-­‐infrastructure	  
and	   development	   projects	   that	   affect	   the	   balance	   of	   ecosystems	   and	   local	   inhabitant	  
communities.	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  Ecuador	  has	  changed	  its	  constitution	  to	  give	  Nature	  “the	  
right	  to	  exist,	  persist,	  maintain	  and	  regenerate	   its	  vital	  cycles,	  structure,	   functions	  and	  
its	  processes	  in	  evolution.”407	  
	  
	   Despite	   the	  differences	  between	  customary	   land	   title	  and	  biocultural	   rights,	   it	   is	  
impossible	   to	   speak	   of	   either	   without	   seeing	   how	   the	   cases	   concerning	   both	   these	  
concepts	  are	  fundamentally	  linked.	  In	  fact	  the	  ethic	  that	  underlies	  both	  these	  concepts	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
405	   Section	  5	  of	  the	  Forest	  Rights	  Act	  states	  that	  the	  holders	  of	  any	  forest	  right	  under	  this	  Act	  are	  
empowered	  to-­‐	  
(a)	  protect	  the	  wild	  life,	  forest	  and	  biodiversity;	  
(b)	  ensure	  that	  adjoining	  catchments	  area,	  water	  sources	  and	  other	  ecological	  sensitive	  areas	  are	  
adequately	  protected;	  
(c)	  ensure	  that	  the	  habitat	  of	  forest	  dwelling	  Scheduled	  Tribes	  and	  other	  traditional	  forest	  dwellers	  is	  
preserved	  from	  any	  form	  of	  destructive	  practices	  affecting	  their	  cultural	  and	  natural	  heritage;	  
(d)	  ensure	  that	  the	  decisions	  taken	  in	  the	  Gram	  Sabha	  to	  regulate	  access	  to	  community	  forest	  resources	  
and	  stop	  any	  activity	  which	  adversely	  affects	  the	  wild	  animals,	  forest	  and	  the	  biodiversity	  are	  complied	  
with.	  
406	   Ley	  de	  Derechos	  de	  la	  Madre	  Tierra,	  Law	  071	  of	  the	  Plurinational	  State	  passed	  by	  Bolivia's	  Plurinational	  
Legislative	  Assembly	  in	  December	  2010.	  
407	   Vidal,	  John,	  “Bolivia	  Enshrines	  Natural	  World’s	  Rights	  with	  Equal	  Status	  for	  Mother	  Earth”,	  The	  












is	   one	   that	   sees	   land	   not	   purely	   as	   a	   tradable	   commodity	   but	   as	   the	   very	   soul	   of	   a	  
people.	  Communities	  have	   slowly	  begun	   to	   innovate	  with	   legal	   instruments	   like	   trusts	  
and	  biocultural	  community	  protocols	  to	  secure	  their	  biocultural	  rights.	  We	  shall	  explore	  












CHAPTER	  IX	  –	  BIOCULTURAL	  COMMUNITY	  PROTOCOLS:	  TOWARDS	  A	  
PLURALISM	  OF	  PROPERTY	  
	  
Resources	   are	   fundamentally	   a	   matter	   of	   relationships,	   not	   things.	   They	   do	   not	   exist	  
outside	   of	   the	   complex	   relationships	   between	   society,	   technology,	   culture,	   economics	  
and	  environment	  in	  some	  pre-­‐ordinated	  form.408	  
	  
The	  focus	  thus	  far	  has	  been	  twofold:	  First,	  to	  deconstruct	  the	  notion	  of	  property	  and	  to	  
break	  it	  down	  to	  its	  building	  blocks	  i.e.	  that	  property	  is	  a	  legally	  enforceable	  claim	  or	  a	  
relationship	   between	   people	   rather	   than	   a	   thing	   and	   that	   property	   rights	   must	   be	  
justified	  in	  the	  context	  of	  human	  or	  community	  welfare.	  Secondly,	  through	  highlighting	  
trends	   in	   international	   and	   domestic	   law	   it	   has	   been	   shown	   that	   international	  
jurisprudence	  is	  beginning	  to	  recognize	  that	  stewardship	  of	  the	  land	  can	  be	  a	  stick	  in	  the	  
bundle	  of	  property	  rights.409	   In	  fact	  the	  trends	  over	  the	  last	  three	  decades	  suggest	  that	  
the	  narrowing	  down	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  property	  in	  the	  seventeenth	  century	  from	  a	  set	  of	  
enforceable	   relationships	   to	   a	   privately	   owned	   thing	   has	   been	   on	   the	   wane.	   Instead	  
there	   has	   been	   a	   steady	   re-­‐expansion	   of	   the	   grounds	   on	   which	   claims	   to	   property	  
(whether	  land	  or	  natural	  resources)	  can	  be	  made.	  
	  
	   Based	  on	   growing	   evidence	   that	   the	   environmental	   crisis	   is	   a	   result	   of	   delinking	  
property	   rights	   (private	   property)	   from	   their	   social	   and	   environmental	   functions,	   law	  
makers	  and	  judges	  have	  been	  forced	  to	  recognize	  property	  claims	  that	  go	  beyond	  pure	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
408	   Howitt,	  Richie,	  “Frontiers,	  Borders,	  Edges:	  Liminal	  Challenges	  to	  the	  Hegemony	  of	  Exclusion”,	  
Australian	  Geographical	  Studies,	  39(2),	  2001,	  pp.	  233-­‐245.	  
409	   Justice	  Benjamin	  Cardozo	  has	  been	  credited	  with	  developing	  this	  metaphor:	  “The	  bundle	  of	  power	  and	  
privileges	  to	  which	  we	  give	  the	  name	  of	  ownership	  is	  not	  constant	  through	  the	  ages.	  The	  faggots	  must	  
be	  put	  together	  and	  rebound	  from	  time	  to	  time”	  in	  Cardozo,	  Benjamin	  N.,	  The	  Paradoxes	  of	  Legal	  
Science,	  New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1928,	  p.129.	  In	  several	  opinions,	  Justices	  of	  the	  
Supreme	  Court	  of	  the	  United	  States	  have	  invoked	  this	  image	  to	  describe	  the	  fullest	  possible	  set	  of	  
private	  property	  rights,	  see	  Kaiser	  Aetna	  v.	  United	  States,	  444	  U.S.	  164	  (1979,	  176)	  (referring	  to	  “sticks	  
in	  the	  bundle	  of	  rights	  that	  are	  commonly	  characterized	  as	  property”);	  United	  States	  v.	  Craft,	  535	  U.S.	  
274	  (2002,	  278)	  (“A	  common	  idiom	  describes	  property	  as	  a	  ‘bundle	  of	  sticks’…”)	  cited	  in	  Ellickson,	  
Robert,	  “Two	  Cheers	  for	  the	  Bundle-­‐of-­‐Sticks	  Metaphor,	  Three	  Cheers	  for	  Merrill	  and	  Smith,”	  Econ	  












legal	   title.410 	   These	   claims	   are	   based	   on	   alternate	   ethical	   criteria	   that	   challenge	  
ownership	  as	   the	  only	  criterion	  to	   justify	  a	  property	  claim.	  As	  discussed	  previously,	  all	  
claims	   to	   property	   are	   based	   on	   a	   particular	   conception	   of	   personhood	   and	   the	  
individual’s	   wellbeing.	   A	   claim	   to	   private	   property	   is	   based	   on	   a	   conflation	   of	  
personhood	   with	   the	   homo	   economicus	   thereby	   identifying	   human	   and	   societal	  
wellbeing	  with	  the	  law’s	  ability	  to	  secure	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  homo	  economicus.	   	  
	  
	   The	  emergence	  of	  stewardship	  as	  an	  ethical	   justification	  for	  community	  property	  
claims	   has	   sought	   to	   limit	   the	   unconditional	   nature	   of	   private	   property	   claims	   that	  
abjure	  all	  environmental	  responsibilities.	  As	  shown	  earlier,	  Articles	  8(j)	  and	  10(c)	  of	  the	  
CBD	   laid	   the	   foundations	   for	   stewardship	   as	   a	   legal	   ground	   for	   community	   property	  
claims.	  Article	   8(j)	   obliges	   State	   parties	   to	   respect,	   preserve	   and	  maintain	   knowledge,	  
innovations	   and	   practices	   of	   indigenous	   and	   local	   communities	   embodying	   traditional	  
lifestyles	  relevant	  for	  the	  conservation	  and	  sustainable	  use	  of	  biodiversity.	  Article	  10(c)	  
goes	   further	   by	   requiring	   State	   parties	   to	   protect	   and	   encourage	   customary	   use	   of	  
biological	   resources	   in	   accordance	   with	   traditional	   cultural	   practices	   compatible	   with	  
the	  conservation	  and	  sustainable	  use	  of	  biodiversity.	   	  
	  
	   While	  the	  multilateral	  environmental	  agreements	  since	  the	  CBD	  entered	  into	  force	  
in	  1993	  have	  ensured	  that	  community	  property	  claims	  based	  on	  stewardship	  are	  here	  to	  
stay,	  it	  will	  be	  some	  time	  before	  the	  decisions	  of	  regional	  tribunals	  and	  domestic	  courts	  
entertain	  this	  principle	  as	  a	  stand	  alone	  criterion	  to	  justify	  a	  property	  claim.	  However,	  it	  
appears	   from	   the	   case	   law	   analysed	   above411	   that	   judges	   tend	   to	   support	   or	   deny	   a	  
property	   claim	   based	   on	   a	   number	   of	   criteria	   ranging	   from	   legal	   title	   to	   long-­‐term	  
possession	   to	   cultural	   attachment	   to	   stewardship.	   In	   the	   highly	   contested	   community	  
claims	   to	   property	   rights,	   it	   appears	   that	   the	   courts	   reason	   their	   decisions	   on	   an	  
approach	   that	   seeks	   to	   bind	   together	   different	   kinds	   of	   claims	   all	   of	   which	   together	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410	   See	  Chapter	  1.	  












make	   up	   a	   community’s	   legally	   recognized	   right	   to	   property.	   In	   such	   an	   approach	   a	  
property	  claim	  does	  not	  stand	  or	  fall	  based	  on	  just	  one	  factor	  but	  a	  multitude	  of	  factors	  
including	  stewardship.	   	  
	  
	   For	  this	  reason	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  make	  the	  case	  that	  we	  have	  reached	  a	  stage	  
where	  only	   evidence	  of	  historical	   stewardship	  would	  ensure	  a	  better	   title	   to	  property	  
(specifically	   land	   or	   natural	   resources)	   than	   a	   claim	   that	   is	   based	   on	   a	   title	   deed.	  
However,	  evidence	  from	  case	  law	  shows	  that	  a	  claim	  of	  historical	  stewardship	  together	  
with	  long	  occupation	  by	  a	  community	  or	  cultural	  attachment	  stands	  a	  strong	  chance	  of	  
trumping	  a	  property	  claim	  that	  is	  based	  purely	  on	  legal	  title.	  The	  litmus	  test	  of	  whether	  
evidence	  of	  historical	  stewardship	  actually	  contributes	  to	  strengthening	  a	  property	  claim	  
would	  have	  to	  be	  based	  on	  whether	  an	  absence	  of	  that	  same	  evidence	  would	  weaken	  a	   	  
claim	  notwithstanding	  proof	  of	  long	  occupation	  and	  use.	   	  
	  
	   What	  comes	   through	  clearly	   in	  nearly	  all	   the	  cases	  of	   the	   regional	  and	  domestic	  
courts	   previously	   discussed	   is	   that	   property	   claims	   led	   by	   indigenous	   or	   tribal	  
communities	  invariably	  present	  evidence	  of	  historical	  stewardship	  resulting	  from	  strong	  
cultural	  and	  spiritual	  bonds	  with	  the	  property	  in	  question.	  The	  sub-­‐text	  in	  the	  arguments	  
presented	  by	  communities	  and	  the	  reasoning	  of	  the	  courts	  in	  these	  cases	  mirror	  Radin’s	  
argument	   that	   a	   personal	   property	   claim	   should	   trump	   a	   fungible	   property	   claim	   (i.e.	  
evidence	  by	  the	  state	  that	  the	  title	  to	  the	  land	  belongs	  to	  the	  government	  to	  lease	  freely	  
to	  mining	  or	  timber	  companies).	   	  
	  
	   In	  fact	  what	  establishes	  the	  significance	  of	  evidence	  of	  stewardship	  is	  the	  courts’	  
concentration	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   community’s	   relationship	   with	   its	   lands	   and	   an	  
emphasis	   on	   its	   non-­‐fungible	   nature.	   The	   final	   decision	   by	   the	   courts	   in	   the	   cases	  
previously	  discussed	  upholds	  community	  claims	  of	   ‘personal’	  property	  over	  competing	  
claims	  by	  the	  state	  to	  the	  land	  as	  a	  fungible	  asset.	  The	  communities	  did	  not	  simply	  claim	  












significance.	  The	   land	   in	   fact	  defined	   them	  as	  a	  people.	   The	   states	  on	   the	  other	  hand	  
claimed	  the	  land	  as	   it	  would	  claim	  any	  other	  land	  within	  its	   jurisdiction	  to	  which	  there	  
was	  no	  clear	  title.	   	  
	  
	   Stewardship	  at	  its	  core	  implies	  an	  ethic	  of	  care	  and	  such	  an	  ethic	  is	  only	  realizable	  
in	  situations	  where	  the	  relationship	  to	  property	  is,	  to	  use	  Radin’s	  term,	  ‘personal’	  with	  
ties	  that	  go	  beyond	  the	  property	  as	  pure	  exchange	  value.	  Cultural	  and	  spiritual	  bonds	  to	  
a	  land	  distinguish	  it	  from	  a	  mere	  piece	  of	  real	  estate	  and	  necessarily	  display	  a	  care	  ethic	  
and	   hence	   stewardship.	   Radin,	   however,	   warns	   that	   every	   kind	   of	   attachment	   to	  
property	  need	  not	  be	  given	  recognition.	  She	  notes:	  
	  
If	   there	   is	   a	   traditional	   understanding	   that	   a	  well-­‐developed	  person	  must	   invest	  
herself	   to	   some	   extent	   in	   external	   objects,	   there	   is	   no	   less	   a	   traditional	  
understanding	  that	  one	  should	  not	  invest	  oneself	  in	  the	  wrong	  way	  or	  to	  too	  great	  
an	  extent	   in	  external	  objects.	  Property	   is	  damnation	  as	  well	  as	   salvation,	  object-­‐
fetishism	  as	  well	  as	  moral	  groundwork.412	  
	  
	   As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  cases	  discussed	  above	  however,	  the	  courts	  do	  not	  uphold	  a	  
property	   claim	   merely	   because	   the	   claimant	   can	   produce	   evidence	   of	   a	   personal	  
attachment	  to	  it,	  similar	  to	  an	  attachment	  to	  a	  pair	  of	  shoes	  or	  a	  car.	  On	  the	  contrary	  it	  
is	   submitted	   that	   from	   the	   consistent	   judicial	   affirmation	   of	   certain	   kinds	   of	   property	  
claims,	   a	   relationship	   of	   stewardship	   evidenced	  by	   strong	   cultural	   and	   spiritual	   bonds	  
with	  a	  particular	  piece	  of	  land	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  upheld	  due	  to	  the	  larger	  societal	  benefits	  of	  
conservation	  of	  Nature.	   	  
	  
	   In	  any	  case	  a	  property	  claim	  based	  on	  stewardship	  can	  quite	  easily	  co-­‐exist	  with	  a	  
competing	  property	  claim	  based	  on	  legal	  title.	  Both	  these	  claims	  do	  not	  necessarily	  have	  
to	  be	  mutually	  exclusive.	  For	  most	  part	  a	  property	  claim	  based	  on	  stewardship	  seeks	  a	  
right	  to	  use,	  manage,	  benefit	  and	  to	  set	  limits	  on	  property	  rights	  derived	  from	  legal	  title.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












An	  example	  of	  such	  a	  situation	  would	  be	  a	  community’s	  claim	  to	  use	  and	  care	  for	  their	  
sacred	  sites	  on	  a	  land	  to	  which	  a	  private	  owner	  holds	  the	  title.	  While	  the	  private	  owner	  
is	  still	  free	  to	  occupy	  and	  benefit	  from	  his	  land,	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  community	  as	  guardian	  
of	  its	  sacred	  sites	  limit	  the	  extent	  of	  his	  rights	  of	  use.	   	  
	  
	   Such	   a	  model	   is	   not	   necessarily	   radical	   in	   property	   jurisprudence,	   as	   Riley	   et	   al	  
have	  noted	   in	   their	  argument	   for	   ‘cultural	  property	   rights’.413	   In	   fact	   such	  models	  are	  
gaining	  increasing	  currency	  especially	  in	  the	  context	  of	  trusts	  where	  a	  private	  owner	  sets	  
aside	   for	   conservation	  portions	  of	   his	   property	   to	  be	   held	   in	   trust	   for	   perpetuity.	   The	  
trustees	  may	  be	  a	   local	   tribe,	  a	  private	  owner	  or	   in	  some	  cases	   the	   local	  government.	  
The	   tribes	   commit	   to	   looking	   after	   the	   land	   for	   future	   generations	   who	   are	   the	  
beneficiaries	  of	  the	  trust	  and	  the	  government	  may	  provide	  tax	  breaks	  since	  the	  land	  is	  
set	   aside	   for	   conservation.	   The	   private	   owner	   financially	   benefits	   from	   the	   tax	  
exemption	   along	  with	   having	   the	   land	   sustainably	  managed.	   The	   tribes	   are	   therefore	  
able	   to	   carry	   on	   their	   traditional	   ways	   of	   life	   along	   with	   the	   necessary	   cultural	   and	  
spiritual	  practices	  that	  are	  necessary	  for	  the	  flourishing	  of	  their	  peoplehood.	   	  
	  
	   An	  arrangement	  of	  this	  sort	  explores	  the	  possibility	  of	  different	  kinds	  of	  property	  
rights	  based	  on	  separate	  grounds	  (trusteeship/stewardship	  and	  ownership)	  co-­‐existing,	  
thereby	   challenging	   the	   popular	   myth	   that	   a	   private	   property	   right	   brooks	   no	  
encumbrances.	   Mary	   Christina	   Wood	   has	   undertaken	   an	   extensive	   study	   on	   such	  
stewardship	   trust	   models	   in	   the	   United	   States.	   The	   outcomes	   of	   this	   study	   were	  
published	   in	   a	   two	   part	   series	   titled	   ‘Tribes	   as	   Trustees’	   414which	   examines	   in	   detail	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
413	   Supra	  n.	  299.	  
414	   Wood,	  Mary	  Christina	  et.al,	  “Tribes	  as	  Trustees	  Again	  (Part	  1):	  The	  Emerging	  Tribal	  Role	  in	  the	  
Conservation	  Trust	  Movement”,	  Harvard	  Environmental	  Law	  Review,	  Vol.	  32,	  2008,	  pp.373-­‐	  432;	  
Wood,	  Mary	  Christina	  et.al,	  “Tribes	  as	  Trustees	  Again	  (Part	  2):	  Evaluating	  Four	  Models	  of	  Tribal	  
Participation	  in	  the	  Conservation	  Trust	  Movement”,	  Stanford	  Environmental	  Law	  Journal,	  Vol.27,	  2008,	  
p.	  477-­‐546.	  In	  Part	  1,	  pp.	  407-­‐408,	  Wood	  provides	  an	  interesting	  example	  of	  the	  Yanix	  Ranch	  
trusteeship	  model.	  The	  Yainix	  Ranch	  is	  a	  788-­‐acres	  located	  in	  the	  Upper	  Klamath	  Basin	  of	  Southern	  
Oregon.	  It	  sits	  near	  the	  confluence	  of	  the	  Sprague	  and	  Sycan	  Rivers,	  both	  of	  which	  once	  held	  thriving	  












innovative	   ways	   in	   which	   different	   property	   claims	   can	   co-­‐exist	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	  
conservation.	  Studies	  of	  this	  nature	  have	  the	  beneficial	  impact	  of	  deconstructing	  reified	  
notions	  of	  property	  as	  a	  ‘right	  to	  exclude’,	  and	  underscoring	  the	  truth	  that	  property	  is	  a	  
relationship.	   The	   insights	   gained	   from	   such	   an	   understanding	   take	   us	   beyond	   the	  
reductionist	   binary	   of	   absolute	   private	   property	   versus	   a	   complete	   open	   access	   to	   a	  
more	   nuanced	   approach	   of	   the	   commons	   being	   a	   way	   of	   inclusively	   recognizing	   the	  
different	  kinds	  of	  relationships	  people	  may	  construct	  with	  respect	  to	  property.	   	   	  
	  
	   As	  Marx	  and	  Macpherson	  noted,415	   property	  as	  a	  concept	  is	  fluid	  and	  is	  in	  essence	  
a	  set	  of	  enforceable	  claims.	  The	  kinds	  of	  claims	  that	  are	  legally	  recognized	  versus	  those	  
that	   are	   not	   depend	   on	   a	   variety	   of	   factors.	   The	   rise	   of	   mercantilism	   from	   the	  
seventeenth	  century	  onwards,	  that	  later	  evolved	  into	  the	  free	  market	  capitalism	  in	  the	  
nineteenth	  century,	  privileged	  claims	  to	  private	  property	  over	  common	  property	  claims.	  
The	  work	  of	  John	  Locke	  shows	  clearly	  the	  difficult	  moral	  arguments	  that	  had	  to	  be	  made	  
to	   justify	   enclosure	   of	   the	   commons	   and	   unlimited	   accumulation	   in	   the	   seventeenth	  
century.416	   Debates	  about	  the	  commons	  versus	  private	  property	  are	  in	  essence	  debates	  
about	   different	   kinds	   of	   property	   claims.	   The	   right	   to	   private	   property	   is	   a	   right	   to	  
exclude,	  whereas	  a	  right	  to	  the	  commons	  is	  a	  right	  of	  a	  community	  not	  to	  be	  excluded.	   	  
	  
	   Growing	   public	   concern	   about	   loss	   of	   biodiversity	   and	   its	   adverse	   effects	   on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The	  ranch	  land	  was	  originally	  part	  of	  the	  Klamath	  Indian	  Reservation.	  The	  land	  was	  sold	  to	  a	  series	  of	  
non-­‐Indian	  ranchers	  and	  owners	  of	  the	  land	  stocked	  far	  more	  cattle	  than	  was	  environmentally	  
feasible.	  Years	  of	  overgrazing	  degraded	  the	  ranch	  and	  riparian	  erosion	  filled	  the	  river	  with	  sediment	  
making	  the	  Sprague	  River	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  low	  water	  quality	  in	  Upper	  Klamath	  Lake.	  In	  2002,	  the	  
Hyde	  family	  purchased	  the	  Yainix	  Ranch,	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  cooperation	  could	  restore	  the	  ranch	  to	  
productivity	  in	  a	  way	  that	  was	  good	  for	  ranchers,	  tribes,	  and	  fish.	  The	  Hydes	  worked	  with	  Sustainable	  
Northwest,	  a	  Portland-­‐based	  nonprofit	  organization,	  to	  create	  an	  innovative	  agricultural	  conservation	  
easement.	  The	  Klamath	  Tribes	  hold	  the	  easement	  and	  are	  solely	  responsible	  for	  monitoring	  the	  
ranch’s	  ecological	  health	  in	  order	  to	  restore	  riparian	  vegetation	  and	  hence	  the	  water	  quality,	  habitat,	  
and	  fisheries.	  The	  Hydes	  hold	  title	  to	  the	  ranch	  and	  live	  and	  pay	  taxes	  on	  the	  property,	  but	  manage	  the	  
land	  in	  accordance	  with	  a	  restoration	  plan	  designed	  by	  the	  state,	  tribal,	  environmental,	  and	  
neighbouring	  agricultural	  partners.	  
415	   See	  Chapters	  5	  and	  6.	  












climate,	  food	  and	  health	  security,	  coupled	  with	  evidence	  of	  good	  conservation	  practices	  
by	   communities	   has	   provided	   the	   impetus	   for	   historical	   stewardship	   to	   strengthen	   a	  
community’s	  claim	  to	  property.	  While	  the	   links	  between	  biodiversity	  conservation	  and	  
the	  stewardship	  roles	  of	  certain	  communities	  is	  obvious	  in	  the	  various	  decisions	  of	  the	  
Conference	  of	  the	  Parties	  to	  the	  CBD,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  the	  strong	  participation	  of	  
indigenous	  peoples	  groups	  and	  supporting	  organizations	  in	  all	  the	  negotiations	  relating	  
to	  multilateral	   environmental	   agreements.	   In	   fact,	   indigenous	   peoples	   and	   traditional	  
communities	  have	  also	  begun	  to	  strategically	  present	  their	  claims	  over	  land,	  knowledge	  
and	  resources	  not	  merely	  as	  title	  claims	  but	  also	  as	  stewardship	  claims.	   	  
	  
	   The	   environmental	   crisis	   has	   inadvertently	   had	   the	   effect	   of	   expanding	   the	  
justificatory	   grounds	   for	   a	   legitimate	   property	   claim	   to	   include	   evidence	   of	   historical	  
stewardship	   as	   a	   good	   ground	   for	   a	   property	   claim.	   Furthermore	   evidence	   of	  
stewardship	   under	   certain	   situations	   could	   actually	   trump	   a	   claim	   based	   purely	   on	   a	  
legal	  title	  deed.	  This	  has	  resulted	  in	  a	  radical	  reconfiguration	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  property	  
and	  thus	  provided	  valuable	  ammunition	  for	  communities	  claiming	  the	  commons	  right	  or	  
the	  ‘right	  not	  to	  be	  excluded’	  against	  the	  hegemony	  of	  private	  property	  rights.	  
	  
(a)	  Trusts:	  Separating	  Title	  from	  Control	  and	  Benefits	  
	  
[I]n	  establishing	  a	  trust,	  a	  founder	  (or	  a	  court,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  ‘imputed’	  trusts)	  can	  play	  a	  
whole	  range	  of	  ‘tricks’	  with	  three	  particular	  aspects	  of	  property	  ownership:	  nominal	  title,	  
benefit	  and	  control.	  The	   founder	   (or	   the	  court)	   can	   juggle	   these	  around	   in	  a	  variety	  of	  
ways.417	  
	  
	   One	  of	  the	  problems	  with	  the	  conflation	  of	  property	  with	  private	  property	   is	   the	  
misconception	   that	   legal	   title,	   control	   and	   benefit	   would	   all	   have	   to	   vest	   in	   the	  
titleholder.	  Common	  law	  has	  produced	  legal	  instruments	  such	  as	  ‘trusts’	  however,	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  













allow	   for	   the	   separation	   between	   title,	   control	   and	   benefits	   thereby	   allowing	   the	  
coexistence	   of	   multiple	   claims	   over	   things.	   	   The	   history	   of	   trusts	   in	   common	   law	  
extends	  back	  to	  the	  time	  of	   the	  crusades	   in	  the	  13th	  century.	  They	  were	  developed	  to	  
allow	   the	   feudal	   land	  owners	  who	  went	   off	   to	   fight	   in	   foreign	   lands	   to	   pass	   the	   legal	  
rights	  over	  their	  estates	  to	  someone	  they	  trusted	  (a	  trustee),	  who	  would	  then	  manage	  
the	   lands	  on	   the	  understanding	   that	   the	  original	   land	  owner	  and	  his	   family	  would	  still	  
have	  ultimate	  rights	  over	  the	  land	  as	  the	  beneficiaries.	  The	  trustee	  was	  expected	  to	  act	  
in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  beneficiaries	  and	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  agreement	  reached	  
with	  the	  original	  landowner	  (the	  deed	  of	  trust).418	  
	  
	   The	  concept	  of	  trust	  has	  obviously	  evolved	  since	  then	  and	  the	  modern	  trust	  can	  be	  
created	  by	  anyone	  who	  is	  the	  absolute	  owner	  of	  a	  property	  (the	  settlor)	  by	  appointing	  a	  
trustee	   to	  manage	   the	   property	   in	   accordance	  with	   a	   trust	   deed	   for	   a	   beneficiary	   (or	  
beneficiaries,	   some	  of	  whom	  may	  yet	   to	  be	  born).	  Once	  the	   trust	   is	  created,	   the	   legal	  
title	  vests	   in	  the	  trustee,	  but	  the	  actions	  of	   the	  trustee	  are	  clearly	   limited	  by	  the	  trust	  
deed	  and	  have	  to	  serve	  the	  beneficiaries	  who	  are	  said	  to	  have	  an	  ‘equitable	  or	  beneficial	  
interest’	  in	  the	  trust	  property.	   	   Thus	  while	  the	  trustee	  has	  legal	  title	  over	  the	  property,	  
the	   beneficiary	   has	   both	   the	   ‘equitable	   property	   right’	   against	   the	   trust	   property	   and	  
personal	  claims	  against	   the	   trustee	   to	  ensure	   that	   the	   trustee	  acts	   in	  accordance	  with	  
the	  terms	  of	  the	  trust.419	   	  
	  
	   The	  development	  of	  trusts	  owes	  its	  origins	  to	  common	  law’s	  efforts	  to	  create	  the	  
necessary	   flexibility	   in	   property	   jurisprudence	   to	   ensure	   equitable	   management	   of	  
property.	   	   Courts	   have	   therefore	   imposed	   trusts	   in	   situations	   where	   the	   direct	  
application	   of	   property	   law	   was	   likely	   to	   create	   an	   injustice.	   Such	   trusts,	   created	  
irrespective	   of	   the	   intention	   of	   the	   parties	   are	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘constructive	   trusts’.	   In	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
418	   Hudson,	  Alastair,	  Understanding	  Equity	  and	  Trusts,	  3rded.,	  London:	  Routledge-­‐Cavendish,	  2008,	  p.13.	  
419	   Ibid,	  at	  14;	  There	  is	  nothing	  that	  prevents	  the	  settlor	  from	  also	  being	  a	  trustee	  and	  a	  trustee	  from	  also	  












Paragon	   Finance	  plc	   v.	  D.B.	   Thakerar	  &	  Co.420	   Lord	   Justice	  Millett	   of	   the	   England	  and	  
Wales	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  explained	  the	  institution	  as:	  
	  
A	   constructive	   trust	   arises	   by	   operation	   of	   law	  whenever	   the	   circumstances	   are	  
such	  that	   it	  would	  be	  unconscionable	   for	   the	  owner	  of	   the	  property	   (usually	  but	  
not	   necessarily	   the	   legal	   estate)	   to	   assert	   his	   own	   beneficial	   interest	   in	   the	  
property	  and	  deny	  the	  beneficial	  interest	  of	  another.421	  
	  
	   Courts	  have	  imposed	  constructive	  trusts	  whenever	  they	  felt	  that	  the	  common	  law	  
owner	  of	  a	  property	   is	  acting	  unconscionably	  and	   such	  actions	  would	  adversely	  affect	  
the	  rights	  of	  others.	   In	  the	  1996	  House	  of	  Lords	  decision	  of	  Westdeutsche	  Landesbank	  
Girozentrale	  v.	  Islington	  London	  Borough	  Council,422	   Lord	  Browne-­‐	  Wilkinson	  elaborated	  
this	  rationale	  by	  stating	  that:	  
	  
Equity	  operates	  on	  the	  conscience	  of	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  legal	  interest.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
a	  trust,	  the	  conscience	  of	  the	  legal	  owner	  requires	  him	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  purposes	  
for	  which	  the	  property	  is	  vested	  in	  him	  (express	  or	  implied	  trust)	  or	  which	  the	  law	  
imposes	  on	  him	  by	  reason	  of	  his	  unconscionable	  conduct	  (constructive	  trust).	  
	  
	   Lord	   Denning	   in	   the	   1972	   case	   of	  Mrs.	   Emily	   Hussey	   v.	   P.	   Palmer423	   provided	  
perhaps	  the	  boldest	  exposition	  of	  a	  constructive	  trust	  when	  he	  stated	  that:	  
	  
Although	   the	   plaintiff	   alleged	   that	   there	   was	   a	   resulting	   trust,	   I	   should	   have	  
thought	  that	  the	  trust	  in	  this	  case,	   if	  there	  was	  one,	  was	  more	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  
constructive	  trust:	  but	  this	  is	  more	  a	  pattern	  of	  words	  than	  anything	  else.	  The	  two	  
run	   together.	   By	   whatever	   name	   it	   is	   described,	   it	   is	   a	   trust	   imposed	   by	   law	  
whenever	   justice	  and	  good	  conscience	   require	   it.	   It	   is	   a	   liberal	  process,	   founded	  
upon	  large	  principles	  of	  equity,	  to	  be	  applied	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  defendant	  cannot	  
conscientiously	  keep	  the	  property	  for	  himself	  alone,	  but	  ought	  to	  allow	  another	  to	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have	   the	   property	   or	   share	   in	   it.	   The	   trust	   may	   arise	   at	   the	   outset	   when	   the	  
property	   is	   acquired,	   or	   later	   on,	   as	   the	   circumstances	   may	   require.	   It	   is	   an	  
equitable	   remedy	   by	   which	   the	   Court	   can	   enable	   an	   aggrieved	   party	   to	   obtain	  
restitution.424	  
	  
	   While	   the	   courts	   in	   both	  Mabo	   and	  Degamuukw	   (discussed	   previously)	   did	   not	  
explicitly	  assert	  that	  they	  were	  imposing	  a	  constructive	  trust	  on	  the	  Crown,	  the	  fact	  that	  
they	   imputed	   a	   fiduciary	   duty	   on	   it	   to	   act	   in	   the	   best	   interests	   of	   the	   aboriginal	  
communities	   underpinned	   the	   same	   principle	   of	   equity	   as	   in	   constructive	   trusts.	   The	  
courts	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  Crown	  had	  radical	  title	  to	  all	   land	  in	   its	   jurisdiction.	  This	  
radical	  title,	  though	  limited	  by	  common	  law,	  still	   implied	  that	  the	  Crown	  could	  acquire	  
the	   land	   of	   the	   aboriginal	   communities	   for	   a	   public	   purpose.	   However,	   the	   fact	   that	  
aboriginal	   or	   native	   title	   could	   only	   be	   transferred	   back	   to	   the	   Crown	   was	   sufficient	  
ground	  for	  the	  courts	  to	  impute	  to	  the	  Crown	  a	  fiduciary	  duty	  to	  act	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  
the	   aboriginal	   communities.425	   The	   power	   of	   the	   Crown	   to	   acquire	   aboriginal	   lands,	  
according	  to	  the	  courts,	  necessarily	   imposed	  upon	  it	  the	  duty	  to	  act	   in	  the	  interests	  of	  
the	  aboriginal	  communities.	  
	  
	   While	   the	   Canadian	   and	   Australian	   courts	   have	   imputed	   a	   fiduciary	   duty	   to	   the	  
Crown	   when	   dealing	   with	   aboriginal	   lands,	   they	   have	   also	   imposed	   another	   kind	   of	  
trusteeship	   or	   stewardship	   on	   the	   aboriginal	   communities	   themselves	   in	   relation	   to	  
their	   lands.	   Chief	   Justice	   Lamer	   in	  Delgamuukw	  explicitly	   noted	   that	   aboriginal	   title	   is	  
limited	  by	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  range	  of	  uses	   to	  which	   the	   land	  can	  be	  put	  should	  not	  be	  
irreconcilable	  with	   the	  nature	  of	  attachment	   to	   the	   land	  which	   forms	   the	  basis	  of	   the	  
particular	   group’s	   aboriginal	   title.426	   The	   Canadian	   Supreme	   Court	   further	   elaborated	  
this	  duty	  of	  trusteeship	  when	  it	  reasoned	  that	  lands	  held	  pursuant	  to	  an	  aboriginal	  title	  
could	  not	  be	  alienated	  since	  these	  lands	  are	  more	  than	  a	  fungible	  commodity.	  The	  Court	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explained	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  community	  and	  the	  lands	  has	  an	  important	  
non-­‐economic	  component	  based	  on	  the	  cultural	  and	  spiritual	  bonds	  of	  the	  community	  
with	  its	  lands.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  these	  bonds	  the	  aboriginal	  title	  was	  recognized	  in	  the	  first	  
place.427	  
	  
	   The	   use	   of	   the	   trust	   model	   (without	   terming	   it	   thus)	   with	   legal	   title	   limited	   by	  
stewardship	   requirements	   has	   been	  widely	   used	   in	   the	   context	   of	   ‘community	   based	  
natural	   resource	  management’	   (CBNRM)	   in	   Eastern	   and	   Southern	  Africa.	   Some	  of	   the	  
best-­‐known	  models	  have	  been	  Zimbabwe’s	  CAMPFIRE	   (Communal	  Areas	  Management	  
Programme	   for	   Indigenous	   Resources)	   and	  Namibia’s	   communal	   conservancies.	   These	  
CBNRM	  models	   in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  were	  devised	  to	  counter	   the	  colonial	   systems	  of	  
centralized	   political	   authority	   over	   land	   and	   resources,	   systems	   that	   were	   later	  
embraced	   by	   post-­‐colonial	   states,	   decimating	   local	   institutions	   of	   land	   and	   resource	  
governance.	  Resources	  were	  abused	  for	  private	  gain	  and	  patronage	  by	  centralized	  state	  
authorities	   that	   had	   legal	   title	   over	   the	   land	   but	   lacked	   the	   capacity	   to	   manage	   the	  
resources	   effectively.	   This	   led	   to	   the	   transformation	   of	   community	  managed	  wildlife,	  
forests	   and	   fisheries	   in	   the	   form	   common	   property	   into	   de-­‐facto	   open	   access.	   The	  
consequence	  was	  a	  rapid	  depletion	  of	  the	  resources	  since	   local	  users	   lacked	  the	  rights	  
and	  therefore	  the	  incentives	  to	  manage	  them.428	   	  
	  
	   The	   late	  1960s	   saw	  experiments	  by	   the	  governments	  of	   South	  Africa,	   Zimbabwe	  
and	   Namibia	   in	   developing	   wildlife	   management	   policies	   that	   sought	   to	   devolve	  
stewardship	   of	   wildlife	   to	   white	   landowners.	   These	   landowners	   in	   turn	  managed	   the	  
animals	   as	   a	   form	   of	   land	   use	   generating	   economic	   benefits	   from	  wildlife	   production	  
thereby	  incentivizing	  stewardship	  and	  conservation.	  In	  Zimbabwe,	  27,000	  square	  km	  of	  
farmland	  shifted	  from	  cattle	  ranching	  to	  wildlife	  production,	  and	  Namibia	  saw	  an	  80	  per	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cent	   increase	  of	  wildlife	   on	  private	   lands	  between	  1972	   and	  1992.	   In	   both	   Zimbabwe	  
and	  Namibia,	  the	  successes	  of	  devolved	  stewardship	  led	  to	  adopting	  the	  same	  reforms	  
on	   communal	   lands	   after	   their	   transition	   to	   majority	   rule	   in	   1980	   and	   1990	  
respectively.429	   	   	  
	   	  
	   CAMPFIRE	   in	   Zimbabwe	   was	   a	   creative	   model	   of	   devolving	   stewardship	   over	  
wildlife	  and	  benefits	  arising	  from	  their	  use	  to	  local	  communities.	  However	  the	  extent	  of	  
devolution	   was	   limited	   to	   the	   Rural	   District	   Councils	   rather	   than	   extended	   to	  
communities	   on	   the	   ground.	   The	   CAMPFIRE	   model	   between	   1989-­‐2001	   expanded	   to	  
cover	  37	  districts	  with	  43,000	  square	  km	  of	  communal	   land	  being	  set	  aside	  for	  wildlife	  
management,	  generating	   revenues	  of	  over	  20	  million	  USD	  shared	  evenly	  between	   the	  
Rural	  District	  Councils	  and	  the	  communities.	  One	  of	  the	  main	  criticisms	  of	  the	  CAMPFIRE	  
model	  was	  its	  limited	  devolution	  of	  stewardship	  rights	  to	  communities	  which	  hampered	  
local	   incentives	   for	   wildlife	   conservation.430 	   Namibia	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   through	  
legislative	   reforms	   in	   1996,	   empowered	   communities	   to	   form	   their	   own	   communal	  
conservancies	   on	   communal	   lands	   with	   full	   stewardship	   rights.431	   Between	   1996	   and	  
2007	   over	   50	   communal	   conservancies	   covering	   118,000	   square	   km	   were	   formed	   in	  
Namibia,	   with	   communities	   entering	   into	   joint	   ventures	   with	   tourism	   and	   hunting	  
companies	  and	  keeping	  all	  revenues	  generated.432	   	  
	  
	   The	   CAMPFIRE	   and	   conservancy	  models	   exemplify	   devolution	   of	   stewardship	   to	  
the	  community	   level	  and	  have	  generated	  evidence	  of	  conservation	  best	  practice.	  They	  
were	   in	   many	   respects	   the	   precursors	   of	   the	   discourse	   of	   biocultural	   rights	   with	  
community	  stewardship	  rather	  than	  state	  ownership,	  being	  the	  rallying	  cry.	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(b)	  Biocultural	  Rights	  and	  the	  Pluralisation	  of	  Property	  
	  
	   While	   biocultural	   rights	   are	   a	   range	   of	   rights	   claimed	   by	   communities	   to	   secure	  
their	  way	  of	  life	  as	  stewards	  of	  the	  land,	  they	  derive	  their	  primary	  justification	  as	  far	  as	  
the	  broader	   society	   is	   concerned	   from	   the	  need	   to	  protect	   the	  environment.	  Hence	  a	  
property	  claim	  by	  a	  community	  becomes	  an	  assertion	  of	  a	  biocultural	   right	  only	   if	   the	  
claim	  is	  justified	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  stewardship.	  One	  of	  the	  ramifications	  of	  an	  assertion	  
of	  biocultural	  rights	  is	  the	  necessary	  pluralisation	  of	  the	  grounds	  for	  a	  property	  claim	  to	  
include	  stewardship.	  Stewardship	  as	  a	  ground	  for	  a	  property	  claim	  inherently	  limits	  the	  
claimant	   to	   using	   the	   property	   only	   in	   ways	   that	   do	   not	   conflict	   with	   need	   for	  
conservation.	   	  
	  
	   The	  recognition	  of	  stewardship	  as	  a	  legitimate	  ground	  for	  claiming	  property	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  the	  CBD	  does	  not	  always	  translate	   into	  greater	  preservation	  of	  biodiversity.	  
This	   has	   to	   do	  with	   the	  delinking	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   property	   and	   the	   kind	  of	   rights	   it	  
entails	   from	   the	   grounds	   on	  which	   the	   property	   claim	   is	  made	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   For	  
example	  a	  community	  assertion	  of	  property	  rights	  over	  traditional	  knowledge	  is	  justified	  
under	  the	  CBD	  as	  a	  way	  to	  recognize	  and	   incentivise	  the	  conservation	  practices	  of	  the	  
community.	  The	  assumption	  of	   the	  CBD	   is	   that	   such	  recognition	  will	   lead	   to	   increased	  
conservation	  of	  biodiversity.	  However	  the	  common	  tendency	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  property	  
rights	   is	   to	   conflate	   their	   exercise	  with	   the	   right	   to	   private	   property,	   i.e.	   the	   right	   to	  
freely	  use	  or	  dispose	  of	   the	  property	  with	  minimal	   restrictions.	  Thus	   the	  exercise	  of	  a	  
biocultural	  right	  may	  not	  always	  result	  in	  outcomes	  that	  affirm	  the	  biocultural	  relations	  
of	  a	  community	  with	  Nature.	   	  
	  
	   It	  follows	  that	  a	  community’s	  cultural	  and	  spiritual	  bonds	  with	  its	  ecosystem	  must	  
be	  emphasized	  in	  every	  situation	  where	  a	  community	  asserts	  property	  rights	  that	  have	  












property	   right	   as	   a	   right	   to	   stewardship	   is	   the	   common	   reduction	   of	   the	   different	  
property	  relations	  to	  relations	  of	  private	  property.	  In	  many	  ways	  this	  is	  a	  problem	  that	  
arises	  when	  the	  exercise	  of	  a	  right	  is	  divorced	  from	  discussions	  regarding	  its	  content	  and	  
its	  origins.	  Rather	  the	  right	  tends	  to	  float	  freely	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  open	  to	  co-­‐option	  
by	   the	   dominant	   discourses,	   in	   this	   case,	   the	   discourse	   of	   private	   property.	   The	   San-­‐
Hoodia	   case	   is	  an	  example	  of	   this	   conceptual	   conflation.	  Here	   the	  exercise	  of	   the	  San	  
community’s	  right	  over	  their	  traditional	  knowledge	  was	  delinked	  from	  the	  cultural	  and	  
spiritual	  values	  of	  the	  community	  leading	  to	  conflicts	  within	  the	  community	  and	  friction	  
between	  the	  San	  and	  the	  Nama.433	   	  
	  
	   This	   problem	   has	   also	   been	   widely	   debated	   under	   the	   broad	   theme	   of	  
commodification	  of	  ethnicity	  and	  culture.434	   The	  problem	  with	  these	  debates,	  however,	  
is	  a	  tendency	  to	  throw	  the	  proverbial	  baby	  out	  with	  the	  bathwater.	  Most	  tend	  to	  work	  
on	   a	   reductionist	   binary	   of	   private	   property	   versus	   open	   access,	   where	   the	   only	  
alternative	  to	  the	  excesses	  of	  private	  property	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  imaginary	  commons	  in	  which	  
land,	   culture	   and	   knowledge	   are	   all	   freely	   available	   to	   anyone	  who	  would	   like	   to	   use	  
them.	  These	  commodification	  debates	  make	  the	  classic	  error	  of	  conflating	  property	  with	  
private	  property	  and	  defining	  property	  as	  a	  thing	  rather	  than	  as	  an	  enforceable	  claim.	  A	  
more	   considered	   response	   to	   the	   excesses	   of	   private	   property	   is	   to	   rescue	   property	  
from	   its	   popular	   misconception	   and,	   in	   Polanyi’s	   terms,	   to	   re-­‐embed	   markets	   within	  
society,	  where	  markets	  are	  an	  aspect	  of	  society	  rather	  than	  the	  other	  way	  round.	   	  
	  
	   The	  call	  for	  biocultural	  rights	  is	  an	  effort	  to	  re-­‐embed	  markets	  within	  society	  with	  
an	  emphasis	  on	   the	   relevant	  community’s	   stewardship	  of	  Nature.	  Society,	  however,	   is	  
not	  homogenous	  and	  static	  but	  heterogeneous	  and	  dynamic,	  with	  different	  competing	  
needs	   and	   interests.	   The	   values	   on	  which	   any	   society	   is	   based	   is	   a	   contested	   terrain.	  
Without	   presuming	   any	   transcendental	   ethics	   outside	   of	   history	   and	   context,	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
433	   Supra	  n.	  175.	  












growing	   influence	  of	   the	  discourse	  of	   environmentalism	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   the	  ecological	  
crisis	  has	  given	  impetus	  to	  the	  recent	  legal	  manifestation	  of	  an	  ethic	  that	  was	  hitherto	  
marginalized	  by	   capitalism.	   This	   is	   the	   ethic	   of	   stewardship,	   a	   principle	   that	   is	   vibrant	  
amongst	   communities	  with	   strong	  cultural	   and	   spiritual	  bonds	  with	  Nature.	  These	  are	  
communities	  that	  have	  sacralised	  Nature,	  where	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  community	  is	  tightly	  
interwoven	  with	  the	  land	  and	  the	  deities	  and	  spirits.	   	  
	  
	   The	   operative	   question	   at	   this	   stage,	   then,	   is	   one	   of	   strategy:	   How	   do	   we	   re-­‐
introduce	  and	   then	  privilege	   the	  ethic	  of	   stewardship	  within	   legal	  discourse?	  To	   state	  
the	  question	  differently:	  How	  do	  we	  ensure	  that	  the	  collective	  is	  not	  individualized;	  how	  
are	   we	   to	   ensure	   that	   property	   claims	   based	   on	   stewardship	   do	   not	   become	   empty	  
receptacles	  which	  are	  filled	  by	  the	  values	  of	  private	  property?	   	  
	  
(c)	  The	  New	  Juridical	  Subject:	  From	  the	  Homo	  Economicus	  to	  the	  Homo	  
Ecologicus	  
	   	  
	   Much	   of	   the	   discussion	   hitherto	   has	   critiqued	   the	   dominant	   legal	   approach	   to	  
understanding	   property	   without	   reference	   to	   other	   legal	   concepts.	   The	   scholars	   and	  
cases	   that	   have	   been	   analysed	   have	   sought	   to	   make	   the	   all-­‐important	   link	   between	  
property	  and	  personhood.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  personhood	  or	   in	  this	  case	  peoplehood	   is	  
an	   empty	   category	   which	   derives	   its	   meaning	   from	   what	   a	   society	   understands	   as	  
wellbeing.	   One	   cannot	   speak	   of	   what	   it	   means	   to	   be	   a	   person	   or	   a	   people	   without	  
necessarily	  describing	  certain	  ways	  of	  being.	   	  
	  
	   These	   descriptions	   are	   rarely	   value	   neutral.	   On	   the	   contrary	   they	   describe	   a	  
certain	   kind	   of	   a	   person	   or	   people.	   In	   capitalist	   economies	   for	   example,	   the	   homo	  
economicus,	  or	  in	  Adam	  Smith’s	  terms	  ‘our	  tendency	  to	  truck,	  barter	  and	  exchange	  one	  
thing	   for	   another’,	   is	   presented	   as	   the	  essence	  of	   personhood.	   This	   in	   turn	   forms	   the	  












economies,	   where	   profit	   and	   exchange	   is	   valued,	   personhood	   is	   conflated	   with	   the	  
homo	  economicus,	  and	  property	  is	  conflated	  with	  private	  property.	  
	  
	   It	   is	   therefore	   clear	   that	   conceptions	   of	   property	   are	   based	   on	   conceptions	   of	  
personhood,	   and	   conceptions	   of	   personhood	   are	   based	   on	   conceptions	   of	   wellbeing.	  
While	  it	  is	  our	  conception	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  a	  person	  that	  informs	  our	  conception	  
of	   property,	   the	   law	   tends	   to	   reify	   property,	   thereby	   doing	   the	   reverse,	   which	   is	   to	  
define	   personhood	   or	   the	   juridical	   subject	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   dominant	  
understanding	   of	   property.	   Thus,	   in	   capitalist	   economies,	   the	   dominance	   of	   private	  
property	  results	  in	  a	  juridical	  subject	  with	  the	  right	  to	  private	  property	  and	  the	  right	  to	  
exclude	   being	   the	   primary	   right.	   This	   leads	   to	   situations	   where	   both	   property	   and	  
personhood	  are	  mutually	  reinforcing,	  and	  socially	  agreed	  conceptions	  of	  wellbeing	  are	  
significantly	  influenced	  by	  dominant	  conceptions	  of	  property.	  
	  
	   The	  homo	  economicus	  and	  its	  conception	  of	  Nature	  as	  pure	  exchange	  value	  have	  
been	  blamed	  for	  the	  widespread	  loss	  of	  biodiversity	  and	  its	  adverse	  consequences.	  The	  
tide	  is	  now	  turning;	  we	  have	  begun	  to	  mend	  the	  link	  between	  human	  wellbeing	  and	  the	  
wellbeing	   of	   Nature.	   Communities	   where	   the	   ethic	   of	   stewardship	   is	   still	   strong	   are	  
increasingly	   seen	   as	   repositories	   of	   a	   kind	   of	   wellbeing	   that	   mainstream	   society	   has	  
sacrificed	   in	   favour	  of	   capitalism.	  The	   legal	   response	   to	   this	   shift	   in	   thinking	  has	  been	  
greater	   recognition	   of	   the	   rights	   of	   communities	   to	   their	   traditional	   ways	   of	   life	   and	  
different	  understandings	  of	  human	  and	  planetary	  wellbeing.	  While	  such	  rights	  are	  what	  
are	   referred	   to	   here	   as	   biocultural	   rights,	   the	   single	  most	   important	   obstacle	   to	   their	  
development	   is	  not	  recognition	  per	  se	  but	  rather	  the	  manner	   in	  which	   lawmakers	  and	  
judges	  seek	  to	  recognise	  them.	  
	  
	   Rights	   are	   merely	   enforceable	   claims,	   and	   wellbeing	   is	   what	   is	   sought	   through	  
them.	   Hence,	   what	   lawmakers	   and	   judges	   understand	   to	   be	   wellbeing,	   significantly	  












Biocultural	   rights	   are	   a	   subset	   within	   the	   category	   of	   group	   rights,	   not	   because	   they	  
create	  new	  rights	  but	  because	  they	  introduce	  new	  content	  into	  existing	  group	  rights	  and	  
new	  grounds	   for	  claiming	  such	  rights.	   In	   fact	   the	  term	  ‘biocultural	   right’	   is	  deployed	   in	  
order	  to	  name	  a	  paradigm	  shift	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  wellbeing	  rather	  than	  creating	  a	  
new	  set	  of	  rights.	  The	  essence	  of	  this	  type	  of	  right	  lies	  in	  the	  recognition	  of	  new	  types	  of	  
claim	  based	  on	  stewardship	  as	   informing	   the	  content	  of	  pre-­‐existing	   rights.	  The	  group	  
right	  to	  property	  for	  example,	  becomes	  a	  biocultural	  right	  when	  this	  right	  recognizes	  the	  
claim	  of	  a	  community	  based	  on	  evidence	  of	  historical	  stewardship.	  
	  
	   If	  stewardship	  becomes	  the	  primary	  ethic	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  biocultural	  rights	  
are	   derived	   from	   group	   rights,	   then	   it	   is	   critical	   to	   explore	   how	   this	   ethic	   can	   be	  
foregrounded	  in	  discussions	  that	  relate	  community	  rights	  in	  the	  context	  of	  biodiversity.	  
Such	  an	  exercise	  is	  crucial	  if	  we	  are	  to	  prevent	  biocultural	  rights	  from	  being	  co-­‐opted	  by	  
the	   discourse	   of	   private	   property.	   In	   this	   respect	   Balbus’s	   arguments	   about	   the	   legal	  
form	   mirroring	   the	   commodity	   form	   are	   relevant.435	   He	   noted	   that,	   in	   capitalist	  
societies,	  the	  juridical	  subject	  as	  a	  self-­‐enclosed	  bearer	  of	  rights	  imitates	  the	  commodity	  
form,	  which	   is	   pure	   exchange	   value,	   delinked	   from	   use	   value.	   Just	   as	   the	   commodity	  
form	  is	  a	  market	  abstraction	  estranged	  from	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  process	  of	  production,	  the	  
juridical	  subject	  as	  the	  homo	  economicus	  is	  estranged	  from	  the	  complexity	  of	  life,	  a	  life	  
that	  is	  not	  motivated	  purely	  by	  economic	  imperatives	  but,	  rather	  is,	  informed	  by	  cultural	  
and	  spiritual	  relationships.	   	  
	  
	   Biocultural	   rights	   and	   their	   emphasis	   on	   stewardship	   reconfigure	   the	   juridical	  
subject	  from	  the	  homo	  economicus	  to	  the	  homo	  ecologicus.	  The	  juridical	  subject	  evolves	  
from	  an	  atomistic	  entity	  that	  interprets	  property	  rights	  as	  facilitating	  only	  free	  trade	  to	  a	  
relational	   entity	   that	   views	   property	   rights	   as	   securing	   stewardship.	   The	   homo	  
ecologicus	  then	  is	  the	  paradigm	  that	  emerges	  out	  of	  the	  environmental	  crisis	  seeking	  to	  
stem	  the	  excesses	  of	  the	  homo	  economicus.	  The	  homo	  ecologicus	  underscores	  the	  fact	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












that	  traditional	  ways	  of	  life	  result	  in	  the	  stewarding	  of	  biodiversity	  and	  these	  ways	  of	  life	  
are	   rooted	   in	   strong	   cultural	   and	   spiritual	   relationships	   with	   Nature.	   The	   future	   of	  
biodiversity	  conservation	  then	  rests	  in	  protecting	  these	  traditions	  through	  securing	  the	  
concomitant	  biocultural	  rights.	   	   	  
	  
(d)	  Affirming	  Stewardship:	  Towards	  Biocultural	  Community	  Protocols	  
	  
Landscapes	  are	  culture	  before	  they	  are	  nature;	  constructs	  of	  imagination	  projected	  onto	  
wood,	  water	  and	  rock.436	  
	  
	   As	  noted	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter,	  resources	  (or	  property)	  are	  a	  matter	  of	  
relationships,	   not	   things,	   and	   can	   only	   be	   understood	   in	   the	   context	   of	   society	   as	   a	  
whole,	  which	  includes	  the	  dominant	  cultural	  and	  spiritual	  values.	  Our	  understanding	  of	  
property	  or	  Nature	   for	   that	  matter	   is	  mediated	  by	  our	  values;	  what	   is	   seen	  cannot	  be	  
divorced	  from	  the	  spectator.	  How	  we	  understand	  Nature	  is	  discourse	  dependent;	  it	  does	  
not	   exist	   waiting	   to	   be	   discovered	   by	   us,	   but	   rather	   our	   perception	   of	   the	   world	   is	  
determined	   by	   how	   we	   describe	   it.	   The	   dichotomy	   between	   Nature	   and	   culture	   is	  
illusory	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  our	  culture	  informs	  how	  we	  perceive	  Nature.437	  
	  
	   Biocultural	   rights	   seek	   in	   essence	   to	   ensure	   the	   conservation	   of	   biodiversity	  
through	  the	  legal	  protection	  of	  a	  stewarding	  way	  of	   life,	  which	  includes	  the	  protection	  
of	   relevant	   cultural	   and	   spiritual	   values.	   These	   rights	   show	   that	   Nature	   conservation	  
cannot	  be	  a	  simple	  techno-­‐bureaucratic	  exercise.	  Instead	  it	   is	  the	  protection	  of	  certain	  
ways	  of	  understanding	  Nature	  as	  kindred	  (or	  sacred).	  But	  herein	   lies	   the	  challenge	   for	  
biocultural	  rights,	  since	  they	  seek	  the	  protection	  of	  certain	  ways	  of	  being	  and	  knowing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
436	   Schama,	  S.	  Landscape	  and	  Memory,	  London:	  Harper	  Collins,	  1995,	  cited	  in	  Verschuuren,	  Bas,	  “An	  
Overview	  of	  Cultural	  and	  Spiritual	  Values	  in	  Ecosystem	  Management	  and	  Conservation	  Strategies”,	  
Endogenous	  Development	  and	  Bio-­‐Cultural	  Diversity:	  The	  Interplay	  of	  Worldviews,	  Globalisation	  and	  
Locality,	  Haverkort,	  B.	  and	  Rist,	  S.,	  Eds.,	  Series	  on	  Worldviews	  and	  Sciences,	  No.	  6,	  Leusden:	  
Compas/CDE,	  2007.	  
437	   A	  similar	  point	  is	  made	  on	  the	  distinction	  between	  ‘facts’	  and	  ‘values’	  by	  Putnam,	  Hilary,	  Reason,	  












that	   result	   in	   the	   stewardship	   of	  Nature.	  While	   stewardship	   is	   integral	   to	   the	   cultural	  
systems	  of	  certain	  communities,	  it	  is	  critical	  for	  lawmakers	  to	  appreciate	  these	  systems	  
when	  they	  develop	  and	  implement	  laws	  and	  policies	  relating	  to	  conservation.	  As	  ‘sacred	  
natural	  sites’	  advocate	  Bas	  Verschuuren	  notes:	  
	  
The	  way	   people	   perceive	   nature	   depends	   on	   culturally	   defined	   value	   and	   belief	  
systems	   that	   form	   an	   important,	   often	   intergenerational,	   source	   of	   information.	  
Some	  of	  this	  valuable	  information,	  relating	  in	  particular	  to	  its	  spiritual	  dimensions,	  
may	  not	  yet	  be	  considered	  in	  current	  ecosystem	  management.	  Part	  of	  the	  reason	  
for	  this	  may	  be	  that	  such	  knowledge	  is	  inaccessible	  and	  difficult	  to	  be	  understood	  
by	  outsiders	  such	  as	  western-­‐trained	  conservationists	  and	  conventional	  ecosystem	  
managers.	  Hence,	  accounting	  for	  the	  various	  worldviews	  and	  their	  corresponding	  
cultural	   and	   spiritual	   values	   in	   the	   practice	   of	   ecosystem	  management	   forms	   a	  
challenge	  for	  policy	  makers	  and	  local	  people	  alike.438	   	  
	  
	   Since	   the	  early	  1990s	  significant	  efforts	  have	  been	  made	   internationally	   to	  place	  
the	   role	   of	   cultural	   and	   spiritual	   values	   in	   conservation	   in	   the	   foreground	   of	   our	  
thinking.439	   Nevertheless	   these	   efforts	   do	   not	   adequately	   consider	   how	   to	   ensure	   an	  
effective	   interface	   between	   the	   stewardship	   values	   of	   communities	   that	   lead	   to	  
conservation	   and	   the	   development	   and	   implementation	   of	   law	   and	   policy	   both	  
international	  and	  domestic	  relating	  to	  biodiversity	  protection.	  The	  obligation	  on	  states	  
to	  ensure	  biodiversity	  conservation	  through	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  biocultural	  rights	  of	  
indigenous	  people	  and	  local	  communities	  (through	  Articles	  8(j)	  and	  10(c)	  of	  the	  CBD	  and	  
Article	  16	  of	  the	  African	  Model	  Law440)	  only	  takes	  us	  so	  far.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  content	  
of	  these	  rights	  in	  domestic	  law	  is	  still	  provided	  by	  states	  and	  local	  administrators.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
438	   Verschuuren,	  Bas,	  “An	  Overview	  of	  Cultural	  and	  Spiritual	  Values	  in	  Ecosystem	  Management	  and	  
Conservation	  Strategies”,	  in	  Endogenous	  Development	  and	  Bio-­‐Cultural	  Diversity,	  p.	  299	  in	  supra	  
n.345.	  
439	   Examples	  of	  this	  include	  the	  IUCN	  World	  Commission	  for	  Protected	  Areas	  specialist	  task	  force	  on	  
Cultural	  and	  Spiritual	  Values	  of	  Protected	  Areas	  and	  the	  Akwé:Kon	  Voluntary	  Guidelines	  for	  the	  
conduct	  of	  cultural,	  environmental	  and	  social	  impact	  assessments	  on	  developments	  likely	  to	  impact	  
sacred	  sites	  adopted	  by	  the	  193	  Parties	  to	  the	  CBD	  at	  their	  fifth	  Conference	  of	  Parties	  in	  May	  2000.	  














	   In	   the	   negotiations	   leading	   up	   to	   the	   Nagoya	   Protocol	   on	   ABS,	   one	   of	   the	   key	  
debates	   relating	   to	   the	   rights	   of	   communities	   over	   their	   traditional	   knowledge	  
concerned	   the	   way	   in	   which	   these	   rights	   should	   be	   recognized.	   Many	   states	   viewed	  
them	   as	   something	   they	   would	   need	   to	   implement	   in	   domestic	   law,	   i.e.	   ensure	   that	  
communities,	   as	  with	   any	   other	   property	   owner,	   give	   prior	   informed	   consent	   for	   the	  
commercial	   or	   research	   uses	   of	   their	   traditional	   knowledge.	   Indigenous	   peoples’	  
representatives,	  however,	  argued	  that	  their	  right	  to	  the	  traditional	  knowledge	  had	  to	  be	  
understood	   in	   the	   larger	   context	   of	   conservation	   and	   sustainable	   use	   of	   biodiversity.	  
Traditional	   knowledge	   according	   to	   this	   argument	   is	   dynamic	   and	   is	   embodied	   in	   an	  
active	  interface	  between	  the	  cultural	  and	  spiritual	  practices	  of	  a	  community,	  on	  the	  one	  
hand,	  and	  the	  ecosystem	  they	  inhabit,	  on	  the	  other.	  Hence,	  for	  a	  law	  seeking	  to	  protect	  
community	  rights	  to	  their	  traditional	  knowledge	  to	  be	  effective,	  it	  has	  to	  affirm	  an	  entire	  
way	  of	  life.	   	  
	  
	   An	  argument	  of	   this	  kind	  builds	  on	   first	  principles.	   It	   states	   that,	   if	   the	  object	  of	  
recognizing	   the	   rights	   of	   communities	   to	   their	   traditional	   knowledge	   is	   to	   ensure	  
conservation,	  then	  the	  flurry	  of	  act vity	  around	  models	  of	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  to	  
protect	  such	  knowledge,	  including	  its	  documentation,	  will	  not	  in	  themselves	  lead	  to	  the	  
object	  of	   the	  right.	   Instead,	   the	  CBD’s	  recognition	  of	   the	  right	  of	  communities	  to	  their	  
traditional	   knowledge	   intends	   to	  protect	  a	  way	  of	   life	   that	   leads	   to	   conservation.	  This	  
implies	  that	  the	  right	  to	  traditional	  knowledge	  is	  not	  akin	  to	  a	  private	  property	  right	  to	  
trade	  freely	  in	  traditional	  knowledge,	  but	  a	  right	  to	  a	  way	  of	  life	  replete	  with	  knowledge,	  
innovations	   and	   practices	   that	   lead	   to	   the	   conservation	   and	   sustainable	   use	   of	  
biodiversity.	   	  
	  
	   Such	  a	  holistic	  interpretation	  of	  Article	  8(j)441	   of	  the	  CBD	  led	  to	  further	  discussions	  
on	  how	  states	  can	  effectively	  recognize	  the	  right	  to	  a	  stewarding	  way	  of	  life	  rather	  than	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












a	  right	  that	  turned	  traditional	  knowledge	  into	  a	  tradable	  commodity.	  The	  African	  Group	  
of	  countries	  in	  their	  submissions	  to	  the	  Working	  Group	  on	  ABS	  regarding	  the	  recognition	  
of	   community	   rights	   to	   their	   traditional	   knowledge	   proposed	   ‘biocultural	   community	  
protocols’442	   as	  a	  useful	  method	  for	  protecting	  a	  way	  of	  life.	  This	  submission	  asked	  for	  
recognition	   of	   such	   protocols	   in	   domestic	   ABS	   law	   so	   as	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   rights	   of	  
communities	  to	  traditional	  knowledge	  did	  not	  simply	  replicate	  the	  content	  of	  a	  private	  
property	  right	  but	  rather	  promoted	  a	  way	  of	  life	  that	  would	  encourage	  conservation.	   	  
	  
	   Biocultural	  community	  protocols	  -­‐	  or	  what	  later	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  community	  
protocols	  in	  the	  Nagoya	  Protocol	  on	  ABS	  -­‐	  are	  community-­‐led	  instrume ts	  that	  promote	  
participatory	  advocacy	  for	  the	  recognition	  of	  and	  support	  for	  ways	  of	  life	  that	  are	  based	  
on	   the	   sustainable	   use	   of	   biodiversity,	   according	   to	   customary,	   national	   and	  
international	   laws	   and	   policies.443	   In	   this	   sense,	   biocultural	   community	   protocols	   are	  
community-­‐specific	  declarations	  of	  the	  right	  to	  diversity	  and	  claims	  to	  social	  pluralism.	  
Their	   value	   and	   integrity	   lie	   in	   the	   process	   that	   communities	   undertake	   to	   develop	  
them,	   in	  what	  the	  protocols	  represent	  to	  the	  community,	  and	   in	  their	   future	  uses	  and	  
effects.444	   	  
	  
	   It	  is	  worth	  quoting	  at	  length	  from	  the	  submission	  of	  the	  African	  Group	  to	  highlight	  
the	  debates	  around	  the	  real	  meaning	  of	  Article	  8(j)	  of	  the	  CBD,	  and	  hence	  the	  right	  of	  
communities	   to	   their	   traditional	   knowledge.	  When	   referring	   to	   the	  need	   to	   safeguard	  
the	   cultural	   and	   spiritual	   values	   of	   stewardship	   (or	   ‘ecological	   values’),	   the	   African	  
Group	  submitted	  that:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
442	   UNEP/CBD/WG-­‐ABS/7/INF/1.	   	  
443	   Jonas,	  H.,	  Bavikatte,	  K.	  and	  Shrumm,	  H.,	  “Biocultural	  Community	  Protocols	  and	  Conservation	  
Pluralism”,	  Policy	  Matters,	  17,	  IUCN-­‐CEESP,	  Malaysia,	  pp.	  102-­‐112;	  A	  significant	  amount	  of	  work	  on	  the	  
development	  and	  elaboration	  of	  BCPs	  was	  done	  by	  Natural	  Justice	  (Lawyers	  for	  Communities	  and	  the	  
Environment),	  an	  international	  NPO	  working	  on	  community	  rights	  and	  biodiversity	  and	  headquartered	  
in	  South	  Africa.	  The	  submissions	  of	  the	  African	  Group	  regarding	  the	  protection	  of	  traditional	  
knowledge	  benefitted	  from	  the	  inputs	  from	  members	  of	  the	  Natural	  Justice	  team.	  
444	   Jonas,	  H.,	  Bavikatte,	  K.,	  and	  Shrumm	  H.,	  “Community	  Protocols	  and	  Access	  and	  Benefit	  Sharing,”	  Asian	  













Article	  8	  j	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  conservation	  and	  sustainable	  use	  of	  biological	  diversity	  
in	  the	  context	  of	  ILCs	  (indigenous	  and	  local	  communities)	  is	  dependent	  on	  aspects	  
of	   their	   TK	   (traditional	   knowledge	   associated	   with	   genetic	   resources)	   which	   is	  
rooted	  in	  their	  'ecological	  values'.	  This	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  Art	  8	  j	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  
the	  protection	  and	  promotion	  of	  all	  the	  TK	  of	  all	  ILCs	  but	  specifically	  the	  TK	  of	  ILCs	  
embodying	  traditional	   lifestyles	  relevant	  to	  the	  conservation	  and	  sustainable	  use	  
of	  biodiversity.	   Such	  ecologically	   integral	   TK	   is	  based	  on	  a	   value	   framework	   that	  
regulates	   the	   relationship	  between	   the	   cultures	  of	   ILCs	   and	   their	   lands.	   Thus	   TK	  
relevant	   for	   the	   conservation	   and	   sustainable	   use	   of	   biodiversity	   rests	   on	  
'ecological	   values'	   which	   in	   turn	   rests	   on	   secure	   rights	   to	   land	   and	   culture.	   The	  
truth	   of	   the	  matter	   is	   that	   ILCs	   have	   conserved	   and	   sustainably	   used	   biological	  
diversity	  for	  thousands	  of	  years	  not	  because	  they	  have	  been	  able	  to	  trade	  in	  their	  
TK	  but	  because	  they	  have	  been	  able	  to	  live	  on	  their	  traditional	  lands	  in	  accordance	  
with	  their	  'ecological	  values'.	  ABS	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ILCs	  focuses	  inordinately	  on	  an	  
agenda	   of	   TK	   protection	   that	   perceives	   TK	   outside	   of	   the	   relationships	   which	  
generate	  it,	  divorcing	  it	  from	  the	  ecological	  values	  that	  lead	  to	  its	  formation.	  The	  
relations	   that	   the	   ILCs	  have	  with	  nature	   is	  one	  of	   a	  perpetual	  dialogue	  between	  
land	  and	  culture	  each	  constituting	  and	  reconstituting	  the	  other.	  Ecological	  values	  
are	   therefore	   rooted	   in	   an	   experience	   of	   relatedness	   between	   community	   and	  
nature.	  Current	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  (IPR)	  systems	  perceive	  TK	  in	  a	  manner	  
that	   is	  quite	  similar	   to	  conventional	  property	   systems	  where	   land	   for	  example	   is	  
viewed	   as	   a	   commodity	   separate	   from	   the	   network	   of	   relations	  within	  which	   it	  
operates.	  TK	   is	   also	  viewed	  as	  an	  object	   separate	   from	  the	  cultural	  and	   spiritual	  
relationships	   with	   the	   land	   within	   which	   it	   is	   embedded.	   TK	   in	   reality	   is	   the	  
manifestation	   of	   a	   particular	   kind	   of	   relationship	   with	   nature.	   TK	   is	   not	   just	  
information	  but	  a	  set	  of	  relations	  that	  is	  embodied	  in	  traditional	  lifestyles	  of	  ILCs	  
which	  ensure	   conservation	  and	   sustainable	  use	  of	  biodiversity….To	   treat	  TK	  as	  a	  
commodity	   and	   to	   assume	   that	   protecting	   this	   commodity	   will	   ensure	  
conservation	  and	  sustainable	  use	  of	  biological	  diversity	  is	  akin	  to	  thinking	  that	  the	  
sale	   of	   ivory	   will	   necessarily	   lead	   to	   the	   conservation	   of	   elephants	   and	   their	  
habitats.445	   	  
	   	  
	   The	   African	   countries	   elaborate	   their	   argument	   in	   the	   context	   of	   ABS	   by	   noting	  
that,	  for	  the	  conservation	  and	  sustainable	  use	  objectives	  of	  the	  CBD	  to	  be	  realized,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












process	   and	   outcome	   of	   ABS	   negotiations	   must	   uphold	   the	   spirit	   of	   Article	   8(j).	   The	  
emphasis	  therefore	  should	  not	  be	  solely	  on:	  
	  
(T)he	  sale	  of	  TK	  (traditional	  knowledge)	  but	  focus	  equally	  on	  the	  conservation	  and	  
sustainable	  use	  of	  biological	  diversity	  and	  protection	  and	  promotion	  of	  traditional	  
lifestyles	   including	   rights	   to	   land	   and	   culture.	   This	   implies	   ensuring	   that	   the	  
ecological	   values	   of	   the	   ILCs	   in	   question	   are	   central	   to	   all	   stages	   of	   the	   ABS	  
negotiation	  i.e.	  at	  the	  stage	  of	  'PIC',	  'MAT'	  and	  'benefit	  sharing'.’446	   	  
	  
	   It	   should	   also	   be	   emphasized	   that:	   ‘the	   process	   and	   the	   outcome	   of	   an	   ABS	  
agreement	   between	   ILCs	   and	   the	   relevant	   stakeholders	   must	   affirm	   aspects	   of	   their	  
traditional	  lifestyles	  that	  conserve	  and	  sustainably	  use	  biological	  diversity.’447	  
	   	  
	   The	  African	  Group	  went	  on	  to	  explain	  community	  protocols	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ABS	  
by	  stating	  that:	   	  
	  
A	  community	  protocol	  is	  an	  outlining	  of	  ecological	  values	  on	  which	  prior	  informed	  
consent	  (PIC),	  mutually	  agreed	  terms	  (MAT)	  and	  benefit	  sharing	  would	  be	  based.	  A	  
useful	   analogy	   for	   a	   community	   protocol	   would	   be	   the	   'bill	   of	   rights'	   in	   the	  
Constitution	   of	   a	   country	   that	   lists	   the	   core	   values	   of	   a	   people.	   It	   enunciates	   a	  
community’s	   core	   values	   and	  while	   it	   remains	   a	   flexible	   instrument,	   it	   provides	  
community	  members	  and	  outside	  interests	  a	  level	  of	  certainty	  about	  the	  principles	  
upon	   which	   any	   ABS	   agreement	   will	   be	   negotiated.	   Community	   protocols	   are	  
perhaps	  the	  best	  chance	  for	   ILCs	  to	  ensure	  that	  their	  ways	  of	   life	  and	  values	  are	  
respected	   and	   promoted.	   Merely	   relying	   on	   the	   benefits	   of	   ABS	   agreements	  
without	  affirming	  their	   'ecological	  values'	  would	  reduce	   ILCs	  to	  sellers	  of	  TK	  who	  
warm	  themselves	  on	  the	  embers	  of	  a	  lifestyle	  that	  is	  fast	  dying	  out.448	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
446	   Ibid,	  at	  71.	  
447	   Ibid,	  at	  71.	  
448	   Ibid,	  at	  72;	  One	  could	  proffer	  another	  possible	  explanation	  as	  to	  why	  the	  African	  Group	  of	  countries’	  
proposal	  of	  community	  protocols	  was	  widely	  accepted	  by	  the	  other	  states.	  Research	  on	  management	  
of	  common	  pool	  resources	  had	  clearly	  shown	  that	  conservation	  and	  sustainable	  use	  of	  ecosystems	  
depended	  on	  devolution	  of	  rights	  and	  sharing	  of	  benefits	  with	  communities	  that	  had	  historically	  
managed	  these	  ecosystems.	  However,	  because	  these	  ecosystems	  were	  managed	  as	  commons	  with	  
multiple	  claimants,	  the	  state	  or	  third	  parties	  were	  unable	  to	  identify	  these	  rights	  holders	  and	  
beneficiaries.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  clear	  community	  led	  process	  that	  were	  able	  to	  identify	  the	  rights	  












	   	  
	   After	  intense	  negotiations,	  in	  October	  2010	  in	  Nagoya,	  Japan,	  the	  193	  states	  that	  
are	   parties	   to	   the	   CBD	   adopted	   the	   Nagoya	   Protocol	   on	   ABS.	   This	   Protocol	   was	   a	  
significant	   milestone	   for	   communities	   because	   it	   was	   the	   first	   time	   in	   international	  
treaty	   law	   that	   states	   were	   obliged	   to	   give	   legal	   recognition	   to	   customary	   laws	   and	  
community	   protocols	   of	   communities	   when	   it	   came	   to	   securing	   the	   rights	   of	   those	  
communities	  to	  their	  traditional	  knowledge.449	   The	  implications	  of	  such	  recognition	  for	  
biocultural	   rights	   as	   a	   whole	   are	   enormous	   since	   it	   lays	   strong	   foundations	   for	   the	  
protection	  of	  a	  way	  of	   life	   (including	  cultural	  and	  spiritual	  values,	   customary	   laws	  and	  
traditional	  decision	  making	  structures)	  that	  leads	  to	  stewardship	  of	  Nature.	  
	  
	   Biocultural	  community	  protocols	  are	  making	  their	  impact	  felt	  in	  the	  development	  
of	   laws	  and	  policies	   that	  go	  beyond	  ABS,	   for	  example	  REDD+,450	   protected	  areas	  etc.,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
rights	  holders	  and	  beneficiaries	  were	  or	  in	  some	  cases	  not	  recognize	  them	  at	  all.	  This	  led	  to	  business	  as	  
usual	  i.e.	  community	  commons	  were	  turned	  into	  open	  access	  due	  to	  centralization	  of	  control	  or	  
private	  appropriation	  resulting	  in	  a	  tragedy	  of	  commons	  situation.	  Community	  protocols	  cracked	  this	  
problem	  by	  developing	  a	  clear	  process	  of	  how	  multiple	  local	  claimants	  over	  common	  pool	  resources	  
can	  come	  together	  to	  reflect,	  consolidate	  and	  articulate	  rules	  of	  how	  they	  govern	  and	  manage	  these	  
resources	  (based	  on	  their	  values	  etc.).	  This	  meant	  that	  communities	  were	  able	  to	  take	  the	  initiative	  in	  
asserting	  rights	  through	  a	  process	  of	  establishing	  'internal	  coherence	  and	  external	  interface'.	  This	  also	  
facilitated	  communities	  in	  consolidating	  their	  various	  rights	  fragmented	  through	  different	  laws	  in	  a	  
single	  process/document.	  Effectively	  community	  protocols	  eliminated	  all	  possible	  excuses	  of	  why	  
rights	  and	  benefits	  cannot	  be	  devolved	  thus	  leading	  to	  a	  proper	  alignment	  of	  conservation	  theory	  and	  
practice.	  
449	   Article	  12	  Traditional	  Knowledge	  Associated	  with	  Genetic	  Resources	  
1.	  In	  implementing	  their	  obligations	  under	  this	  Protocol,	  Parties	  shall	  in	  accordance	  with	  domestic	  law	  
take	  into	  consideration	  indigenous	  and	  local	  communities’	  customary	  laws,	  community	  protocols	  and	  
procedures,	  as	  applicable,	  with	  respect	  to	  traditional	  knowledge	  associated	  with	  genetic	  resources.	   	  
2.	  Parties,	  with	  the	  effective	  participation	  of	  the	  indigenous	  and	  local	  communities	  concerned,	  shall	  
establish	  mechanisms	  to	  inform	  potential	  users	  of	  traditional	  knowledge	  associated	  with	  genetic	  
resources	  about	  their	  obligations,	  including	  measures	  as	  made	  available	  through	  the	  Access	  and	  
Benefit-­‐sharing	  Clearing-­‐House	  for	  access	  to	  and	  fair	  and	  equitable	  sharing	  of	  benefits	  arising	  from	  the	  
utilization	  of	  such	  knowledge.	   	  
3.	  Parties	  shall	  endeavour	  to	  support,	  as	  appropriate,	  the	  development	  by	  indigenous	  and	  local	  
communities,	  including	  women	  within	  these	  communities,	  of:	   	  
(a)	  Community	  protocols	  in	  relation	  to	  access	  to	  traditional	  knowledge	  associated	  with	  genetic	  resources	  
and	  the	  fair	  and	  equitable	  sharing	  of	  benefits	  arising	  out	  of	  the	  utilization	  of	  such	  knowledge;	   	  
450	   Reducing	  Emissions	  from	  Deforestation	  and	  Forest	  Degradation	  (REDD)	  is	  an	  effort	  to	  create	  a	  
financial	  value	  for	  the	  carbon	  stored	  in	  forests,	  offering	  incentives	  for	  developing	  countries	  to	  reduce	  












where	   the	   legislative	   purpose	   of	   conservation	   of	   biodiversity	   intersects	   with	   the	  
stewarding	  ways	  of	   life	  of	   communities.451	   It	   is	   submitted	   that	   the	   reason	  behind	   the	  
success	  of	   these	  community	  protocols	   lies	   in	   their	  ability	   to	   challenge	   the	  widespread	  
reification	  of	  the	  rights	  discourse,	  whereby	  states	  increasingly	  engage	  in	  rights	  talk	  but	  
lack	   clarity	   or	   political	  will	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   defining	   the	   content	   of	   those	   rights	   and	  
how	  their	  enforcement	  will	  lead	  to	  the	  greater	  goal	  of	  human	  wellbeing.	   	  
	  
	   The	  dominant	  approach	  of	  the	  liberal	  rights	  discourse	  is	  piecemeal,	  meaning	  that	  
each	  right	  -­‐	  be	  it	  a	  right	  to	  property	  or	  culture	  or	  expression	  -­‐	  is	  seen	  as	  self-­‐contained	  
and	   completely	   divorced	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   culture,	   property	   or	   expression	   are	   all	  
strands	  tightly	  woven	  into	  the	  rope	  of	  life.	  No	  single	  right	  has	  meaning	  in	  itself.	  It	  gains	  
meaning	  only	  when	  interacting	  with	  other	  rights.	   	  
	  
	   Biocultural	  community	  protocols	  developed	  by	  communities	  begin	  with	  the	  end	  in	  
mind,	  which	  is	  conservation	  and	  sustainable	  use	  of	  biodiversity.	  They	  then	  describe	  the	  
way	   of	   life	   of	   the	   community,	   its	   customary	   laws,	   cultural	   and	   spiritual	   values,	  
governance	   and	   decision	   making	   structures	   etc.,	   all	   of	   which	   contribute	   to	   the	  
stewardship	   practices	   of	   the	   community.	   The	   community	   then	   identifies	   its	   current	  
challenges	   and	   lays	   claim	   to	   a	   range	   of	   rights	   in	   domestic	   and	   international	   law.	   In	  
essence,	  the	  broad	  rights	  claim	  allows	  the	  community	  to	  determine	  for	  itself	  its	  way	  of	  
life,	  which	  in	  turn	  ensures	  the	  continuation	  of	  their	  stewardship	  practices.	  The	  value	  of	  
community	  protocols	  lies	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  act	  as	  the	  glue	  that	  holds	  together	  the	  total	  
mosaic	  of	  a	  community	  life	  that	  is	  fragmented	  under	  different	  laws	  and	  policies,	  with	  the	  
understanding	  that	  the	  conservation	  of	  Nature	  is	  a	  result	  of	  a	  holistic	  way	  of	  life.	   	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
goes	  beyond	  deforestation	  and	  forest	  degradation,	  and	  includes	  the	  role	  of	  conservation,	  sustainable	  
management	  of	  forests	  and	  enhancement	  of	  forest	  carbon	  stocks.	  From:	  http://www.un-­‐
redd.org/AboutREDD/tabid/582/Default.aspx.	  Retrieved	  September	  13th	  2011.	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   Jonas	  and	  Shrumm,	  legal	  practitioners	  working	  on	  community	  rights	  in	  the	  context	  
of	  conservation	  confirm	  that	  even	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  a	  protocol	  is	  developed	  can	  be	  
used	  by	  the	  community	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  self-­‐reflexive	  process	  regarding	  their	  way	  of	  life,	  
values,	  customary	  laws	  and	  priorities	  and	  how	  they	  would	  want	  to	  engage	  with	  a	  variety	  
of	   supporting	   legal	   frameworks	   and	   rights.	   They	   refer	   to	   the	   entire	   process	   as	   a	  
biocultural	   approach	   to	   the	   law	   that	   empowers	   communities	   to	   challenge	   the	  
fragmentary	  nature	  of	   state	   law,	   and	   instead	   to	  engage	  with	   it	   from	  a	  more	  nuanced	  
and	  integrated	  perspective.452	  
	  
(e)	  Biocultural	  Rights:	  Where	  to	  From	  Here?	  
	  
	   A	  visual	  depiction	  of	  a	  discourse	  of	  biocultural	  rights	  would	  resemble	  a	  wheel	  with	  
the	  circumference	  being	  the	  objective	  of	  conservation	  and	  sustainable	  use,	  the	  central	  
hub	  being	  the	  ethic	  of	  stewardship	  and	  the	  spokes	  being	  the	  different	  biocultural	  rights	  
that	  communities	  require	  to	  protect	  their	  ways	  of	  life	  which	  in	  turn	  are	  represented	  by	  
the	   area	   of	   the	  wheel.	   This	   depiction	   seeks	   to	   emphasize	   the	   ethic	   of	   stewardship	   or	  
care	  that	  pulls	  together	  the	  seemingly	  disparate	  rights	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  objective	  
of	  conservation.	  The	  notion	  of	  stewardship	  is	  critical	  for	  a	  discourse	  of	  biocultural	  rights,	  
for	  it	  provides	  the	  ethical	  content	  for	  these	  rights	  and	  thereby	  creates	  a	  paradigm	  shift	  
whereby	   rights	   to	   land,	   culture,	   traditional	   knowledge,	   self-­‐governance	   etc.	   are	  
informed	  by	  a	  set	  of	  values	  that	  are	  not	  market	  based.	   	  
	  
	   Extensive	   research	   validates	   the	   strong	   links	   between	   cultural	   diversity	   and	  
biological	  diversity,	  together	  with	  the	  stewardship	  role	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  local	  
communities.	   In	   1999	   the	   United	   Nations	   Environment	   Program	   published	   a	   seminal	  
collection	  of	  articles	  on	   the	  cultural	  and	  spiritual	  values	  of	  biodiversity,453	   a	  collection	  
that	   was	   edited	   by	   the	   late	   anthropologist	   Darrell	   Addison	   Posey.	   Posey	   inspired	   an	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entire	  generation	  of	  anthropologists	  and	  community	  activists	  to	  begin	  mapping	  the	  role	  
of	  cultures	  of	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  local	  communities	  in	  ensuring	  biodiversity.	  He	  was	  
one	  of	   the	   first	   to	  highlight	   the	  need	   for	   a	  bundle	  of	   rights	   approach	   to	   conservation	  
that	   would	   reflect	   the	   integrated	   nature	   of	   community	   life.	   He	   called	   these	   rights	  
‘traditional	  resources	  rights’	  (TRR)	  and	  described	  them	  as:	  
	  
[T]he	  many	  “bundles	  of	   rights”	   that	  can	  be	  used	   for	  protection,	   compensation,	  
and	   conservation….TRR	   is	   an	   integrated	   rights	   concept	   that	   recognizes	   the	  
inextricable	   link	   between	   cultural	   and	   biological	   diversity	   and	   sees	   no	  
contradiction	   between	   the	   human	   rights	   of	   indigenous	   and	   local	   communities,	  
including	   the	   right	   to	   development	   and	   environmental	   conservation.	   Indeed,	  
they	   are	   mutually	   supportive	   since	   the	   destiny	   of	   traditional	   peoples	   largely	  
determines,	   and	   is	   determined	  by,	   the	   state	  of	   the	  world’s	  biological	   diversity.	  
TRR	  includes	  overlapping	  and	  mutually	  supporting	  bundles	  of	  rights.454	  
	  
	   The	   concept	   of	   biocultural	   rights	   further	   nuances	   Posey’s	   ideas	   on	   TRR	   by	  
introducing	   stewardship	   as	   the	   fundamental	   ethos	   that	   binds	   together	   the	   different	  
rights	   that	   communities	   need	   to	   protect	   their	   way	   of	   life.	   Biocultural	   rights	   are	   best	  
described	  as	  a	  web.	  While	  the	  liberal	  rights	  discourse	  focuses	  on	  the	  juridical	  subject	  as	  
an	  atomistic	  bearer	  of	  many	  separate	  rights,	  biocultural	  rights	  understand	  the	  juridical	  
subject	  as	  a	  node	  in	  a	  web	  of	  biocultural	  relationships.	   	  
	  
	   Biocultural	   rights	   focus	   less	   on	   freestanding	   rights	   and	   more	   on	   the	   linkages	  
between	   rights	   required	   by	   communities	   to	   care	   for	   their	   lands	   and	   resources.	   Like	  
language,	  where	  a	  word	  makes	  sense	  only	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  words	  (for	  example,	  light	  
makes	   sense	   only	   in	   relation	   to	   dark	   which	   is	   non-­‐light),	   within	   a	   biocultural	   rights	  
framework,	   rights	   are	  meaningless	   on	   their	   own.	   They	  make	   sense	  only	   in	   relation	   to	  
other	  rights	  and	  in	  the	  larger	  context	  of	  wellbeing	  of	  communities	  and	  Nature.	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   The	   term	  biocultural	   right	   is	  ultimately	  a	   label	   for	   the	   legal	   tide	  moving	   towards	  
securing	  the	  stewardship	  of	  Nature	  by	  indigenous	  peoples	  and	  local	  communities.	  This	  
momentum	  is	  fuelled	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  these	  communities	  that	  can	  help	  humanity	  re-­‐
member	   its	   kinship	   with	   Nature	   and	   repair	   the	   dis-­‐membering	   that	   has	   been	   caused	  
from	  viewing	  Nature	  only	  as	  exchange	  value.	   	  
	  
	   We	  would	  do	  well	  to	  end	  with	  the	  words	  of	  Joji	  Carino	  who	  in	  1997	  representing	  
the	  International	  Alliance	  of	  Indigenous-­‐Tribal	  Peoples	  of	  the	  Tropical	  Forests	  stated	  in	  
her	  address	  to	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  Special	  Session:	  
	  
Often,	  the	  campaigns	  of	   indigenous	  communities	  are	  misjudged	  as	  the	  ignorance	  
of	  ‘primitives’	  unschooled	  in	  modern	  economic	  realities.	  But	  make	  no	  mistake.	  We	  
are	  not	  peoples	  of	  the	  past-­‐	  we	  are	  your	  contemporaries	  and	  in	  some	  ways	  may	  be	  
your	  guides	  towards	  more	  sustainable	  futures	  in	  the	  twenty	  first	  century.455	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